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2ABSTRACT
The t h e s i s  i s  an at tempt  t o  deal with two t o p i c s .  The t e x t  
c o n s i s t s  of  a d e t a i l e d  reading  of  Gregory B a te son 's  ethnography 
of  th e  Iatmul o f  New Guinea, Naven (1936: 1958).  In t h i s  
c l a s s i c  work Bateson at tempted to  analyse  a nexus o f  r i t u a l  and 
ceremonial  a c t i v i t i e s  among t h e  Iatmul.  The t h e o r e t i c a l  and 
methodological  ques t ions  r a i s e d  by Bateson in h is  book are  of  
profound importance f o r  anthropology in g e n e ra l ,  and f o r  s t u d i e s  
of  " r i t u a l "  in p a r t i c u l a r .  The te n s io n s  explored in Naven, 
between exp lana t ion  and unders tanding ,  between ac t io n  and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and between i n t e l l e c t u a l  coherence and s o c ia l  
co n tex t ,  a re  c r u c i a l  concerns f o r  a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  working in the  
1980s. Ba teson 's  book was w r i t t e n  a t  a t ime when s t r u c t u r a l -  
f u n c t io n a l  ism was t h e  ascendant  paradigm in B r i t i s h  anthropology,  
and i t  d e a l t  with problems which t h a t  paradigm was unable to  
fo rm ula te  or  t o  d i s c u s s .  The t h e s i s  argues t h a t  many of  th e  
ques t ions  which an th ro p o lo g i s t s  have r a i s e d  about  r i t u a l  would be 
b e t t e r  phrased as ques t ions  about performance,  and i t  s e t s  out  
to  show t h a t  Naven can be read as a c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  an anthropology 
of performance r a t h e r  than as a c o n t r ib u t io n  t o  an anthropology 
of r i t u a l .  This c o n s t i t u t e s  th e  second t o p i c .  The t h e s i s  
cons ide rs  c r i t i c a l l y  th e  work of  o the r  s ch o la r s  in t h i s  f i e l d ,  
notably Edmund Leach, C l i f f o r d  Geertz,  Claude L ev i -S t r au s s ,
G i lb e r t  Lewis, Vic tor  Turner and Richard Schechner.  Turner and 
Schechner have r e c e n t ly  been r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  t h e  development of  
a "d ramaturg ica l"  model of  r i t u a l  and of broader  s o c i a l  c o n te x t s ,  
and th e  t h e s i s  concludes with a c r i t i q u e  of  some of  t h e  p r e ­
suppos i t ions  i m p l i c i t  in t h e i r  work. The notion  of  performance 
is  not  o f f e red  as an a l t e r n a t i v e  category  t o  t h a t  of  r i t u a l ,  f o r  
t h i s  would only rep la ce  one e s s e n t i a l i s m  by ano the r .  I t  is  
suggested t h a t  th e  development of  a th eo ry  of  performance would 
c o n s t i t u t e  a use fu l  s t r a t e g y  in contemporary concerns with th e  
decen te r ing  and decons t ruc t ion  of  t r a d i t i o n a l  an th ropo log ica l  
c a t e g o r i e s .
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4FOREWORD
No w r i t e r  w r i t e s  alone.  F r iends ,  loved ones and t e a c h e r s  a re  
not  a n c i l l a r y  workers but  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  any work a t  a l l .
My i n t e r e s t  in Gregory Bateson stems from my t ime as an 
undergraduate a t  th e  London School of  Economics. I have to  thank 
my t e a c h e r s  a t  t h e  Department of  Soc ia l  Anthropology th e r e ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  Dr Alfred  Gell who, with an a p p re c ia t io n  of  the  
Grand A l l i an ce  which th e  au thor  of  Naven and th e  sometime husband 
of  Margaret Mead would have a p p rec ia te d ,  included a l e c t u r e  on 
Bateson in a course on American an thropology.  Dr Michael 
Sal lnow's  p e rc e p t iv e  and imaginat ive teach ing  led me t o  an 
i n t e r e s t  in t h e o r i e s  of  r i t u a l  and performance.  I would a l so  l i k e  
t o  thank ano ther  of  my t e a c h e r s  a t  th e  LSE, Dr Joanna Overing,  
f o r  her  con t inu ing  i n t e r e s t  in my work as an undergradua te  and as 
a r e sea rch  s tu d e n t .  Her guidance and her f r i e n d s h i p  has been 
inva luab le .
My p re l im ina ry  re sea rch  a t  th e  School of  O r ie n ta l  and African 
S tudie s  was funded by a g ran t  from th e  Socia l  Science Research 
Council from 1982 t o  1984. I must a l so  thank th e  Royal Anthropo­
lo g i c a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  a generous award which has f inanced  the  
f i n a l  s tages  of  t h e  p re p a ra t io n  o f  my t h e s i s .
I r e c a l l  with warm a p p re c ia t i o n  my t e a c h e r s  a t  th e  Royal 
Academy of Dramatic Art  who in sp i r e d  me with a l i f e - l o n g  love 
f o r  th e  performing a r t s ,  and f o r  th e  t h e a t r e  in p a r t i c u l a r .
I would s p e c i a l l y  l i k e  t o  mention Keith Johns tone ,  who i s  not  only 
a t e a c h e r  of  ac t in g  b le ssed  with gen ius;  he was a l s o  re sp o n s ib le  
f o r  my f i r s t  tak ing  a s e r io u s  i n t e r e s t  in an thropology.
I would l i k e  t o  thank a l l  my f r i e n d s  f o r  t h e i r  encouragement,  
companionship and suppor t .  Thanks, p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  t o  Jude Alderson,  
Suki Huntington,  John and Vera Bolton,  Eve Grace and Penny Ward.
This t h e s i s  i s  f o r  Kathleen Bradley,  1906-1983. I owe her 
more, much more, than I can ever  say.
5CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
FIFTY YEARS AFTER i t s  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  Gregory Ba teson 's  Naven 
remains arguably one of  t h e  g r e a t  unapprec ia ted  c l a s s i c s  of  s o c i a l  
anthropology.  Indeed,  h i s  published work o th e r  than  t h e  ethnography 
of t h e  Iatmul probably has a wider r eade rsh ip  o u t s id e  anthropology 
than w i th in  i t .  This i s  because from th e  mid-1950s u n t i l  h i s  death 
in 1980 Bateson became well known f o r  h is  r e s ea rch  in o the r  a r e a s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  animal communication, fami ly groups of  sch izophren ics  
and eco logy .  His fo l lowing dur ing  the  1960s amongst th e  r a d i c a l  
mandarins of  a n t i - p s y c h i a t r y ,  ecology and t h e  o t h e r  movements which 
made up th e  ' c o u n t e r - c u l t u r e '  had l i t t l e  o r  nothing t o  do with h is  
r e p u ta t i o n  as an a n t h ro p o l o g i s t .  This i s  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h i s  
e a r l i e s t  work, an th ropo log ica l  f ie ld -w ork  c a r r i e d  out  in th e  e a r l y  
1930s amongst a s tone age people l i v in g  on t h e  Upper Sepik River in 
New Guinea, conta ined  th e  seeds of  many o f  h i s  l a t e r  achievements.
This t h e s i s  i s  in p a r t  an a t tempt to  demonst ra te  t h i s  c o n t in u i t y  
in B a teson 's  thought by means o f  a d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  of  Naven. In 
doing so ,  I hope a l so  t o  show him t o  have been a seminal f i g u r e  in 
t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  s o c i a l  anthropology ,  and one o f  c r u c i a l  re levance  f o r  
a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  working in t h e  l a t e  1980s. F u r th e r ,  t h e  t h e s i s  i s  
an a t tempt a t  an o r i g i n a l  c r i t i q u e  of  Ba teson 's  Naven which examines 
t h e  work as a c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  t h e  th eo ry  of  performance in an throp­
ology.  In using t h i s  term I am r e f e r r i n g  t o  a d i s p a r a t e  c o l l e c t i o n  
of  w r i t i n g s  which do not  c o n s t i t u t e  an accepted corpus of  l i t e r a t u r e  
but  which I w i l l  use as r e f e r e n c e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in t h i s  In t roduc t ion  
and in t h e  l a s t  s e c t io n  of  t h e  t e x t .  These a re  l a rg e ly  drawn from 
an th ropo log ica l  s tu d ie s  of  r i t u a l  in genera l  and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  
r e c e n t  work which has employed th e  " d r a m a tu r g i c a l " model not  only 
of  r i t u a l  bu t  of  s o c ie ty  (o r ,  a t  l e a s t ,  va r ious  s o c i e t i e s )  a t  l a rg e .
I r e f e r  here in p a r t i c u l a r  t o  t h e  w r i t i n g s  o f  V ic to r  Turner,  C l i f f o r d  
Geertz and Richard Schechner,  as well as t o  th e  symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n -  
i s t  approach of  Erving Goffman. The t h e s i s  a l so  draws on ph ilosoph­
i c a l  p e r s p e c t iv e s  from Derr ida ,  G irard ,  W i t tg e n s t e in ,  S a r t r e  and
6Taylor .  In using th e  term “ performance th e o ry "  as a gener ic  labe l  
f o r  th e s e  and o th e r  r e fe re n c e s  I may be s e t t i n g  a p receden t ,  but  
I hope t o  show t h a t  i t  i s  a usefu l  one f o r  s o c i a l  an thropology.  The 
t h e s i s  w i l l ,  I hope, i n d i c a t e  something of  t h e  p o s s i b l e  s u b je c t  
m a t te r ,  scope and im p l ica t ions  of  an approach t o  performance.
In t h e  main body of  th e  t h e s i s  I hope to  show t h a t  Naven 
(1936 1s t  e d i t i o n ;  1956 2nd e d i t i o n )  is  a c r u c i a l  e a r l y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
towards an anthropology of  performance.  My ba s ic  argument here is  
t h a t  Ba teson 's  t e x t  c o n t in u a l l y  at tempts  t o  t r ansce nd  a s t r u c t u r a l -  
f u n c t i o n a l i s t  model o f  r i t u a l  by opening up seve ra l  l i n e s  of  
t h e o r e t i c a l  debate which, I sugges t ,  can u s e f u l l y  be cons idered as 
po in t ing  towards th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  an anthropology of  performance.  
Even a p a r t  from t h i s ,  however, I w i l l  t r y  t o  show why t h i s  book proves 
Bateson t o  have been a major f i g u r e  in s o c i a l  anthropology d e s p i t e  
th e  s e l f - c o n f e s s e d  f a i l u r e s  noted by th e  au thor  a t  t h e  end of  h is  
t e x t  and t h a t  t h e s e  f a i l u r e s  c o n t r i b u t e  towards,  r a t h e r  than  d e t r a c t  
from, th e  success of  Naven as an expos i t ion  o f  an th ropo log ica l  
argument. F u r th e r ,  t h e se  f a i l u r e s  c o n t r i b u t e  in no small measure to  
th e  importance of  th e  book as an e x e rc i s e  in an anthropology of  
performance,  s ince  the  very t h e o r e t i c a l  c lo s u re s  which Bateson 
r e g r e t t e d  not  achiev ing by th e  end of  h is  t e x t  would a c t u a l l y  work 
a g a in s t  an anthropology of  performance in my sense  of  t h e  term.
Bateson h im se lf  does not  use th e  notion  o f  performance in h is  
t e x t ,  whereas th e  terms ' r i t u a l '  and 'ceremony'  occur  f r e q u e n t ly .
These terms a re  used as conventiona l  common-places, and imply what 
can be c a l l e d  an e s s e n t i a l i s t  meaning of  ' r i t u a l '  and of  'ceremony' ;  
t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  a l l  r i t u a l s  and a l l  ceremonies share  a common essence  
which al lows them t o  be placed with in  th e  same a n a l y t i c a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  
Bateson i s  thus  open t o  t h e  charge of  t h e  ' c r av in g  f o r  g e n e r a l i t y 1 
which W i t tgens te in  (1958) d e sc r ibe d .  My t h e s i s  q u es t io n s  t h i s  
e s s e n t i a l  ism, and a t tempts  t o  add th e  dimension of  performance t o  
Naven by means of  a d e t a i l e d  reading of  th e  book which pays p a r t i c u l a r  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  oppos i t ions  and t e n s io n s  which haunt  th e  o r i g i n a l  
t e x t .  These oppos i t ions  a re  le g ion ,  but  they inc lude  t h e  pu l l  between 
exp lana t ion  and unders tand ing ,  as well as t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in he ren t  
in g r a f t i n g  th eory  on t o  d e s c r ip t io n  and th e  choices  which have to  
be made between d i f f e r e n t  modes of  d e s c r ip t io n  in t h e  f i r s t  p lace
7(and,  in t u r n ,  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of  a t h e o r e t i c a l  schema - e i t h e r  
e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  - w i th in  which such cho ices  a re  made).
F in a l ly  t h e r e  i s  th e  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n ­
a l i s t  framework with in  which Bateson was working and in which he had 
been t r a i n e d ,  and h i s  own s t rong  sense of  th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of  t h a t  
framework. I sugges t  t h a t  Ba teson 's  u n c r i t i c a l  employment of  an 
e s s e n t i a l i s t  no tion  of  " r i t u a l "  provides an impor tan t  i n d i c a t i o n  of  
many of h i s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in th e  book, and I propose an a l t e r n a t i v e  
arena o f  a performance p e r s p e c t iv e  as a means o f  examining th e  t e x t  
of  Naven a f r e s h .  This does not  mean t h a t  I w i l l  a t tempt to  rep lace  
an e s s e n t i a l i s t  no tion of  r i t u a l  with an e s s e n t i a l i s t  notion of 
performance.  Rather ,  I w i l l  leave t h e  term "performance" undefined 
except  as an arena of  d e s c r i p t i v e  and t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  and 
allow th e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  emerge as my reading  of  Naven 
p ro g re s se s .
In focus ing  on th e  o p pos i t ions  and t e n s io n s  which form the  
foundations  of  Ba teson 's  t e x t ,  my reading w i l l  a t tempt a " d eco n s t ru c ­
t i o n "  of  Naven. (I am applying  th e  o f ten  im prec ise ly  used term 
" d e c o n s t r u c t io n "  here in th e  sense  a s s o c ia t e d  with t h e  work of  * 
Jacques Derr ida ;  see t h i s  Chapter ,  pp 19-22.) Later  in the
t h e s i s  r e f e r e n c e  w i l l  be made t o  W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  l a t e r  philosophy 
of  language,  and h i s  s t r e s s  on ‘' u s e " ,  as ano ther  s t r a t e g y  which has 
a l ready  proved usefu l  in th e  re-exam inat ion  of  c r u c i a l  c a t e g o r ie s  
such as " k i n s h i p "  and " b e l i e f "  and which might a l so  be of  a s s i s t a n c e  
in a re -exam inat ion  of  th e  ca tegory  " r i t u a l " .  Here, I would only 
t e n t a t i v e l y  sugges t  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  view any f i e l d  of  
performance as a s e r i e s  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  -  or  r e - p r e s e n t a t i o n s  - 
in which a c t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e  u s e , become c r u c i a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  
in t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  any one performance.  In t h e  remainder of
t h i s  I n t ro d u c t io n  I w i l l  co n s id e r  th e  im p l ic a t ions  of  t h e  var ious  
s t r a t e g i e s  which can be termed d e c o n s t ru c t iv e ,  in th e  l i g h t  of  the  
work o f  Derr ida ,  Foucault  and G ira rd ,  while o u t l i n i n g  some o f  th e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  f ac ing  a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  a t  th e  p r e s e n t  t ime in th e  
notion of  " r i t u a l ".
The no tion  of  performance has not  rece ived  much a t t e n t i o n  in 
an thropology .  This i s  in c o n t r a s t  t o  r i t u a l ,  which has c o n s t i t u t e d  
a c e n t r a l  a n a l y t i c a l  ca tegory  in s o c ia l  anthropology s ince  th e  
beginning.  In r e c e n t  years  seve ra l  scho la r s  have r a i s e d  im por tant ,  
and d i s t u r b i n g ,  ques t ions  as t o  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  o t h e r  an thropolog­
ic a l  c a t e g o r i e s ;  Leach (1961) and Needham (1971) on k insh ip  and 
marr iage ,  Needham (1972) on b e l i e f  and Sperber (1975) on symbolism 
are  prominent  examples of  such “ r e th i n k in g " .  Some of th e  ques t ions  
which I hope t h i s  t h e s i s  w i l l  r a i s e  have a l ready  been s t a t e d  by 
Sperber in th e  opening words o f  h i s  c r i t i q u e  o f  an th ropo log ica l  
t h e o r i e s  of  symbolism:
'What i s  a theo ry  of  symbolism? What co n d i t io n s  must i t  f u l f i l ?  
What genera l  p r o p e r t i e s  must i t  account f o r ? '  (1975: x)
S u b s t i t u t e  ' r i t u a l '  f o r  ' symbolism'  here  and th e  q u o ta t io n  becomes 
a s ta tem en t  of  many of th e  concerns of  t h i s  t h e s i s .  For reasons  t o  
be d iscussed  I do not  wish t o  sugges t  however t h a t  we should abandon 
t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  ca tegory  o f ' ' r i t u a l "  a l t o g e t h e r .
In a r e c e n t  a r t i c l e ,  t h e  p s y c h i a t r i s t  and medical  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  
Roland Li t t lewood draws a t t e n t i o n  t o  the  u se fu l  comparison which 
can be made between p s y c h i a t r y ' s  ca tegory  of  “ n e u r o s i s "  and th e  
a n th ropo log ica l  ca tegory  o f  “ r i t u a l " :
'One in a hundred ado lescen t  g i r l s  ta kes  an overdose every yea r  
and i t  i s  now t h e  most common reason f o r  t h e  admission of 
women t o  h o s p i t a l .  What a re  t h e  symbols such r i t u a l s  a r t i c u l a t e ?  
How a re  they  c o n s t ru c t e d ,  v a l id a te d  and employed? How do we 
go about a s s e s s in g  such in s t r u m e n ta l i t y ?  I f  p s y c h ia t ry  has in 
t h e  p a s t  pa tho log ized  wholesale such normative s o c ia l  r i t u a l s  
as ' p o sse s s ion  s t a t e s ' ,  anthropology has b u i l t  up a s o p h i s t i ­
ca ted  body o f  th eo ry  t o  approach ' r i t u a l '  ' (1986: 11)
Li t t lewood then  argues t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  such behaviour as 
t a k in g  overdoses as 'm a n ip u la t iv e '  and ' n e u r o t i c '  can be viewed in 
t h e  l i g h t  of  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  exp lana t ions  of  ' p o s se s s io n  s t a t e s '  in 
non-Western s o c i e t i e s .
'Whereas personal  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  r e a c t i o n  and any 
pragmatic motives can be d i sp laced  on an in t ru d in g  s p i r i t ,  th e  
notion  o f  d i s e a s e  in t h e  West may serve  s i m i l a r  f u n c t i o n s '
(1986: 1 1 s a u t h o r ' s  emphasis ) .
9The c r i t i c i s m  of th e  use o f  th e  ca tegory  " r i t u a l "  i s  not  t h a t  th e  
ca tegory  e x i s t s ,  bu t  t h a t  i t  has o f ten  been used t o  exp la in  e i t h e r  
too  l i t t l e  o r  too  much. The t e n o r  of  my argument i s  r e f l e c t e d  in 
one o f  Gregory Ba teson 's  'Metalogues '  with h i s  daughter :
'Daughter:  Daddy, what i s  an i n s t i n c t ?
Fa the r :  An i n s t i n c t ,  my dea r ,  i s  an exp lana to ry  p r i n c i p l e .
D: But what does i t  exp la in?
F: Anything - almost anything a t  a l l .  Anything you want i t  t o
e x p la in .
D: Don' t  be s i l l y .  I t  d o e s n ' t  exp la in  g r a v i t y .
F: No. But t h a t  i s  because nobody wants " i n s t i n c t "  t o  exp la in  
g r a v i t y .  I f  they  d id ,  i t  would exp la in  i t .  We could 
simply say t h a t  t h e  moon has an i n s t i n c t  whose s t r e n g th  
v a r i e s  in v e rs e ly  as th e  square o f  t h e  d i s t a n c e . . .
D: But t h a t ' s  nonsense, Daddy.
F: Yes, s u r e ly .  But i t  was you who mentioned " i n s t i n c t " ,  not
11 (1972 ( a ) :  38) .
In t h i s  t h e s i s  I do not  want t o  sugges t  t h a t  one "exp lan a to ry  
principle '* '  ( r i t u a l )  should be rep laced  by ano ther  (per formance).
I do, however, wish t o  r e f l e c t  on why th e  ca tegory  o f  r i t u a l  has 
been so powerful throughout th e  h i s t o r y  of  an th ropology,  and why th e  
notion  of  performance has been so l i t t l e  encouraged.  L i t t l ew o o d 's  
comparison o f  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of  a d i scou rse  about n e u ro s i s  by 
p s y c h ia t ry  and t h a t  of  t h e  d i scou r se  about r i t u a l  by anthropology 
i s  r em in iscen t  o f  F o u c a u l t ' s  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  d i s c o u r s e  about 
madness, and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f o r  Foucault  t h i s  d i s c o u r s e ,  as with a l l  
d i s c o u r s e s ,  i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by what i t  excludes -  which, in t h e  case 
of  madness, i s  Reason i t s e l f .  Or r a t h e r ,  Reason i s  i n i t i a l l y  def ined  
in terms of  what i t  exc ludes ,  namely "madness11 (1967).  One of  th e  
ques t ions  addressed  in what fol lows i s  t h e r e f o r e ,  what has th e  
an th ropo log ica l  d i s co u r s e  about r i t u a l  excluded? Or t o  use F o u c a u l t ' s  
s t y l e  of  argument,  what has i t  excluded o r  m arg ina l i sed?
In o rde r  t o  put  such ques t ions  in con tex t  i t  i s  necessary  to  
r e c a l l  e a r l i e r  usage,  in p a r t i c u l a r  Durkheim's use o f  one of  Kan t ' s  
most c r u c i a l  fo rm u la t ions :  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  s e n s ib l e  
and t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l .  This d i s t i n c t i o n  was taken  up by Durkheim and 
repackaged as an inhe re n t  t e n s io n  between t h e  demands of  s o c ie ty  
and th e  demands of  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  o rganic  n a t u re .  This enabled 
Durkheim t o  cla im t h a t  such a t e n s io n  provides  th e  dynamic which 
in fuses  and informs a l l  “ c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s " ;  in The
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Elementary Forms of  th e  Rel ig ious  L i fe  h is  c la im i s  app l ied  t o  th e  
c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  produced through r e l i g i o u s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
th rough ,  t h a t  i s ,  r i t u a l .  Rel igion does not  c r e a t e  s o c i e t y ,  but  
r e l i g i o n  js^ th e  c o l l e c t i v e  express ion  of  th e  con t inua l  c r e a t i o n  of 
s o c ie ty  by th e  group.  Symbols a re  powerful because they  t ranscend  
th e  in d i v id u a l ;  r i t u a l s  l ikew ise .  For Durkheim, t h e  d i s t i n c t i v e  
t r a i t  o f  r e l i g i o u s  thought  i s  t h e  d iv i s i o n  o f  t h e  world in to  two 
s e p a ra t e  domains, namely t h e  sacred  and t h e  profane (1915).  The 
Kantian metaphys ica l  dualism o f  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and th e  s e n s ib l e  
i s  s o c io lo g is ed  in to  t h a t  between th e  sacred  and t h e  profane.
For a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s ,  t h i s  dualism has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been implica ted  
in ano the r ;  t h a t  between exper ience ,  o r  " b e l i e f ", and " a c t i o n ”, 
or  " r i t u a l " .  Ritua l  ac t ion  from t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  i s  viewed as 
" e x p r e s s i v e " ,  as opposed t o  Hins t rum en ta l " ,  in t h e  l i g h t  of  
Parsons '  dichotomy. Thus, we see a continuum of  oppos i t ions  in 
an th ropo log ica l  w r i t i n g  about r i t u a l  which can be t r a c e d  back t o  
Kant, i . e .  s e n s i b l e / p r o f a n e / t e c h n i c a l  on t h e  one hand, and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l / s a c r e d / e x p r e s s i v e  on th e  o th e r .  Much an th ropo log ica l  
debate about t h e  n a tu re  of  r i t u a l ,  whether of  an 1 i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t 1 
or  a ' s y m b o l i s t '  type  (Skorupski 1976), have arguably cen t red  
around th e s e  dual isms.  I t  i s  my con ten t ion  t h a t  t h e  notion of  
performance in d i c a t e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a number of  s t r a t e g i e s  which 
would be ab le  t o  avoid t h e  p r i v i l e g i n g  of  e i t h e r  s id e  of  any 
ex p e r i e n c e -a c t io n  a x i s .  R i tu a l s  and o th e r  performances could then be 
f r eed  from t h e  burden o f  ‘' b e l i e f ' 1 which o f ten  v i t i a t e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s '  
a t tempts  t o  unders tand a c t i v i t i e s  which they  have,  r i g h t l y  or  
wrongly,  l a b e l l e d  as " r i t u a l " .
A s trenuous  at tempt t o  overcome Durkheimian dualisms was made
by Leach in t h e  f i r s t  chap te r  of  h i s  ethnography o f  Highland Burma
and in a l a t e r  a r t i c l e .  But in both works r i t u a l  a c t io n  i s  d i sp laced
by r i t u a l  s t a t e m e n t s ; "do ing  t h i n g s "  g ives  way t o  " s a y in g  t h i n g s " .
Almost every  human ac t io n  can be d iv ided  in to  a ‘t e c h n ic a l  aspec t  v
which does something and an a e s t h e t i c ,  communicative aspec t  which
says something'  (1968: 523).  Here Leach t rans fo rm s  th e  Kantian
o ppos i t ion  between th e  s e n s ib l e  and t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  in to  an
o ppos i t ion  between a ca tegory  def ined  as " t h e  t e c h n i c a l 11, congruent  
with " d o i n g "  and a ca tegory  def ined as " t h e  a e s t h e t i c 11, which i s
11
congruent  with " t h e  communicative".
This i s  a r e s ta t em e n t  o f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  Leach had e a r l i e r  
o u t l in e d  in h i s  ethnography of  Highland Burma, where he wrote 
‘from t h i s  p o in t  of  view techn ique  and r i t u a l ,  p rofane and sacred ,  
do not  denote types  o f  ac t io n  but  aspec ts  of  almost  any kind of  
a c t i o n 1 (1954: 13, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .  A Kachin r e l i g i o u s  s a c r i f i c e  
may be regarded  as a t e c h n i c a l ,  economic a c t .  But Leach con t inues :
' . . . f r o m  t h e  o b s e r v e r ' s  p o in t  of  view t h e r e  i s  a good deal  t h a t  
goes on a t  a s a c r i f i c e  t h a t  i s  q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t  as f a r  as 
bu tchery ,  cooking and meat d i s t r i b u t i o n  a re  concerned.  I t  i s  
t h e s e  o th e r  aspec ts  which have meaning as symbols of  s o c ia l  
s t a t u s ,  and i t  i s  t h e s e  o th e r  aspec ts  which I d e s c r ib e  as 
r i t u a l  whether or  not  they  involve d i r e c t l y  any c o n c e p tu a l i s ­
a t io n  of  t h e  supe rna tu ra l  or  t h e  m e taphys ica l '  (1954: 13).
Leach th us  d e f in e s  ' r i t u a l '  as  a r e s id u a l  ca teg o ry ,  t h a t  which i s  
not  t e c h n i c a l .  R i tua l  i s  decentred  by being def ined  in terms of  
t e c h n ic a l  a c t i v i t y  from which i t  i s  exc luded ,  j u s t  as f o r  Foucault  
t h e  West has def ined  madness in terms of  what i t  i s  no t ,  i . e .
Reason. A s i m i l a r  decen te r ing  of  " e m o t io n 1* in terms of  a p r i v i l ­
eged " i n t e l l e c t "  can be t r a c e d  th roughout  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  the  West.
Myth and r i t u a l ,  Leach c la ims ,  a re  two ways of  saying the  same 
t h i n g .  He c r i t i c i s e s  the
' c l a s s i c a l  d o c t r i n e  in English s o c ia l  an thropology . . .  t h a t  myth 
and r i t u a l  a re  concep tua l ly  se p a ra t e  e n t i t i e s  which pe rp e tu a te  
one ano ther  through fu n c t io n a l  in te rdependence - th e  r i t e  is  
a d r am a t i s a t io n  of  t h e  myth, th e  myth i s  t h e  sanc t ion  or  c h a r t e r  
f o r  t h e  r i t e '  (1954: 13).
I t  i s  t h i s  approach which has made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  myths t o  be 
d iscussed  as i s o l a t e d  e n t i t i e s ,  and as ' c o n s t i t u t i n g  a system of 
b e l i e f  (1954: 13). This has given r i s e  t o  much ' s c h o l a s t i c  nonsense '  
concerned with e l u c i d a t i n g  th e  ' c o n te n t  of  b e l i e f  and of  the  
r a t i o n a l i t y  o r  o the rw ise  o f  t h a t  c o n t e n t '  (1954: 13).  Ritua l  and 
myth a re  in te rdependen t ,  accord ing t o  Leach, but  not  because of any 
fu n c t io n a l  i n t e r p l a y  between them.
'As I see i t ,  myth regarded as a s ta tem en t  in words "says" th e
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same th in g  as r i t u a l  regarded as a s ta tem ent  in a c t i o n .  To ask 
ques t ions  about  t h e  con ten t  of  b e l i e f  which a re  not  contained  
in t h e  con ten t  of  r i t u a l  i s  nonsense1 (1954: 13-14).
R i t u a l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  a means o f  communication but  not  o f  ac t ion  
and i t  i s  s t i l l ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  c l o s e l y  argued d i s c l a im e r s  made in th e  
Highland Burma book and in th e  1968 a r t i c l e ,  an a n a l y t i c a l l y  
d i s c r im in a b le  ca tegory  of  ' a s p e c t s '  of  a c t i o n s ,  i f  not  of  a c t io n s  
per  se .
A s i m i l a r  dichotomy is  t o  be found in t h e  r e c e n t  body of  work 
produced by C l i f f o r d  Geertz which a t tempts  an exeges i s  of  Bal inese  
symbolic and r i t u a l  l i f e  a f t e r  t h e  manner o f  a c u l t u r a l  hermeneut ics.  
The apo theos i s  o f  t h i s  view r e s u l t s  in a p i c t u r e  of  Balinese 
performance as a r e f l e c t i o n  of  symbols or  b e l i e f s ,  encapsu la ted  
with in  a r i t u a l i s e d  ' t h e a t r e  s t a t e ' ( 1980(b))Hobart has c r i t i c i s e d  
t h i s  p i c t u r e  as an e thnograph ic  ' f r e e z i n g '  o f  t h e  s u b je c t s  of  
an th ropo log ica l  enquiry  in th e  w r i t in g  of  what he c a l l s  ' e u g e n i c  
t e x t s '  ( in  p r e s s : 8 ) . G e e r tz ' s  concern with symbolism as a system of 
a l l -p o w e r fu l  essences  reduces Bal inese  a c t o r s  l i t e r a l l y  t o  the  
s t a t u s  o f  a c t o r s  in t h e  t h e a t r i c a l  sense .  In t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  
according t o  Hobart,  t h e  Ba l inese  themselves a re  denied a voice ,  
f o r  Geertz b e l i e v e s  t h a t
'a  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  c o l l e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  ( i s )  th e  necessary 
and s u f f i c i e n t  exp lana t ion  of  human a c t i o n s '  (Hobart 1987: 12, 
my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
Whereas Leach had at tempted t o  conf ine  r i t u a l  e f f i c a c y  t o  a 
demarcated arena of  communication, f o r  Geertz r i t u a l  has become 
th e  locus of  s o c i a l  a c t i v i t y  in B a l i ;  a“ t o t a l  s o c i a l  f a c t "  in th e  
c l a s s i c  Durkheimian sense ,  a f a c t  which i s  so t o t a l l y  s o c ia l  t h a t  
ind iv idua l  a c t io n  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and, th e re b y ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of any reworking of  the1'system" i s  p rec luded .  There are  s i m i l a r i t i e s  
between G e e r tz ' s  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  Bal inese  and T u rn e r ' s  of th e  Ndembu. 
The ' c u l t s  of  a f f l i c t i o n '  desc r ibed  by Turner in h i s  e a r l i e r  works 
(1957, 1968) a re  e l a b o ra te d  in to  ' s o c i a l  dramas'  through which, in 
s o c i e t i e s  a l l  over th e  world,  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  achieved from c i v i t a s  
t o  commuhitas and back (1969).  Here again ,  r i t u a l  becomes an 
e s s e n t i a l i s t  exp lana to ry  p r i n c i p l e  which moves not  only th e  i n h a b i t ­
an ts  of  Ndembu v i l l a g e s ,  but  those  of  the  world a t  l a rg e .  I s h a l l  
d iscuss  T u rn e r ' s  work a t  some length in my Chapter  11.
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I t  i s  use fu l  t o  compare th e  work of  Geertz and Turner with a 
neo-Marxist  s ta tement on r i t u a l  by Bloch (1974).  There are 
remarkable and important  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between h i s  p o s i t i o n  and t h a t  
of L ev i -S t r au s s ,  whose work I w i l l  examine l a t e r  in t h i s  In t roduc­
t i o n .  Both w r i t e r s  have at tempted a r a d i c a l  c r i t i q u e  of  a n th ropo l ­
og ica l  debates  on the  t o p i c  of  r i t u a l ,  and both focus on th e  notion 
of  *'r i t u a l  language1'.
For Bloch, t h e  power of  r i t u a l  language i s  t o  be found not in 
i t s  con ten t  but  in i t s  form. The media of  r i t u a l  c a r ry  no meaning 
whatsoever,  a t  l e a s t  not in the  log ica l  sense .  This i s  because 
r i t u a l  language and behaviour a re  e xce ss ive ly  fo rm al ized ,  and they 
thus  d r a s t i c a l l y  l i m i t  t h e  choices  a v a i l a b l e ,  in both speech and 
behaviour ,  t o  r i t u a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The formal ized  language used in 
r i t u a l  c a r r i e s  what Austin (1962) r e f e r s  t o  as i l l o c u t i o n a r y  fo r c e ,  
which i s  t o  say t h a t  i t  does something in the  world by using a 
conven t iona l ,  p e r s u as iv e ,  ‘' p e r fo rm a t iv e"  f o r c e .  I t  does not  convey 
informat ion about th e  world.  Promises and apologies  could be 
considered  as speech ac t s  o f  t h e  i l l o c u t i o n a r y  k ind.  Ritua l  language,  
according t o  Bloch, i s  impoverished by th e  absense of  locu t iona ry  
speech ac t s  which, un l ike  i l l o c u t i o n a r y  speech a c t s ,  ca r ry  propos-  
i t i o n a l  f o r c e .  They a re  d e s c r i p t i v e  and in fo rm a t ive ,  and at tempt 
t o  ' . . . c o r n e r  r e a l i t y  by adapt ing  communication t o  p a s t  percep t ion  
and connecting t h i s  with f u t u r e  p e r ce p t io n '  (Bloch 1974: 67).
Bloch equates  r i t u a l  language with t h a t  of  t r a d i t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  
a language in which th e  ap p ro p r ia t e  responses  t o  any given s ta tement 
are  a l ready  s t i p u l a t e d .  R itua l  language i s  th u s  l i m i t e d ,  j u s t i f i c ­
a to ry  and, l i t e r a l l y ,  non-sense .  Since th e  r u l e s  which genera te  the  
p r o p o s i t i o n a l , l o g i c a l ,  con ten t  of  speech,  o r  th e  ' f e a t u r e s  of  
a r t i c u l a t i o n ' ,  a re  negated in i l l o c u t i o n a r y  u t t e r a n c e s ,  i l l o c u t i o n ­
ary fo r c e  i s  n o n - lo g i c a l ,  s ince  f o r  i t s  express ion  log ic  demands th e  
d i a l e c t i c  of  argument, counter-argument and r e s o l u t i o n .  To put  i t  
s imply,  Bloch w r i t e s :
'we can say t h a t  log ic  depends on th e  f l e x i b i l i t y  of  th e  f e a t u r e s  
of  a r t i c u l a t i o n  in language and i f  t h e r e  i s  no such f l e x i b i l i t y  
t h e r e  can be no argument, no lo g ic ,  no ex p la n a t io n ,  and in one
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sense  o f  t h e  word, no semant ics '  (1974: 66).
Thus when a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  ask, 11 What i s  th e  meaning of  r i t u a l ? " ,  
they are  a c t u a l l y  ask ing ,  "What i s  th e  meaning of  i l l o c u t i o n a r y  
speech?"  in th e  sense o f ,  "What does i t  e x p l a in ? 11 Bloch concludes 
t h a t
'To ask t h i s  question;: assumes a func t ion  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  a u tho r ­
i t y  and r e l i g i o n  which i t  cannot have and draws a t t e n t i o n  
away from o th e r  p o s s ib le  f u nc t ions  which i t  may have, e . g .  t o  
hide r e a l i t y '  (1974: 67) .
Bloch draws on a p a r t i c u l a r  r i t u a l ,  t h e  c i rcumcis ion  ceremony of 
th e  Merina of  Madagascar, f o r  h is  argument.  Again, a p a r t i c u l a r  
ethnographic  example i s  used t o  c o n s t ru c t  an e s s e n t i a l ,  general  
theory  of  r i t u a l .  I would ques t ion  whether B loch 's  lo g ica l  
p o s i t i v i s t  s t a n c e ,  in t h e  form of h is  use of  A u s t i n ' s  l i n g u i s t i c  
philosophy ,  l i m i t s  th e  sense in which th e  concept  of  " l o g i c a l  
communication" i s  used t o  "convey in fo rm at ion '1 about th e  world. Is 
i t  r e a l l y  t r u e  t h a t  a l l  kinds of  loc u t iona ry  u t t e r a n c e s  convey 
l e g i t i m a te  information  about th e  world, whereas a l l  i l l o c u t i o n a r y  
u t t e r a n c e s  are mere shadows, mere empty g e s tu re s ?  (1) What, 
p r e c i s e l y ,  i s  t h e  mix of  locu t ionary  and i l l o c u t i o n a r y  u t t e r a n c e s  
in th e  new sreader ' s  s c r i p t ?  Is  i t  no t  b f ten  th e  case  t h a t  in 
c e r t a i n  kinds of  s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  th e  predominance of  supposedly 
' f a c t u a l ' ,  ' i n f o r m a t iv e '  exchanges can be evidence o f  a d i s j u n c t i v e  
pover ty  of  communication, r a t h e r  than of  a c l a r i t y  and wealth of  i t ?  
At th e  h e a r t  of  Bloch 's  a n a ly s i s  i s  another  oppos i t ion  which 
p r i v i l e g e s  one term (" in form at ion" )  a t  the  expense o f  another  
( "performance") .  This reaches  i t s  apotheos is  in t h e  claim t h a t  s i n g ­
ing and dancing a re  a t  the  f a r  end of  t h e  i l l o c u t i o n a r y  spectrum 
and t h a t  a r t  i t s e l f  is  to  be equated with i l l o c u t i o n a r y  u t t e r a n c e .  
The s o - c a l l e d  c r e a t i v i t y  of  th e  a r t i s t  i s  a f i c t i o n ,  s ince  what 
r e a l l y  happens i s  t h a t  when th e  complex g e n e ra t iv e  p o t e n t i a l  of 
language or  bod ily  movement has been forb idden
‘th e  remaining cho ices  l e f t  a re  so simple t h a t  they  can suddenly 
be apprehended consc ious ly .  C r e a t i v i t y  has suddenly become 
c o n t r o l l a b l e ,  hence e n j o y a b l e . . . a r t  i s . . . a n  i n f e r i o r  form of 
communication'  (1974: 72-73).
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In one of  t h e  few examples in th e  l i t e r a t u r e  of  a coherent  
r e co g n i t io n  of  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  a ‘per fo rm at ive  approach t o  
r i t u a l 1, Tambiah has lu c id ly  c r i t i c i s e d  l a t t e r - d a y  re s ta t em e n ts  of  
th e  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  p o s i t i o n  which sees r i t u a l  as s e rv ing  only t o  
b o l s t e r  a p re -o rda ined  s o c ia l  o rde r .  Here Tambiah t a k es  i s sue  with 
B loch 's  p ro p o s i t i o n  t h a t  formal ized communication, common t o  both 
t r a d i t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  and r e l i g i o n ,  serves  t o  'h id e  r e a l i t y '
(Bloch,  1974: 67).  Tambiah w r i t e s :
'My q u a r re l  i s  not  with a Marxist  fo rmula t ion  as such but  with 
t h a t  kind of  fo rmula t ion  which sees a p r i o r  " r e a l  world" of  
" b ru te  f a c t s "  t h a t  r e l i g i o n ,  as a m y s t i f i c a t i o n ,  seeks t o  h ide ,  
as i f  t h e r e  a re  some p r iv i l e g e d  o rders  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t s  
which have a pre-symbolic or  p r e - c u l t u r a l  e x i s t e n c e . . .Moreover, 
f o r  me, th e  e x c i t i n g  kind of  a n a ly s i s  i s  t h a t  which sees 
r i t u a l  invo lu t ion  not  so much as a d i a b o l i c  smoke-screen but  as 
an id e o lo g ic a l  and a e s t h e t i c  s o c ia l  c o n s t r u c t io n  t h a t  is  
d i r e c t l y  and r e c u r s i v e l y  implica ted  in th e  exp res s ion ,  r e a l i z ­
a t io n  and e x e r c i s e  of  power' (1981: 153).
In a fo o tn o te  Tambiah pushes h i s  po in t  home:
'C e r ta in  neo-Marxists  and adap ta t ion  e c o l o g i s t s  use the  e p i t h e t  
of  'm y s t i f i c a t i o n '  too  f a c i l e l y  as an excuse o r  cover-up f o r  
e i t h e r  not  s e r io u s ly  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  o r  not  comprehending r i t u a l  
symbolism and r i t u a l  p a t t e r n i n g ;  they merely see  fu n c t io n a l  and 
u t i l i t a r i a n  uses f o r  r i t u a l  a c t i o n '  (1981: 153).
I hope t o  show in th e  main body of  th e  t h e s i s  t h a t  Bateson would 
have been in sympathy with Tambiah's s ta tem en t .
An at tempt t o  d ispose  of  t h e  problem of r i t u a l  as an a n a l y t i c  
ca tegory  a l t o g e t h e r ,  t o  des t roy  r i t u a l  as a locus of  meaning from
a p e r s p e c t iv e  which shows i n t e r e s t i n g  s i m i l a r i t i e s  t o  B loc h 's ,  has
come from L ev i -S t r au s s .  In h is  1968 a r t i c l e  c i t e d  above,  Leach
dec la red  t h a t  Lev i -S t rauss  ' i s  in c l in e d  to  see r i t u a l  as i n t e g r a l
with p rocesses  of  t h o u g h t . . .Such an approach impl ies  t h a t  we should
th in k  of  r i t u a l  as a language in a q u i t e  l i t e r a l  sense '  (Leach
1968: 524).
But Leach i s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  th e  Lev i -S t rauss  of  The Savage Mind;
by th e  t ime t h a t  Leach was w r i t i n g ,  Lev i -S t rauss  h im se l f  was denying 
such an im p l ic a t io n .  In t h e  F ina le  t o  h i s  f i n a l  volume o f  h is  
s t u d i e s  o f  myth, Lev i -S t rauss  wishes t o  e n t i r e l y  d i s s o c i a t e  r i t u a l
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from th e  arena of  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  a n a l y s i s .  L £ v i - S t r a u s s ' s  argument 
here can be viewed as a paradigm f o r  an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  d ism issa l  
of  r i t u a l  a c t i v i t y .  I s h a l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  r e f e r  t o  i t  a t  some leng th .  
Mythology, Lev i -S t rauss  argues ,  ' e x i s t s  in two c l e a r l y  d i f f e r e n t  
m o d a l i t i e s ' ,  sometimes as e x p l i c i t ,  ranking as 'works in t h e i r  own 
r i g h t 1 and sometimes as mere fragments which a re  ' l i n k e d  t o  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  phase of  th e  r i t u a l ,  on which i t  se rves  as a g lo s s ,  
and i t  i s  only r e c i t e d  in connec tion with th e  performance of  r i t u a l  
a c t s '  (1971: 669).  At one leve l  of  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  we cannot 
s e p a ra t e  r i t u a l  from myth which, d i s a s t r o u s l y ,  many a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  
concerned with r i t u a l  have at tempted t o  do. V ic to r  Turner i s  
one such.  What a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  should do, i f  th ey  wish to  study 
r i t u a l  in terms of  i t s  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as a s e p a ra t e  e n t i t y  
from myth, i s  t o  remove from i t  t h e  ' i m p l i c i t  mythology'  which 
'adheres  t o  i t  without  r e a l l y  being p a r t  of  i t '  (1971: 669).
This i m p l i c i t  mythology i s  nothing le s s  than ' t h o s e  b e l i e f s  and 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  which a re  connected with a philosophy of  n a tu re '  
(1971: 669).  But I would argue t h a t  t h i s  could r e f e r  t o  j u s t  about 
anything which might be r e f e r r e d  t o  in any r i t u a l  anywhere. Levi-  
S t r auss  con t inues  with the  warning t h a t  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s  l i k e  Turner 
who claim t o  wish t o  adduce a non-verbal  language of  r i t u a l  symbolism 
should be wary of  the  e r r o r  committed by Leach when he a s s e r t s  
on t h e  one hand t h a t  r i t u a l  t r a n s m i t s  and communicates information  
about t h e  world,  and on th e  o th e r  hand t h a t  p r i m i t i v e  symbolism is  
h ighly  charged em otional ly  (1971: 669-670).  I sugges t  t h a t  Levi- 
S t rauss  i s  here adopting th e  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  s t r a t e g y  which p r i v i l e g e s  
c o n c e p tu a l i ty  as a g a in s t  emotion; t h e r e  a re  s i m i l a r i t i e s . h e r e ,  t o o ,  
with B loch 's  a n a l y s i s .  Lev i -S t rauss  claims t h a t  t h e  two p o s s i b i l i t ­
i e s  a re  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  f o r  t h e r e  can be no c o g n i t i v e  meaning in 
r i t u a l  a c t s  per  s e . For i t  i s  only t r u e  mythology,  mythology u n ta rn ­
ished by ' r i t u a l  f r a g m e n ts ' ,  which i s  a t t ached  t o  language.  But 
L ev i -S t rauss  does no t  i n d i c a t e  h is  c r i t e r i a  f o r  dec id ing  what ' t r u e  
mythology'  i s .  Mythology in i t s  essence  has ' a r t i c u l a t e  language as 
i t s  v e h i c l e '  (1971: 670). Music marks a breaking away from language,
al though vocal music s t i l l  r e t a i n s  an a f f i n i t y  with i t ,  'an a f f i n i t y  
which i s  demonstrated by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  myths a re  o f ten  chanted or
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sung1 (1971: 670).  This a f f i n i t y  g ra d u a l ly  l e s s e n s ,  however, in th e  
movement from pure ly  vocal music t o  s ing ing  o r  chant ing  with musical  
accompaniment. When we ge t  t o  pure in s t rum en ta l  music,  we are  no 
longer in t h e  realm of language a t  a l l .
L§vi -S t rauss  then o f f e r s  a p a r a l l e l  with what occurs  in the  
t r a n s i t i o n  from 'pure  mythology'  to  'pu re  r i t u a l ' .  E x p l i c i t  r i t u a l  
i s  l i t e r a t u r e  ' i n  th e  f u l l  sense o f  th e  t e r m ' .  But in im p l i c i t  
mythology we see t h a t  ' f ragments  o f  d i s c o u r s e '  a r e  mixed in with 
' n o n - l i n g u i s t i c  a c t i o n s ' ,  and when f i n a l l y  we ge t  to  'pure  r i t u a l '  
we f in d  t h a t  a l l  c o n tac t  with language has been l o s t .  Here again 
t h e r e  a re  s t r i k i n g  s i m i l a r i t i e s  with B loch 's  account  of  th e  Merina 
c i rcumcis ion  ceremony. Pure r i t u a l ,  according t o  L ev i -S t r au s s ,
‘c o n s i s t s  e i t h e r  of  sacred  formulae - incomprehensible f o r  the  
u n i n i t i a t e d ,  o r  belonging to  an a rcha ic  tongue t h a t  i s  no longer 
unders tood,  o r  even of  u t t e r a n c e s  devoid of  any i n t r i n s i c  
meaning, such as a re  o f ten  used in magic -  or  o f  phys ica l  
movements or  o f  th e  s e l e c t i o n  and handl ing  of  va r ious  o b j e c t s .
At t h i s  po in t  r i t u a l ,  l i k e  music a t  t h e  o th e r  extreme of th e  
system, moves r i g h t  o u t s id e  language,  and i f  we wish t o  under­
s tand  i t s  d i s t i n c t i v e  n a tu re ,  we have obv ious ly  t o  cons ide r  t h i s  
pure form, not  t h e  in termediary  s t a t e s '  (1971: 671).
What, th e n ,  is  r i t u a l  a l l  about? L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  answer i s  
s tunn ing ly  simple .  R itua l  r e p r e s e n t s  a f a i l u r e  of  language o r ,  
r a t h e r ,  a f a i l u r e  by people t o  use language c o r r e c t l y .  R itual  
g e s tu r e s  and th e  handling of  r i t u a l  o b j e c t s  a re  ' a  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  
w ords . . .The  performance of  g e s tu r e s  and th e  manipula t ion  of  o b je c t s  
a re  dev ices  which al low r i t u a l  t o  avoid speech'  (1971: 671-672).
Here L^v i-S t rauss  adopts what Derrida (1976) would c a l l  th e  
l o g o c e n t r ic  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  r i t u a l  usurps t h e  11 c o r r e c t 1* use of  
language;  in L ^ v i - S t r a u s s ' s  a n a l y s i s ,  r i t u a l  occupies  t h e  same 
degraded p o s i t i o n  with regard  t o  speech as does w r i t i n g  in D e r r id a ' s  
c r i t i q u e  o f  Western metaphys ics.  I w i l l  deal  more f u l l y  with 
D e r r id a ' s  important  not ion  of  logocen tr ism with p a r t i c u l a r  r e fe ren c e  
t o  h i s  c r i t i q u e ,  or  " d e c o n s t r u c t io n " ,  of  L e v i - S t r a u s s 1s s t r u c t u r a l i s t  
an thropology,  l a t e r  in my I n t ro d u c t io n .
But t h e r e  i s  an obvious o b je c t io n  to  L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  p ro p o s i t io n  
which he h im se lf  r a i s e s ;  t h i s  i s  t h a t  r i t u a l s  u su a l ly  con ta in  a
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g re a t  deal  of  speech.  Again, t h e  argument sounds remarkably l i k e  
B lo c h 's .  Our next  s t e p ,  says L ev i -S t r au s s ,  i s  t o  examine not  what 
r i t u a l  words say,  but  how they  say i t  (1971: 672).
Ri tua l  language makes use of  two e s s e n t i a l  p rocedures .  These are 
' p a r c e l l i n g  o u t 1 and ' r e p e t i t i o n ' .  In t h e  f i r s t  case ,  r i t u a l  'has 
no concern f o r  th e  g e n e r a l 1 and i s  obsessed with t h e  minutae of  
taxonomical  c a t e g o r i e s ,  be they c a t e g o r i e s  o f  p l a n t s ,  animals ,  human 
be ings,  n a t u r a l  ob je c t s  or  whatever.  The s l i g h t e s t  d i f f e r e n c e  in 
the  e x p l i c a t i o n  of  such taxonomies i s  seen as c r u c i a l  in r i t u a l  
p r a c t i c e s  (1971: 672).  In t h e  second case ,  r i t u a l  'goes in f o r  
a r i o t  o f  r e p e t i t i o n ;  th e  same formula,  o r  formulae s i m i l a r  in 
syntax or  assonance ,  a re  repea ted  a t  s h o r t  i n t e r v a l s . . . t h e  same 
formula must be repea ted  a g r e a t  many t imes  ru n n in g 1 and so on 
(1971: 673) .  (2) Lev i -S trauss  claims t h a t  f a r  from being in opp­
o s i t i o n  t o  each o th e r ,  t h e  two procedures  of  p a r c e l l i n g  out  and 
r e p e t i t i o n  a re  e q u i v a l e n t s .  R epe t i t ion  in f a c t  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  
extreme development of  p a r c e l l i n g  o u t .  D if fe rences  between th in g s  
are  emphasised and r e s t a t e d  ad i n f i n i t u m ; then th e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  
made t o  d i sappea r  a l t o g e t h e r :  ' d i f f e r e n c e s  which have become so 
small as t o  be i n f i n i t e s i m a l  tend  t o  d i sappea r  in q u a s i - i d e n t i t y 1 
(1971: 673).
Mythology, t h e r e f o r e ,  p o in t s  towards t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  
r e a l i t y  and i s  the reby  a l l i e d  with language.  R i tua l  i s  placed a t  
th e  op p o s i te  end of t h e  continuum. I t  seeks t o  r e tu r n  t o  th e  pure 
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  which had e x i s t e d  befo re  t h e  moment of  mythology, 
th e  moment of  language.  The argument i s  capped by t h e  summary 
r e l e g a t i o n  of  r i t u a l  t o  th e  h i t h e r  s id e  o f  th e  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  
e n t e r p r i s e  in t h e  s ta tement t h a t
' t h e  oppos i t ion  between r i t e  and myth i s  t h e  same as t h a t  
between l i v in g  and th in k in g ,  and r i t u a l  r e p r e s e n t s  a b a s t a r d ­
i z a t i o n  of  thought ,  brought  about by th e  c o n s t r a i n t s  of  l i f e  
. . . T h i s  d e s p e ra t e ,  and in v a r i a b ly  un s u cces s fu l ,  at tempt  t o  r e ­
e s t a b l i s h  th e  c o n t in u i t y  of  l ived  e x p e r i e n c e . . . i s  th e  essence  
of  r i t u a l . . . '  (1971: 675, my emphasis ) .
✓
L ev i -S t rauss  i s  here  appea ling  t o  what can be descr ibed  as an 
a u th e n t i c  l ived  r e a l i t y ,  coterminous with a language which i s
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f a i t h f u l  t o  ' t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s '  o f  t h a t  r e a l i t y .  This i s  opposed to  
th e  ' b a s t a r d i z a t i o n  of  though t '  r ep re sen ted  by r i t u a l .  Levi- 
S t r auss  the reby  p laces  r i t u a l  o u t s id e  any d i s c o u r s e  of  reason - 
as does Bloch, al though f o r  d i f f e r e n t  polemical  purposes - but 
he i n s i s t s  t h a t  mythology be enthroned w i th in  reason ,  s ince  f o r  
him mythology announces " t h e  moment of  language11. This i s  th e  
u l t im a te  express ion  of  a r a t i o n a l i s t  e n t e r p r i s e  which has run a l l  
the  way through L £ v i -S t r a u s s ' s  work, and which f i t t i n g l y  culminates  
in t h e  F ina le  to  The Mythologiques. L^v i -S t rauss  wishes t o  i n d i c a t e  
the  presence  of  a pure language,  an a u t h e n t i c  speech which i s  un­
t a i n t e d  by th e  meaningless,  r e p e t i t i o u s  and indu lgen t  excesses  
performed by th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in r i t u a l .
I now tu rn  t o . D e r r i d a ' s  powerful comments on L e v i - S t r a u s s 1s 
s t r u c t u r a l i s m .  In two es says ,  Derr ida  o f f e r s  a s u b t l e  c r i t i q u e  - 
or  in h i s  terms a " d e c o n s t r u c t io n " - of  th e  use by Lev i -S t rauss  of  
t h e  o p p o s i t io n s  which have always been c r u c i a l  t o  th e  l a t t e r  
(1972, 1976). In S t r u c t u r e , Sign and Play in t h e  Discourse of  th e  
Human S c ie n c e s , Derrida shows t h a t  th e  oppos i t ion  between Nature 
and Cul tu re  can be t r a c e d ,  a l b e i t  in a v a r i e t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  g u ise s ,  
through t h e  e n t i r e  h i s t o r y  of  Western philosophy and t h a t  indeed 
i t  i s  c e n t r a l  to  i t  (1972: 252).  But in The Elementary S t ru c tu r e s  
of  K insh ip , Derrida p o in t s  ou t ,  Lev i -S t rauss  p laces  t h i s  oppos i t ion  
in doubt even as he ass igns  i t  a c r u c i a l  and u n iv e rs a l  importance.
The i n c e s t  taboo ,  claimed by L^vi-S t rauss  t o  be both of  na tu re  and 
of  c u l t u r e ,  cannot be lodged w i th in  th e  o p p o s i t i o n .  According to  
Derr ida ,  t h e  taboo t h e r e f o r e  escapes
' t h e  domain of  t r a d i t i o n a l  concepts ;  i t  i s  something which escapes 
th e s e  concepts  and c e r t a i n l y  precedes  them - probably as th e  
cond i t ion  o f  t h e i r  p o s s i b i l i t y .  I t  could perhaps be sa id  
t h a t  t h e  whole of  ph i lo soph ica l  c o n c e p tu a l i z a t i o n ,  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  
r e l a t i n g  i t s e l f  t o  th e  n a t u r e / c u l t u r e  o p p o s i t i o n ,  i s  designed 
to  leave in th e  domain of  th e  un th inkab le  t h e  very th ing  t h a t  
makes t h i s  co n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  p o s s i b l e :  th e  o r i g i n  of  the  
p r o h i b i t i o n  of  i n c e s t '  (1972: 253-254).
Later  in th e  same essay Derrida t u r n s  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  The Savage 
Mind in which Lev i -S t rauss  p r e s e n t s  th e  oppos i t ion  between th e  
b r i c o l e u r , tha t :  c o l l e c t o r  of  ready-made o b je c t s  and concepts  respons­
ib l e  f o r  th e  " to te m ic  o p e ra to r "  and th e  c o l l e c t i v e  c r e a t i o n s  of
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mythology, and th e  engineer who c o n s t r u c t s  h is  own language in the  
form of a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  syntax and lex icon .  This oppos i t ion  too 
can be tu rned  a g a in s t  i t s e l f .  Derrida w r i t e s  t h a t
' t h e  eng ineer  i s  a myth. A s u b je c t  who would supposedly be th e  
a b s o lu te  o r ig i n  of h i s  own d iscou r se  and would supposedly 
c o n s t r u c t  i t  "out of  no th ing" ,  "out of  whole c l o t h " ,  would be 
th e  c r e a t o r  of  th e  v e rb e , th e  verbe i t s e l f .  The not ion of  the  
eng ineer  who had supposedly broken with a l l  forms of  b r ico lag e  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  a t h e o lo g ic a l  idea;  and s ince  Lev i -S t rauss  t e l l s  
us elsewhere t h a t  b r ico lag e  i s  mythopoet ic ,  t h e  odds a re  t h a t  
t h e  eng ineer  i s  a myth produced by t h e  b r i c o l e u r 1 (1972: 256).
Derrida can now suggest  t h a t  th e  domains of  t h e  b r i c o l e u r  and th e  
eng ineer ,  f a r  from d isp lay ing  th e  oppos i t ion  claimed by Lev i -S t rauss ,  
a c t u a l l y  i n t e r p e n e t r a t e  each o th e r :
'From t h e  moment t h a t  we cease  t o  b e l i e v e  in such an engineer  
and in a d i scourse  breaking with th e  rece ived  h i s t o r i c a l  
d i s c o u r s e ,  as soon as i t  i s  admitted t h a t  every f i n i t e  d iscourse  
i s  bound by a c e r t a i n  b r i c o l a g e , and t h a t  t h e  eng ineer  and the  
s c i e n t i s t  a re  a l so  spec ie s  of  b r i c o l e u r s  then th e  very idea of 
b r i c o l a g e  i s  menaced and th e  d i f f e r e n c e  in which i t  took on 
i t s  meaning decomposes' (1972: 256).
Elsewhere,  Derrida focuses on a p a r t i c u l a r  ethnographic  example 
from L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  T r i s t e s  Tropiques (1973) in o rde r  to  unpack the  
oppos i t ion  between speech and w r i t i n g ,  and t h e  Slv io l e n c e "  of  the  
l a t t e r ,  mournfully descr ibed  by L ev i -S t rauss  in h i s  account  of  the  
Nambikwara Ind ians .  Against  L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  cla im t h a t  th e  Nambikwara 
were w ithout  w r i t i n g  in t h e i r  indigenous ,  p r e - c o n t a c t  s t a t e ,  Derrida 
at tempts  t o  show t h a t  w r i t i n g  i s  a l ready  f u l l y  im plica ted  with in  
Nambikwara c u l t u r e  (1976: 101-140). For Derr ida ,  w r i t i n g  i s  the  
p recond i t ion  o f  language and no t ,  as t h i n k e r s  from P la to  t o  Rousseau 
and beyond have claimed,  an i n f e r i o r  or  supplementary vers ion  of  i t .  
According t o  Derr ida  t h e r e  i s  no innocent ,  a u t h e n t i c  speech un­
t a i n t e d  by w r i t i n g  and th e  v io lence  which Lev i -S t rauss  claims has 
been brought to  p r im i t i v e  s o c i e t i e s  by w r i t i n g .  S o c i e t i e s  every­
where a re  marked by w r i t ing  in D e r r id a ' s  sense ,  by what he d e sc r ibe s  
as ' t h e  v io lence  of  the  a r c h e -w r i t in g ,  t h e  v io lence  of  d i f f e r e n c e ,  
of  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  and of  t h e  system of  a p p e l l a t i o n s '  (1976: 110).
I t  i s  on th e  l a t t e r  t h a t  Derr ida  focuses  in t h e  essay under 
co n s id e r a t i o n ;  according to  Lev i -S t rauss  t h e  Nambikwara a re  not
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allowed t o  use proper  names in speaking t o  each o th e r ,  but  ch i ld ren  
of ten  d i s c l o s e  th e  proper names of  o th e rs  in h o s t i l e  p lay .  For 
Derrida t h e  ' a r c h e - w r i t i n g 1 which al lows th e  ' im p ro p r i e ty '  of  the  
use of  t h e  'p rope r  name' i n d i c a t e s  the  h o s t i l i t y  and v io lence  
a l ready  p re s e n t  with in  Nambikwara s o c i e t y ,  a h o s t i l i y  and v io lence  
which i s  not  brought to  th e  Nambikwara by th e  white man's w r i t ing  
but  which has always e x i s t e d  (1976: 110-118). D e r r id a ' s  argument 
has been lu c id ly  summarised by Norr is :
'The "nature" which Rousseau i d e n t i f i e s  with a pure,  unmediated 
speech,  and L^vi-Strauss  with th e  dawn of t r i b a l  awareness,  
b e t ra y s  a n o s ta l g ic  mystique of  presence  which ignores  the  
s e l f - a l i e n a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r  of  a l l  s o c ia l  e x i s t e n c e '  (1982: 40).
D e r r id a ' s  c r i t i q u e  of  Lev i -S trauss  and of  o th e r  w r i t e r s  ques t ions  
th e  t r u t h  of  what the  former desc r ibe s  as a metaphysics which 
determines 'being  as p resence '  (1972: 249), o r  a metaphysics which 
at tempts  t o  reach a t r u t h  s e l f - p r e s e n t  t o  i t s e l f  beyond the  arena 
of language.  As Norris  puts  i t :
' d e c o n s t ru c t io n  works to  undo th e  idea - according t o  Derr ida ,  
t h e  ru l i n g  i l l u s i o n  of  Western metaphysics - t h a t  reason can 
somehow dispense  with language and a r r i v e  a t  a pure ,  s e l f -  
a u t h e n t i c a t i n g  t r u t h  or  method. Though philosophy s t r i v e s  to  
e f f a c e  i t s  t e x tu a l  or  w r i t t e n  c h a r a c t e r ,  th e  s igns  of  t h a t  
s t r u g g le  a re  t h e r e  t o  be read in i t s  b l i n d - s p o t s  of  metaphor 
and o th e r  r h e t o r i c a l  s t r a t e g i e s '  (1982: 19).
T h i s " i s vl inked  to  D e r r i d a ' s : n o t i o n ’ of logocen tr ism, or  th e .d eep -  
sea ted  b e l i e f  t h a t  t r u t h  and s e l f - p r e s e n c e  a re  t o  be loca ted  in the  
sphere of  a u t h e n t i c ,  l ived  speech r a t h e r  than in t h a t  of  i t s  poor 
in a u th e n t i c  r e l a t i o n ,  namely w r i t i n g .  According t o  Norr is
'For  Derr ida ,  t h i s  i s  y e t  another s ign  of  th e  roo ted Western 
p r e ju d i c e  which t r i e s  t o  reduce w r i t in g  - o r  th e  ' f r e e  p lay '  
of  language -  to  a s t a b l e  meaning equated with th e  c h a ra c te r  
of  speech . In spoken language (so th e  im pl ica t ion  ru n s ) ,  
meaning i s  ' p r e s e n t '  t o  t h e  speaker through an a c t  of  inward 
s e l f - s u r v e i l l a n c e  which ensures  a p e r f e c t ,  i n t u i t i v e  ' f i t '  
between in t e n t io n  and u t t e r a n c e '  (1982: 23, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis 
and p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
D e r r id a ' s  c r i t i q u e  of  Lev i -S trauss  can thus  be read as a decons t ruc­
t i o n  of  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  p r iv i l e g i n g  of  an a u th e n t i c  speech governed by 
th e  pure s e l f - p r e s e n t  s t r u c t u r e s  of  reason which determine th e  r i f t
22
between Nature and Culture  and which ensures  th e  very e x i s t en ce  of 
Cul ture i t s e l f .
Having int roduced D e r r id a ' s  c r i t i q u e  of  s e l f - p r e s e n c e  and 
logocen tr i sm -  and, hopefu l ly ,  in t h e  process in d ica te d  something 
of  th e  s t y l e  of  argument a s s o c ia t e d  with decons t ruc t ion  - I w i l l  
now b r i e f l y  cons ider  an an a ly s i s  of  L e v i - S t r a u s s ‘s comments on 
r i t u a l  in t h e  F ina le  by Rene Girard ,  a contemporary of  Derrida and 
a c r i t i c  and ph ilosopher  a l so  l inked  with p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l i s m  (1978). 
Girard p o in t s  out  t h a t  r i t u a l  i s  concerned with d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
q u i t e  as much as mythology. In i n i t i a t i o n  r i t e s ,  f o r  example, the  
s u b je c t s  a re  no doubt placed in an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  s t a t e ,  but  only 
as p a r t  o f  a p re l iminary  phase of  a process which ends with an 
e x p l i c i t  ( r e - ) d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in t h e  form of a new, s t a b l e ,  so c ia l  
i d e n t i t y .  The r i t e  of  s a c r i f i c e ,  t o o ,  can be read as a means whereby 
the  reg en e ra t io n  of  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  assured and s o c i a l l y  accepted 
(1978: 155-156). But i f  r i t u a l  i s  o f ten  concerned with d i f f e r e n t ­
i a t i o n ,  i t  i s  a l so  t r u e  t h a t  myth i s  a l so  im plica ted  in u n d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t i o n .  Myth as well as r i t u a l  r e s o r t s  t o  make-believe in order  
to  j o i n  t o g e th e r  e n t i t i e s  which have been d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  by language 
(1978: 156).  Girard goes on t o  say t h a t  both myth and r i t u a l  employ 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  of  something which language cannot  exp res s .
‘ In myth, th e  same r e p r e s e n t a t io n s  a re  p ra i s ed  (by Lev i -S t rauss)  
a t  l e a s t  i m p l i c i t l y ,  s ince  we would not  even know without  
them t h a t  t h e  myth in tends  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  c e r t a i n  o b j e c t s .  We 
must have t h a t  f i r s t  moment when th e s e  o b je c t s  a re  supposed 
t o  be stuck  to g e th e r .  In r e a l i t y  th e  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  plays 
t h e  same r o l e  everywhere1 (1978: 157, my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  at tempt  t o  exp la in  t h e  presence  of  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
in myth as t h e  remnants of  ' b a s ta rd i z e d  myths t h a t  a re  p r im ar i ly  
th e  account of  some r i t u a l '  i s  not  adequate t o  defend the
' a s s i m i l a t i o n  of  myth with d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and of  r i t u a l  with 
th e  u n i d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . . .The two are  always p re s en t  t o g e th e r  
and t h e i r  ju x t a p o s i t i o n  produces th e  s tandard  p r o f i l e  of  
both myth and r i t u a l '  (1978: 157).
Why th e n ,  Girard asks,  does L ev i -S t rauss  a t tempt  to  deny t h i s  so 
vehemently? Par t  of  the  answer l i e s  in th e  p r iv i l e g e d  p o s i t i o n  
s t r u c t u r a l i s m  accords to  language.  But, according t o  Gira rd ,
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L ev i -S t rauss  has o the r  aims in mind. Through h i s  d ism issa l  of 
r i t u a l ,  L^v i -S t rauss  i s  ab le not  only t o  e x to l  language,  but  he 
is  a l s o  ab le  t o  a s s im i l a t e  non-verbal  p r a c t i c e s  t o  r e l i g i o u s  
behav iour ,  s ince  'L ev i -S t r auss  i s  almost  as eager  t o  c a s t i g a t e  
r e l i g i o n  as t o  ex to l  language* (1978: 158). L e v i - S t r a u s s 1s 
ambivalent  a t t i t u d e  towards metaphysics prov ides  a f u r t h e r  motive.
'Th is  t h i r d  be ta  no i r e  i s  a l so  a s s im i la t e d  to  r i t u a l .  The 
d e f i n i t i o n  of  r i t u a l  as ' a  n o s t a l g i a  f o r  t h e  immediate1 has a 
c u r io u s l y  ph i losoph ica l  r ing  f o r  an a n t h ro p o l o g i s t .  One of 
t h e  reasons  could be t h a t  i t  i s  a l so  L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  philosophy* (1978: 158).
What Lev i -S t rauss  ends by doing,  according  t o  Girard ,  i s  to  
r ev e r se  t h e  metaphysics of  Bergson, who had hoped t h a t  a f u tu r e  
n a tu ra l  sc ience  would be ab le t o  t r anscend  t h e  inadequacy of  r i g i d  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  Lev i -S trauss  t h in k s  t h a t  th e  r e c e n t  d iscovery  of 
the  ge n e t ic  code in d i c a te s  t h a t  th e  p r e c i s e  oppos i te  w i l l  t ake  p lace  
The ge n e t ic  code i s  an assurance  t h a t  he can now put  a name t o
' t h a t  p r i n c i p l e  of  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  t h a t  governs th e  works of 
n a tu re  as well as of  c u l t u r e ;  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  moves th e  e n t i r e  
un ive rse  and f i n a l l y  becomes conscious  of  i t s e l f ,  f i r s t  in a 
crude mythological  form, l a t e r  in t h e  works of  science*
(1978: 159). (3)
Thus, says Girard ,  Bergson 's  old e lan  v i t a l  has been r e c o n s t i t ­
uted and renamed by Lev i -S trauss  as an elan  d i f f e r e n c i a t e u r , or  
c o d i f i c a t e u r . Both Bergson and Lev i -S t rauss  r e p la c e  r e a l i t y  and 
the  mind by a metaphysical  p r i n c i p l e .  But ' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n *  here 
becomes a b lanke t  term whose amorphous ub iqu i ty  covers a s tud ied  
vagueness on Levi -S trauss*s  p a r t .
' R e a l i t y ' s  being a s s im i la t e d  t o  a pure u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  does 
not  sugges t  in what manner i t  should be carved.  I t  provides 
no g u id e l in e s  to  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  opera tes  
in t h e  void .  Any mode of  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i s  as good or  bad 
as any o th e r '  (1978: 159).
But Lev i -S t rauss  h imself  denies  such metaphys ica l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  on hi 
p a r t .  When he becomes aware of  i t ,  he a t t r i b u t e s  i t  t o  myth i t s e l f .  
'Mythic though t '  t r iumphs y e t  again f o r  'we r e a l i s e  t h a t  th e  reading 
of  mythology depends even more on metaphysics than my previous 
remarks have a l ready  made c l e a r '  (Gira rd  1978: 160). L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s
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argument i s  f lawed not  because of  h i s  two c a t e g o r i e s  of  d i f f e r e n t i ­
a t ion  and u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ;  they  a re  an impor tant  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  The 
problem f o r  Girard is  t h a t  Lev i -S t rauss  cannot  u t i l i z e  them f u l l y  
because he makes them in to  metaphysica l  a b s o lu t e s .  (I would add t h a t  
L ev i -S t rauss  a l so  makes them in to  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  u n i v e r s a l s . )
Girard con t inues  by saying t h a t  Lev i -S t rauss
'does not  give c r e d i t  t o  the  con junc t ive  elements in h i s  own 
symbolic network; we must not  fo l low him when he says t h a t  
myth alone i s  'good t o  t h i n k ' ,  when he excommunicates r i t u a l  
from an thropology,  and when he equates  th e  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
with r i t u a l *  (1978: 163).
Girard  then  proceeds t o  inc o rpo ra te  h i s  c r i t i q u e  of  Lev i -S trauss  
in to  h i s  own argument as t o  t h e  n a tu re  of  r i t u a l ,  an argument he had 
s e t  out  a t  length in a prev ious  work (1977).  B r i e f l y ,  Girard sees  
a l l  symbolism, and t h a t  conta ined  in r i t u a l  p r a c t i c e s  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  
as ev idence of  a ' 'mimetic c r i s i s ' *  t h a t  i s  always a t  work in human 
r e a l i t y .  Socia l  l i f e  c o n s ta n t ly  produces exper iences  and behaviour 
which a re  im i t a t i v e ;  so,  th e  d e s i r e  f o r  th e  o th e r  i s  t h e  d e s i r e  to  
be l i k e  t h e  o th e r .  In mimetic r i v a l r y ,  t h i s  d e s i r e  i s  t ransformed 
in to  i t s  o p p o s i t e ,  namely th e  d e s i r e  t o  be as un l ike  th e  o th e r  as 
p o s s i b l e  and,  u l t im a te ly ,  th e  d e s i r e  f o r  th e  e l im in a t io n  of  th e  o th e r .  
The f i g u r e  of  t h e  scapegoat  looms la rge  he re .  Both myths and 
r i t u a l s  revea l  a t  t h e i r  c e n t r e  a moment of  r e s o l u t i o n  in which th e  
c r i s i s  reaches  i t s  he ig h t .  This i s  th e  p o in t  a t  which the  many 
subsume t h e i r  in d iv idua l  r i v a l r i e s  in t h e  c r e a t i o n  of  a s a c r i f i c i a l  
s u b je c t  who i s  endowed with a l l  t h e  e v i l  which has,  the reby ,  been 
expel led  from th e  community. In t h e  a c t  of  s a c r i f i c e  o r ,  i f  you 
l i k e ,  of  r i t u a l  murder, the  s a c r i f i c i a l  v ic t im  is  t ransformed from 
being th e  in c a rn a t io n  of  t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  e v i l ,  t o  t h a t  of  t r a n s c e n d ­
e n t a l  good. This t r ans fo rm a t ion  achieves two r e s u l t s ;  i t  e l im in a te s  
th e  g u i l t  of  t h e  community, and i t  r e in c o r p o r a t e s  th e  v ic t im in to  
th e  community by making him th e  gua ran to r  of  th e  f u t u r e  peace of  the  
community (G ira rd ,  1977).
In h i s  l a t e r  a r t i c l e ,  Girard cla ims t h a t  L ev i -S t rauss  t r e a t s :  
r i t u a l  as j u s t  such a scapegoa t .  R itua l  f o r  him has become the  
s o lu t i o n  t o  t h e  problem of ' t h o s e  phenomena t h a t  do not  respond
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proper ly  t o  th e  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  method1 (Gira rd ,  1978: 166) (4)
In r i t u a l  Lev i -S trauss  has found an i n s t i t u t i o n  which i s  ' a  sense­
le ss  r e v o l t  a g a in s t  th e  very essence  of  human i n t e l l i g e n c e 1 
(1978: 167).  What does Lev i -S t rauss  do here? G i r a r d ' s  answer i s  
t h a t  L ev i -S t rauss  takes  a l l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  away from r i t u a l  and 
gives  i t  t o  mythology; a t  t h e  same t ime ,  he t a k e s  away a l l  
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  from myth, and g ives  i t  t o  r i t u a l .  This r e d i s t ­
r i b u t i o n  i s  however not  e n t i r e l y  symmetrical ,  f o r
' i n  o rde r  to  t u rn  myth in to  th e  sacred  temple o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  
some of t h e  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  must be kep t  t h e r e ,  acknowledged 
as such,  or  almost as such'  (1978: 167).
L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  h i s  v i l l a i n  o f  th e  p iece ,  remains 
e v i l  u n t i l  a l i t t l e  b i t  o f  i t  i s  seen t o  n e c e s s a r i l y  remain in 
myth. When i t  i s  seen to  be so,  i t  i s  claimed by myth f o r  i t s  own.
So ' r i t u a l  i s  expel led  as th e  so le  and complete embodiment of  the  
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d '  (1978: 168). But t h i s  i s  no t  a l l .  The 
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  elements n e c e s s a r i l y  al lowed t o  remain in myth 
undergo a dynamic t r an s fo rm a t io n .
'L e f t  t o  i t s e l f ,  the  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i s  pure d i s i n t e g r a t i o n ;  
once transmuted by expu ls ion ,  i t  holds t h e  key t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
of  myth as a s e l f - o r g a n i z in g  system'  (1978: 168).
Girard sees L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  manipula t ion  of  t h e  ' u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 1 
as a p a r a l l e l  with P l a t o ' s  denouncement o f  w r i t i n g  in The Phaedrus 
as ana lysed by Derrida (1981).  Ritua l  i s  L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  pharmakon; 
i f  taken  in l a rg e  doses i t  i s  poison,  but  i f  taken in small amounts 
as p r e s c r ib e d ,  i t  i s  medicine.  Girard goes on t o  say t h a t  we should 
a l so  view P l a t o ' s  expulsion of  th e  poet  from th e  Republic as being 
on a par  with L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  expulsion  o f  r i t u a l  from th e  temple of  
s t r u c t u r a l i s m .  For Gira rd ,  as a g a in s t  L e v i -S t r a u s s ,  r i t u a l  is  
'an e a r l i e r  e f f o r t  to  expel  th e  "e v i l  mixture" and make c u l t u r e  sa fe  
f o r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n '  (1978: 169). G i r a r d ' s  n e x t  move marks th e  
cu lminat ion  of  h i s  argument. For a l l  r i t u a l  expuls ions  must 
themselves be expe l led  -  e x p e l led ,  t h a t  i s ,  from consc iousness .
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L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  expulsion of  r i t u a l  must i t s e l f  be expe l led  by him. 
Like th o se  r e l i g i o u s  t e x t s  which claim t o  deny v io lence  but  which 
in r e a l i t y  a re  w r i t t e n  only t o  conceal  i t ,  so too
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' t h e  Lev i -S t raus s ian  t e x t  i s  genera ted  by a new expu ls ion ,  in 
many re s p e c t s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  th e  r i t u a l  one; what i s  expe l led  i s  
t h e  expulsion  i t s e l f ,  but  so i t  i s  a l ready  in t h e  r e l i g i o u s  
forms '  (1978: 169).
For Girard  ' t h e  t r u t h  of  t h e  expu ls ion '  l i e s  in i t s  being ' t h e  
e s s e n t i a l  taboo of  human c u l t u r e ;  f a r  from t r a n s g r e s s i n g  i t ,  the  
second-genera t ion  expulsion r e in f o r c e s  t h i s  t aboo '  (1978: 169).
What i s  the reby  genera ted  i s  a new t e x t ,  in which th e  newly f a b r i c ­
ated metaphysical  no tions  in troduced  by way of  exp lana t ion  and 
' d e m y s t i f i c a t i o n '  opera te  in e x a c t ly  th e  same way as t h a t  which had 
formerly  been e xpe l led .  All p o s t - r i t u a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  Girard 
concludes ,  a re  genera ted  in t h i s  way. They a l l  o p e ra te  on th e  b a s i s  
of  second-genera t ion  expulsions  t h a t  'expe l  t h e  former agent  of 
expu l s ion '  (1978: 169). He s p e c i f i c a l l y  mentions t h e  t h e a t r e ,  
ph ilosophy ,  th e  j u d i c i a l  system and a l l  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
I accep t  G i r a rd ' s  c r i t i q u e  of  L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  p o s i t i o n ,  and in 
p a r t i c u l a r  of  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  d ism issa l  of  r i t u a l  a c t i v i t y  as a locus 
of  coherence and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y .  I would sugges t ,  however, t h a t  
G i r a r d ' s  p r i v i l e g i n g  of  r i t u a l  (exempli f ied  by h i s  no tion  of  the  
u n iv e rs a l  expulsion  of  the  scapegoa t  as ' t h e  e s s e n t i a l  taboo of  
human c u l t u r e ' )  i s  comparable t o  L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  p r i v i l e g i n g  of  
language.  For Girard ,  r i t u a l  becomes an a n a l y t i c a l  ca tegory  par  
e x c e l l e n c e , and he thus  opens h im se lf  t o  a c r i t i q u e  of  essence j u s t  
as Lev i -S t raus s  is  open to  D e r r id a ' s  c r i t i q u e  o f  logoccentr i sm .
In t h i s  I n t roduc t ion  I have adduced va r ious  examples of  anthropo­
lo g i c a l  ana lyses  of  r i t u a l  in o rde r  t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  a re  problems 
a s s o c ia t e d  with any a t tempt a t  a u n iv e r s a l ,  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  theory  
of  r i t u a l .  Rather than at tempt a comprehensive survey of  the  
h i s t o r y  of  t h e  an th ropo log ica l  ca tegory  o f  r i t u a l ,  which would have 
been unmanageable and in a p p ro p r i a te  in t h i s  co n te x t ,  I have focused 
on r e c e n t  at tempts  to  r e - d e f i n e  (and /o r  t o  devalue) t h e  notion of  
flr i t u a l “ in t h e  l i g h t  o f  contemporary t r e n d s .  I would suggest  
t h a t  t h e r e  a re  a l so  problems in any at tempt t o  c o n s t r u c t  a 
u n iv e rs a l  theo ry  of  performance,  which i s  why I s top  s h o r t  of  
a t tempt ing  a d e f i n i t i o n  of  t h e  l a t t e r  and why I p r e f e r  t o  merely 
s t a t e  an i n t e n t i o n  to  open up th e  s u b je c t  f o r  th e  em pir ica l  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  th e  d i f f e r e n t  r i t u a l s  and performances which take  
p lace  in d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s .  My s t r e s s  on performance a r i s e s  from
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an at tempt a t  a re-examinat ion of  e x i s t i n g  an th ropo log ica l  
c a t e g o r i e s .
I t  i s  my con ten t ion  t h a t  Ba teson 's  Naven can u s e f u l l y  be read as an 
e a r ly  t e x t  in an anthropology o f  performance;  I a l so  sugges t  t h a t  
i t  i s  a t e x t  which co n t in u a l ly  a t tempts  t o  de c o n s t ru c t  i t s e l f  
-  or  t o  unfold i t s  own t e n s io n s  and oppos i t ions  -  in ways which 
f ind  sympathet ic  echoes in the  anthropology o f  th e  p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l i s t  
e r a .  For t h e s e  and o th e r  reasons ,  Naven i s  a c r u c i a l  t e x t  f o r  
a n t h ro p o lo g i s t s  of  th e  1980s and 1990s. A f te r  p resen t ing  a b r i e f  
summary of  Ba teson 's  background, in th e  main body of  th e  t h e s i s  
I w i l l  pursue a d econs t ruc t !ve  reading  of  Ba teson 's  t e x t .  I w i l l  
t h e r e f o r e  fo l low i t  c l o s e l y ,  chap te r  by c h a p t e r .  In th e  concluding 
se c t io n  of  th e  t h e s i s  I w i l l  review some o f  th e  more re c e n t  works 
which seem r e l e v a n t  to  a performance p e r s p e c t iv e  and, in th e  l i g h t  of  
th e se  and of  my d e t a i l e d  co n s id e ra t io n  of  Naven, I w i l l  a s sess  
the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  an anthropology of  performance.
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NOTES to  Chapter One
( 1) For a “ d e c o n s t ru c t iv e "  c r i t i q u e  of  A u s t in ' s  speech ac t  
th e o ry ,  see Derrida (1977).  A luc id  ex p o s i t io n  of  D e r r id a ' s  
argument, and the  subsequent debate between Derrida and 
S e a r l e ,  i s  provided by Norris  (1982: 109-112).
(2) I would comment here t h a t  according  t o  a theme which runs a l l
t h e  way through the  Mythologiques, myth too  “ goes in f o r  a 
r i o t  of  r e p e t i t i o n " .
(3) I t  might be p r o f i t a b l e  t o  compare L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  ex tens ion  of
th e  not ion  of  ' d i s c o n t i n u i t y '  t o  ' t h e  e n t i r e  u n iv e rs e '  with 
Ba teson 's  claim t h a t  t h e  processes  of  'mind'  and of  ' e v o lu t io n '  
a re  coterminous.  See FORM, SUBSTANCE AND DIFFERENCE in 
Bateson (1973).
(4) I t  w i l l  perhaps be ev iden t  from my reading  of  Naven in my 
l a t e r  chap te rs  t h a t  Bateson h imse lf  was not  innocent  in t h i s  
r e s p e c t .  For a ph i lo soph ica l  co n s id e ra t io n  o f  a s i m i l a r ,  and 
no doubt connected,  problem see Rorty (ed.  1980). The te n o r  
of  much o f  th e  work in t h i s  volume i s  t h a t  emotions in th e  
West a re  defined  pure ly  n e g a t iv e l y ,  as t h e  absence of  co g n i t io n .  
This ,  o f  course,  i s  e x a c t ly  how Lev i -S t rauss  t r e a t s  r i t u a l
in h i s  F in a le .
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CHAPTER TWO: GREGORY BATESON -  THE BACKGROUND
EVEN A CURSORY reading! of; Batesohts^ biographidal :  dHaailsusuctgests  
a number o f  p o s s ib le  reasons f o r ,  as Adam Kuper put  i t ,  h i s  ' r a t h e r . . .  
s t r ange  r e p u ta t io n  in B r i t i s h  an thropology'  ( in  Bateson 1973: 9) .
Born in to  a prominent Cambridge academic fami ly in 1904, Bateson grad­
uated from h is  f a t h e r ' s  c o l l e g e ,  St J o h n ' s ,  in n a t u ra l  sc ience ,  
changed to  anthropology and c a r r i e d  ou t  f ie ld -w ork  in New Guinea where 
he met Margaret Mead. They were married in 1936, th e  year  Naven 
was pub l i shed ,  and then Bateson and Mead c a r r i e d  out  j o i n t  f ie ld -work  
in B a l i .  In 1940 Bateson went t o  the  United S t a t e s ,  which was to  be 
h is  base f o r  th e  r e s t  of  h is  l i f e .  He was made an American c i t i z e n  
in 1956, and he did not r e tu rn  t o  England u n t i l  1968 when he took 
p a r t  in t h e  D ia l e c t i c s  of L ibe ra t ion  Conference in London. The 
United S ta t e s  remained h is  home u n t i l  h i s  death in 1980.
Bateson was thus  both English and American and th e  combination was 
c r u c i a l ,  not  only f o r  the  e x t e rn a l  even ts  of  h is  l i f e ,  but a l so  in 
terms of  h is  i n t e l l e c t u a l  development. Bateson was taugh t  an th ropo l ­
ogy as a pos tg radua te  a t  Cambridge by Haddon, who had himse lf  been 
t r a i n e d  as a zo o lo g i s t  before  th e  famous 1898 exped i t ion  with Rivers.  
A f te r  h is  e a r l y  B r i t i s h  education and n a tu ra l  sc ience  and anthropology,  
he met and married Mead, whose t r a i n i n g  had been in t h e  very d i f f e r e n t  
Boasian school of  American c u l t u r a l  anthropology.
By th e  t ime he wrote Naven, Bateson had a l ready  d iscussed  with 
Mead her  ideas  and those of  Ruth Benedict ,  Mead's contemporary and 
another  s tu d en t  of  Boas. F u r the r ,  while in t h e  f i e l d  in New Guinea, 
Bateson had access t o  a copy of  the  manuscript  o f  B ened ic t ' s  P a t t e rn s  
of  Culture  which the  l a t t e r  s en t  out  t o  Mead. Benedict  and Mead had 
both been s tuden ts  of  Franz Boas, o f ten  regarded as the  founder of  
American anthropology,  which in c o n t r a - d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  B r i t i s h  " s o c i a l " 
anthropology was avowedly " c u l t u r a l ". Boas' school o f  " h i s t o r i c a l  
p a r t i c u l a r i s m "  had been in sp i re d  by German Romanticism and the  w r i t ings  
of Kant and D i l th ^ .  This r e s u l t e d  in th e  development of  an an throp­
ology in t h e  United S ta t e s  which was c l o s e r  t o  what some would c a l l  
" t h e  humanit ies"  - with an a t t e n d a n t  i n t e r e s t  in a e s t h e t i c s ,  c u l t u r a l  
s t y l e  and Freudian and g e s t a l t  psychology - than th e  s c i e n t i f i c ,  or
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p s e u d o - s c i e n t i f i c ,  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l  ism o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  school 
(H a r r i s ,  1968: 250-289).
The c o l l i s i o n  between th e  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l  ism of Bateson 's  
e a r l y  t r a i n i n g  in both biology and anthropology and th e  humanis t ic ,  
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e ,  t e n o r  o f  th e  American Boasian school provides  one 
of  th e  e s s e n t i a l  t e n s ions  in Naven. This t e n s io n  c o n t r ib u ted  in no 
small measure t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  many, i f  not  most,  o f  Bateson 's  con­
temporar ie s  found the  book unreadable  a t  th e  t ime of  i t s  f i r s t  pub­
l i c a t i o n  in 1936, a v e r d i c t  with which Bateson h im se lf  r a t h e r  d isarmingly  
agreed in h i s  Epilogue to  the  second,  1958, e d i t i o n .
Another reason f o r  Bateson 's  p e c u l i a r ,  i f  not  in v id io u s ,  r e p u t ­
a t ion  in B r i t i s h  soc ia l  anthropology i s  t h a t  even in t h e  f i r s t  
e d i t i o n  of  Naven he revea led  a t a s t e  f o r  t r a n s d i s c i p l i n a r y  a n a ly s i s  
which made h i s  book a t  be s t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  read  f o r  those  expecting an 
ethnography in th e  s t y l e  of  Argonauts of  t h e  Western P a c i f i c  or  The 
Andaman I s l a n d e r s , and which led him with in  a few yea rs  out  of  an throp­
ology and in to  o the r  areas  of  r e s e a rc h .
The incomprehension which g ree ted  the  p u b l i c a t i o n  of  Naven - 
d e s p i t e  an a p p re c ia t iv e  and encouraging review by Radcliffe-Brown 
(1937: 172-174) - served to  a l i e n a t e  Bateson f u r t h e r  from an academic 
e s tab l i shm en t  with which he a l ready  f e l t  di senchanted  (L ipse t  1982:
139, 146, 151, 156). The usual  p rogress ion  o f  t h e  c a r e e r  of  a s o c ia l  
a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ,  then as now, was in th e  o rd e r  of  f ie ld -w o rk ,  w r i t ing  
up f ie ld -w ork  no tes ,  complet ion of  a t h e s i s  and th e  award of  a PhD 
or s im i l a r  doc to ra l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  fol lowed by teach ing  and p u b l i c a t i o n .  
Bateson did not  f i t  in to  t h a t  mould n e a t l y .  He ta u g h t  f o r  a while a t  
Cambridge in th e  1930s, and subsequently  held many p r e s t i g io u s  pos ts  
in America as well as being t h e  r e c i p i e n t  o f  a number of  success ive  
r esearch  g r a n t s  f o r  h is  var ious  p r o j e c t s .  But he was never gran ted 
a d o c to ra te  and he was never accepted w ith in  th e  ranks of  the  p r o f e s s ­
ion of  B r i t i s h  s o c ia l  an thropology.  His se lf - im posed  e x i l e  in 
America must be counted as only one reason f o r  t h i s  exc lu s ion .
How f a r  t h i s  was a m a t te r  of  personal  cho ice cannot  be s a id ,  but  
L i p s e t ' s  biography (1982) i n d i c a te s  t h a t  Bateson had l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t
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in j o i n in g  those  ranks .  There can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t ,  as Edmund 
Leach wrote in h is  ob i tua ry  of  Bateson,  'he  was never a convent ional  
academic'  (1980: 9 ) .  His c a r e e r  switched from anthropology to  cyber ­
n e t i c  r e sea rch  t o  psych ia t ry  t o  animal ethology to  ecology;  of ten  
he was working in two or  more areas  a t  t h e  same t im e .  This was h is  
ou ts tand ing  f e a t u r e  as a t h i n k e r ,  f o r  he was arguably a t  h i s  b e s t  
when s tand ing  in th e  no-man's- land between two domains and t r y i n g  
to  draw ideas  from each.  Leach has confirmed t h a t  in th e  1930s
' i n  th e  working s i t u a t i o n  in s o c i a l  anthropology in Cambridge 
a t  t h a t  t i m e . . . t h e r e  was no one who r e a l l y  understood what 
Gregory was t a l k i n g  a b o u t1 (Leach, quoted in L ipse t  1982: 140).
In h i s  1980 o b i tu a ry  Leach agrees  t h a t  Naven i s  ' v i r t u a l l y  un read a b le1 
but  he adds:
' i t  con ta in s  enough o r i g i n a l  ideas  t o  f i l l  a l i b r a r y . . . A  g re a t  
deal  o f  contemporary s o c ia l  and c u l t u r a l  anthropology which i s  
commonly thought t o  have i t s  r o o t s  in t h e  w r i t i n g s  of Levi- 
S t r a u s s ,  and in r e a c t io n s  t o  varying s t y l e s  of  ethnology and 
soc iob io logy ,  in f a c t  comes from Bateson and e s p e c i a l l y  from 
Naven (1980: 8 -9 ) .
In terms of  q u a n t i t y ,  Ba teson 's  publ i shed work as an a n th ropo l ­
o g i s t  i s  s l i g h t .  I t  c o n s i s t s  of  Naven (1936: 1958), th e  book he 
wrote in c o l l a b o r a t io n  with Mead, B a l i : A Photographic Analysis  
(1942), and t h e  hal f-dozen  o r  so a r t i c l e s  of  d i r e c t  an th ropo log ica l  
import included in the  c o l l e c t e d  papers Steps t o  an Ecology of  Mind 
(1973) t o g e th e r  with o the r  papers publi shed  in var ious  s c h o la r ly  
j o u r n a l s .  Bateson 's  b iographer ,  David L ip se t ,  wrote:
' I  o f ten  heard him decry th e  t r a p p in g s  of  g r e a tn e s s  - a system­
a t i c  th e o ry ,  o r  an organized school of  s t u d e n t s ,  o r  even a 
t h i c k  s e t  of  c o l l e c t a b l e  works - because he f e l t  they  genera ted  
dogma' (1982: 304).
There i s ,  however, good reason f o r  b e l i e v in g  t h a t  Bateson was 
never a c t u a l l y  happy with h i s  t r a c k  record  as an a n t h ro p o l o g i s t .  The 
evidence comes from h is  own words, as w itness  t h e s e  t e l l i n g  l in e s  
from t h e  c lo s ing  pages of  Naven:
' I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  I have co n t r ib u te d  but  l i t t l e  t o  our s t o r e  of 
an th ropo log ica l  f a c t s  and t h a t  th e  in format ion about Iatmul 
c u l t u r e  which I have used in th e  var ious  chap te r s  does no more
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than  i l l u s t r a t e  my methods . . .my supply of  f a c t s  i s  meagre, 
and I c e r t a i n l y  cannot claim t h a t  my f a c t s  have demonstrated 
t h e  t r u t h  of  any th e o r y . . . n o n e  of  my t h e o r i e s  i s  in any sense 
new o r  s t r a n g e .  They a re  a l l  t o  some e x t e n t  p l a t i t u d e s '
(Bateson 1936: 278-279).
This s e l f - e f f a c i n g  apology reads l i k e  an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  excuse f o r  
r a t h e r  t h i n n i s h ,  o r  a t  any r a t e  u n t idy ,  f i e ld -w ork  note s  and c o n t r a s t s  
d ra m a t ic a l ly  with Leach's  panegyric quoted above. In l a t e r  y e a r s ,  
c e r t a i n t y  as t o  h i s  own p lace  in th e  scheme of th in g s  seems t o  have 
eluded Bateson.  In 1970, a t  th e  age of  66, he t o l d  an audience of  
l i n g u i s t s ,  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  and o th e rs
' I  am no t  a very w e l l - read  ph i losophe r ,  and philosophy i s  not 
my bu s in es s .  I am not  a very w e l l - r e ad  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ,  and 
anthropology i s  not  e x a c t ly  my b u s in e s s '  (Bateson 1 9 7 3 ( e ) :  423).
He goes on to  at tempt  a d e f i n i t i o n  of  what e x a c t ly  has been h is  
bus iness  and i t  i s  worth c i t i n g :
‘ I have s tud ied  the  area  of  impact between very a b s t r a c t  and 
formal ph i losophic  thought on th e  one hand and th e  n a tu ra l  
h i s t o r y  of  man and o th e r  c r e a tu r e s  on th e  o t h e r .  This over lap  
between formal premises and ac tua l  behaviour i s ,  I a s s e r t ,  of  
q u i t e  d readfu l  importance to day '  (1973 (e ) : 423).
This sounds,  on th e  face  of  i t ,  a r a t h e r  grand c laim. I t  c e r t a i n l y  
sounds f a r  removed from what a re  cons idered  th e  more usua l ,  and more 
modest,  concerns of  a s o c ia l  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  - t h a t  i s  t o  say,  to  
convey something about th e  s o c ia l  o rg a n iz a t i o n ,  way of  l i f e  and ways 
of  thought of  th e  members of  a p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t y .  But any an th ropo l ­
o g i s t ' s  p i c t u r e  of  a s o c ie ty  hangs on a theo ry  o r  group of  t h e o r i e s ,  
and th e s e  t h e o r i e s  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  epiphenomena of  assumptions which 
th e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ,  knowingly or  unknowingly, c a r r i e s  around in h i s  
head.  All ethnography i s  based on th e o ry ,  i f  f o r  no o th e r  reason than 
t h a t  a l l  ethnography re q u i re s  s e l e c t i o n  of  f a c t s  from th e  wealth of 
c o l l e c t e d  da ta  (which in i t s e l f  had been s e l e c t e d  in the  f i e l d )  and 
p r e s e n t a t i o n ;  or  in o the r  words, framing.  There i s  no such th in g  as 
an unframed d e s c r i p t i o n .  So t h a t  we can say perhaps t h a t  in th e  
1930s B a teson 's  'very a b s t r a c t  and formal ph i losoph ic  though t '  had 
been h i s  own, and th e  ' n a tu r a l  h i s t o r y  of  man' had been rep resen ted  
in h i s  an th ropo log ica l  work by h is  da ta  on th e  Iatmul and the  
Ba l inese .
33
L a te r ,  Bateson became concerned with problems a r i s i n g  out  of  th e  
genera l  epistemology of Western c u l t u r e ,  al though t h i s  concern i s  
apparent  a l ready  in t h e  pages of  Naven. In the  1950s, f o r  example, 
he app l ied  h is  ep i s temolog ica l  concern t o  an at tempt a t  unders tand­
ing d i s t o r t e d  p a t t e r n s  of  communication in th e  f a m i l i e s  of  p a t i e n t s  
who had been diagnosed as menta l ly i l l .  In t h i s  work th e  dichotomy 
between formal premises and ac tua l  behaviour became t h a t  of  Western 
c u l t u r e ,  i f  no t  th e  human spec ie s  per  se {1973(d >173-198 and passsim) .  
I t  might appear from t h i s  t h a t  Bateson did not  escape a common 
f a t e  of  s o c i a l  a n th ro p o lo g i s t s ,  t h a t  of  ex tending h i s  an th ropo log ica l  
ne t  t o  inc lude  everybody and every s o c i e t y .  How f a r  was he g u i l t y  
of  t h e  secondary ethnocentr i sm a g a in s t  which Leach p ro te s t e d  in h is  
Rethinking Anthropology? Was Bateson s t i l l  working ou t  a model of  
Iatmul s o c i a l  dynamics in h i s  work on th e  use of  c y b e rn e t i c s  in so c ia l  
r e sea rch  in th e  1940s? Did th e  double bind theory  of  sch izophrenia  
which he pioneered in th e  1950s owe i t s  o r ig i n s  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
of  b i t s  and p ieces  of  Iatmul and Bal inese  ethnography?
When Bateson 's  c a r e e r  i s  viewed in i t s  e n t i r e t y  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  
d i sce rn  a p a t t e r n  which sub t ly  r e s i s t s  any at tempt a t  t r a n s l a t i o n  in to  
a s imple 11 grand theory'*.  There i s  no Batesonian model o f  mankind to  
s e t  bes ide  L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  homo sapiens  s t r u c t u r a l  i s . There i s  however 
a r eco g n i sa b le  Batesonian methodology with i t s  unique combination of 
b io logy ,  systems theory  and a humanist a e s t h e t i c s  which seeks to  
p r i v i l e g e  n e i t h e r  behaviour nor c r e a t i v i t y  bu t  t o  see one r e f l e c t e d  
in the  o t h e r .  There are  a number o f  important  themes which run 
a l l  t h e  way through h is  w r i t i n g ,  from Naven t o  th e  posthumously 
publ ished Angels Fear (1987).  These inc lude th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
c u l t u r e  and nature? the  d i f f e r e n c e s  in forms of  e x p lan a t io n ,  
unders tand ing and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  in sc ien c e ,  a r t  and anthropology 
and p sych ia t ry jan d  mental process  as th e  workings of  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  
o rder  immanent in both thought and in e v o l u t io n .  For Bateson, i t  
was impor tan t  t o  view mind and n a tu re ,  as he put  i t  in the  t i t l e  
of h i s  l a s t  book, as a ’necessary  u n i t y 1 (1980).  In words w r i t t e n  
a t  t h e  end of  h i s  l i f e ,  he descr ibed  how he saw r ig o u r  and imaginat ion ,  
' t h e  two g r e a t  c o n t r a r i e s  of  mental p r o c e s s ' ,  as analogous to  
g ene t ic  r e p l i c a t i o n  and mutat ion r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( 1 980: 233 and passim).
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Whatever h i s  r e p u ta t io n  as an a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ,  Gregory Bateson 
remained a n a tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t  a l l  h is  l i f e .  He was never e x c lu s iv e ly  
one nor t h e  o th e r ,  but a combination.  I t  must be sa id  t h a t  th e  
a n t h ro p o l o g i s t  and th e  n a tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t  were o f ten  a t  odds ,but  
the  r e s u l t i n g  te n s io n s  produced some remarkable work. These 
t e n s io n s  have been convincingly  and ev o c a t iv e ly  t r a c e d  to  t h e i r  
o r ig i n s  in Ba teson 's  family background by David L ipse t  in th e  
l a t t e r 1s d e t a i l e d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  biography (1982).  L i p s e t 1s pre face  
r e f e r s  t o  t h e  c u l t u r a l  m i l ieu  of  l a t e  V ic to r ian  England as one in 
which
‘e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  s o c ie ty  was s t r a i n e d  by t h e  emergence o f  modern 
knowledge, s t a t u s e s ,  sex r o l e s ,  f am i ly ,  and educa t ion .  An 
abundance of  highly charged p o l a r i t i e s  marked th in k in g  then :  
s p i r i t u a l i s m  - evo lu tion ism,  idea l i sm - m a te r ia l i sm  and 
c l a s s i c i s m  -  modernism1 (L ipse t  1982: x i i ) .
There were c l a shes  between p r i e s t s  and s c i e n t i s t s ,  and between 
f a t h e r s  and sons,  and many uncompromsing a t t i t u d e s  were taken up.
But t h e r e  were a few in d iv id u a l s  whose d e s t i n i e s  r equ i re d  an at tempt 
t o  r e s o lv e  th e s e  and o the r  dual isms.  Gregory Bateson was one such 
i n d iv id u a l :  he was not
‘a man who found h is  n iche ,  n o r . . . o n e  who f i t  n e a t ly  with in  
s o c i a l  and p ro fe s s io n a l  l i f e .  Rather ,  (he was) . . .  a doubly 
a n a c h ro n i s t i c  man, who was both ahead of  and behind h i s  t im es '  
(1982: x i i ,  my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
Bateson was born in 1904, t h e  youngest  of  t h r e e  sons t o  the  
prominent Cambridge b i o l o g i s t  William Bateson.  The l a t t e r ,  a 
b r i l l i a n t  s c i e n t i s t  who coined th e  term ‘' g e n e t i c s ' 1 and whose p ion­
eer ing  work in t h a t  f i e l d  made him a leading f i g u r e  in th e  p os t -  
Darwinian n a t u ra l  s c ien c es ,  was a connoisseur  of  a r t  and l i t e r a t u r e .  
Ba teson 's  f a t h e r  saw a r t  a s 1 not  only a hea l thy  a n t i d o t e  to  s c i e n t i f i c  
r i g o u r ,  but  as a kind of  p recond i t ion  f o r  i t .  L ipse t  quotes 
Bateson s e n io r  as having w r i t t e n :
' I f  t h e r e  had been no poets  t h e r e  would have been no problems,  
f o r  s u r e ly  th e  u n l e t t e r e d  s c i e n t i s t  o f  today would never have 
found them. To him i t  i s  e a s i e r  t o  so lve  a d i f f i c u l t y  than t o  
f e e l  i t .  I t  i s  good, b e s id e s ,  t h a t  th e  Science man should be 
made to  know t h a t  t h e r e  was a people as sharp as he i s ,  who 
saw t h e  same Nature as he s ees ,  who read i t  o therwise  with no 
l e s s  confidence  than he'  (William Bateson,  quoted in L ipse t  
1982: 19)
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For Gregory Bateson,  however, t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between what might 
be termed a e s t h e t i c  app rec ia t ion  on th e  one hand, and i n t e l l e c t u a l  
a p p rec ia t io n  on th e  o th e r ,  was to  prove le s s  comfortab le  and more 
prob lemat ic  than t h i s .  I f  t h e  f a t h e r  noted and even applauded th e  
dichotomy, i t  was l e f t  t o  t h e  son t o  a t tempt t o  r e s o lv e  i t .  Indeed,  
i t  can be argued t h a t  th e  t e n s io n  between th e s e  two ways of seeing 
the  world provides  one of  th e  bas ic  themes of  Naven.
Gregory Bateson 's  l a t e r  concerns are p re f igu re d  elsewhere in h is  
f a t h e r ' s  comments in 1908 on Mendel's th eo ry :
'We a re  accustomed to  th ink  of  a man, a b u t t e r f l y ,  o r  an apple 
t r e e  as each one th i n g .  In o rder  t o  unders tand th e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  
of  Mendel ism we must ge t  thoroughly  f a m i l i a r  with th e  f a c t  t h a t  
they a re  each two t h i n g s ,  double th roughout every p a r t  of  t h e i r  
composit ion .  There is  perhaps no b e t t e r  e x e r c i s e  as a p rep a r ­
a t io n  f o r  gene t ic  r esearch  than  to  examine th e  people one meets 
in d a i l y  l i f e  and t o  t r y  in a rough way t o  analyze  them in to  th e  
two assemblages of  c h a ra c te r s  which a re  un i ted  in them'
(William Bateson,  quoted in L ipse t  1982: 36, B a teson 's  emphases).
In h i s  s c i e n t i f i c  work, William Bateson was convinced t h a t  d iv i s io n  
lay a t  t h e  h e a r t  of  h e red i ty  and v a r i a t i o n .  He wrote in 1909:
' I n  t h e  symmetry of the  d iv id ing  c e l l  th e  b as i s  of  t h a t  resemblance 
we c a l l  Heredity i s  con ta ined .  To im i ta t e  t h a t  morphological  
phenomena of  l i f e  we have t o  dev ise  a system which can d iv id e .
I t  must be ab le t o  d iv id e ,  and to  segment as - g ro s s ly  -  a 
v i b r a t i n g  p l a t e  or  rod does, or  as an i c i c l e  can do as i t  becomes 
r ibbed  in a continuous stream of  water;  but  with t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  
t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  chemical d i f f e r e n c e s  and p r o p e r t i e s  must 
s imul taneously  be decided and disposed in o rd e r ly  r e l a t i o n  to  
th e  p a t t e r n  of  th e  segmentat ion '  (William Bateson, quoted in 
L ipse t  1982: 23).
This c o r r e c t i v e  fo rce  he descr ibed  as a kind of  ' p o l a r i t y '  which
'cannot  be a proper ty  o f . . . m a t e r i a l , as such, but  i s  determined 
by a fo rc e  ac t ing  on th e  m a t e r i a l ,  j u s t  as th e  p o l a r i t y  of  the  
magnet i s  not  determined by th e  arrangement of i t s  p a r t i c l e s ,  
but  by th e  d i r e c t i o n  in which th e  c u r r e n t  f lows '  (quoted in 
L ip se t  1982: 23).
Twenty-five years  l a t e r ,  in h is  major work on Iatmul s o c ie ty  and 
c u l t u r e ,  Gregory Bateson was t o  augment t h i s  notion  of  symmetrical 
d iv i s i o n  with t h a t  of  a complementary p a t t e r n .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  
ar^ue t h a t  th e  f i r s t  in t im a t ions  of  th e  model of  schismogenetic
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s o c ia l  i n t e r a c t i o n  are  to  be found s c a t t e r e d  in th e  w r i t i n g s  of  
Ba teson 's  f a t h e r .
Around th e  tu rn  o f  the  century  William Bateson introduced the  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Mendelian s e l e c t i o n  to  England, and in 1905 he and 
his  co l leagues  proposed to  c a l l  t h e i r  s tudy of  h e r e d i ty  and v a r i a t i o n  
“ g e n e t i c s " .  L i p s e t ' s  account shows t h a t  t h e  i n s p i r a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  
new sc ience  of  g ene t ic s  sprang from a source which was d i s t r u s t f u l  
of both m a te r ia l i sm  and u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  A b e l i e f  in the  ' rhythmic 
o rd e r '  of  na tu re  was a foundat ion f o r  a l l  Bateson s e n i o r ' s  work.
'He t r i e d  t o  express t h i s  in terms of  v i s u a l  and formal 
ana log ies  t o  phenomena which possessed rhythmic o rder  and 
contained  undula tory motion,  o r  what he came to  c a l l  v ib r a t i o n s .  
Sand r i p p l e s  on th e  beach,  th e  z e b r a ' s  s t r i p e s ,  waves, and 
organic  segmentat ion a l l  o f f e red  themselves as in s tances  of  
both form and pe r iod ic  o s c i l l a t i o n  which Bateson suggested were 
"comparable" to  the  s e r i e s  of  segments formed by " the communication 
of  v i b r a t i o n s  in an E l a s t i c  Body" ' (L ip se t  1982: 22-23).
I mention here in pass ing L i p s e t ' s  observa t ion  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one 
h i s t o r i a n  of  s c ience ,  William Coleman, has argued t h a t  Bateson 's  
notion o f  ' rhythmic o rd e r '  owed much t o  h is  l i f e - l o n g  f r i e n d s h ip  
with th e  ph ilosopher  Whitehead. The two men
'shared  no t  only i n t e r e s t  and unders tanding  of  a r t  and th e  c l a s s i c s  
but  concern f o r  a p ress ing  problem, how to  r e c o n c i l e  p a t t e r n  or  
form, t h e  product  or  companion of  change less  geometry, with the  
inescapab le  dynamism of n a t u r e 1 (Coleman 1971, quoted in 
L ipse t  1982: fn 22).
This i s  of  i n t e r e s t ,  not  only because i t  p r e f ig u re s  Gregory Bateson 's  
own concerns with t h e  dual demands of  ' r i g o u r  and im a g in a t io n ' ,  but  
a l so  because Whitehead was th e  co -au thor  with Bert rand Russel l  of  
P r in c i p i a  Mathematica. This work, and in p a r t i c u l a r  th e  theory  of 
“ lo g ic a l  t y p e s ' 1 which issued from i t ,  was to  e x e r t  a cons ide rab le  
in f luence  on Gregory Bateson 's  th in k in g .  I w i l l  be dea l ing  with 
t h i s  t o p i c  in my Chapters Ten and Twelve.
37
Gregory Bateson passed th e  Natural  Science Tripos a t  Cambridge 
with f i r s t  c l a s s  honours in 1923, and in January of  th e  fol lowing 
year  he was chosen t o  r e t r a c e  Darwin’s s teps  in th e  Galapagos 
I s lands  as temporary n a t u r a l i s t  on th e  yacht  of  a vaca tion ing  
m i l l i o n a i r e .  A f te r  spending h is  21s t  b i r th d ay  thus  engaged, he 
r e tu rned  to  Cambridge r a t h e r  a t  a loss  as t o  what t o  do nex t .  Family 
p res su res  seemed to  be in c re a s in g ly  i r r i t a t i n g  him, as well as a 
growing f e e l i n g  of  awkwardness with h i s  p o s i t i o n  with in  t h e  Cambridge 
academic e l i t e  as a " BatesonM. He re sen ted  th e  pa th ,  a l b e i t  a 
b r i l l i a n t  one, which had been mapped out  f o r  him. L ipse t  quotes 
him say ing ,  about t h i s  per iod :
' I  moved out  of  zoology - t o  ge t  in to  something in which I was 
me and no t  son o f . . . I t  bothered me t h a t  I was named Gregory, 
a f t e r  Gregor Mendel1 (Bateson,  quoted in L ipse t  1982: 113).
Readers o f  Naven may r e c a l l  t h e  legend recounted in t h e  Foreword,
to  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  Bateson was int roduced  t o  anthropology by A*C.
Haddon ' t e l l i n g  me in a ra i lway t r a i n  between Cambridge and King's
Lynn t h a t  he would t r a i n  me and send me to  New Guinea'  (Bateson
1936: i x ) .  I t  seems from L i p s e t ' s  account t h a t  Bateson was drawn to
anthropology more in a s p i r i t  of  th e  e l im in a t io n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  than
by a p o s i t i v e  impulse; he had dipped in to  psychology and found t h a t
i t  ' d i d n ' t  make much s e n s e 1 (Bateson, quoted in L ipse t  1982: 114).
Haddon's own background seemed an i n s t r u c t i v e  example to  Bateson;
l ik e  many o th e r  e a r ly  B r i t i s h  a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  he had o r i g i n a l l y  t r a i n e d
as a n a tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t .  On th e  exped i t ion  t o  t h e  Torres S t r a i t  in
1898 he switched from marine bio logy to  an thropology.  By th e  time
he c o l l a r e d  Gregory Bateson in 1925, Haddon was becoming, with
Seligman and Rivers,  a member of  an o ld e r  genera t ion  of  B r i t i s h
a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s ,  a genera t ion  which, v ia  an in te rm ed ia te  enthusiasm
f o r  " d i f f u s i o n i s m " ,  had l e f t  behind th e  s p e c u la t i v e  h i s t o r i c i s m  of
the  Tylor -  F razer  e ra  f o r  a new concern with s o c i e t y ,  o r  r a t h e r  with
p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t i e s ,  s tud ie d  in t e n s iv e l y  a t  f i r s t  hand by means
of th e  new method of  f ie ld -w ork  - o r  " p a r t i c i p a n t  o b s e rv a t io n "  -
e s t a b l i s h e d  by Malinowski in th e  second decade of  th e  tw e n t i e th
cen tu ry .  In th e  terms of  a l a t e r  p a r la n ce ,  diachrony was g iv ing  way
t o  synchrony; B r i t i s h  anthropology was becoming B r i t i s h  so c ia l  
an thropology.
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The new school in B r i t i s h  anthropology was c a l l e d  * ' func tiona- 
i s t “ by Malinowski and h is  fo l l o w e rs .  L a te r ,  Radcliffe-Brown would 
claim t h a t  h i s  11 s t r u c t u r a l 11 approach had developed a more so c io lo g ­
ica l  foundation  f o r  the  c l a s s i c  per iod  of  B r i t i s h  f ie ld -w ork  in the  
l a t e  1930s, 1940s and 1950s. (1) In th e  mid 1920s B r i t i s h
a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  were keen t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  s u b je c t  as a sc ience  
in i t s  own r i g h t ,  but  when Gregory Bateson s t a r t e d  a t tend ing  
Haddon1s l e c tu r e s  a t  Cambridge he found l i t t l e  or  no t h e o r e t i c a l  
founda tion in them. Bateson wrote in a l e t t e r  in August 1925:
' I t  i s  t e r r i b l e  to  f in d  how shaky a l l  th e  ground i s  on which th e  
elements of  a n t h ro p o l o g y . . . a r e  based,  and i t  w i l l  be so much 
more d i f f i c u l t  t o  absorb th e  f a c t s ,  t h e r e  being no s t r u c t u r e  
of  the o ry  upon which to  hook them' (Bateson quoted in L ipse t  
1982: 114-115).
As f o r  ethnography,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  of  th e  new anthropology in 
p r i n t  in 1925. Malinowski had published The Family Among th e  
A u s t r a l i an  Aborigines in 1913 and t h e  f i r s t  o f  h i s  works on the  
T robr ianders ,  Argonauts of th e  Western P a c i f i c , in 1922. The 
founder and lead ing proponent of  f u nc t iona l i sm  was j u s t  beginning 
h is  i n f l u e n t i a l  c a re e r  as a t e a c h e r  a t  t h e  London School of 
Economics. Radcliffe-Brown, who was a l so  t o  become a t e a c h e r  of  
major in f lu en ce  in B r i t i s h  an thropology,  was te ach ing  a t  th e  
U n ivers i ty  of  Cape Town. His monograph The Andaman I s lan d e r s  
had been publi shed  in 1922.
Functional ism, then ,  of  an embryonic, crude and un ce r t a in  na tu re  
was th e  nascen t  t r end  in B r i t i s h  s o c ia l  anthropology in 1925 when 
Gregory Bateson commenced h i s  t r a i n i n g  in t h e  s u b je c t .  Along with 
c l a s s e s  in in te rv iew techn iques ,  elementary phonet ic s  and th e  c o l l e c ­
t i o n  of  genea logie s  he was taugh t  how to  measure s k u l l s  with 
c a l i p e r s .  L ipse t  records  Ba teson 's  impressions of  Malinowski as 
fo l lows ;  t h e  quo ta t ion  throws i n t e r e s t i n g  l i g h t  on Bateson 's  l a t e r  
d i s q u i s i t i o n s  on th e  inadequacies of  f u nc t iona l i sm  in Naven.
'My view was t h a t  he (Malinowski) was r a t h e r  an amusing man, but 
a lousy a n t h ro p o lo g i s t ,  a lousy t h e o r i s t . . .The whole (Malinow- 
sk ian)  fu n c t io n a l  theory  of  human needs,  t h a t  i f  you make a 
l i s t  of  human needs, and then you d i s s e c t  th e  c u l t u r e  on how 
i t  s a t i s f i e s  them - t h i s  seemed t o  be t o  me abso lu te  b a l l s .
I t  being t r u e ,  of  course,  t h a t  i f  t h e  c u l t u r e  does not  provide
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th e  people any food,  the  people d i e .  But t h a t  i s  not  th e  same 
as saying  t h a t  the  food i s  provided t o  keep them a l i v e ;  th e  
food can be provided to  g ive  them s o c ia l  s t a t u s ,  t o  ornament 
f e s t i v a l s ,  o r  any number o f  t h i n g s '  (Bateson,  quoted in Lipse t  
1982: 123, a u t h o r ' s  p a ren th es e s ) .
A f te r  h i s  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g ,  Bateson s e t  out  f o r  th e  f i e l d  in 
January 1927. His d e s t i n a t i o n  was New Guinea, but  h i s  f i r s t  at tempts  
a t  e thnographic  research  - among th e  Baining and th e  Sulka -  proved 
l e s s  than s u c c e s s fu l .  I t  was only some two years  l a t e r ,  in February 
1929, t h a t  a c r u i s e  t o  th e  Sepik River reg ion  led him to  t h e  v i l l a g e s  
of th e  Iatmul (L ipse t  1982: 125 - 130).
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NOTES to  Chapter Two
(1) For a usefu l  account of  t h i s  e a r l y  per iod  in B r i t i s h  s o c ia l  
anthropology ,  see Kuper (1983, Chapters 1 & 2 ) .
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHNOGRAPHIC SETTING
MY ACCOUNT OF NAVEN w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  be incomplete,  f o r  i t  is  
a d i f f i c u l t  book to  summarise adequa te ly .  P a r t  of  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  
stems from th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  is  not r e a l l y  one book, but  several  
t e x t s  jo in e d  to g e th e r  in an e l l i p t i c a l ,  improvised way. The wording 
of th e  s u b - t i t l e  suggests  as much. I t  reads :  'A Survey of  th e  Problems 
Suggested by a Composite P ic tu r e  of  th e  Cultu re  of  a New Guinea 
Tribe Drawn From Three Points  of  View.’
Naven was w r i t t e n  as an account of  f i e ld -w o rk .  I t  took i t s  t i t l e  
from th e  name which, according t o  Bateson,  th e  Iatmul of  New Guinea 
gave to  a s e r i e s  of  a c t i v i t i e s  which took p lace  p a r t i c u l a r l y  between 
c lo se  consanguineal  and a f f i n a l  k in .  These a c t i v i t i e s  seemed to  
be genera ted  by achievements of  s o c i a l  importance on the  p a r t  of 
youngs te rs ,  s p e c i a l l y  boys. From h is  co n s id e ra t io n  of  what he takes  
to  be t h e  r e l e v a n t  ethnographic d e t a i l s  concerning th e s e  ce l e b ra to ry  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  Bateson develops h i s  o v e r - a l l  'Composite P i c t u r e '  of 
Iatmul s o c ie ty  and c u l t u r e .  But t h i s  i s  only one of  th e  th reads  
of th e  book. Interwoven with the  ethnography,  a t  t imes  i n e x t r i c a b ly ,  
is  an argument about the  framing of  ethnograph ic  data which, in 
p la ces ,  becomes convoluted and, some might say,  t e d io u s ly  obscure.
The reade r  i s  co n s tan t ly  thrown between data and th e o ry ,  and between 
varying models of  th e  an thropolog ica l  p r o j e c t ,  with such i n t e l l e c t u a l  
d e x t e r i t y  t h a t  i t  i s  easy f o r  him or  her  t o  ge t  l o s t .  For every 
t h e o r e t i c a l  sugges t ion th e r e  seems to  be a coun te r - sugges t ion ;
Bateson not  only t h e o r i s e s ,  but  he t h e o r i s e s  about h is  t h e o r i e s .
From th e  vantage po in t  of  1989, Naven i s  a t r u l y  modern work. I t  
was no t ,  however, th e  kind of  book which f i t t e d  t h e  atmosphere of  th e  
B r i t i s h  s o c i a l  anthropology of  t h e  1930s.
Most ethnographers  now t a c i t l y  admit,  f o r  b e t t e r  or  worse,  t h a t  
a l l  f ie ld -w ork  r e p o r t s  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e o r e t i c a l  and t h a t  no an throp­
o l o g i s t ' s  observa t ions  are  without  b ia s  o f  one kind or  ano ther .  I t  
has become a common-place t h a t  the  an th ro p o lo g i s t  in t h e  f i e l d  i s  th e  
product  o f  a c u l t u r e  l i k e  anyone e l s e ,  and t h a t  a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  ca r ry  
as many preconceptions  around with them as th e  members of  any o the r
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c u l t u r e .  Needham put  the  m a t te r  s u c c in c t ly  when he wrote t h a t
'problems do not  p resen t  themselves phenomenally: they  have to  be 
conce ived,  and t h i s  means th e  fo rmula t ion  of  c a t e g o r i e s '
(1971 x v i ) .
This dilemma, t h a t  the  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  e n t e r s  th e  f i e l d  with h is  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  baggage and t h a t  h i s  b ia s  w i l l  s t i l l  be opera t ing  in h is  
w r i t ing  up, has been a core i s sue  in pos t-war  debates  about the  
na tu re  and i n t e g r i t y  of th e  ethnograph ic  e n t e r p r i s e .  But when 
Bateson was working among t h e  Iatmul t h e  i s sue  of  conceptual  ethno­
c e n t r i c  b ia s  had hard ly  been r a i s e d .  In Naven t h i s  i s  not  s t a t e d  
o s t e n s ib l y ,  but  i t  i s  a c r u c i a l  theme.
The book i s  as much an i n t e l l e c t u a l  autobiography as a work of  
anthropology.  Argumentative coherence i s  o f ten  almost  l o s t  in th e  
interweaving between the se  two t h r e a d s .  The ques t ion  which l inks  
them, and which provides th e  ra i so n  d ' e t r e  f o r  Ba teson 's  p r o j e c t ,  
i s :  how is  an adequate d e s c r ip t i o n  of  a l i e n  modes of  l i f e  poss ib le?  
I m p l i c i t  here a re  two f u r t h e r  ques t ions :  what form would such a 
d e s c r ip t io n  take?  and what do we mean by d e s c r ip t i o n ?
Bateson seems in no doubt as t o  th e  convention w ith in  which he is  
working.  He assumes t h a t  a bedrock of  s e c u r i t y  i s  provided by th e  
idea of  s c ien c e .  I f  we do sc ience  p rope r ly ,  he o f ten  seems to  be 
say ing,  a proper d e s c r ip t io n  w i l l  emerge. I t  i s  s c ience  which w i l l  
lead us t o  a p r e c i s e  kind of  unders tand ing which t h e  a r t  of  t h e  
n o v e l i s t ,  f o r  example, can never provide us .  Thus on th e  f i r s t  
page of  h i s  t e x t ,  Bateson t e l l s  us t h a t  an a r t i s t  i s  able  t o  leave 
many of  t h e  ‘premises '  of  a c u l t u r e  i m p l i c i t  in h i s  d e s c r ip t i o n ;  
th e  c r e a t i v e  n o v e l i s t  can r e ly  on ' em p h a s i s ' .  The method of  the  
a r t i s t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  ' i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c '  r a t h e r  than ' a n a l y t i c ' ,  and 
h i s  techn ique  i s  fo re ign  t o  th e  methods o f  sc ience  (1936: 1) .  This 
in t ro d u c to ry  chap te r  i s  a d e c l a r a t i o n  of  i n t e n t .  The i n t e n t  is  
avowedly s c i e n t i f i c .
The f i r s t  sen tence of  th e  book p r e s e n t s  a p i c t u r e  of  Bateson 's  
e thnograph ic  i d e a l ,  and i t  i s  worth quoting in f u l l .
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' I f  i t  were p o s s ib le  adequa te ly  t o  p r e s e n t  t h e  whole o f  a c u l t u r e ,  
s t r e s s i n g  every aspect  e x a c t ly  as i t  i s  s t r e s s e d  in th e  c u l tu r e  
i t s e l f ,  no s in g l e  d e t a i l  would appear b i z a r r e  or  s t r ange  or  
a r b i t r a r y  to  th e  reade r ,  but  r a t h e r  t h e  d e t a i l s  would a l l  
appear n a t u r a l  and reasonable  as they  do t o  t h e  n a t iv e s  who 
have l ived  a l l  t h e i r  l i v e s  w i th in  th e  c u l t u r e '  (1936: 1).
He then p o l a r i s e s  sc ience  and a r t  as th e  two p o s s ib le  means by which 
t h i s  idea l  can be at tempted .  Ar t ,  in t h e  person of  t h e  ' c r e a t i v e  
n o v e l i s t 1, i s  taken to  t a s k .  The p a r t i c u l a r  form o f  sc ience  deve l ­
oped by anthropology -  by which Bateson means th e  s t r u c t u r a l -  
fu n c t io n a l  ism of the  1930s - has
'p a id  g r e a t e s t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  those  aspec t s  of  c u l t u r e  which lend 
themselves most r e a d i ly  t o  d e s c r ip t i o n  in a n a l y t i c  te rms.  They 
have descr ibed  th e  s t r u c t u r e  of  seve ra l  s o c i e t i e s  and shown th e  
main o u t l i n e s  of  t h e  pragmatic f u nc t ion ing  of t h i s  s t r u c t u r e 1 
(1936: 2 ) .
But t h e r e  has been an important  f a i l u r e .  For func t iona l i sm  has
' s c a r c e l y  at tempted th e  d e l in e a t io n  of  those  aspec ts  of  c u l tu r e  
which th e  a r t i s t  i s  ab le t o  express  by im p r e s s i o n i s t i c  methods 
. . . n o  fu n c t io n a l  s tudy can ever  be reasonably  complete unless  i t  
l i n k s  up th e  s t r u c t u r e  and pragmatic working of  th e  c u l t u r e  with 
i t s  emotional  tone o r  e th o s '  (1936: 2 ) .
Bateson 's  own t e x t  w i l l  show t h a t  t h i s ,  as well as t h e  o th e r  t a sk s
he s e t s  h im se l f ,  i s  f a r  from simple and t h a t  i t s  execution  involves
a d r a s t i c  e x p l i c a t i o n  - o r ,  as one might say in a 11 pos tm o d e rn i s t18
age a " d e c o n s t r u c t io n w - of  th e  very terms employed in s t a t i n g  th e  
problem.
At th e  beginning of th e  book Bateson expresses  a fundamental 
d i f f i c u l t y .  I f  t h e  success of  th e  s c ience  of  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  anthropology 
l i es ,  in th e  d e s c r ip t i o n  and a n a ly s i s  o f  ' s t r u c t u r e ' ,  o r  th e  
'p ragmatic  working of  t h e  c u l t u r e 1, how can t h i s  be l inked  with a 
v a l id  account  of  the  'emotional  t o n e 1 - e th o s ,  in Ba teson 's  te rminology 
of  th e  people? I t  is  c l e a r  from th e s e  opening remarks t h a t  Bateson 
c ons ide rs  t h i s  is sue  of  supreme importance.  Is  i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  the  
a n th ro p o lo g i s t  to  produce a s c i e n t i f i c  account o f  th e  emotional l i v e s  
of  h i s  s u b je c t s ?  The t e ns ion  between th e  need f o r  a d e s c r ip t i o n  of  
s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  on th e  one hand, and of  emotional  tone  on th e  o th e r ,  
in t roduces  a theme of one of  th e  major c o n f l i c t s  which th e  book
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at tempts  t o  r e s o lv e .  But t h i s  t e n s io n  e x i s t s  no t  only in a space 
between t h e  an th ro p o lo g i s t  and th e  o b je c t  of  anthropology;  i t  
i t s e l f  c o n s t i t u t e s  the  primary problem f o r  th e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  who 
has t o  mediate between h i s  own s u b j e c t i v i t y  and an o b j e c t i f i e d  
s u b je c t ,  o r  group of  s u b j e c t s .  In some sense ,  th e  o b je c t  of  the  
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s  own s u b j e c t i v i t y  i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by a f i e l d  of  
o the r  s u b j e c t i v i t i e s .  In 1936, Bateson was unable t o  formulate 
th e  problem in t h i s  way, but  by 1958 and t h e  Epilogue t o  th e  
2nd e d i t i o n  o f  Naven, he could w r i t e :
' I t  i s  t h i s  f a c t  - t h a t  th e  p a t t e r n s  of  s o c ie ty  as a major 
e n t i t y  can by learn ing  be i n t r o j e c t e d  o r  concep tua l ized  by 
t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t  in d iv id u a l s  -  t h a t  makes anthropology and 
indeed t h e  whole of behavioural  sc ience  p e c u l i a r l y  d i f f i c u l t .
The s c i e n t i s t  i s  not  th e  only human being in th e  p i c t u r e .
His s u b je c t s  a l so  a re  capable  of  a l l  s o r t s  of  le a rn ing  and 
c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  and even, l i k e  th e  s c i e n t i s t ,  they are 
capable of  e r r o r s  of  c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n '  (1958: 292)
Bateson goes t o  pa ins tak ing  e f f o r t  th roughout  h is  t e x t  t o  
re so lv e  t h e  t e n s io n  between 11 s t r u c t u r e "  and " e t h o s " ,  and in th e  
process  he d r iv e s  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  a n a l y s i s  t o  i t s  l i m i t s  and at tempts 
to  t ranscend  i t  a l t o g e t h e r .  Whether he succeeded in t h i s  o r  not  is  
deba tab le ,  but  a t  any r a t e  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  by-produc t  of  the  
s t r u g g le  r e s u l t e d  in a t e x t  which has enduring value f o r  both the  
pas t  h i s t o r y  and th e  p re sen t  deba tes o f  s o c ia l  anthropology.
Despite th e  book being l i t t e r e d  with th e  words " s c i e n c e "  and 
" s c i e n t i s t ' 5, as i f  he i s  c o n s ta n t ly  reminding us t h a t  anthropology 
i s  a s c ience  and t h a t  the  an th ro p o lo g i s t  i s ,  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  a s c i e n t i s t ,  
nowhere in t h e  book does Bateson d e f in e  what he means by " s c i e n c e " .  
This might be due to  h i s  tak ing  t h e  not ion f o r  g ran ted ;  a t  th e  same 
t ime,  i t  appears from h is  t e x t  t h a t  he was in c re a s in g ly  u n c e r t a in ,  
not so much as t o  whether h is  search f o r  a t r u l y  s c i e n t i f i c  an throp­
o lo g ica l  method and s t y l e  could prove s u c c e s s f u l ,  as t o  what kind of 
language such a s c i e n t i f i c  d i scou r se  would employ. I t  i s  t h i s  complex 
search ,  f o r  a method, a s t y l e  and a language,  and th e  s u b t l e  
i n t e r p l a y  between them, which makes Naven such a d i f f i c u l t  work, and 
a t  th e  same t ime such an important  one.
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Much of th e  te n o r  of  th e  w r i t i n g  in th e  book i s  d isp layed  in the  
opening sentence  o f  th e  Epilogue t o  th e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  of  1936.
'The w r i t i n g  of  t h i s  book has been an exper iment,  o r  r a t h e r  
a s e r i e s  of  experiments,  in methods of  t h in k in g  about an throp­
o lo g ic a l  m a te r i a l '  (1936: 257).
But experiments a re  at tempts  t o  v a l i d a t e  hypotheses .  What a re  the  
hypotheses t h a t  Bateson i s  a t tempt ing  to  v a l i d a t e  here? A major 
i rony of  t h e  book in th e  terms of  t h e  above quote i s  t h a t  Bateson 
thought  t h a t  i t s  conclus ions  did not  in f a c t  " p r o v e 1' anyth ing,  
un less  perhaps i t  was t h a t  s o c ia l  anthropology i s  not  a sc ience  and 
can never be one.  I suggest  t h a t  t h i s  i s  one of  th e  book' s  major 
s t r e n g t h s ;  bu t  Bateson,  a t  l e a s t  a t  t h e  t ime of  t h e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  of  
1936, obvious ly  f e l t  t h a t  any such conc lusion  would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
he had f a i l e d .
' I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  I have c o n t r ib u te d  but  l i t t l e  t o  our s to r e  
o f  an th ropo log ica l  f a c t s  and t h a t  th e  in format ion about Iatmul 
c u l t u r e  which I have used in t h e  var ious  chap te r s  does no more 
than i l l u s t r a t e  my methods. Even f o r  purposes of  i l l u s t r a t i o n  
my supply of  f a c t s  i s  meagre, and I c e r t a i n l y  cannot  claim 
t h a t  my f a c t s  have demonstrated t h e  t r u t h  o f  any th e o ry '
(1936: 278 - 279).
But t h i s  no te  of  pessimism should be read a longs ide  t h e  Epilogue to  
the  second e d i t i o n  o f  1958. By t h i s  t ime Bateson 's  search  f o r  a 
v a l id  s c i e n t i f i c  method in anthropology seems t o  be on f i rm e r  ground.  ( 1)
I have e x t r a c t e d  fou r  main themes from Bateson 's  Naven. The 
f i r s t  i s  h i s  at tempt to  apply t h e  c l a s s i c  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  
model of  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  t o  h i s  m a t e r i a l .  He recogn ises  the  
inadequacy of  t h i s  model from th e  beginning,  and an important  e a r ly  
sec t ion  of  h is  t e x t  i s  devoted t o  an ex p lo ra t io n  o f  t h e  concepts  
of  " s t r u c t u r e "  and " f u n c t i o n 11. A r igo rous  c r i t i q u e  of  th e se  concepts
leads t o  my second theme, which i s  developed through Bateson 's  
need t o  s u b s t i t u t e  h i s  own models and h is  own t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts .  
These concepts  go- f a r  beyond what he perce ives  as th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
of  f u n c t io n a l i sm .  Three important  such concepts  can be l i s t e d ;  
namely e t h o s ,  e idos  and schismogenesis .  I deal  with each of  th e se
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in my Chapters  Seven, Eight ,  Nine and Ten.
A major c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  th e  concepts  of  e thos  and e idos  i s  
provided by th e  t h i r d  theme, namely th e  in f luence  of  th e  American 
school of  anthropology rep resen ted  by Margaret Mead and Ruth 
Benedic t .  B en ed ic t ' s  concept  of  " c o n f i g u r a t i o n '* was a major 
i n s p i r a t i o n  f o r  Bateson 's  " e t h o s "  and " e i d o s " .  This t h i r d  theme 
is  impor tant  f o r  an unders tanding  of  Naven, f o r  Benedict  and Mead 
showed Bateson t h a t  t h e r e  was an a l t e r n a t i v e  approach t o  an throp­
ology from th e  B r i t i s h  func t iona l i sm  in which he had been t r a i n e d  
and which,  a t  th e  o u t s e t ,  he had seen - a l b e i t  with susp ic ious  
eyes - as a v a l id  s c i e n t i f i c  methodology and a lo g i c a l  p rogress ion  
of  h is  own e a r l i e r  t r a i n i n g  as a n a tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t .
My fo u r th  theme is  h ig h l ig h te d  in Ba teson 's  1958 Epilogue,  
which r e f l e c t s  in important  ways many of h i s  concerns in th e  years  
fo l lowing t h e  o r ig i n a l  p u b l i ca t io n  of  Naven in 1936. This theme 
dea ls  with th e  twin notions  of  schismogenic i n t e r a c t i o n  and th e  
use o f  cy b e rn e t i c  models in s o c ia l  a n a l y s i s .  These were of  c e n t r a l  
importance in th e  work Bateson c a r r i e d  out  when he l e f t  anthropology 
to  work in o th e r  f i e l d s .
I begin my expos i t ion  of  t h e  book with an account of  Bateson 's  
in t ro d u c to ry  da t a .  He c a r r i e d  out  f i e ld -w ork  amongst th e  Iatmul 
from 1929 :un t i l  1930, and again from 1932 u n t i l  1933. The Iatmul 
l ived  on t h e  Sepik River in New Guinea in l a rge  v i l l a g e s ,  each of 
which numbered between two hundred and a thousand people .  They 
had been head hunte rs  u n t i l  only a few years  before  Bateson 's  
f i e ld -w o rk .  Socia l  o rg a n i s a t io n ,  k insh ip  and r e l i g i o u s  systems 
were complex. Each community was d iv ided  in to  groups according t o  
two independent  systems which showed l i t t l e  congruence.  There was 
a d iv i s i o n  in to  two to temic  m o ie t i e s ,  which were f u r t h e r  subdivided 
in to  c l a n s .  There was a l so  a d iv i s i o n  in to  two c r o s s - c u t t i n g  
p a i r s  of  i n i t i a t o r y  m oie t ie s  which were subdivided in to  age g rades .  
None of  t h e s e  groups was s t r i c t l y  exogamous. Membership of  a l l
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groups was determined by p a t r i l i n e a l  descen t  (1936: 4 ) .  (2)
Bateson does not  provide any comprehensive account of  Iatmul 
economy or  r e l i g i o n .  Economic c o n s id e ra t io n s  a re  d iscussed  in h is  
chap te r s  on male and female e thos ,  which I deal  with in some d e t a i l  
in Chapters  Seven and Eight .  I t  would appear from Bateson 's  
s c a t t e r e d  comments on economy t h a t  t h e  Iatmul l ived  by a combination 
of pig r e a r i n g ,  f i s h in g  and gardening,  with women p laying  a major 
r o l e  in food production .  From th e  pauc i ty  of  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  Iatmul 
economy i t  i s  apparent  t h a t  Bateson was not  much i n t e r e s t e d  in the  
s u b je c t .  I t  did not  have a p lace  in h i s  a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  naven 
and t h i s  f a c t  may have v i t i a t e d  h i s  f i n d i n g s ,  as I w i l l  sugges t  
l a t e r . i n  my c r i t i q u e .
Re l ig ious  l i f e  among t h e  Iatmul appears ,  from Bateson 's  
r e fe ren c es  t o  th e  m a t te r ,  and from h is  ch ap te r  'Sorcery  and Vengeance' ,  
t o  have cen t red  around a b e l i e f  in a n c e s t r a l  s p i r i t s ,  or  wagans, 
which were implicated  in revenge so rce ry ,  and a complex to temic  
naming system governing the  nomenclature o f  both in d iv id u a l s  and 
groups.
The c r u c i a l  kin c a t e g o r ie s  f o r  B a teson 's  purposes were those  
of  wau (o r  mother ' s  b ro th e r  = MB) and laua ( s i s t e r ’ s c h i l d ,  e i t h e r  
ZS = s i s t e r ' s  son or  ZD = s i s t e r ' s  daugh te r ) .  (See Diagram 1, 
p 48 . )  Despite  t h e  emphasis on p a t r i l i n y
' t h e  people pay a g r e a t  deal  of  a t t e n t i o n  t o  k in sh ip  l inks  
through th e  mother or  s i s t e r . . .both  t h e  p a t r i l i n e a l  and m a t r i l -  
inea l  l inks  are  preserved  in a c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  system through 
many g e n e ra t io n s '  (1936: 4 ) .
The kin terms wau and laua a re  used not  only t o  denote own mother 's  
b ro th e r  (MB) and s i s t e r ' s  son (ZS), but  a re  a l so  used between 
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  MB and ZS,
' so  t h a t  th e  term wau inc ludes  such r e l a t i v e s  as mother ' s  
m othe r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  son, even though a l l  t h r e e  of  th e  i n t e r v e n ­
ing women through whom t h e  k insh ip  i s  t r a c e d  have married in to  
d i f f e r e n t  c l a n s '  (1936: 4-5)
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Diagram 1. Iatmul Kinship Terminology, Reproduced from 
B ateson's Naven (1936).
D IAGRAM OF K I N S H I P  T E R M S  U S E D  IN T H I S  BOOK
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t. ngguiail, 4. naisagut.
2. iat. 5, tateonto.
3. mbuambo. 6. nondu.
I. kaishe-nampa.
II. Own clan
7. iau. 10. mbora. 13. tshaisht.
8. nyai'. 11, ttiau. 14. nyamun,
9. nyame. 12. no. 13, tagtoa.
III, lanoa-nampa or laua nyanggu,
IV, tmu-nyame. (Son’s iai nampa.)
16, tihuambO' 19. ianan. 31, laua.
17, laitdo. 20. niait. 22. kaisht-ragtoa.
18, nyanggai.
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VI. totua-nauagut. (Son’s wau-nyame.)
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At th e  end o f  h is  f i r s t  chap te r  Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  he w i l l  be 
concerned c h i e f l y  with th e  r e l a t i o n s  between c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  
waus and l a u a s .
B a teson 's  second chap te r  gives  an in t ro d u c to ry  account o f  th e  a c t i v i t ­
ies  which t h e  Iatmul c a l l e d  naven.
'The ceremonies a re  c a l l e d  naven and are  performed in c e l e b ra t i o n  
of  t h e  a c t s  and achievements of  th e  laua ( s i s t e r ' s  c h i l d ) .
Whenever a laua -  boy or  g i r l ,  man or  woman -  performs some 
s tandard  c u l t u r a l  a c t ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  when th e  c h i ld  performs 
t h i s  a c t  f o r  the  f i r s t  t ime in i t s  l i f e ,  th e  occasion may be 
c e l e b r a t e d  by i t s  wau. The p o s s i b l e  occasions  f o r  th e  performance 
of  naven a re  very numerous and very f r e q u e n t '  (Bateson 1936: 6 ) .
I t  i s  necessary  t o  note here t h a t  th roughout t h e  book Bateson 
c o n ce n t ra te s  on naven c e l e b ra te d  f o r  boys; in t h i s  second chap te r ,  
f o r  example, fou r  pages a re  devoted to  l i s t i n g  occasions  on which 
naven may be ce l e b ra te d  f o r  boys,  whereas a l i t t l e  over h a l f  a page 
is  given to  those  occasions  when i t  may be c e l e b ra t e d  f o r  g i r l s .
The words 'may b e 1 a re  important  here ,  and they  a re  used in s te ad  
of  a more d e f i n i t e  s ta tem en t .  One might a l so  note t h e  wording of  th e  
l a s t  sen tence  in t h e  above q u o ta t io n :  ' t h e  p o s s i b l e  occasions  f o r  
the  performance of  naven1 (my emphasis ) .  I t  seems t h a t  from th e  
o u t s e t  Bateson i s  in some doubt as t o  t h e  n a tu re  of  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between 'achievements '  of  th e  s i s t e r ' s  c h i l d ,  and t h e  ' c e l e b r a t i o n s '  
which may o r  may not  accompany them. I s  naven performed sometimes, 
on th e  occasion of  an achievement,  o r  o f ten  on such an occasion?
What c on t ingen t  f a c t o r s  determine whether o r  not  a naven i s  performed? 
Bateson does not  en la rge  on th e s e  impor tant  p o i n t s .
B a teson 's  l i s t  of  achievements on th e  p a r t  o f  boys which may 
r e s u l t  in naven behaviour i s  d iv ided  in to  f i v e  s e c t i o n s .  F i r s t  we 
are  t o l d  t h a t  major achievements may r e s u l t  in a naven whenever 
they  a re  performed.  At the  top of  t h e  l i s t  i s  a homicide,  or  any 
a c t i v i t y  which a s s i s t s  the  k i l l i n g  o f  a human being (1936: 6 ) .  This 
had not  been p o s s ib le  s ince  th e  p r o h ib i t i o n  of  head-hunt ing  by the  
c o lo n ia l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Also included in t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  the  k i l l i n g  
of  any l a rg e  animal,  such as a c ro c o d i l e  o r  wild p ig .  Next, we are 
t o l d  t h a t  'minor c u l t u r a l  a c t s '  may r e s u l t  in naven, but  only on 
the  f i r s t  occasion on which thgy^are  c a r r i e d  ou t .  Such achievements 
inc lude  t h e  k i l l i n g  of  smal l^ | |p | t j r t ia ls ,  f i s h  o r  b i r d s ,  f e l l i n g  a
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sago palm, using an axe or  k n i f e ,  bea t ing  a drum, and so on. I t  
appears from Bateson 's  l i s t  t h a t  p r a c t i c a l l y  any a c t i v i t y  of  any 
so c ia l  o r  c u l t u r a l  importance c a r r i e d  out  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t ime by 
th e  laua might be an occasion f o r  naven.
In t h e  next  s ec t io n  of  t h e  l i s t  we a re  t o l d  t h a t  any a c t  on the  
p a r t  of  t h e  male laua which i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with 
h is  m othe r ' s  b ro th e r  w i l l  r e s u l t  in naven. Such a c t s  inc lude  
ceremonial  connected with th e  to temic  ances to rs  of  wau' s  c l a n ,  
and musical a c t i v i t i e s ,  as well as more p r a c t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  which 
a s s i s t  t h e  wau, such as house bu i ld ing  and suppor t  in debates  in 
t h e  men's house.
The fo u r th  s ec t io n  covers occasions  when th e  laua indulges in 
boas t ing  in t h e  presence of  h i s  wau. This w i l l  provoke naven 
behaviour  by th e  wau ' i f  i t  i s  c a r r i e d  t o  excess '  al though ' i t  is  
c o r r e c t  f o r  a boy to  boas t  in th e  presence  of  h i s  wau' (1936: 8 ) .  (3) 
In t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  co n tex t ,  t h a t  i s  of excess ive  boas t ing  on the  
p a r t  o f  th e  laua  in t h e  presence of  h i s  wau, wau w i l l  respond with a 
g e s tu r e ,  in Ba teson 's  words, ' s u g g e s t iv e  of  t u rn in g  h i s  buttocks  t o  
h is  l a u a ' (1936: 8 ) .  But he con t inues :
' I  have never seen the  complete g e s tu r e  of  rubbing th e  but tocks  
on th e  l a u a ' s  sh in ,  th e  cl imax of  th e  naven, c a r r i e d  out  in rep ly  
to  l a u a ' s  b o as t s ;  u sua l ly  th e  t h r e a t  i s  enough to  curb th e  young 
man's tongue .  But i t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  when exaspera ted ,  
a wau may complete th e  g e s tu re  and, by so doing,  involve th e  laua 
in a p r e s e n t a t io n  of  va luab le s  t o  t h e  wau' (1936: 8 ) .
He then w r i t e s  t h a t  al though i t  i s  'p ro b ab le '  t h a t  t h i s  boas t ing  
behaviour i s  p a r t  of  th e  r o l e  which laua i s  expec ted t o  play v i s - a - v i s  
h is  wau, t h e  r e a c t io n  of  th e  wau t o  such boas t ing  i s  one of  anger or  
annoyance. This ,  Bateson argues ,  marks i t  ou t  from a l l  o th e r  naven 
behaviour on t h e  p a r t  of  wau, which i s  complimentary and co n g ra t ­
u la to ry  towards laua in r e s p e c t  o f  th e  l a t t e r ' s  achievements.  I t  i s  a 
case which ' d i f f e r s  from the  o t h e r s '  (1936: 8 ) .  But we have j u s t  been 
t o l d  (see th e  preceding paragraph) t h a t  t h i s  ' s p e c i a l  c a s e ' ,  involving 
what might be c a l l e d  a r i t u a l l y  obscene g e s tu r e ,  i s  ' t h e  cl imax of  the  
naven ' .  This g e s tu r e  w i l l  play a c e n t r a l  p a r t  in Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s
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of a l l  naven behaviour .  I t  should a l so  be remembered t h a t  Bateson 
claims t h a t  he has never seen th e  'complete g e s t u r e '  (1936: 8 ) .
The f i n a l  ca tegory  of  even ts  Bateson l i s t s  as evoking naven 
is  made up of  'changes in s o c i a l  s t a t u s '  (1936: 8 ) ,  He emphasises 
t h a t  naven i s  not  a r i t e  de p as sag e , and t h a t  even th e  d e s c r ip t i o n  
'changes in s o c i a l  s t a t u s '  i s  of  doubtfu l  accuracy .  In th e  con tex t  
of  th e  graded i n i t i a t o r y  system, c r u c i a l  f o r  th e  l i f e  cyc le  of  th e  
Iatmul male,  th e  wau does not  c e l e b r a t e  t h e  promotion of  th e  young 
man from grade t o  grade ,  but  t h e  ceremony of i n i t i a t i o n  i t s e l f  which 
o f ten  t a k e s  p lace  sometime before  t h e  s h i f t  in age-grade  membership. 
The changes f o r  th e  male laua which may be occasions  f o r  naven 
include  e a r  bor ing ,  boring of  th e  nasa l  septum, i n i t i a t i o n ,  marriage 
and h is  becoming possessed by a shamanic s p i r i t  (1936: 8 - 9 ) .
The b i r t h  and death of  a laua a re  not  occasions  f o r  naven, 
according t o  Bateson, al though he seems in some doubt about t h i s .
For example, when th e  s i s t e r ' s  son i s  born,  t h e  wau approaches the  
c h i ld  and p r e s e n t s  i t  with a coconut and a personal  name which is  
connected t o  th e  to temic  ances to r s  of  way's  c l a n .
'Though I have never seen t h i s  done I b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  wau 
might well  exclaim: "Lan men t o ! "  (Husband thou indeed!)  when 
t h e  baby gripped h i s  f i n g e r s '  (1936: 9 ) .
Bateson goes on t o  say t h a t  t h i s  exclamation on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  wau 
is  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  d e t a i l  o f  naven behav iour .  He does not  explore  
the  seeming c o n t r a d i c t io n  in h is  da ta  t h a t  al though l a u a ' s  b i r t h  
i s  not  an occasion f o r  naven, th e  wau may respond t o  t h e  b i r t h  with 
a verba l  communication c l o s e l y  a s s o c ia t e d  with t h e  naven.
This i s  one of  s evera l  passages in th e  in t ro d u c to ry  se c t i o n  of  
Ba teson 's  t e x t  in which th e  au thor  seems t o  have some d i f f i c u l t y  in 
e x t r a p o la t in g  what he d e f i n i t e l y  t a k es  t o  be naven behaviour o r ,  
t o  use h i s  own o f t - r e p e a t e d  word, ' c e r e m o n ia l ' ,  from th e  genera l  
nexus o f  behaviour  between wau and l a u a . At t h e  p o in t  in h i s  t e x t  
I am examining here ,  f o r  example, Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  as f a r  as 
l a u a ' s  b i r t h  i s  concerned
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'we s h a l l  s e e . . . t h a t  th e  g iv ing of  th e  sp e c ia l  name i s  an ac t  
which demonstrates th e  e x i s t e n c e  of  th e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p ;  
and t h a t  t h e  coconut i s  th e  f i r s t  in a long s e r i e s  of  g i f t  
exchanges which w i l l  accompany naven and o th e r  ceremonies '  
(1936: 9 ) .
But where does behaviour g en e ra l ly  t y p i c a l  of  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between wau and laua end, and naven behaviour  proper  begin? Does 
such a c u t - o f f  p o in t  e x i s t ?  Is  i t  implied t h a t  behaviour between 
a wau and h i s  laua i s  in some sense naven behaviour?
Again, when laua d ie s  Bateson s t a t e s  t h a t  no naven occurs .
However
' t h e  c l  ass  i f i c a t o r y  wau plays  an important  p a r t  in th e  mortuary 
ceremonies,  and f i n a l l y  claims th e  dead man as in some spec ia l  
sense  a member of  th e  maternal  clan!  . (1936: 9 ) .
A f te r  dea th ,  t h e  ghost  w i l l  l i v e  in th e  land of  th e  dead under the  
nanles which th e  wau has given him. No d e t a i l s  a re  provided of  t h e se  
mortuary ceremonies,  except  t h a t  th e  dead man is  claimed by th e  wau, 
who p u l l s  t h e  f i g u r e  which r e p re s e n t s  th e  deceased towards h imself  
with a hook.
N ei ther  a re  we given any e x p l i c i t  d e t a i l s  of  wau's  ac tua l  
behaviour on th e  occasion of  l a u a ' s  marr iage ,  except  t h a t  the  
former c e l e b r a t e s  a t  t h i s  t ime .  Bateson i s  again vague.
'The even t  of  marriage may be c e l e b ra te d  not  only by wau, but 
a l s o ,  I b e l i e v e ,  by tawontu ( w i f e ' s  b r o t h e r ) .  In one of the  
myths which I c o l l e c t e d ,  t h e r e  occurs a casual  mention o f  the  
f a c t  t h a t  a b r i d e ' s  own b ro th e r  rubs h i s  bu t tocks  on the  
b r idegroom's  sh in .  I do not know of any o th e r  occasion  which i s  
c e l e b ra t e d  in t h i s  way by taw on tu1 (1936: 9 -10) .
Bateson then  gives  a b r i e f  l i s t  o f  achievements in th e  l i f e  of  
female laua which may r e s u l t  in naven. These a re  r a r e r  than  f o r  
males, and inc lude ca tch ing  f i s h ,  cooking,  making a r a in  cape or  a 
mosquito bag'and  bearing a c h i l d .  I n i t i a t i o n  and dancing a re  a l so  
inc luded.  Bateson says t h a t  he does not  know anything  about boas t ing  
behaviour on th e  p a r t  o f  g i r l s  v i s - a- v i s  t h e i r  waus .  The wau1s 
g es tu re  o f  rubbing h is  buttocks  a g a i n s t  t h e  laua i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
a p a r t  of  th e  boys1 naven, but  Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  might be
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'an analogue of  t h i s  g e s tu re  in th e  ceremonies f o r  a g i r l . . .  
in t h e  pantomime of her  b i r t h  from th e  b e l ly  of  wau1 
(1936: 10, c f  pp 5 8 - 5 9  below).
Chapter  II  con t inues  with an account  of  t h e  naven a c t i v i t i e s  
which Bateson witnessed and about which he was t o l d  by informants.  
This i s  fol lowed by a passage c a l l e d  'D e sc r ip t io n  of t h e  Ceremonies ' .  
F i r s t ,  we a re  t o l d  t h a t  d e s p i t e  th e  long l i s t  of  p o s s ib le  occasions  
f o r  th e  ca r ry ing  out  of  naven, l a rge  naven ceremonies a re  not  of ten  
performed,  perhaps because of  t h e  expense involved .
' In  most in s ta n ces ,  i f  the  l a u a *s achievement i s  brought  to  
t h e  n o t i c e  of  th e  wau, th e  l a t t e r  only exclaims:  "Lan men 
t o ! 11 (Husband thou indeed ! ) ,  throws lime over h i s  laua and 
h a i l s  him ceremonia l ly with a s t r i n g  of  names of  ances to r s  of 
wau1s c l a n '  (1936: 10).
He then says t h a t  t h e r e  are many naven which a re  only c e l e b ra te d  
'on a small s c a l e 1. He cannot say how f r e q u e n t ly  t h e se  a re  
performed 'because I may o f ten  have heard nothing of  such occurrences  
even though they  took p lace  while I was in th e  v i l l a g e . '
He only witnessed  f i v e  naven in f a c t  ' i n  which any of  th e  r i t u a l  was 
c a r r i e d  o u t '  (1936: 11).
These took p lace  in fou r  s e p a ra t e  v i l l a g e s .  One o f  th e  
occasions was f o r  a group of  ch i ld r e n  who had been working sago, 
both boys and g i r l s .  Two more were f o r  a boy who had made a canoe 
and f o r  a young man who had k i l l e d  a pig and provided a f e a s t .  In 
both t h e s e  in s t a n c e s ,  only th e  women p a r t i c i p a t e d  while th e  waus 
ignored th e  ev en t s .  I t  seems remarkable t h a t  Bateson could c a l l  
th e se  events  naven in the  absence of  any a c t i v i t y  on th e  p a r t  of  
the  waus .  His phrase ' t h e  waus apparen t ly  ignor ing  th e  occas ions '  
(1936: 11), however, sugges ts  t h a t  they  were aware of  the  proceedings 
in some way.
On th e  fo u r th  occasion of  a naven inc luding  ' r i t u a l 1 witnessed
by Bateson, only waus took p a r t ,  without  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  any
women. The f i n a l  occasion occurred  when a wau rushed in to  a group
of dancers  and rubbed h i s  buttocks  on th e  shin  of  a male laua who
was impersonating one of  the  wau's ances to rs  (1936: 11). Apart
from th e s e  f i v e  in s tances  which he wi tnessed ,  Ba teson 's  account  on 
h i s  own admission i s  based on inform an ts '  s t a t em en t s .  The reade r
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might be confused by h i s  s ta tement here t h a t  ' I  have only witnessed 
f iv e  naven in which any of  th e  r i t u a l  was c a r r i e d  o u t '  (1935: 11). 
What p r e c i s e l y  does he mean by t h i s ?  What e x a c t ly  i s  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between an a c t i v i t y  which i s  naven and which involves  ' r i t u a l 1, and 
naven which i s  not  - in Ba teson 's  te rms ,  a t  any r a t e  -  e l abo ra ted  
r i t u a l l y ?  What would a naven which did not  involve what Bateson 
c a l l s  ' r i t u a l '  look l ike?  Would such an event  be p o ss ib le?
Nowhere in h i s  t e x t  does Bateson at tempt a d e f i n i t i o n  o r  d iscuss ion  
of th e  deno ta t ion  o r  connota t ion  of  th e  terms ' r i t u a l '  and 
' c e r e m o n ia l ' ;  th e se  are  taken f o r  granted  by him. I sugges t  t h a t  
he was led a s t r a y  by the  power of  t h e s e  terms in t h e  anthropology 
of h is  day,  and t h a t  h i s  search f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  de l im i ted  f i e l d  
of  behaviour which he could c a l l  ' naven ' (read  here ' r i t u a l '  or  
' c e r e m o n ia l ' )  behaviour v i t i a t e d  h is  a n a l y s i s .  I s h a l l  expand 
on t h i s  p o in t  l a t e r  th roughout t h e  t h e s i s .
The fo l lowing  sec t io n  i s  t i t l e d  'D e sc r ip t i o n  of  th e  Ceremonies ' .  
I t  begins:
'The ou ts tand ing  f e a t u r e  of  th e  ceremonies i s  th e  d ress ing  of  
men in women's c lo th e s  and of  women in th e  c lo th e s  of  men. The 
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  wau d res ses  h im se l f  in th e  most f i l t h y  of  
widow's weeds, and when so ar rayed he i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  as 
"nyame" ("mother" ) '  (1936: 12).
From th e  t e x t  immediately a f t e r ,  i t  i s  apparent  t h a t  Bateson i s  
r e f e r r i n g  t o  one p a r t i c u l a r  in s ta nce  here ,  t h e  naven in th e  v i l l a g e  
of Palimbai  which he had witnessed ,  performed f o r  a young man who 
had made a l a rge  canoe f o r  th e  f i r s t  t ime.  A number of  photographs 
i l l u s t r a t e  th e  even t .  Two c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  waus a re  shown wearing 
d i r t y ,  ragged s k i r t s ,  and they are smeared with ashes ,  l i k e  widows. 
Their  o u t f i t s ,  which include  t a t t e r e d  capes worn on t h e i r  heads 
and p ieces  o f  old sago pancakes in s e r t e d  in t h e i r  noses ,  was 
' d i r e c t e d  towards c r e a t in g  an e f f e c t  o f  u t t e r  d e c re p i tu d e '
(1936: 12).  Also,  Bateson r e p o r t s  t h a t  ' t h e i r  b e l l i e s  were bound 
with s t r i n g  l i k e  those  of  pregnant  women' (1936: 12). I r e f e r  
t o  t h i s  apparen t ly  ugly c a r i c a t u r i n g  of  motherhood below, c f  p 5 7 ' 
Bateson then desc r ibe s  the  behaviour o f  th e  waus in t h i s  event .
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' In  t h i s  d i sg u s t in g  costume and with a b s o lu t e ly  grave face s  
( t h e i r  g r a v i ty  was noted with sp e c ia l  approbation  by the  
b y s ta n d e r s ) ,  the  two "mothers” hobbled about th e  v i l l a g e  each 
using as a walking s t i c k  a s h o r t  sha f ted  paddle such as 
women use.  Indeed,  even with t h i s  suppor t ,  they could hardly  
walk,  so d e c re p i t  were the y .  The ch i ld r e n  of  th e  v i l l a g e  
g ree ted  t h e se  f i g u r e s  with screams of  l a u g h te r  and thronged 
around th e  two "mothers",  fo l lowing wherever they  went and 
b u r s t i n g  in to  new sh r ieks  whenever th e  "mothers",  in t h e i r  
f e e b l e n e s s ,  stumbled and f e l l  and, f a l l i n g ,  demonstrated t h e i r  
femaleness by assuming on th e  ground gro tesque  a t t i t u d e s  with 
t h e i r  legs widespread'  (1936: 12).
The two waus-as-mothers wandered through th e  v i l l a g e  in search 
of  t h e i r  ' c h i l d '  ( the  l a u a ),  enqu i r ing  in h ig h -p i t c h e d ,  cracked 
voices  as t o  h is  whereabouts, saying 1 "We have a fowl t o  g ive  to  
the  young man" ' (1936: 12).  The laua had absented  h im se lf  from 
the  even t .
'As soon as he found out  t h a t  h i s  waus were going t o  shame 
themselves  in t h i s  way, he went away t o  avoid t h e  s p e c ta c le  of 
t h e i r  degraded behaviour '  (1936: 13).
I should note  here t h a t  in t h i s  in s t a n c e ,  which would seem to  be a 
f a i r l y  e l a b o ra te d  example o f  naven, t h e  laua chose not  t o  t ake  p a r t  
a t  a l l ,  which would seem to  c o n f l i c t  with t h e  impression we have 
been given t h a t  naven i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a kind of  i n t e r - a c t i o n  between 
wau and l a u a . Again Bateson s t a t e s  t h a t  wauvshould rub h is  but tocks  
a g a in s t  h i s  l a u a ' s  leg ,  which w i l l  r e s u l t  in ' t h e  laua (making) 
has te  t o  g e t  va luab les  which he may p re s e n t  t o  h i s  w a u l . (1936: 13). 
Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  th e  laua should p r e s e n t  va luab les  each t ime 
the  wau makes th e  g e s tu r e :  'one s h e l l  f o r  each rubbing of  the  
b u t to ck s '  (1936: 13).  According t o  Bateson,  t h e  Iatmul say t h a t  th e  
v a luab les  th us  p resented  t o  th e  wau w i l l  'make him a l l  r i g h t ' .
Bateson then  d e c l a r e s  t h a t  he saw t h i s  g e s tu r e  made only once,  during 
the  dance in th e  v i l l a g e  of  Malinggai .  But t h i s  would appear to  
c o n t r a d i c t  h i s  s ta tement -  made in t h e  paragraph dea l ing  with naven 
occasioned by excess ive  boas t ing  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  laua (1936: q)
-  t h a t  ' I  have never seen th e  complete g e s tu r e  of  rubbing the  
bu ttocks  on th e  l a u a ' s  sh in ,  th e  climax of  t h e  n a v e n . . . '
But i f  th e  example quoted above from Malinggai v i l l a g e  does not 
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  'complete g e s t u r e ' ,  then  what would? (Would Bateson
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have recognised ' t h e  complete g e s t u r e '  i f  he had seen i t ? )  I t  
seems again as i f  Bateson i s  having d i f f i c u l t y  in d e l im i t in g  
' naven ' behaviour proper ,  and t h a t  he i s  s i f t i n g  through h is  
e thnographic  data seeking some kind o f  idea l  type  of  naven 
behaviour which, whenever he d esc r ibe s  what he ta kes  t o  be an 
ac tua l  in s t a n c e ,  does not a c t u a l l y  appear.
In th e  p a r t i c u l a r  case he i s  desc r ib in g  here ,  th e  two waus 
f a i l e d  t o  f in d  th e  laua and they  went to  th e  canoe which th e  
young man had made. They co l lapsed  in t h e  c r a f t  in a s t a t e  of  
d i s a r r a y ,  t h e i r  legs wide a p a r t .  A photograph i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s .
They then s a t  down, took up the  paddles and went f o r  a s ho r t  voyage 
on th e  lake .  Iatmul men stand t o  paddle a canoe,  while women 
s i t .  Ashore again ,  th e  waus hobbled away.
'The performance was over and they went away and washed them­
se lv es  and put  on t h e i r  o rd inary  garments '  (1936: 14).
The exchange of  va luables  between wau and laua might or  might not
be made face  t o  face .  In t h i s  case ,  i t  was made i n d i r e c t l y .
'The fowl was f i n a l l y  given t o  t h e  laua and i t  became h i s  duty
t o  make a p resen t  of  s h e l l  va luab les  to  h i s  wau a t  some l a t e r
d a t e '  (1936: 14).
Is t h i s  exchange of  g i f t s  between wau and laua made only in th e  
context  of  naven? Apparently i t  i s  no t ,  f o r  Bateson notes  t h a t
' r e t u r n  p re sen ts  of  t h i s  kind a re  ce remonia l ly  given,  gen e ra l ly  
on occasions when some o the r  dances a re  being performed.  The 
s h e l l s  a re  t i e d  to  a spear  and so p resen ted  t o  t h e  wau'
(1936: 14).  -----
Bateson then r e p o r t s  t h a t  in more e l a b o r a t e  naven, r i t u a l  
behaviour spreads to  involve not  only th e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  r e l a t i v e s  
of t h e  l a u a , but a l so  o th e r  persons who might perform naven d i r e c te d  
a t  i n d iv id u a l s  who are i d e n t i f i e d  with th e  l a u a . This i s  s p e c i a l ly  
so when women take  p a r t .  Elder  b r o t h e r s '  wives w i l l  bea t  t h e i r  
husbands ' younger b ro th e r  when the  l a t t e r ' s  achievements are 
being c e l e b r a t e d .  Fur ther :
'owing t o  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  spreading of  t h e  naven not  only 
does t h e  boy who has worked sago g e t  beaten by h is  e l d e r  
b r o t h e r ' s  wives, but  a l so  th e  boy 's  f a t h e r ' s  e l d e r  b ro th e r s '  
wives ge t  up and bea t  th e  f a t h e r '  (1936: 14).
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And as f a r  as g i f t  giving i s  concerned,  in t h i s  in s ta nce  we a re  t o l d  
t h a t  men who a re  not  the  waus a c t u a l l y  performing,  may give  p r e s e n t ­
a t io n s  o f  food t o  t h e i r  own l a u a s .
In t h e  naven in Mindimbit v i l l a g e  mentioned above f o r  a group 
of  c h i ld r e n  who had worked sago f o r  th e  f i r s t  time - only female kin 
took p a r t  - th e  women's costumes and bearing  were smart and proud, 
in c o n t r a s t  t o  th e  f i l t h y ,  bedraggled a t t i r e  and bumbling, comic 
g a i t  of  th e  waus descr ibed in th e  Palimbai naven given f o r  the  
co n s t ru c t io n  of  a la rge  canoe.  The female r e l a t i v e s  involved,  both 
r e a l  and c l a s s i f i c a t o r y ,  were s i s t e r s ,  f a the rs*  s i s t e r s  and e l d e r  
b r o th e r s '  wives,  a l l  dressed  as men. They borrowed th e  bes t  
f e a t h e r  headdresses and ornaments symbolising homicide from t h e i r  
menfolk,  they  pa in ted  th e  men's lime boxes and th e  s e r r a t e d  lime 
s t i c k s  which bear a t a l l y  of  t h e  number of men k i l l e d  by th e  owner. 
The women were proud of  t h e i r  male f i n e r y  and sauntered  about 
express ing  anger,  p r ide  and a s s e r t i v e n e s s .  The mothers and mothers '  
b r o th e r s '  wives,  however, did  not  d ress  as men. The mother merely 
took o f f  her  s k i r t ,  and th e  mothers '  b r o t h e r s '  wives wore f i l t h y  
widows’ costumes,  l i k e  the  waus descr ibed  e a r l i e r  (1936: 14-15).
As well as th e  change in costume and bea r ing ,  t h e se  female kin 
were a l so  addressed by d i f f e r e n t  kin terms t o  t h e  norm, a l l  o f  which 
contained a s u f f i x  meaning 'man' .  Thus, f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r  was ca l l e d  
' f a t h e r ' ,  e l d e r  b r o t h e r ' s  wife was c a l l e d  ' e l d e r  b r o th e r '  and so 
on. The mother, however, did not  acqu i re  such a male kin 
des igna t ion  (1936: 15). I would sugges t  t h a t  th e  da ta  o u t l in ed
in th e  above two paragraphs ,  t o g e th e r  with t h e  c a r i c a t u r i n g  of  
motherhood in th e  Palimbai naven (c f  my pp 54-56),  i n d i c a te s  a 
p o s s ib le  d en ig ra to ry  a t t i t u d e  towards motherhood -  and, by 
im p l ic a t io n ,  towards nu r tu r ing?  - amongst th e  Iatmul or  a t  l e a s t  
amongst Iatmul men. I w i l l  develop t h i s  theme in l a t e r  c h ap te r s .  (4 )
When t h e  canoe brought the  c h i ld ren  back from t h e  sago swamps, 
the  women assembled and splashed th e  c h i l d r e n ,  as i f  they were 
men r e tu rn i n g  from a successfu l  head-hunting r a i d .  The c h i ld ren  
landed and
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' t h e  v i l l a g e  appeared t o  go mad f o r  a whi le ;  f a t h e r s '  s i s t e r s  
and e l d e r  b r o th e r s '  wives dashing about searching  r e s p e c t iv e l y  
f o r  t h e i r  various  b r o th e r s '  ch i ld r e n  and husbands '  younger 
b ro th e r s  in o rder  t o  bea t  them' (1936: 16),
The men concerned hid in th e  ceremonial  houses which are usua l ly  
considered men's s a n c tu a r i e s  where women must not  go, but  on such 
occasions  t h e  women have th e  l i c en ce  t o  e n t e r  t h e  men's houses in 
search of  t h e  app rop r ia te  vic t ims  t o  bea t  them, and t o  chase them 
i f  they run away. Bateson did not  on t h i s  occasion  see any a c t i v i t i e s  
on th e  p a r t  of  th e  mothers and s i s t e r s .  The o th e r  women, dressed  
as men, con tinued t h e i r  performance throughout th e  day. In the  
evening th e  women danced by themselves .  In th e  manner of  th e  men, 
who o f ten  take  o f f  t h e i r  pubic aprons and dance a f t e r  dark,  th e  
women danced with t h e i r  bodies uncovered,  al though s t i l l  wearing 
t h e i r  head-dresses  and ornaments. Some of  th e  o ld e r  men expressed 
shock a t  t h i s  (1936: 16-17).
Bateson was t o l d  of  ano ther  naven held in Mindimbit v i l l a g e  
f o r  a l i t t l e  g i r l  who had caught  a f i s h .  This occasion  was more 
e l a b o r a t e .  Bateson sugges ts  t h a t  t h i s  might have been because the  
waus involved were i n t e n t  on ob ta in ing  s h e l l s  in r e tu r n  f o r  the  
pigs which they  gave to  t h e  l a u a s . Bateson was t o l d  t h a t  both males 
and females took p a r t .  Two more l i t t l e  g i r l s  were a l so  honoured, 
but we a re  not  given f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  about t h i s .  Eight pigs were 
k i l l e d ,  and everybody in t h e  v i l l a g e  appeared t o  t a k e  p a r t .  In 
t h i s  in s ta n ce  the n ,  the  naven a c t i v i t i e s ,  f a r  from being l im i ted  
to  i n t e r - a c t i o n  between s p e c i f i c  k in ,  c l e a r l y  amounted t o  a ce l e b ­
r a t i o n  which involved an e n t i r e  community. I t  even went beyond 
t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  v i l l a g e ,  s ince  'one pig was even presen te d  to  a 
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  laua in th e  next  v i l l a g e 1 (1936: 17).
According t o  Bateson 's  in formants ,  t h e  fo u r  waus involved had 
dressed as 'm o th e r s ' ,  with t h e i r  c lo th e s  tucked up to  expose t h e i r  
g e n i t a l s .  Three of  th e se  'mothers '  had c a r r i e d  th e  l i t t l e  g i r l s
'on t h e i r  h e a d s ' ,  supposedly in t h e  manner in which Iatmul mothers
ca r ry  t h e i r  c h i ld ren  on t h e i r  shou lde rs .  The fou r th  wau, who did 
not  wear a s k i r t  a t  a l l ,  was t i e d  down on a s t r e t c h e r  on which he 
was rocked v i o l e n t l y  by a group o f  men who sang songs from t h e i r
c l a n .  The l i t t l e  g i r l  in whose honour th e  naven was being
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p r i n c i p a l l y  c e l eb ra te d  was placed on th e  wau's b e l l y ,  while her 
f a t h e r  s tood  by with an adze decora ted  with a m o th e r -o f -p e a r l .
The f a t h e r  gave t h e  adze t o  t h e  g i r l ,  who then used i t  t o  cu t  
th e  ropes which t i e d  her  wau down on th e  s t r e t c h e r .  She gave 
the  adze t o  th e  wau, while he r a i s e d  h im se lf  t o  a s i t t i n g  p o s i t i o n .  
The f a t h e r s  of  t h e  o the r  g i r l s  presen te d  g i f t s  t o  t h e  g i r l s '  
waus and a l so  loosened th e  waus1 s k i r t s .  The waus then  changed 
in to  t h e i r  normal male costumes.  While t h i s  was going on, a 
mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  wife - t h e  wife of  th e  wau who had been t i e d  
t o  th e  s t r e t c h e r  -  danced with her  s k i r t s  up, showing her  g e n i t a l s .  
Over her  head and f ace  she wore a s t r i n g  bag, and she c a r r i e d  a
digging s t i c k ,  which she held behind her  shou lders  with her  hands
r a i s e d .  A f te r  her  dance she was p resen ted  with a m o ther -o f -pear l  
ornament and t h r e e  s h e l l s  by th e  l i t t l e  g i r l ' s  f a t h e r  (1936:
17-18).
Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  the  scene on th e  s t r e t c h e r  appeared t o  him 
to  be a ' r i t u a l  pantomime.. .a  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  of  th e  b i r t h  of  the  
l i t t l e  g i r l  from th e  b e l ly  of  her  mother ' s  b r o th e r '  (1936: 18).
But he admits  t h a t  none of  h is  informants had heard of  th e  custom 
of ty in g  a woman in labour t o  a s t r e t c h e r .  S im i la r ly ,  he f e e l s  
t h a t  th e  dance of  th e  mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  wife i s  a l so  a r e p r e s e n t ­
a t ion  of a woman g iv ing b i r t h .
Next, according to  Bateson,
' a  genera l  p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  food and va luab les  fol lowed t h i s  
ceremony1 (1936: 18).
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  he uses th e  word 'ceremony'  immediately a f t e r  
at tempt ing  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  p o in ted ly  symbolic,  of  th e  performance.  
There i s ,  however, no mention of  any f u r t h e r  in s ta nces  of t h i s  
'ceremony'  in th e  r e s t  of  the  book. Neither  i s  any mention made of  
any f u r t h e r  in s tances  of  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  kind of  naven recounted 
from Palimbai v i l l a g e ,  in which th e  two waus-as -mothers  sought the  
laua without  success ,  and then co l lapsed  in to  th e  canoe.  I t  seems 
t h a t  Bateson i s  seeking a symbolic e x p lan a t io n ,  or  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
f o r  a performance which he has c a l l e d  a 'ceremony' .  Yet he gives  
no ev idence t h a t  i t  i s  a ceremony a t  a l l ,  in t h a t  i t  might well have
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been a unique event  ta k ing  p lace  in p a r t i c u l a r  ci rcumstances  with,  
as one might say,  a p a r t i c u l a r  ' ' s c r i p t "  and a p a r t i c u l a r  ‘' c a s t " .  
Admittedly ,  i t  might be a unique event  which takes  p lace  with in  a 
more genera l  co n tex t ,  t h a t  of  naven behaviour ,  o r  of  what I could 
c a l l  " navenne s s 11. I suggest  t h a t  we a re  faced here  with an 
at tempt t o  provide a symbolic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  what i s  assumed 
t o  be a r e g u la r  s te reo typed  a c t  (of  t h e  kind which might conven­
t i o n a l l y  be descr ibed  in words such as " a t  ha rv es t  t ime the  
So-and-So parade around the  v i l l a g e . . . " ) ,  when th e  performance 
in ques t ion  may have been a unique,  improvised even t .
B a teson 's  account  cont inues  with what h i s  informants had t o l d  
him of  t h e  naven in Mindimbit v i l l a g e :  during th e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  
food and v a lu a b le s ,  e ig h t  p igs  were k i l l e d  and p re s en te d .  One 
was given by her  wau t o  th e  l i t t l e  g i r l  who had caught  a f i s h .
She stepped upon i t  - ' c e r e m o n ia l ly ' ,  in Ba teson 's  words (1936:18),  
though presumably not  in those  of  h i s  in form ants .  Three pigs  
were given by waus t o  t h e i r  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  l a u a s .  One was given 
by a woman t o  her  husband's  s i s t e r ' s  c h i l d .  One was given to  
a c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  s i s t e r ' s  husband, and ano ther  t o  a widowed 
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  s i s t e r .  Bateson then comments on th e  nexus of  g i f t  
exchanges which seemed t o  him t o  be an important  p a r t  of  a l l  
naven a c t i v i t i e s :
' t h i s  p a t t e r n  i s  f u r t h e r  extended so t h a t  th e  exchanges 
a c t u a l l y  t ake  p lace  between th e  r e l a t i v e s  of  wives on the  
one hand and th e  r e l a t i v e s  of  husbands on the  o th e r '
(1936: 19).
What happens,  on t h i s  account ,  i s  t h a t  th e  w i f e ' s  c l a n ,  inc luding 
her  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  b ro th e r s ,  give p igs  t o  th e  husband, husband's  
son or  t h e  husband 's  f a t h e r .  The Iatmul phrase  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by 
saying t h a t  th e  wau-nyame nampa (m other ' s  b ro th e r  and mother 
people) g ive  pigs  t o  the  lanoa nampa (husband people)  or  the  
laua nyanggu ( s i s t e r ' s  c h i ld ren  people)  (1936: 19). In terms of  
Iatmul kin  terminology,  th e se  two l a s t  a re  almost synonymous 
(1936: 19).  In th e  r e tu rn  p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  of  s h e l l s  and o the r  
v a lu ab le s ,  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  b ro the rs  and o th e r  r e l a t i v e s  of  the  
r e c i p i e n t s  o f  pigs w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  va luab les  which make up
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the  r e c i p r o c a l  g i f t s
' so  t h a t  th e  l i s t  was exceedingly  e l a b o r a t e  and .involved 
a g r e a t  number of  people,  r e l a t e d  in t h e  most var ious  ways 
t o  th e  o r i g i n a l  donors of  th e  p ig s '  (1936: 19).
I t  appears t h a t  what Bateson i s  d e s c r ib in g  here i s  a c l a s s i c  
example of  g i f t  exchange which, from h is  ethnographic  examples, 
might be on any s c a le  ranging from a simple dyadic t r a n s a c t i o n  up 
t o  a network of  massive r e c i p r o c a l  exchange which can involve an 
e n t i r e  v i l l a g e  and, f u r t h e r ,  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  kin in o th e r  v i l l a g e s  
too .
The f i n a l  example of  a naven of  which Bateson g ives  a d e t a i l e d  
account  i s  t h a t  f o r  a successfu l  homicide on th e  occasion of  his  
f i r s t  k i l l .  Owing to  th e  in f luence  of  th e  co lon ia l ,  a u t h o r i t i e s  
and th e  outlawing of  head-hunt ing,  such a c e l e b r a t i o n  would have 
belonged t o  th e  p a s t .  We must remember here  t h a t  Ba teson 's  m a te r ia l  
concerning t h i s  example again came from in form ants '  accounts .
Some of  th e  d e t a i l s  we have encountered a l ready  are  repea ted ,  
but  we a re  t o l d  of  four  more in c id e n t s  which Bateson r e f e r s  to  as 
'pantomime' and which
' a l l . . . i n v o l v e  th e  same types  of  t r a n s v e s t i s m  which I have 
desc r ibed  above1 (1936: 19).
The exception  seems to  be th e  costume of t h e  mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  
wife (mbora) , who wears ragged female c lo th e s  in th e  f i r s t  inc iden t  
but  puts  on (probably ragged) men's c lo th e s  in th e  second and 
t h i r d  i n c i d e n t s .
In t h e  f i r s t  i n c id e n t  about which Bateson was t o l d ,  t h e  mother 's  
b r o t h e r ' s  w ife  danced in a bedraggled s k i r t ,  wearing a f i s h i n g  ne t  
on her  head.  The enemy head was suspended from her  neck.  With her  
hands h a l f  r a i s e d  she held a digging s t i c k  behind her  shou lde rs .
She danced u n t i l  sunse t  when th e  husband 's  s i s t e r ' s  son (n as a ) 
presented  a s h e l l  t i e d  t o  a spea r ,  a t  t h e  same t ime loosening the  
s k i r t  from h i s  mbora (mother 's  b r o t h e r ' s  wife = MBW). In th e  second 
i n c id e n t ,  t h e  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r s  ( iau-ndo = FZ) dressed  as men 
and c a r r i e d  in t h e i r  hands th e  kind of  f e a t h e r  ornament which the
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homicide w i l l  put  in h i s  head-d ress .  The mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  wives 
in male costume (mbora-ndo) then lay down on th e  ground,  and the  
iau-ndo then stepped across  them ca r ry ing  th e  s p ec ia l  f e a t h e r s .
The mbora-ndo snatched th e  f e a t h e r s  and ran o f f  with them (1936: 
19-20).
In th e  t h i r d  inc iden t  th e  wau donned a s k i r t ,  pu t  an orange- 
coloured  f r u i t  in h i s  anus and cl imbed a ladder  a g a in s t  th e  wall 
of  a house,  d isp lay ing  h i s  anatomical ornament as he did  so.  At 
the  top  of  th e  ladder  he mimed an a c t  of  sexual  i n t e r c o u r s e  with 
h is  w ife ,  who was dressed  as ,  and acted  t h e  p a r t  o f ,  a man.
The laua was much ashamed a t  t h i s  s i g h t ,  and l a u a ' s  s i s t e r  
wept. Bateson w r i t e s  here t h a t  th e  orange f r u i t  rep resen ted
'an anal  c l i t o r i s ,  an anatomical  f e a t u r e  f r e q u e n t ly  imagined 
by th e  Iatmul and a p p ro p r ia te  t o  th e  wau' s  assumption of  
g ro tesque  f e m i n i i t y .  My informant t o l d  me t h a t ,  a f t e r  th e  
mbora, ac t in g  as male, had copulated  with t h e  wau, th e  o the r  
women would a l l  fol low s u i t  - and we may imagine a scene of  
c o n s id e ra b le  confusion around th e  un fo r tuna te  wau1 
(1936: 20).
In th e  fou r th  in c id e n t ,  a l a rge  pear-shaped prawn t r a p  with 
a l o b s t e r  pot  en t rance  was r a i s e d  on t o  t h e  la dder  of  a house.
All t h e  women of  th e  v i l l a g e  lay naked on th e  ground, in f r o n t  of  
the  la d d e r .  The homicide then stepped over th e  women, t o  e n t e r  
the  house,  accompanied by h i s  s i s t e r .  There i s  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  here 
in B a teson 's  account ,  because as Bateson a l so  says t h a t  ' t h e  
only women over whom he ( the  l a u a ) would not  s tep  a re  h i s  s i s t e r  
and h i s  w i fe '  (1936: 20),  we must assume t h a t  s i s t e r  (Z) and wife 
(W) a re  not  included in ' a l l 1 or  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a lacuna somewhere 
in th e  d a t a .  The young man was ashamed t o  look a t  th e  g e n i t a l s  of 
the  women as he stepped over them, and he walked with h i s  head 
r a i s e d .  The s i s t e r  d isp layed  no such modesty,  and even a t tacked  
th e  prone womens' g e n i t a l s  with her  hands, p a r t i c u l a r l y  th o se  of 
t h e  t s h a i s h i  ( e ld e r  b r o t h e r ' s  w i f e ) ,  c a l l i n g  out  "A vu lva l"
Upon which t h e  t s h a i s h i  r e p l i e d  "No! A p en i s ! "  The t s h a i s h i  then 
sang a comic song which, l i k e  a l l  Iatmul songs i t  seems, was 
composed of  a s e r i e s  of  to temic  names. This p a r t i c u l a r  song was 
made up of  names o f  th e  f i s h  t r a p  perched on t h e  ladder .  At th e  end
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of th e  song th e  homicide speared th e  t r a p  and en te red  the  
house.  Bateson again o f f e r s  a symbolic a n a l y s i s :
' t h e  f i s h  t r a p  i s  c e r t a i n l y  a symbol of  th e  vulva,  and t h i s  
symbol occurs a l so  in e s o t e r i c  mythology, to g e th e r  with the  
complementary symbol, t h e  e e l ,  which ge t s  caught in th e  
t r a p '  (1936: 21).
I should note here t h a t  Bateson 's  account of  t h e s e  fou r  
in c id en ts  i s  given in the  p re sen t  t e n s e ,  i e :  ' t h e  mbora dances 
in bedraggled s k i r t  with her  head in s id e  a f i s h i n g  n e t 1 (1936:
19). I p o in t  t h i s  out  because the  cont inuous  use of  th e  p resen t  
t e n se  sugges ts  t h a t  th e  fou r  in c id e n t s  which had been descr ibed  
by Ba teson 's  informants occurred  r e g u l a r l y ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  on 
repea ted  occas ions ;  Bateson might well  have conver ted n a r r a t i v e  
( the n a r r a t i v e  t a l e s  t o l d  him by informants)  in to  a gene ra l ized  
ethnographic  p r e s e n t .  Again, whether " p a s t " or  " p r e s e n t lE, we are  
confused as t o  whether th e se  in c id en ts  were i s o l a t e d  or  r e g u la r  
occur rences .  Perhaps th e  use of  t h e  p r e s e n t  t e n se  was suggested 
to  Bateson because of  h is  search  f o r  some kind of  " r i t u a l 1' or  
" c e r e m o n i a l 11 p a t t e r n  in to  which he could f i t  t h e  naven. That 
he was engaged in such a process  can be seen from the  c lo s ing  
sec t io n  o f  h i s  second chap te r ,  which i s  a summary of  what he 
c a l l s  ' t h e  naven behaviour of  th e  var ious  r e l a t i v e s '  (1936: 21).
His use o f  t h e  d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e  here implies t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
d e f i n i t e  p a t t e r n  of  behaviour t o  be d e l im i te d ,  descr ibed  and 
analysed (th e  naven behaviour) ;  t h e r e  a re  sugges t ions  here of  
B e n ed ic t ' s  P a t t e rn s  of  C u l tu r e .
This summary c o n s i s t s  o f  a l i s t  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  behaviours 
repor ted  so f a r  f o r  the  var ious  r e l a t i v e s  r epo r te d  as involved in 
known o r  assumed ins tances  of  naven. Seven kinds of  kin a re  l i s t e d  
mother ' s  b ro th e r ,  mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  w ife ,  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ,  
mother,  s i s t e r ,  g ^ e r  b r o t h e r ' s  wife and w i f e ' s  b r o th e r .  For 
example:
'Wau (mother ' s  b ro the r )  wears g ro tesque  female a t t i r e ;  o f f e r s  
TTTs bu ttocks  t o  male laua ;  in pantomime g ives  b i r t h  t o  female 
laua who looses h i s  bonds; suppor ts  h imse lf  on the  adze
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presen ted  by her ;  p re s en ts  food t o  laua of  e i t h e r  sex and 
r e c e iv e s  in tu rn  s h e l l  v a lu ab le s ;  a c t s  as female in gro tesque 
copu la t ion  with mbora. These ceremonial a c t s  may be performed 
e i t h e r  by own wau or  c a l a s s i f i c a t o r y  wau - most u sua l ly  the  
l a t t e r 1 (1936: 21).
We should note here t h a t  in c id en ts  which have been observed or 
repo r ted  more than once - eg,  th e  r e c i p r o c a l  p r e s e n ta t i o n  of  
food and s h e l l  va luab les  - a re  l i s t e d  a longside  in c id e n t s  which 
Bateson has observed o r  which have been repo r ted  t o  him only once 
- th e  o f f e r i n g  of  the  bu ttocks  t o  th e  l a u a , and (according to  
the  B a teson 's  a n a l y s i s ,  but  not  t o  th e  Iatmul)  th e  pantomimic 
b i r t h  of  t h e  female l a u a .
The behaviour of  the  s ix  remaining r e l a t i v e s ,  a l l  female k in ,  
is  then s i m i l a r l y  l i s t e d .  Three of  t h e s e ,  t h e  iau ( f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r  
= FZ), t h e  nyanggai ( s i s t e r  = Z) and th e  t s h a i s h i  ( e ld e r  b r o t h e r ' s  
wife = eBW), a re  repor ted  as wearing ' s p le n d id  male a t t i r e ' .
But aga in ,  in c id e n t s  p rev ious ly  repo r ted  as having occurred  only 
once a re  a l so  l i s t e d ,  eg 1Nyame (mother = M ) . . . l i e s  p r o s t r a t e  
with o th e r  women when th e  homicide s t e p s  ac ross  them a l l '
(1936: 22) .
One kind o f  behaviour which w i l l  provide a c r u c i a l  focus f o r  
Ba teson 's  a n a l y s i s  of  th e  naven l a t e r  in th e  book i s  th e  
t r a n s v e s t i s m  of both male and female p a r t i c i p a n t s .  However, i f  
we examine Bateson 's  da ta  c l o s e l y ,  we f in d  t h a t  of  th e  seven 
in s ta nces  of  naven e i t h e r  observed by him or  repo r ted  t o  him by 
in f o r m a n t s , , in only t h r e e  did male t r a n s v e s t i s m  occur;  namely, 
th e  even t  a t  Palimbai in which th e  two waus-as -mothers  sought 
but  did  not  f ind  th e  l a u a ; t h e  Mindimbit naven in which one wau 
was t i e d  down on a s t r e t c h e r ;  and t h e  naven f o r  t h e  homicide in 
which t h e  t r a n s v e s t i t e  wau enacted  a g ro tesque  a c t  o f  sex with 
h is  w ife .
In c id e n ts  involving  female t r a n s v e s t i s m  repo r ted  number two: 
the  naven in Mindimbit f o r  t h e  ch i ld re n  who had worked sago and,
again ,  t h a t  in which th e  mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  wife dressed  as a man 
in t h e  comic act.  of  i n t e r c o u r s e .  In t h e  o th e r  in s tances  in which 
only women a re  repor ted  t o  have p a r t i c i p a t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  no record
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of t h e i r  having been t r a n s v e s t i t e .  F in a l ly  in t h i s  r ega rd ,  and 
perhaps most i n t e r e s t i n g  of  a l l ,  Bateson r e p o r t s  no in s tance  of  
naven in which both males and females were t r a n s v e s t i t e ,  except  
f o r  th e  episode of. mock in t e r c o u r s e  between th e  wau and h is  w ife .
At t h e  o u t s e t  of  h is  an a ly s i s  Bateson i s  faced with a problem 
which he never formulates  e x p l i c i t l y ,  but  which a c lo se :  reading of  
t h i s  e a r l y  p a r t  of  h is  t e x t  e l u c i d a t e s .  I t  would appear t h a t  he 
i s  seeking a normative d e f i n i t i o n  of  naven behaviour ,  which the  
wealth of  v a r i e t y  of  ac tua l  in s tances  renders  e l u s i v e .  His approach 
i s  consonant with an at tempt t o  d iscover  an idea l  naven of  which 
ind iv idua l  performances are  in s t a n c e s .  Later  he formula tes  eidos  
as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a formal model of Iatmul though t ,  an idea l  cogn i t ive  
system, which he assumes to  be a t  th e  roo t  of  naven behaviour,  and 
indeed a t  t h e  ro o t  of  a l l  Iatmul behaviour .  I s h a l l  argue t h a t  
t h i s  a t tempt a t  th e  encapsu la t ion  of  an idea l  co g n i t iv e  system 
f a i l s ,  j u s t  as th e  at tempt to  encapsu la te  an idea l  naven f a i l s .
A s i m i l a r  at tempt to  ground complex r i t u a l  behaviours in an 
ideal  c o g n i t i v e  matrix  f o r  a New Guinea s o c ie ty  has been made more 
r e c e n t ly  by G ell ,  w r i t in g  about the  Umeda, but  Gell f a i l s  t o  show 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any such th ing  as a "normal" Umeda dance of  which 
ac tua l  in s ta nces  a re  mere examples (1975).  S im i l a r l y ,  Geertz has 
at tempted an adumbration of  an idea l  Ba l inese  i d e n t i t y , r e v e a l e d  in 
a p le th o ra  of  names and symbols, which i s  expressed in t h e  workings 
of  th e  Ba l inese  s t a t e  (Geertz 1980). This sweepingly genera l  
p e r s p e c t iv e  of  th e  r e l a t i o n  between c u l t u r e  and ac t io n  views the  
Ba linese as being programmed by a system of P la ton ic  id e a l s  which 
are manifes ted  in the  d a i ly  l i v e s  o f  Bal inese  in d i v id u a l s .
We w i l l  see t h a t  in h is  own ethnography of  th e  Ia tmul,  Bateson 
was unable t o  con ta in  th e  wealth of  ac tua l  in s tances  of  naven 
behaviour  and. accompanying data w i th in  an idea l  matr ix  of  an e i d o s , 
and t h a t  t h i s  notion is  dropped in favour  of' tethos'*, which in tu rn  
gives way t o  an ac t ion-based  model of  Iatmul i n t e r - a c t i o n  
i nco rpo ra t ing  both eidos  and e thos .  This model i s  based on th e  
notion of  schismogenesis .
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Goody's comments on th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in h e re n t  in comparison and 
d e f i n i t i o n  a re  r e l e v a n t  here .  In h is  paper The Im pl ica t ions  of  
I n c e s t , he poin ted  t.o th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  a decon tex tua l i s ed  
theory  o f  i n c e s t .  One needs t o  s i t u a t e  i n c e s t  with in  t h e  t o t a l  
f i e l d  o f  p r o h ib i t i o n s  w i th in  any one p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e .  Inces t  
cannot be simply compared c r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y ,  f o r  t h e r e  might be 
d i f f e r e n t  kinds of  p r o h ib i t i o n s  a t  work w i th in  one p a r t i c u l a r  
c u l t u r e  (Goody 1956). By analogy Bateson does not
examine forms of  ceremonial behaviour amongst t h e  Iatmul 
o the r  than  t h a t  which he de f ines  as naven. Naven i s  cen t red  
from t h e  s t a r t .  A d e s c r ip t i o n  of  naven performances in th e  
con tex t  of  o th e r  kinds of  ceremonial ,  f o r  in s t a n c e  kin group 
ceremonies or  p a r t i c u l a r  in s tances  of  exchange,  might have been 
f r u i t f u l .  As i t  i s ,  Bateson p re s en ts  us with a naven which i s  
p r e - e x i s t e n t  t o  o th e r  so c ia l  f a c t s  in t h e  s o c i e t y ,  in t h a t  i t  i s  
i n o r d i n a t e l y  p r iv i l e g e d  by him. For Bateson, th e  naven i s  
de l im i ted  and wholly i t s e l f  without  r e f e r e n c e  t o  any o th e r  kind 
of  ceremonial  or  per formative con tex t  in Iatmul c u l t u r e .
Another view of Bateson 's  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  provided by the  
Chomskian approach,  which sees  performance (here  r e f e r r i n g  to  
in d iv idua l  in s tance )  as t o t a l l y  con s t r a in ed  by a deep s t r u c t u r e  
of  r u l e s .  According to  t h i s  view, i f  we can unders tand th e  
system o f  r u l e s ,  we w i l l  then be ab le  t o  understand  th e  behaviour .  
But th e  Chomskian s t r a t e g y  p r i v i l e g e s  competence a t  th e  expense 
of  performance; performance i t s e l f ,  as a f i e l d  of  enqui ry  in i t s  
own r i g h t ,  d i s ap p ea r s .  This i s  t h e  crux of  B a teson 's  problem; 
v a r i a t i o n s  in naven performances must be expla ined  in terms of 
a naven id e a l ,  r a t h e r  than in t h e i r  own terms as performances in 
t h e i r  own r i g h t . I t  would, of course ,  s t r eng then  my case i f  
i t  could be shown t h a t  the  Iatmul word naven could a c t u a l l y  be 
t r a n s l a t e d  as .flperformance", o r #'show'f, o r  some such English term.
One might note  here Goodman’s c r i t i c i s m  of th e  view t h a t  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  in a r t  i s  fundamental ly a m a t te r  of  copying.
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'The copy theory  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . i s  s topped a t  th e  s t a r t  
by i n a b i l i t y  t o  spec i fy  what i s  t o  be cop ied.  Not an ob je c t  
th e  way i t  i s ,  n o r . a l l  t h e  ways i t  i s ,  nor th e  way i t  looks 
t o  th e  mindless eye.  Moreover, something i s  wrong with the  
very notion  o f  copying any of  t h e  ways an o b je c t  i s ,  any 
aspec t  o f  i t .  For an aspec t  i s  not  j u s t  th e  ob je c t - f rom -a -  
g iv e n -d i s t a n c e -a n d - a n g le - a n d - i n - a - g iv e n - l ig h t ;  i t  i s  the  
o b je c t  as we look upon or  conceive i t ,  a vers ion  or  cons t rua l  
o f  t h e  o b j e c t .  In r e p re s e n t in g  an o b j e c t ,  we do not  copy 
such a cons t rua l  or  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  - we achieve i t .
’ In o th e r  words, nothing i s  ever  r ep re sen ted  e i t h e r  shorn of  
or  in t h e  f u l l n e s s  of  i t s  p r o p e r t i e s .  A p i c t u r e  never merely 
r e p r e s e n t s  x, but  r a t h e r  r e p re s e n t s  x as_ a man or r e p re s e n t s  
x t o  be a mountain,  or  r e p re s e n t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  x i s  a 
meTorf1-( Goodman 1981: 9, a u t h o r ’s emphasi s) .
B a teson 's  p o s i t i n g  of  an idea l  naven of  which ind iv idua l  
examples a re  merely in s tances  r e v e a l s  h i s  concern with “ premises'*, 
which w i l l  be covered more f u l l y  in th e  next  ch a p te r .  From th e  
d e t a i l s  of  th e  var ious  naven a c t i v i t i e s  he has c o l l e c t e d ,  Bateson 
wishes t o  e s t a b l i s h  premises r e l e v a n t  t o  Iatmul c u l t u r e  and so 
to  Iatmul in d i v id u a l s .  These premises w i l l  be about naven 
and th in g s  connected with i t ;  about waus and lauas ,  p r id e ,  
achievement,  and so on. This i s  induc t ive  method, which seeks to  
e s t a b l i s h  p ro p o s i t i o n s  a t  a h ighe r  leve l  of  a n a ly s i s  which the  
a n th ro p o lo g i s t  can then employ in h is  map of  t h e  c u l t u r e  under 
s tudy.  But t h e se  p ro p o s i t io n s  n e c e s s a r i l y  presuppose th e  ex i s t en ce  
of  an e s s e n t i a l  naven, without  which th e  "premises '* of  t h e  Iatmul 
could no t  have been formulated  by th e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t .  These 
premises a re  t h e  s u b jec t  m a t te r  of  th e  o b j e c t iv e  framing o f  th e  
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s  p ro p o s i t i o n s .
There a re  a l t e r n a t i v e  views o f  th e  s t a t u s  of  premises and
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  Collingwood, f o r  example, s t r e s s e s  t h a t  we should
take  a premise to  be a f a c t  only when i t  i s  a c t u a l l y  a s s e r t e d  by
a s p e c i f i c  ind iv idua l  or  by s p e c i f i c  in d iv id u a l s  (1972: 21-48).
Bateson however i s  a t tempt ing t o  i n f e r  premises d i r e c t l y  from
behaviour ,  without  r e fe ren c e  to  th e  a s s e r t i o n s  or  o therwise  of
th e  Ia tm ul.  Witness,  f o r  example, h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  one naven
event  as a 'pantomimic b i r t h ' ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  d e n ia l s  o f  h i s  Iatmul 
informants t h a t  th e  event  could be so i n t e r p r e t e d  (see above, p. 59).
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Through such a t tem pts ,  as I hope t o  show, Bateson reaches  high 
l e v e l s  of  a b s t r a c t i o n  very qu ick ly .  My p o in t  here i s  t h a t  Ba teson 's  
p o s i t i n g  of  an e s s e n t i a l  naven r e s i s t s  a per fo rmat ive  a n a l y s i s ,  
and i s  a c t u a l l y  opposed to  i t ,  s ince  a theo ry  of  performance gives
a n a l y t i c a l  p r i o r i t y  t o  s p e c i f i c  ways of  doing th in g s  and saying
t h i n g s .
For Goodman, too ,  the  work of  a r t  is  an achievement r a t h e r  than 
an im i ta t io n  of  an essence ,  f o r  a r t  r e f e r s  t o  i t s e l f ,  in i t s  own
making. This i s  not  t o  say t h a t  a r t  i s  not  of  th e  world, but  t h a t
i t  i s  Jj2  t h e  world on i t s  own te rms .  The work of  a r t  can only be 
understood as a work of  a r t  by r e fe ren c e  to  i t s e l f  and to  o th e r  
works of  a r t ;  a r t  i s  an a c t i v i t y . The same notion  can,  I sugges t ,  
be app l ied  t o  those  kinds of  a c t i v i t i e s  which a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  
c a l l ' ' r i t u a l " . P a r t i c u l a r  in s tances  o f  naven might not  r e f e r  to  
an idea l  naven, but they might well r e f e r  t o  .o ther ,  p rev ious ,  
p a r t i c u l a r  in s tances  o r  performances.  There i s  no idea l  naven, 
only a naven t r a d i t i o n .
For Bateson,  t h e  naven was a phenomenon which could only be 
expla ined  by e lu c id a t in g  th e  normative r u l e s  which produced,  or  
which r e q u i r e d ,  i t ;  but  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  cannot  deal  with ac tua l  
in s t a n c e s ,  with p a r t i c u l a r  performances.  Normative ru l e s  must always 
be dependent  upon an idea l  in s tance  t o  which they  can be r e f e r r e d .
In t h i s  way, in s t r u c t u r a l i s t  pa r la nce ,  Bateson hopes t o  a r r i v e  a t  a 
parad igmat ic  scheme which governs syntagmatic in s ta n ces  of  Iatmul 
i n t e r - a c t i o n .  I t  might be, however, t h a t  t h i s  i s  th e  wrong way 
to  approach th e  m a t te r ;  t h a t  t h e r e  might ,  in f a c t ,  be no 11 i d e a l "  
naven a t  a l l .  This would be t h e  foundat ion  o f  a performance 
theory  of  " r i t u a l 11 a c t i o n .
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NOTES to  Chapter Three
(1) I mention t h i s  in pass ing he re .  A d e t a i l e d  account of  t h i s  
second Epilogue fol lows in my chap te r  t e n .
(2) In ch ap te r  s ix  I address myself  in some d e t a i l  t o  the
genea log ica l  s t r e s s  in Ba teson 's  account of  Iatmul k insh ip  
and marriage  arrangements.  Here I w i l l  only comment t h a t  
Bateson p re sen ts  no evidence t o  show t h a t  th e  Iatmul operated 
a descen t  system of any kind ,  whether p a t r i l i n e a l  or
m a t r i l i n e a l  or  of  any o th e r  type .
(3) Bateson i s  not  c l e a r  on th e  m a t te r  of  whether or  not  i t  is
c o r r e c t  f o r  a g i r l  t o  boas t  before  her  wau. His s i l e n c e
on t h i s  po in t  i n d i c a te s  an impor tant  lacuna in h is  co n s id e r ­
a t io n  of  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Iatmul male,  and Iatmul 
female,  e thos .  See chap te rs  seven and e i g h t .
(4) I t  would appear t h a t  widowhood, as well as motherhood, is
being c a r i c a tu r e d  in t h e  Palimbai naven. Bateson w i l l  
a t tempt  t o  show l a t e r  in h i s  t e x t  t h a t  Iatmul men, in 
c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  t h e  women, a re  d i sm iss ive  o f  emotions 
connected with mourning and g r i e f  (cf> f o r  example 1936: 153).
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CHAPTER FOUR: NAVEN: THEORY AND STRATEGY
THE NEXT CHAPTER in Naven, 'The Concepts of  S t ru c tu r e  and
F unc t ion1, i s  h ighly t h e o r e t i c a l  and can be used as th e  opening 
argument in Bateson 's  at tempt t o  harness ,  r ed e f in e  and en la rge  
the se  concepts  f o r  the  purposes of  h is  own methodological  develop­
ment. This at tempt cont inues  through almost  h a l f  of  h is  t e x t  u n t i l  
the  end of  Chapter  VIII ,  'Problems and Methods of  Approach' .  Here, 
Bateson r e t u r n s  to  an examination of  th e  t e n e t s  of  s t r u c t u r a l -  
func t iona ls im  in the  l i g h t  of  h is  d a t a .  However, as I s h a l l  argue,  
he did not  succeed in e x t r i c a t i n g  h im se lf  from the  t h e o r e t i c a l  
base o f  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l  ism even in th e  f i n a l  pages of  th e  book.
Chapter  I I I  opens with the  s ta temen t t h a t
'any at tempt t o  expla in  ( naven) must t a k e  t h e  form of r e l a t i n g
th e  ceremonies to  t h e i r  s e t t i n g . . .S ince  I s h a l l  t r y  t o  give 
ana lyses  of  the  p o s i t i o n  of  naven from both the  s t r u c t u r a l  and 
th e  fu n c t io n a l  po in t s  of  view, i t  w i l l  be well  t o  s t a t e  
d e f i n i t e l y  what I mean a t  t h i s  s tage  by the  two concepts ,  
S t r u c t u r e  and Function'  (Bateson 1936: 23, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis,  
my p a re n th e s e s ) .
He then uses a phrase which w i l l  r e cu r  throughout th e  book, and i t  
w i l l  be used in d i f f e r e n t  ways and f o r  d i f f e r e n t  purposes:  ' c u l t u r a l l y  
s tanda rd i se d  behaviour '  (Bateson 1936: 23) .  D e ta i l s  of  ' c u l t u r a l l y  
s tanda rd i se d  behav iou r ' a r e  what the  an th ro p o lo g i s t  c o l l e c t s  in 
the  f i e l d .  The problem here would seem t o  be: how would one t e l l
i f  a given p iece  of  behaviour was ' s t a n d a r d i s e d '  o r  not? (Bateson 
did not  have Nadel ' s  c e l eb ra te d  d e f i n i t i o n  of  " s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n '*  
to  draw on: ' a  s tandard i sed  mode of  c o - a c t i v i t y '  (1951: 108) ) .  
Ba teson 's  argument i s  t h a t  much of  th e se  da ta  i s  composed of 
na t iv e  s ta tem en ts  about behaviour .  Any d e t a i l  from a s t r u c t u r a l  
po in t  of  view is  embedded in a number of  c u l t u r a l  assumptions; 
the  a c t  of  a mother who gives food t o  her  c h i l d ,  f o r  example, can 
be seen as implying a number of  c u l t u r a l  assumptions about the  
m other -ch i ld  r e l a t i o n s h i p  in t h a t  c u l t u r e .  These assumptions,  or  
'g e n e ra l i s e d  c o n c e p t s ' ,  form a kind o f  ' sho r thand '  which
' i s  not  th e  c r e a t io n  s o le ly  of  t h e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ;  every c u l tu r e  
con ta in s  genera l i sed^concep ts  which a re  a shorthand means of 
r e f e r r i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y  t o  s t r u c t u r a l  a spec ts  of  l a rge  numbers
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of d e t a i l s  of  s tandard ised  behaviour '  (1936: 24).
Such words as 'mother1, 'moiety '  and ' p a t r i l i n y '  a re  examples of  
g e n e ra l i s e d  a b s t r a c t i o n s .
Bateson proceeds to  note t h a t  t h i s  sense of th e  word ' s t r u c t u r e '  
is  c l o s e l y  bound up with what we mean when we t a l k  about ' t r a d i t i o n 1. 
But any r e f e r e n c e  t o  t r a d i t i o n  i s  out  of  p lace  in a synchronic 
s tudy.  I f  th e  notion  of  t r a d i t i o n  i s  s t r i p p e d  of  a l l  r e fe re n c e s  to  
th e  p a s t ,  then we can only be r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  given f a c t s  of  a 
c u l t u r e ,  f a c t s  which are  'g iven '  as premises held by th e  members of 
th e  c u l t u r e .  In the  terms of  a s l i g h t l y  l a t e r  the o ry ,  Bateson here 
converts  Coll ingwood's  p resuppos i t ions  in to  R u s s e l l ' s  language of 
premises.  He i s  s i f t i n g  d e t a i l  in o rder  t o  a r r i v e  a t  g e n e r a l i t i e s .  
This i s  an e s s e n t i a l i z i n g  s t r a t e g y ,  t o  which s tandard  in duc t ive  
method lends i t s e l f .  ( 1)
The term ' s t r u c t u r e '  denotes t h e  nexus o f  th e  given premises of 
a c u l t u r e ,  but  i t  cannot  e a s i l y  r e f e r  t o  th e  many d i f f e r e n t  kinds of
elements which compose a c u l t u r e .  As Bateson puts  i t :
' I  s h a l l  t h e r e f o r e  use th e  word premise f o r  t h e s e  elements.  Thus 
a premise i s  a gen e ra l i s ed  s ta tement of  a p a r t i c u l a r  assumption 
or  im p l ica t ion  r ecogn isab le  in a number of  d e t a i l s  of  c u l t u r a l  
b eh av io u r1 (1936: 24, au th o r7! '  emphasis) .
C u l tu ra l  premises may be expressed e x p l i c i t l y  or  i m p l i c i t l y .  Often 
they w i l l  be implied:  they may only be s t a t e d  in symbolic te rms,
'by th e  terminology of  k in sh ip ,  by metaphoric c l i c h e s '  (1936: 25) 
and so on. I t  i s  convenient  t o  use th e  term f o r  any genera l  s t a t e ­
ment which can be e i t h e r  ob ta ined  from in formants ,  ' o r  which can
be shown over and over again t o  be i m p l i c i t  in th e  behaviour of  
i n d i v id u a l s '  (1936: 25).  He goes on to  p o in t  out  t h a t  i t  i s  not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  r e a l i s e d  how f a r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  premises o f  a c u l t u r e  
comprise what he c a l l s
' a  coheren t  schem e . . . I  would d e f in e  c u l t u r a l  s t r u c t u r e  as a 
c o l l e c t i v e  term f o r  the  coherent  “ l o g i c a l "  scheme which may 
be c ons t ruc ted  by th e  s c i e n t i s t ,  f i t t i n g  t o g e th e r  th e  var ious  
premises of  the  c u l t u r e '  (1936: 25).
In a f o o tn o te  which i s  important  here ,  Bateson comments t h a t  h is  use
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of th e  word ' l o g i c a l 1 in t h i s  con tex t  does not  r e f e r  t o  th e  conven­
t i o n a l  use of  th e  term in our c u l t u r e .  His use in s te ad  r e f e r s  t o  
the  s teps  by which th e  elements of  any c u l t u r e  a re  l inked in the  
minds of  i t s  members. In t h i s  foo tno te  Bateson in t roduces  the  
term ' e i d o s ' ,  and o u t l in e s  a theme of  much of  our contemporary 
anthropology in th e  1990s:
' i t  i s  probable  t h a t  c u l tu r e s  may vary in th e  spec ies  of s teps  
which l ink  t h e i r  premises t o g e t h e r ,  and t h a t  th e  word " log ic"  
must t h e r e f o r e  be i n t e r p r e t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  in every c u l t u r e '  
(1936: 25) .
Ba teson 's  use of  th e  term ' s t r u c t u r e '  i s  of  course  c r u c i a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  from the  way in which i t  i s  employed by Radcliffe-Brown. 
The l a t t e r  def ined  a s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  as ' a  network of  r e l a t i o n s  
between in d iv id u a l s  and groups of  i n d i v i d u a l s '  (1952: 43) .  Bateson 
uses th e  word s t r u c t u r e  t o  ' r e f e r  to  an aspec t  of  c u l t u r e '
(1936: 25) .  I t  i s  important ,  he says ,  t o  keep th e  two senses ,  
r e f e r r i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y  to  s o c i e t y  and t o  c u l t u r e ,  d i s t i n c t .  There 
a re ,  th e n ,  two d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t iv e s  from which we can study the  
same phenomena.
' In  t h e  study of  c u l t u r a l  s t r u c t u r e  we s h a l l  see c lans  and 
k insh ip  terminology as shorthand r e fe re n c e s  t o  d e t a i l s  of  
behav iour ,  while in th e  study of  s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  we s h a l l  
see t h e s e  groupings as segments in th e  anatomy of th e  
community, as a p a r t  o f  t h e  mechanism by which th e  community 
i s  i n t e g r a t e d  and o rgan ised '  (1936: 26).
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  in t h i s  passage to  d i s ce rn  t h e  in f luence  of  the  
c u l t u r a l  anthropology of  the  American Boasian school ,  in c o n t r a s t  
with th e  s o c io l o g ic a l  s t r u c t u r a l i s m  of th e  B r i t i s h  anthropology 
of  the  1930s.
Bateson then tu rn s  to  a co n s id e ra t io n  o f  th e  term " fu n c t io n " .
He appears t o  have g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  in defending t h i s  no tion a t  
a l l  a t  t h i s  p o in t ,  al though th e  word appears throughout th e  
r e s t  of  t h e  book in var ious  co n te x t s .  He w r i t e s
'we might say t h a t  the  naven ceremonies a re  a func t ion  of  a l l  
those  elements of  c u l t u r e  or  p r o p e r t i e s  of  s o c ie ty  upon 
whose presence  the  ex i s t e n c e  of  th e  ceremonies depends '
(1936: 26).
I f ,  f o r  example, he could show t h a t  t h e  ceremonies c o n t r ib u te d  to
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th e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of  th e  community, then he would be ab le  t o  say 
t h a t  ‘t h e  s i z e  of  the  Iatmul v i l l a g e  i s  a func t ion  of  - amongst 
o th e r  t h i n g s  - the  naven ceremonies '  (1936: 26 -27) .  Here he 
e v id e n t ly  f e e l s  himse lf  t o  be in deep wate r .  Whereas in t h e  main 
body of  th e  t e x t  he cont inues  by saying t h a t  t h i s  would be a 
c o n s i s t e n t  and lo g ica l  use of  th e  term which a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  might 
do well t o  adopt ,  a t e r s e  fo o tn o te  puts  t h e  m a t te r  somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t l y .
'The c h i e f  d i f f i c u l t y ,  which t h i s  use invo lves ,  i s  t h a t  on 
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  t h e  naven ceremonies could be shown to  be a 
f u n c t io n  of  every th ing  e l s e  in th e  un ive rse  and th e  an th rop­
o l o g i s t  w i l l  be faced with th e  problem of  d e f in in g  h is  sphere 
of  r e l e v a n c e '  (1936: 27) .  (2)
Bateson has however a l ready  prejudged th e  i s s u e  in an important  
sense.  By sugges t ing  t h a t  naven i s  a f u n c t io n  ' o f  a l l  those  
elements o f  c u l t u r e  o r  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  s o c i e t y  upon whose presence 
the  e x i s t e n c e  of  th e  ceremonies depends1 (1936: 26 ),  he i s  
assuming t h a t  th e  I p r o p e r t i e s  of  s o c i e t y '  a r e  p r e - e x i s t e n t  t o  
naven or  t o  o th e r  kinds of  behav iour.  Here, such p r o p e r t i e s  a re  
viewed as t h e  e s s e n t i a l  foundat ion upon which naven and o th e r  kinds 
of  behaviour a re  p re d ic a te d .  These p r o p e r t i e s  a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
viewed as e x i s t i n g  as i n t r i n s i c  components o f  t h e  world,  and not as 
con t ingen t  o r  h e u r i s t i c  aspec t s  of  a s o c i a l  r e a l i t y  which might be 
formed by, o r  i n t e r p r e t e d  from, behaviour ,  whether naven or  o t h e r ­
wise, r a t h e r  than th e  o th e r  way round.  Might not  naven behaviour 
and o th e r  kinds of ac t ion  c r e a t e  such ' p r o p e r t i e s ' ?
Bateson goes on t o  c r i t i c i s e  Malinowski,  whom he rega rds  as 
using th e  term ' f u n c t i o n '  t o  r e f e r  t o  both t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of 
human needs,  and t o  th e  in terdependence o f  d i f f e r e n t  elements of  
c u l t u r e .  The idea t h a t  c u l t u r e  can thus  be subdivided  in to  
' i n s t i t u t i o n s '  t o  meet th e se  two types  of  adap t ive  ends ,  Bateson 
argues ,  f u r t h e r  confuses th e  i s sue .
'To me i t  seems premature t o  at tempt such an a n a l y s i s  in to  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  u n t i l  t h e  concepts  covered by th e  term, fu n c t io n ,  
have been an a ly se d 1 (1936: 27).
Ins tead  o f  at tempt ing  to  subdivide d i f f e r e n t ' b i t s  o f  a c u l t u r e ,  
Bateson sugges ts  we should at tempt t o  see how t h e  d i f f e r e n t  ty pes  
of  f u n c t io n s  can be c l a s s i f i e d .  By so doing we might be ab le  to  
c l a r i f y  th e  notion  of  ' f u n c t i o n '  per  s e . This ,  however, only goes 
to  demonstrate t h e  ' p r e s e n t  confus ion '  which surrounds the  no t ion ,
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f o r  th e  l i s t  o f  po s s ib le  f unc t ions  in a s o c ie ty  embraces a huge 
spectrum of  what can be termed human a s p i r a t i o n s ,  from th e  ' d i r e c t  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  human n e e d s ' ,  t h r o u g h ' t h e  moulding and t r a i n i n g  of  
human b e i n g s ' ,  t o  ' t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  groups of  human be ings '  and 
' t h e  maintenance of  th e  s t a t u s  quo' (1936: 28) .  I t  i s  apparen t ,  
he says ,  t h a t  every one of  t h e s e  kinds of  func t ion  i s  dependent 
upon every  o th e r  kind and t h i s  i s  t h e  reason why t h e  f u n c t i o n a l i s t s  
themselves  have avoided ana lys ing  th e  concept  of  f u n c t i o n .  But 
again ,  t h e  notion of  ' c l a s s i f i c a t i o n '  which Bateson employs here 
i s  e s s e n t i a l i s t ,  r e f e r r i n g  as i t  does t o  an implied domain of  
given s o c i a l  f a c t s  which can be def ined  as n e c e s s a r i l y  e x i s t e n t ,  
o u t s id e  t ime and any p a r t i c u l a r  in s ta nce  o f  behaviour.
Bateson now a t t a c k s  th e  pseudo-un iversa l  ism o f  s t r u c t u r a l -  
fu n c t io n a l i sm ,  which he c a l l s  here ' s c i e n t i f i c  a n th ropo logy ' .
Older s c ienc es  such as physics  and chemis try  had .long ago solved 
t h e i r  'domestic  problems' and so were beginning t o  be ab le t o  
encroach upon mutual f r o n t i e r s  of  knowledge with b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t s .
'The r e s u l t  of  t h i s  ex tens ion  has been a new sense of  th e  
fundamental  un i ty  of  sc ience  and o f  t h e  world.  But th e  
e f f e c t s  upon anthropology have been d i s a s t r o u s .  The emphasis 
upon u n i ty  has r e t a rd e d  a n a l y s i s '  (1936: 28) .
Physics and chemist ry had only been ab le  t o  reach a s tage  where 
they  could pool c e r t a i n  a reas  of  re sea rch  because o f  t h e i r  
s e p a ra t io n  in th e  p a s t .
'The g r e a t  advances in knowledge a re  made by a n a ly s i s  of  th e  
problems,  by th e  s e p a ra t io n  o f  one c l a s s  of  problem from 
a n o th e r .  To s t a t e  t h a t  a l l  problems a re  i n t e r - r e l a t e d  is  
m ys t ica l  and u n p r o f i t a b l e '  (1936: 28) .  (3)
But a f t e r  a few c o n c i l i a t o r y  remarks in th e  d i r e c t i o n  of  R a d c l i f f e -  
Brown, Bateson announces h i s  i n t e n t i o n  o f  working with t h e  concept  
of  ' f u n c t i o n ' .
' I  s h a l l  endeavour t o  cons ide r  t h e  fu n c t io n a l  p o s i t i o n  (us ing  
th e  term in i t s  wides t  p h i lo soph ica l  sense)  of  t h e  naven 
ceremonies from f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  p o in t s  of  view'  (1936: 29).
I t  i s  among th e s e  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  t h a t  we f i n d  th e  f i r s t  use in
th e  book of  t h e  concepts  of  e thos  and e idos  which a re  t o  become 
c r u c i a l .
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His f i v e  ca t e g o r ie s  a re  a l l  kinds of r e l a t i o n s h i p .  They a re ,  
in the  o rde r  given in the  o r i g i n a l  work, (1) S t r u c t u r a l ,  (2)
A f fec t iv e ,  (3) E tho log ica l ,  (4) E idologica l  and (5) S o c io lo g ic a l .
The most f a m i l i a r  is  the  f i n a l  ca tegory ,  which covers th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between th e  p a r t i c u l a r  ac t ions  of  th e  in d iv idua l  and th e  so c ie ty  
as a whole, in Radcl iffe-Brown's  sense .  Bateson comments t h a t  
th e  f i r s t  and fou r th  c a t e g o r ie s  are very c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d ,  as are 
the  second and t h i r d .  In f a c t  the  members of  each p a i r  appear t o  
be almost  i d e n t i c a l ,  the  only d i f f e r e n c e  seeming t o  be in th e  t e x tu a l  
one of  t h e  wording chosen t o  de f ine  each ca tegory .  ' S t r u c t u r a l  
or  " l o g ic a l "  r e l a t i o n s h i p s '  a re  def ined as being those
'between the  cogn i t ive  aspects  of  the  var ious  d e t a i l s  of 
c u l t u r a l  behaviour:  th e  cog n i t iv e  reasons f o r  behav iour '
while th e  ' e i d o l o g i c a l '  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  those
'between th e  cogn i t ive  aspec ts  of  d e t a i l s  of  c u l t u r a l  behaviour 
and t h e  general  p a t t e rn in g  of  th e  c u l t u r a l  s t r u c t u r e 1 (1936: 
29-30) .
In th e  o th e r  p a i r  of  c a t e g o r i e s ,  ' a f f e c t i v e '  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  those
'between d e t a i l s  of  c u l t u r a l  behaviour and the  bas ic  or  der ived 
emotional needs and d e s i r e s  of  th e  i n d iv id u a l :  th e  a f f e c t i v e  
mot iva t ion  of  d e t a i l s  of  behaviour '
and ' e t h o l o g i c a l '  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  def ined as those
'between th e  emotional aspec ts  of  d e t a i l s  of  c u l t u r a l  behaviour 
and th e  emotional emphases o f  th e  c u l t u r e  as a whole'
(1936: 29-30).
This apparent  doubling of  t h e o r e t i c a l  fo rmula t ions  i s  exp la ined  
in a fo o tn o te  as being warranted s ince  the  a f f e c t i v e  func t ion  is  
‘th e  express ion  of  ethos  in behav iour1, and the  s t r u c t u r a l  func t ion  
is  ' t h e  express ion  of  eidos  in behaviour '  (1936: 30) .  Throughout 
th e  r e s t  of  t h e  book, however, i t  i s  e thos  and, to  a much l e s s e r  
e x t e n t ,  e idos  which are  th e  c r u c i a l  n o t io n s ;  th e  ' a f f e c t i v e '  and 
the  ' s t r u c t u r a l '  a re  l e f t  behind.  I would argue t h a t  ethos  and 
eidos a re  a c t u a l l y  developments of  th e  former n o t io n s ,  and t h a t  t h e i r  
replacement of  ' a f f e c t i v e '  and ' s t r u c t u r a l '  a re  major s teps  in 
Bateson 's  at tempted move away from s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l  ism.
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What kind of  a p i c tu r e  of  s o c ie ty  i s  Bateson p resen t ing  in t h i s  
model? The two p a i r s  of  fu n c t io n s ,  s t r u c t u r a l / e i d o l o g i c a l  and 
a f f e c t i v e / e t h o l o g i c a l , spr ing  from an o r i g i n a l  dichotomy which is  
assumed to  e x i s t  between th e  c o g n i t iv e  ' b i t s '  of  human beings on 
th e  one hand, and th e  emotional or  a f f e c t i v e  ' b i t s '  on th e  o th e r .  
Social  r e a l i t y  is  seen as grounded in a b io l o g i c a l  s u b s t r a t e .
The fu n c t io n s  of  organisms,  including  humans, a re  u l t im a te ly  
d iv ided between th e  promptings of  reason and d e s i r e .  This 
d iv i s io n  t a k e s  p lace  in an o n to log ica l  realm p r i o r  t o  s o c ie ty  
which, fo l lowing Bateson 's  l a t e r  work, we can c a l l  t h e  ' b i o s p h e r e ' .  
(See Diagram 2, page 77) Ba teson 's  t h e s i s  i s ,  appa re n t ly ,  t h a t  
while humans are capable of  c o g n i t io n ,  they  a l so  have emotional 
' n e e d s ' .  Nowhere in h is  work however does Bateson e x h i b i t  t h e  
same kind of  i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  reduct ion ism found in L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  
model of  th e  mind.
I t  fo l lows  from t h i s  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  t h a t  human beings must be 
s o c i a l i z e d  i f  so c ie ty  of  any kind i s  t o  be p o s s i b l e .  This ta kes  
Bateson t o  a second l e v e l ,  which develops and encompasses th e  
b inary  oppos i t ion  a t  t h e  leve l  of  c u l t u r e .  Humans working in 
c u l t u r e  recognize  and a t tempt  t o  meet t h e i r  emotional  needs.
At t h i s  second l e v e l ,  needs a re  "derived" as opposed t o  th e  "basic" 
needs which e x i s t  a t  th e  le ve l  of  t h e  b io sphere .  At t h e  same 
t ime,  c u l t u r e  works on th e  c o g n i t iv e  p o t e n t i a l s  s e t  up a t  th e  leve l  
of  th e  b io sphere .  This double process  r e s u l t s  in th e  composit ion 
of th e  " a f f e c t i v e "  and th e  " s t r u c t u r a l "  domains, which revea l  
themselves a t  a t h i r d  l e v e l ,  t h a t  of  t h e  grand c u l t u r a l  scheme 
of t h e  s o c i e t y ,  as ethos and e i d o s . The s t r u c t u r a l  and th e  a f f e c t i v e ,  
a t  Level Two, a re  i n t e r f a c e s  between c u l t u r e  and th e  b io l o g i c a l  
ind iv idua l  (See Diagram 2:A, page 77).  Ethos and e idos ,  a t  
Level Three,  r e p re s e n t  th e  grand c u l t u r a l  scheme i n t e r n a l i s e d  
with in  th e  ind iv idua l  a t  Level Two.
This t h r e e - t i e r  model f u r t h e r  con ta ins  two whole -par t  systems,  
c o n s t i t u t e d  by t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f '*s t r u c t u r e "  ( p a r t )  t o  " e i d o s "  
(whole) and t h a t  of  " a f f e c t "  ( p a r t )  t o  " e t h o s "  (whole) .  The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p a r t s  and wholes was an impor tant  theme f o r
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Diagram 3 . How an A nthropologist S tudies a C ulture.
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Bateson.  Here, s t r u c t u r e  re p re s e n t s  th e  c o g n i t iv e  reasons f o r  
behaviour ,  which c o n t r ib u te  towards the  e id o s ,  o r  th e  genera l  
p a t t e r n in g  of  th e  whole c u l t u r e .  On th e  o th e r  hand, a f f e c t  
r e p re s e n t s  t h e  d e t a i l s  of  emotional mot iva t ion  which c o n t r i b u t e  
towards e th o s ,  or  the  sum t o t a l  of  emotional needs e i t h e r  a t  the  
"bas ic"  leve l  o f  the  biosphere,  or  a t  th e  "derived"  leve l  of  
c u l t u r e .
I t  i s  a l so  p o s s ib le  and, I sugges t ,  i n s t r u c t i v e  to  view 
Bateson 's  scheme here as the  opera t ion  of  what has come to  be 
c a l l e d  in rece n t  l i t e r a t u r e  a "hermeneutic c i r c l e " ,  in which 
unders tand ing and exegesi s  proceeds from th e  p a r t  t o  the  whole, 
and then  from whole t o  whole, and f i n a l l y  from whole t o  p a r t .  (4)
I i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  in Diagram 3 (page 78).  What fol lows as an 
e lu c id a t io n  of  t h a t  Diagram i s  my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Bateson 's  method­
o log ica l  schema as he p resen ts  i t  in t h i s  e a r l y  sec t io n  of  h is  
t e x t .  Bateson s t a r t s  with the  q u es t ion ,  "How can we study a cu l tu re?"  
(Diagram 3, (1 ) ,  l e f t  hand column) His answer i s  t h a t  we must 
f i r s t  d e s c r ib e  th e  mani fes t  con ten t  o f  th e  c u l t u r e .  This w i l l  
p resen t  i t s e l f  in the  form of observab le  behaviour t o  which we can 
a s c r ib e  c o g n i t i v e  m ot iva t ions .  Once t h i s  mani fes t  con ten t  of 
c o g n i t iv e  " b i t s "  has been desc r ibed ,  we can then deduce t h e  under­
lying c u l t u r a l  system, or  e idos  (Diagram 3,  (2) ) .  So, in the
l e f t  hand column we move from " par t "  - c o g n i t iv e  con ten ts  -  to  
"whole", t h e  c u l t u r a l  system, or  e id o s .  The ques t ion  thus  
answered, "How can we study a cu l tu r e ? "  i s  a s t r u c t u r a l / e i d o l o g i c a l  
one, which i s  answered in s t r u c t u r a l / e i d o l o g i c a l  te rms.  Bateson 
has to  keep in mind the  f a c t  t h a t  the  Iatmul do not  themselves 
p o s tu l a t e  a dichotomy between i n t e l l e c t  and emotion.
But having asked how a s o c ie ty  can be s tu d ie d ,  i t  i s  next
necessary f o r  him t o  ask "What j_s a soc ie ty?"  For Bateson,  th e
ques t ion of  how something i s  analysed must not  be mistaken f o r  the
ques t ion of  what t h a t  th ing  i s .  This second q u es t io n ,  "What i s  a
s o c ie ty ? " ,  r e f e r s  t o  a c t io n ,  a s p e c i f i c  system of ac t ion  a s so c ia ted
with a p a r t i c u l a r  s o c ie ty ,  and i t  i s  e t h o l o g i c a l ,  in c o n t r a s t  to  the
f i r s t  q u es t io n ,  which i s  e i d o l o g i c a l .  Another way o f  p u t t in g  t h i s ,  
in somewhat more a b s t r a c t  te rms,  i s  t o  say t h a t
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he moves from a phenomenology t o  an onto logy .  (5)
In t h e  r i g h t  hand column of th e  diagram, headed 'S teps  t o  a 
C ul tu ra l  Ontology1, Bateson begins with th e  whole ethos  (3) .
He has t o  do t h i s ,  he argues in h is  t e x t ,  because th e  emotional  
emphases, th e  e thos ,  of  a c u l t u r e  can only be determined once 
the  c u l t u r e  as a whole has been desc r ibe d .
'emot ional  s ig n i f i c a n c e  can only be a sc r ibed  p iece  by p iece  
a f t e r  th e  c u l t u r e  as a whole has been examined. . . (whereas)
. . . t h e  m anifes t  ( cogn i t ive )  con ten t  can be descr ibed  p iece  
by p iece  and the  underly ing system (e idos )  deduced from the  
r e s u l t i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n '  (1936: 33, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis ) .
From th e  " w ho le '1 of  e thos ,  Bateson then d e r iv e s  th e  a f f e c t i v e  " p a r t s "  
of  emotional con ten t  (4 ) .  The move from (1) t o  (2) in th e  l e f t  
hand column, and from (3) t o  (4) in t h e  r i g h t  hand column, each 
c p n s t i t u t e s  a hermeneutic c i r c l e .  These two hermeneutic c i r c l e s  
w i l l  l a t e r  be reso lved  when Bateson d i s s o lv e s  h i s  dichotomy between 
the  c o g n i t iv e  and th e  emotional in th e  not ion  of  schismogenesis  
which w i l l  become h is  model of  Iatmul s o c ia l  dynamics, which in 
t u rn  w i l l  revea l  i t s e l f  as a model f o r  ac t io n  r a t h e r  than  of 
behaviour (see  page 19 below).  This w i l l  a l so  c o n s t i t u t e  h is  own 
vers ion  of  what he had e a r l i e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as "p ragm at ic  f u n c t i o n "  
in h is  c r i t i q u e  of  Malinowski.
B a teson 's  c r i t i q u e  of  Malinowski 's  use of  th e  notion  of  " f u n c t i o n "
c e n t r e s  on two ob se rv a t io n s ,  both of  which have long s ince  become
standard  arguments.  In 1936, however, they  might have appeared
as s t a r t l i n g  and u n s e t t l i n g .  The f i r s t  obse rva t ion  i s  t h a t  the
use fu lnes s  of  t h e  idea of  fu n c t io n ,  as app l ied  t o  such examples
as th e  in c re a s e  of s o c i a b i l i t y  among in d iv id u a l s  or  th e  enforc ing
of  r i g h t s  and d u t i e s ,  appears doubtful  i f  we r e a l i s e  t h a t  many
such e f f e c t s  in a s o c ie ty  may be mutual ly  incompat ible.  I f ,  say,
family p r id e  i s  in c reased ,  then  t h i s  may th r e a t e n  th e  s o l i d a r i t y
of th e  community. Bateson 's  second obse rva t ion  i s  t h a t  th e  notion
of fu n c t io n  becomes even more p rob lematica l  i f  we cons ide r  th e
complex v a r i a t i o n s  in human s o c i e t i e s .  A people l i v in g  on th e
margin of  phys ica l  sustenance ,  f o r  example, might not  be i n t e r e s t e d  
in th e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of  a l a r g e r  popu la t ion .
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'The t r u t h  of  the  m a t te r  i s  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  peoples a t t a c h  very 
d i f f e r e n t  values  to  th e s e  var ious  e f f e c t s '  (1936: 31).
Applied t o  h i s  own f ie ld -w ork ,  th e  idea of  th e  ' s t r e n g t h  of  
t r a d i t i o n a l  law' might well apply t o  some Afr ican  communities,
' b u t  th e  phrase  i s  almost meaningless when app l ied  t o  th e  Iatmul 
who have a highly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  c u l t u r e  and w i l l  r e a d i l y  
r e s p e c t  th e  law-breaker  i f  he have but  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r c e  of  
p e r s o n a l i t y '  (1936: 31).
So i t  i s  important  f o r  anthropology to  t a k e  account  of  th e  
g r e a t  v a r i a t i o n  in the  values  which d i f f e r e n t  peoples p lace  upon th e  
var ious  ' e f f e c t s '  p o s tu la te d  by fu n c t io n a l i sm .  We cannot  s t a t e  
t h a t  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  'pragmat ic f u n c t i o n ' ,  in Malinowski 's  words, 
of  a p a r t i c u l a r  d e t a i l  of  a c u l t u r e  i s  t h e  in c re ase  of  fami ly p r ide  
unless  we can show t h a t  family p r ide  i s  valued in o th e r  con tex ts  
of  th e  c u l t u r e .  Fu r ther ,  we must now r e a l i s e  t h a t  we cannot  guess 
a t  th e  needs and d e s i r e s  of  in d iv id u a l s  but  we must f i r s t  e x t ra po ­
l a t e  them from th e  emphases of  th e  whole c u l t u r e .  Bateson i s o l a t e s  
the  concept  of  a f f e c t i v e  func t ion  from Malinowski 's  'pragmatic 
f u n c t i o n ' ,  t h e  former being
' t h e  r e l a t i o n  between d e t a i l s  of  c u l t u r e  and t h e  emotional  needs 
of  i n d i v i d u a l s '  (1936: 32).
He then t a k e s  t h e  argument one s tep  f u r t h e r  and s t a t e s  t h a t  we 
must c o n s t r u c t  ano ther  category
' f o r  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  emotional  con ten t  of  th e  
p a r t i c u l a r  d e t a i l  of  behaviour whose fu n c t io n s  we a re  studying 
and t h e  emotional  emphases of  t h e  c u l t u r e  as a whole'  (1936: 32).
I t  i s  t h i s  ca tegory  of  func t ion  which Bateson c a l l s  ‘e t h o l o g i c a l 1; 
and he uses th e  word ' e th o s '  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  emotional  
emphases of  t h e  c u l t u r e .  We should bear  in mind t h a t  Bateson is  
s t i l l  us ing such terms as ' f u n c t i o n '  and ' f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p '  
he re ,  al though  h is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a re  going well beyond th e  
fo rm ula t ions  of  Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown.
The concept  of  eidos a r i s e s  in a s i m i l a r  way t o  t h a t  of e thos .
'From t h e  examination of  th e  premises in th e  s t r u c t u r e  of  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e  we can f i t  them t o g e th e r  in to  a coherent
system and f i n a l l y  a r r i v e  a t  some genera l  p i c t u r e  of  th e  
c o g n i t i v e  processes  involved.  This genera l  p i c t u r e  I s h a l l
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c a l l  t h e  e idos  of  the  c u l t u r e '  (1936: 32).
So, Bateson argues ,  t h e  emphases o f  a c u l t u r e  can be d iv ided  
in to  th e  a f f e c t i v e  - i^* ethos -  and th e  c o g n i t i v e ,  iue t e id o s .  He 
does not  cons ide r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h i s  dichotomy, which s e t s  
"reason" a g a i n s t  " d e s i r e " ,  may be fundamenta l ly prob lem at ic .  Both 
ethos  and eidos  a re  based upon th e  same hypo thes i s :
' t h a t  t h e  in d iv id u a l s  in a community are  s tan d a rd i se d  by t h e i r  
c u l t u r e ;  while th e  pervading genera l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  a 
c u l t u r e ,  those  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which may be recognised  over 
and over again in i t s  most d iv e rs e  c o n t e x t s ,  a re  an express ion  
of  t h i s  s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n '  (1936: 33).
He w r i t e s  t h a t  t h i s  hypothesis  i s  c i r c u l a r ,  f o r  t h e  'pervad ing 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s '  of  a c u l t u r e  w i l l  no t  only ex p re s s ,  but  a l so  
promote t h e  ' s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s '  (1936: 33) .  I 
would ques t ion  whether h i s  hypothesi s  i s  c i r c u l a r  in th e  same 
sense as t h e  t a u t o l o g i e s  of  f u n c t io n a l i sm ,  o r  whether i t  i s  more 
in th e  n a tu re  o f  a dynamic d i a l e c t i c .  Bateson ta k es  up th e  s u b je c t  
of  c i r c u l a r i t y  in an th ropo log ica l  and s c i e n t i f i c  exp lana t ion  
l a t e r ,  in h i s  Chapter  V II I ,  where he a t tem pts  t o  sugges t  how such 
c i r c u l a r i t y  might be transcended  in an thropology.
Bateson e x p l i c i t l y  acknowledges Ruth B en e d ic t ' s  concept  of  
' c o n f i g u r a t i o n '  (1935) as a b a s i s  f o r  h i s  argument,  which he 
summarises as fo l lows:
'The e idos  of  a c u l t u r e  i s  an express ion  o f  th e  s tan d a rd i se d  
c o g n i t i v e  aspec t s  of  t h e  i n d i v id u a l s ,  whi le  t h e  e thos  i s  th e  
corresponding express ion  o f  t h e i r  s ta n d a rd i se d  a f f e c t i v e  a s p e c t s .  
The sum o f  ethos  and e idos ,  plus such genera l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of  a c u l t u r e  as may be due t o  o th e r  types  of  s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n ,  
t o g e t h e r  make up t h e  c o n f ig u r a t i o n '  (Bateson 1936: 33, a u t h o r ' s  
em phas i s ) .
In t h i s  summary Bateson r ev ea l s  th e  t e n t a t i v e  na tu re  of  h i s  argument; 
he leaves open th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  o th e r  kinds of  s t a n d a r d i s a t io n  
bes ides  c o g n i t i v e  and a f f e c t i v e  but  he does no t  spec i fy  what th e se  
might be.  At th e  end of  t h e  chap te r  he a t tempts  t o  p lace  h i s  own 
fo rm ula t ions  in t h e  con tex ts  of  'Developmental Psychology,  th e  study 
of  th e  moulding o f  t h e  ind iv idua l  Jjyt the c ircumstances  o f  h is  
environment '  , and t h a t  o f  'Socio logy '  in which
' a s  Radcliffe-Brown has poin ted  ou t ,  i n d iv id u a l  psychology 
becomes i r r e l e v a n t  to  t h e  same e x t e n t  t h a t  Atomic Physics i s
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m ethodologica l ly  i r r e l e v a n t  in th e  study of  Bio-Chemis try . '  He 
claims t h a t  he has been ab le t o  l ink  th e s e  two kinds of  s tudy 
'by th e  a b s t r a c t  concept  of t h e  " s t anda rd ised  i n d i v i d u a l " 1(1936: 34).  
But f a r  more important ,  as t h e  book proceeds,  i s  Ba teson 's  
d i s s o l u t i o n  of  th e  e th o s / e id o s  dichotomy in to  an ac t io n  based 
model which w i l l  revea l  i t s e l f  in th e  gu ise  of  schismogenesis  and, 
l a t e r  s t i l l ,  o f  c y b e rn e t i c s .
In a l l  Ba teson 's  work t h e r e  i s  an uneasy symbiosis  between 
h is  n a tu ra l i s m  and h is  a t tempts  t o  unders tand s o c ia l  con tex ts  in 
terms of  communications th e o ry .  The f i r s t  theme i s  more powerful 
in h i s  e a r l i e r  work, when he was s t i l l  heav i ly  in f luenced  by t h e  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  m i l ieu  o f  h is  upbringing and h i s  educa tion  in n a tu ra l  
s c ience .  The second theme i s  foreshadowed in th e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  of  
Naven (1936) and i s  made e x p l i c i t  in t h e  Epilogue t o  th e  second 
e d i t i o n  (1958).  But th e  two themes can always be d iscerned  in h is  
w r i t i n g ,  al though th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them i s  d i f f i c u l t
and o f ten  ambiguous. In th e  case of  naven, t h e  n a t u r a l i s t i c  emphasis 
on d i s c r i m in a t io n  and d e s c r ip t i o n  (framed in ques t ions  such as 
"What i s  th e  naven?", "What a re  i t s  f e a t u r e s ? " )  i s  converted in to  
a theo ry  of  ac t ion  (framed in ques t ions  such as ^What do people 
do?",  "How do they  do i t ? " )  c a l l e d  sch ismogenesis ,  which i s  grounded 
in a communications model. L a te r ,  t h e  schismogenic communications 
model w i l l  develop in to  a cybe rne t ic  feedback system. In Naven 
we can see  Bateson moving between t h r e e  modes of  exp lana t ion :  
from typo logy  (na tu ra l i sm )  t o  a theory  o f  a c t io n  (schismogenesis)  and 
f i n a l l y  t o  an e x p l i c i t  communications system (cybe rne t ic  feedback) .  
This p rog res s ion  i s  no t ,  however, simply l i n e a r ;  a t  va r ious  po in t s  in 
h i s  argument he r e tu r n s  t o  a previous  mode.
This c i r c u i t o u s  s t r a t e g y  i s  l inked t o  ano ther  dev ice  which Bateson 
o f ten  uses t o  develop an argument; t h i s  i s  h i s  h a b i t  of  s e t t i n g  up 
an o p p o s i t i o n ,  r e so lv ing  i t  in a s y n th e s i s  with t h e  use of  a new 
concept  and then employing t h i s  new concept  while s t i l l  making use of  
the  old b ina ry  terms "in th e  shadows". Ba teson 's  deployment of  th e
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notion  of  sch ismogenesis ,  a theory  of  ac t ion  which apparently  
subsumes e thos  and e idos ,  i s  an example of  t h i s  s t r a t e g y .  Another 
way of  d e s c r ib in g  t h i s  i s  t o  r e f e r  t o  Diagram 2 above {page 77) 
and to  see t h a t  almost immediately in Ba teson 's  t e x t  Level Two 
d i s a p p e a r s .  We hear  no more o f  t h e  " a f f e c t i v e 11 and th e  " s t r u c t u r a l "  
f u n c t io n s ;  t h e s e  are  rep laced  by ethos  and e id o s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
The t h r e e  l e v e l s  o f  the  o r ig i n a l  model a re  co l lapsed  in to  two.
F i r s t ,  c o g n i t iv e  p o t e n t i a l  and bas ic  emotional  needs a re  redesc r ibed  
c u l t u r a l l y  as s t r u c t u r a l  and a f f e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s .  But then t h i s  
in te rm ed ia te  leve l  i s  redesc r ibed  in terms of  e thos  and e id o s .  
Consequently t h e re  i s  no mediat ing level  between th e  Biosphere and 
the  leve l  of  e thos  and e id o s ,  th e  Grand C u l tu ra l  Scheme. Fur ther ,  
th e  oppos i t ion  between e thos  and eidos i s  deployed f o r  a t ime,  
but  a t  t h e  expense of  e idos .  By th e  end o f  th e  book e idos  
hard ly  f i g u r e s  in th e  a n a ly s i s  of  th e  naven a t  a l l .  Next, ethos 
develops from a model of  a f f e c t  in to  a model of  ac t io n  through 
th e  use o f  t h e  notion of  schismogenesis .  But schismogenesis ,  as 
a model o f  a c t i o n ,  at tempts  t o  exp la in  how human beings are  t r a i n e d  
in s o c ia l  behaviour ,  and so can be seen as a new formula t ion  of  
Level Two of  Diagram 2; but  t h i s  e n t a i l s  r e in t ro d u c in g  th e  notion 
of  e id o s ,  s ince  t r a i n i n g  in s o c i a l  behaviour n e c e s s i t a t e s  a c o g n i t iv e ,  
as well as an a f f e c t i v e  or  ac t io n  based fu n c t io n .
Another way of  viewing Bateson 's  s t r a t e g i c  development i s  to  
look a t  Diagram 3 above (page 78) and to  see t h a t  h is  f i r s t  
ques t ion ,  t h a t  which i s  asked by every a n th ro p o lo g i s t  -  "How can 
we study a c u l tu r e ? "  - i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by, and a l so  c o n s t i t u t e s ,  
an e idos ;  i t  i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by th e  eidos of  th e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t ,  
and i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  the  eidos  o f  th e  Iatmul as viewed by th e  
an th ro p o lo g i s t  ( l e f t  hand column, (1) - (2) Diagram 3 ) .  In terms 
of  Diagram 2, Bateson begins a t  Level Two ( C u l tu r e ) ,  with 
c o g n i t iv e  " b i t s "  and then once t h e se  have been d esc r ibed ,  he can 
a r r i v e  a t  Level Three ( (2) in Diagram 3) and a f u l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  
e idos .  As f a r  as ethos i s  concerned,  th e  oppos i te  occurs ;
Bateson s t a r t s  a t  Level Three - The Grand C u l tu ra l  Scheme 
(Diagram 2) - with a f u l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  ethos  ( (3 ) ,  r i g h t  hand 
column, in Diagram 3) ,  and he moves back to  Level Two (Culture)  
t o  describe^ th e
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"derived emotional  needs" of  "humans in c u l tu r e "  (i&, those  of 
Iatmul men and t h a t  of  Iatmul women { (4) in Diagram 3) ) .
I t  i s  apparent  throughout th e  book t h a t  Bateson i s  more i n t e r ­
es ted  in ethos than e idos .  The r eade r  w i l l  see t h a t  th e  a n a ly s i s  
of  th e  naven i s  presen ted in terms of  a f f e c t  and a c t i o n ,  r a t h e r  
than of  c o g n i t io n .  Bateson was not  an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t ;  i f  he had 
been, t h e  emphasis might have been th e  o th e r  way round, and we 
would have been given an e i d o lo g ic a l  a n a ly s i s  of  t h e  naven, r a t h e r  
than an a n a l y s i s  grounded in ethos and a c t i o n .  I t  might be 
rewarding t o  view th e  works o f  L ev i -S t r aus s ,  from The Elementary 
S t ru c tu re s  of  Kinship through t o  the  Mythologiques, in t h i s  l i g h t ,  
and to  see French s t r u c t u r a l i s m  as a h ighly  e lab o ra ted  e id o lo g ic a l  
model of  s o c i a l  r e a l i t y .
However, Bateson needs t h e  notion  of  an e id o lo g ic a l  func t ion  
as a "way in" t o  a d e s c r ip t i o n  of  Iatmul s o c i e t y  and c u l t u r e .  But 
once he has a f i rm g r ip  on e thos ,  a f f e c t  and, u l t im a te ly ,  a c t i o n ,  
eidos i s  no longer  needed and i t  can be dropped from th e  an a ly s i s  
of t h e  naven. He can move, in o th e r  words, from a phenomenology -  
whic trhe r e q u i r e s  as a s t a r t i n g  p o in t  - t o  an onto logy ,  which
is  of  f a r  g r e a t e r  i n t e r e s t  t o  him. I t  i s  important  t o  no te ,  
however, t h a t  eidos  makes a r e tu rn  in th e  Second Epilogue of  
1958, in which th e  act ion/communication model o f  schismogenesis  
i s  r e f in e d  in to  an e l abo ra ted  feed-back cyb e rn e t ic  system. I t  
i s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  th in k  of  c y b e rn e t i c s  as a product  of  
e thos ,  r a t h e r  than as a c o g n i t iv e  to o l  with which:to  study e idos .
In t h e  main body of  t h e  t e x t ,  however, we a re  l e f t  with th e  
impression of  th e  naven as an eco log ica l  c o n s t r u c t .  The s h i f t  from 
phenomenology to  ontology a l so  r ev ea l s  a s h i f t  from a focus on 
behaviour ,  which i s  the  c l a s s i c a l  domain of  t h e  n a t u r a l i s t ,  t o  a 
focus on a c t i o n , viewed as a product  of  i n t e n t i o n .  With th e  
in t ro d u c t io n  o f  t h e  notion of  schismogenesis ,  we a re  no longer 
in th e  world of  n a t u r a l l y  behaving organisms,  and s o c ie ty  as another  
vers ion  o f  t h a t  world, but  in th e  domain of  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  a c t in g ,  
or  a c t i v e ,  humans. This opens th e  way to
naven as a p o s s i b l e  seein9  t h e  a n a ly s i s  of  t h e
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ex e rc i s e  in an anthropology o f  performance.
Through t h e  notion of  schismogenesis ,  Bateson i s  ab le  t o  
c o l l a p s e  t h e  dichotomy between i n t e l l e c t  ( e idos )  and emotion ( e th o s ) .  
In t h i s  way, he w i l l  avoid th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  dogma which n e c e s s i t ­
a te s  a r i f t  between thought and a c t i o n .  He w i l l  a l so  avoid th e  
symboli st  t e n s io n  between symbol and r e f e r e n t ,  and between ac t ion  
and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  as well as t h a t  between showing and do ing .
In o th e r  words, Bateson 's  ac t ion -based  model of  schismogenesis  
c o l lap s e s  two o f  th e  most fundamental s e t s  of  b inary  oppos i t ions  
in an th ropo log ica l  thought:
(1) Between i n t e l l e c t  and a f f e c t ;
(2) Between i n t e l l e c t / a f f e c t  and a c t i o n .
He does no t ,  however, escape th e s e  o p p o s i t i o n s ,  f o r  they  a re  s t i l l  
a t  work w i th in  schismogenesis  and they w i l l  re-emerge in the  
Second Epilogue.
I t  i s ,  I sugges t ,  t h e  development of  Ba teson 's  thought  towards 
a model of  s o c ia l  ac t ion  which i s  succes s fu l  in t ranscend ing  
t r a d i t i o n a l  oppos i t ions  in the  theory  o f  s o c i a l  anthropology which 
makes Naven a c r u c i a l  work f o r  an anthropology of  performance.
Perhaps I can summarise Ba teson 's  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r a t e g y  by 
p resen t ing  a schema which fol lows h i s  development through . t h e  
f i v e  kinds of  func t ion  Bateson l i s t s  on pages 29-30 o f  h is  t e x t  
(See Diagram 4 below, page 87) .  I have desc r ibed  th e s e  func t ions  
in terms of  " s tages"  in Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  t h e  naven. We s t a r t  
by asking what an an th ro p o lo g i s t : c a n  expec t  i n i t i a l l y  to  perce ive  
in a s o c i e t y ;  t h i s  i s  th e  f i r s t  s t a g e .  B a teson 's  answer, " b i t s  of  
c o g n i t iv e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " ,  provides  him with h i s  f i r s t  f u n c t io n ,  
the  S t r u c t u r a l .  But we know t h a t  humans a l so  engage in non- 
c o g n i t iv e  behav iour .  We have to  deal with emotion as well as 
i n t e l l e c t ,  and so Bateson i s  led t o  h i s  second fu n c t io n ,  t h e  A f fe c t iv e .  
Next, a t  t h e  t h i r d  s tag e ,  we have t o  r ecogn ise  t h a t  behaviour occurs 
in th e  con tex t  of a system, or  whole, and not  merely in b i t s  and
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pieces ;  t h u s ,  Bateson 's  t h i r d  fu n c t i o n ,  t h a t  o f  Ethos. Two cons id ­
e r a t i o n s  now fo llow.  F i r s t ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  a system of a f f e c t s ,  then 
t h e r e  must a l so  be a system of c o g n i t io n s .  This leads t o  t h e  fou r th  
fu n c t io n ,  t h a t  of  Eidos.  The second c o n s id e r a t i o n ,  which i s  important  
f o r  Ba teson 's  s t r a t e g y  l a t e r  in th e  book, i s  t h a t  we cannot  
s e p a ra te  i n t e l l e c t  and emotion a t  t h e  le ve l  of  a c t i o n ,  al though 
a t  th e  le ve l  of  a n a ly s i s  they  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  d i s c r im in a b le .  This 
w i l l  e v e n tu a l ly  lead t o  a re-worked 11 pragmatic f u n c t i o n "  in the  
new form of schismogenesis .  F in a l ly ,  we must ask i f  our account 
of  c u l t u r e  i s  now complete. Bateson must ask h im se lf  i f  h is  func t ions  
1 -  4 prov ide a comprehensive a n a l y t i c a l  view of  c u l t u r e ,  and 
whether he needs t o  in co rpo ra te  t r a d i t i o n a l  s o c io l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s .
Has t h i s  l a t t e r  a l ready  been included in t h e  f i r s t  fou r  func t ions?
The f i f t h ,  so c io lo g ic a l  func t ion  and our f i f t h  s tage  i s  p a r t  of  a 
dia logue  between Bateson and h is  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p a s t .
This lengthy de tour through Bateson 's  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r a t e g i e s  
has been necessary  because of  th e  d en s i ty  and com plex i t ies  of  the  
t e x t  of  Naven. I t  is  not s u f f i c i e n t  t o  at tempt: ;an exp lana t ion  of 
Ba teson 's  thought ,  f o r  h is  t e x t  i s  not  merely an e x e rc i s e  in 
exp lan a t io n ,  but  in e x p l i c a t i o n .  Any commentary on Naven must 
i t s e l f  a t tempt e x p l i c a t i o n  and not  mere ex p lan a t io n .  The book 
is  an a c t i v e  unfold ing of  an th ropo log ica l  method,and,  as such,  i t  
warrants  t h e  c r i t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  of  a d e c o n s t ru c t iv e  read ing .
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NOTES to  Chapter Four
(1) For t h e  obse rva t ions  in th e  f i n a l  two sentences  of  t h i s  
paragraph I am g r a t e f u l  t o  M. Hobart (1986 (a) ) .
(2 ) Ge l lner  t a k es  a s im i l a r  view of the  'c o n te x tu a l  c h a r i t y '  of  
E vans -Pr i tchard ,  Leach and o th e rs  (1970: 42).
(3) I t  can be argued t h a t  t h e  general  tone  o f  Ba teson 's  l a t e r  
work denies  t h i s  p ro p o s i t i o n ;  c f .  t h e  papers on ecology in 
Bateson (1973).
(4) A usefu l  working d e f i n i t i o n  of  "hermeneutics" as i t  has been 
app l ied  by c e r t a i n  scho la r s  to  contemporary i s sues  in 
anthropology comes from Ricoeur: ' I  assume t h a t  the  primary 
sense of  th e  word "hermeneutics" concerns th e  ru le s  requ i red  
f o r  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  w r i t t e n  documents of  our 
c u l t u r e .  In assuming t h i s  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  I am remaining 
f a i t h f u l  t o  the  concept  of  Auslegung as i t  was s t a t e d  by 
Wilhelm D i l they ;  whereas Verstehen (unders tand ing ,  compre­
hension) r e l i e s  on the  reco g n i t io n  of  what a fo re ign  
s u b je c t  means or  in tends  on th e  b a s i s  of  a l l  kinds of  s igns  
in which psychic l i f e  expresses  i t s e l f  (Lebensausserungen), 
Auslegung ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  exeges i s )  implies  something more 
s p e c i f i c :  i t  covers only a l im i ted  ca tegory  of  s ig n s ,  those  
which a re  f ixed  by w r i t i n g ,  including  a l l  t h e  s o r t s  of 
documents and monuments which e n t a i l  a f i x a t i o n  s im i l a r  to  
w r i t i n g . . . i f  t h e r e  a re  s p e c i f i c  problems which are r a i s e d
by th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t e x t s  because they  are t e x t s  and 
not  spoken language,  and i f  t h e s e  problems a re  th e  ones which 
c o n s t i t u t e  hermeneutics as such,  then t h e  human sc iences  may 
be sa id  t o  be hermeneutical  ( 1 ) inasmuch as t h e i r  ob je c t  
d i s p la y s  some of th e  f e a t u r e s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  of  a t e x t  as 
t e x t ,  and (2 ) inasmuch as t h e i r  methodology develops the  
same kind of  procedures as those  of  Auslegung or  t e x t -  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' (1979: 73, a u t h o r ' s  emphases).
(5) B a teson 's  journey in f a c t  s t a r t s  with an epistemology ( in 
the  form of th e  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  paradigm) befo re  
moving on to  the  phenomenology of  e id o s ,  and thence  to  th e  
ontology of  e thos .
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CHAPTER FIVE: IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION
IN THE FOLLOWING chapters  I w i l l  deal with Ba teson 's  t r ea tm en t  
of h is  Iatmul ethnography in th e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  forego ing t h e o r e t i c a l  
d i s c u s s io n .  Chapters IV, VI, VII and VIII of  Naven a re  c r u c i a l  
in t h i s  r e s p e c t .  They a r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  'C u l t u r a l  Premises 
Relevant t o  t h e  Wau-Laua R e l a t i o n s h i p ' ,  ' S t r u c t u r a l  Analysis  of  
the  Wau-Laua R e l a t i o n s h i p ' ,  'The Sociology of  Naven' and 'Problems 
and Methods of  Approach' .  Bateson 's  Chapter  V, 'Sorcery  and 
Vengeance1, does not  appear t o  be d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  naven 
a n a l y s i s .
The f i r s t  t h r e e  chap te rs  in t h i s  l i s t  l a rg e ly  c o n s i s t  of  
Bateson 's  a t tempt t o  provide an account of  k insh ip  and marriage 
amongst t h e  Iatmul,  with spec ia l  r e fe ren c e  t o  t h e  naven. These 
chap te rs  form an ethnographic  b r idge  between th e  e a r l y  in t roduc t ion  
of  the  concepts  of  ethos and e idos  d e a l t  with in my previous  
ch ap te r ,  and Bateson 's  Chapter  VII I ,  in which e thos  (but  no t ,  i t  
i s  important  t o  note ,  e idos)  i s  f u r t h e r  r e f in e d  and d iscussed  in 
th e  l i g h t  of  m a te r ia l  from th e  a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s  own c u l t u r e .  This 
leads in t o  h is  Chapters IX and X, which deal  with th e  ethos of 
Iatmul men and Iatmul women r e s p e c t i v e l y .
I t  seems no acc iden t  t h a t  the  p rogress ion  in Chapters IV, VI
and VII can be seen as moving from a concern with th e  ind iv idua l  -
the  C u l tu ra l  Premises of  th e  t i t l e  o f  Chapter  IV a re  a f t e r  a l l
those  of  in d iv idua l  members of  Iatmul s o c i e t y ,  and not  those  of
"the Iatmul" -  t o  a d e s c r ip t io n  of  th e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  as a
so c ia l  f a c t  sui  g e n e r i s , a s o c ia l  f a c t  which r e q u i r e s  i t s  own
p a r t i c u l a r  " S t r u c t u r a l  A na lys is"  (which i t  duly r ece ives  in Chapter
VI) and, f i n a l l y ,  t o  a summary which subsumes th e  m a te r ia l  descr ibed
prev ious ly  under a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  'The Sociology of  Naven' in
Chapter VII . I t  is  in t h i s  c h ap te r ,  and in th e  fo l lowing t h r e e
chap te r s  which deal  in g r e a t  d e t a i l  with e th o s ,  t h a t  Bateson 's
reassessment  o f  the  na tu re  of  an th ropo log ica l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  achieves
i t s  most important  t r a n s i t i o n .  In Chapter  IV h i s  epistemology is  
s t i l l  c r u c i a l l y  fu n c t i o n a l ;  he i s  seeking th e  e id o s ,  th e  revea led
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co g n i t iv e  t r u t h ,  of  Iatmul k in s h ip .  Gradually he r e a l i s e s  t h a t  th e  
te n s ion  between t h i s  search  and h is  own developing epistemology is  
unbearable .  In Chapter VIII th e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  the  e th o lo g ic a l  
pe r s p e c t iv e  begins in e a r n e s t ,  and t h i s  w i l l  lead t o  t h e  th eo ry  of 
schismogenesis  presented  in Chapter  XIII and th e  he igh t  of  Bateson 's  
c r e a t i v i t y  in th e  book.
But even in Chapter  VII Bateson i s  s t i l l  a t tempt ing  t o  desc r ibe  
the  naven pure ly  as an epiphenomenon of k insh ip  and marriage 
r e l a t i o n s .  Even in t h i s  r e s p e c t  h i s  handling  of  t h i s  m a te r ia l  
p resen ts  r a d i c a l  f e a t u r e s  which t o  a la rge  e x t e n t  p re -da ted  
L ev i -S t r auss ian  a l l i a n c e  th eory  by more than a decade.
By t h e  'C u l tu r a l  Premises '  of  th e  t i t l e  of  Chapter  IV, Bateson 
means d i s c r im in a t io n s  and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  made between d i f f e r e n t  
types  of  k in .  He w r i t e s :
' I  s h a l l  cons ide r  syntheses  of  th e  type :  a mother gives  food 
t o  her  c h i l d .  A mother ' s  b ro th e r  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  with th e  mother. 
Therefore a mother ' s  b ro th e r  g ives  food t o  h i s  s i s t e r ' s  son'  
{1936: 35).
He de f ine s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  as ' . fol lows:
'When I say t h a t  s i b l i n g s  are  i d e n t i f i e d  I mean t h a t  in t h i s  
c u l t u r e  t h e r e  i s  a l a rge  number of  d e t a i l s  o f  c u l t u r a l l y  
s t a n d a rd i se d  behaviour in which th e  behaviour o f  one s i b l i n g  
resembles t h a t  of  the  o th e r ;  and I a l so  mean t h a t  many d e t a i l s  
of  t h e  behaviour of  o u ts id e  in d iv id u a l s  towards one s i b l i n g  
are  reproduced in t h e i r  behaviour towards t h e  o t h e r '  (1936: 35).
He adds t h e  r i d e r  t h a t  such i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  : r e l a t i v e  and no t  
ab so lu te ;  f o r  example, amongst th e  Iatmul f a t h e r  and son are  
i d e n t i f i e d  as f a r  as e x te rn a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  concerned,  but  
between each o th e r  they  a re  regarded as being d r a s t i c a l l y  
c o n t r a s t e d .
The ' s y n th e s e s '  here a re  Bateson 's  own, and a re  between b i t s  of 
"observed behaviour";  but  they a re  s y n th e t i c  in another  sense ,  t h a t  
of s y n th e t i c  as opposed t o  a n a l y t i c  l o g i c .  Bateson i s  a t tempt ing  to  
adduce new informat ion about t h e  Iatmul c u l t u r e  from premises which he
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ta kes  as being p resen t  in t h a t  c u l t u r e ;  th e  log ic  he i s  fo l lowing 
here i s  no t  a n a l y t i c ,  u e 0grounded in s y l l o g i s t i c  p ro p o s i t i o n s  
s t a t e d  by e i t h e r  th e  Iatmul or  by th e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t .  These 
syn theses  a re  a l so  based in a behav ioural  model, and as such are 
p red ic a ted  on ethos r a t h e r  than on e id o s .  " I d e n t i f i c a t i o n " ,  which 
is  a lo g i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  has become ’’behav ioura l"  o r  e t h o lo g ic a l  
very qu ick ly .  Even a t  t h i s  e a r ly  s t a g e ,  e thos  i s  t a k in g  prominence 
over e idos  in Bateson 's  a n a l y s i s .  (1) The e id o lo g ic a l  notion  of  
“ i d e n t i f i c a t i o n "  i s  used by Bateson as a way of  i n i t i a t i n g  h is  
focus on s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  and k insh ip  r e l a t i o n s ;  but  behaviour,  or  
e thos ,  soon comes t o  the  f o r e .
There a r e ,  Bateson claims,  one d i s c r im in a t io n  and fou r  main 
types  o f  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  amongst th e  Iatmul:
1. Mother 's  b ro th e r  (wau) i s  d isc r im in a ted  from f a t h e r ' s  b ro th e r  
or  f a t h e r  ( n y a i ).
2. There i s  an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  f a t h e r  and son.
3. A c h i ld  i s  l inked with i t s  mother ' s  c l a n ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  p a t r i l i n e a l  
system.
4.  There i s  some i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  a b ro th e r  with h i s  s i s t e r .  
B a teson 's  a c tua l  words a re  'That  t h e r e  i s  an element of  i d e n t i t y  
between a b ro th e r  and h i s  s i s t e r '  (1936: 49) .
5. F i n a l l y ,  a woman i s  ' t o  some e x t e n t  i d e n t i f i e d  with her  
husband'  (1936: 52).
The d iscr iminat ion '  Between mother ' s  b r o th e r  and f a t h e r  i s  p a r t i c ­
u l a r l y  impor tan t  in th e  l i g h t  of  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  th e  ' d i f f e r e n t  
p a t r i l i n e a l  c l a n s '  (1936: 37) claimed by Bateson t o  e x i s t  in Iatmul 
s o c i e t y .  Each clan  possesses  a number of  myths and s p e l l s  which 
are  regarded as t r e a s u r e s ,  and th e se  are  u su a l ly  passed on from 
f a t h e r  t o  son.  Sometimes, however, th e  s e c r e t s  w i l l  be imparted 
by a man t o  h i s  s i s t e r ' s ; s o n  ( f , e , f r o m  wau t o  l a u a ).  Bateson does 
not  sp e c i fy  t h e  e x t e n t  of  such occurrences ,  t h e  m a rg in a l i ty  of 
which i s  implied by h i s  use o f  th e  word 'sometimes '  in h is  t e x t  
(1936: 37) .  These in s tances  o f  wau-laua i n h e r i t a n c e  of  e s o t e r i c  
knowledge a re  marked by th e  payment of  s h e l l  va luab les  by the
laua to  t h e  wau; a l so  the  laua must not  pass th e  s e c r e t s  t o  h i s  own 
son (1936: 37) .  (The im pl ica t ion  here i s  t h a t  a son r e c e iv e s  such
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s e c r e t  knowledge from h is  f a t h e r  without  th e  requirement  of  payment, 
but  t h i s  i s  not  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d . )  Bateson sees  t h i s  excep tion 
to  a p u t a t i v e  ru l e  of  p a t r i l i n e a l  i n h e r i t a n c e  as an a f f i rm a t io n  of  
th e  c lo se  t i e  between wau and laua and as being motivated by the  
wau1s hope t h a t  h is  laua w i l l  speak on h is  b eha l f  in t h e  men's 
house deba te s .
The c o n t r a d i c t io n  here i s  not  e l a b o ra te d ,  and n e i t h e r  i s  another  
u n c e r t a in ty  in t h e  da ta  which i s  p resen ted  in th e  next  passage of  
the  t e x t .  Bateson records  t h a t  in Mindimbit,  when a small boy was 
t o  accomplish h is  f i r s t  k i l l  of  a human being ,  a c a p t iv e  was obtained  
by th e  f a t h e r .  But th e  f a t h e r  was not  al lowed t o  a s s i s t  th e  boy 
in th e  k i l l ;  i t  was th e  wau who had t o  help t h e  boy hold th e  spear 
and d i r e c t  i t s  aim. However, in a fo o tn o te  Bateson r e v e a l s  t h a t  
h is  informants in two o th e r  v i l l a g e s  had t o l d  him t h a t  t h i s  was 
not impor tan t ,  and t h a t  t h e  f a t h e r  would probably  help th e  boy 
(1936: 37) .  I t  appears here t h a t  Ba teson 's  da ta  m i l i t a t e s  a g a in s t
any simple phras ing  of  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ego and f a t h e r  
as being ‘'d isc r im ina ted '*  from t h a t  between ego and mother ' s  b ro the r  
in s t r i c t l y  co d i f i e d  terms th roughout  Iatmul s o c i e t y .
Bateson claims t h a t  f a t h e r  and m othe r ' s  b ro th e r  are a l so  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  in economic c o n te x t s .  He g ives  one example. The 
f a t h e r  helps  h is  son t o  c o l l e c t  va luab les  f o r  th e  l a t t e r 1s b r ide  
p r i c e ,  w ithou t  expec ta t ion  of  any recompense; The wau may a l so  
c o n t r i b u te  bu t ,  un l ike  the  f a t h e r ,  t h e  m othe r ' s  b ro th e r  w i l l  
expect  some r e t u r n ,  which w i l l  u s u a l ly  be in th e  form of a c o n t r i b ­
u t ion  from th e  laua towards th e  b r ide  p r i c e  of  th e  wau' s  own 
son.  From t h i s  evidence Bateson concludes t h a t
' i n  c on tex ts  which concern v a lu a b le s ,  t h e  boy i s  grouped with 
h i s  f a t h e r  and separa ted  from th e  maternal  c l a n ;  while in 
co n tex ts  of  achievement th e  boy i s  un i t ed  with th e  maternal  
cl an  and separa ted  from h i s  f a t h e r .  But in both types  of  
co n tex t  t h e  wau i s  s epara ted  from t h e  f a t h e r '  (1936: 38).
As we have seen ,  t h i s  conclusion i s  reached on r a t h e r  f l imsy  
evidence .  The p o s i t i o n  is  not  c l a r i f i e d  by B a teson 's  cla im t h a t
' t h e r e  i s  a l so  a t r a c e  of  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  between f a t h e r  and 
wau and t h i s  appears even in some d e t a i l s  of  t h e i r  behaviour
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towards th e  jlau' (1936: 38).
I f  wau and nyai ( f a th e r )  a re  cons idered  as b r o t h e r s - i n - l a w ,  and 
not  in terms of  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with l a u a , then
'we s h a l l  see t h a t  co -opera t ion  and com pet i t ion ,  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
and d i s c r i m in a t io n ,  a re  very evenly mixed in th e  p a t t e r n in g  
o f  t h e i r  mutual r e l a t i o n s h i p '  (1936: 38) .
I contend t h a t  Bateson 's  da ta  o v e r - a l l  would tend to  sugges t  t h a t  
t h i s  could be sa id  of  any r e l a t i o n s h i p  between any two Iatmul males.
Evidence f o r  t h e  f i r s t  " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " ,  t h a t  between f a t h e r  
and son,  i s  adduced from k insh ip  te rminology.  Iatmul k insh ip  
vocabu la r ly ,  w r i t e s  Bateson,  con ta ins  a number of  compound phrases  
which j o i n  two k insh ip  terms t o  form one d e n o ta t iv e  term; he gives 
the  example of  nggwail-warangka in which nggwail r e f e r s  to  f a t h e r ' s  
f a t h e r  and warangka t o  f a t h e r ' s  f a t h e r ' s  f a t h e r .  The compound 
phrase i s  a c o l l e c t i v e  term f o r  p a t r i l i n e a l  a n c e s t o r s ,  who are  
c l a s s i f i e d  t o g e t h e r  (1936: 38).  A number of  o th e r  examples of 
compound kin terms which r e l a t e  t o  a p a t r i l i n e a l  b ia s  a re  g iven.
Bateson does not  e x p l i c i t l y  claim t h a t  th e  Iatmul ope ra te  a 
p a t r i l i n e a l  descent fsys tem in the  c l a s s i c a l  sense ,  but  i t  i s  c l e a r  
from t h i s  s e c t i o n  of  h is  book t h a t  th e  model i s  very much in h is  
mind.
Despi te  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  in kin terms between them, t h e  f a t h e r ' s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  with th e  son i s  not  one of  in t imacy .  The f a t h e r ' s  
r o l e  i s  one of  d i s c i p l i n a r i a n  and i s  g e n e ra l ly  a u t h o r i t a t i v e .
But, in t u r n ,  t h e  f a t h e r  is  not  al lowed to  p r o f i t  a t  t h e  expense 
of  h i s  son and he cannot e a t  any of  h is  s o n ' s  garden produce.  The 
son w i l l  r e s i s t  at tempts  by th e  f a t h e r  t o  p lace  th e  boy in h i s  
own ( f a t h e r ' s )  i n i t i a t o r y  grade,  as an i n t r u s i o n  on t h e  f a t h e r ' s  
d i g n i ty .
'Thus t h e  son i s  as much concerned as t h e  f a t h e r  t o  avoid any 
over lapping  of  s o c ia l  s t a t u s '  (1936: 41 ) .
Re la t ions  between f a t h e r  and son a re  g e n e ra l ly  marked by r e s t r a i n t ,  but
'a  very r e a l ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t s  and of  needs e x i s t s  
between them in s p i t e  of  t h e i r  mutual avoidance of  over lapp ing
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s t a t u s '  (1936:  4 2 ) .
Bateson 's  emphasis on s t a t u s  r e l a t i o n s  here appears t o  preven t  him 
from cons ide r ing  t h i s  kind of  da ta  from another  viewpoint ,  which 
might have o f fe re d  r i c h e r  i n s i g h t s ;  namely, t h a t  k insh ip  behaviour 
expresses  th e  workings of  a moral un ive rse .  Bateson has a l so  moved 
quickly from data  r e l a t i n g  t o  te rminology to  behaviour;  aga in ,  a 
s h i f t  from e idos  t o  ethos which p r i v i l e g e s  t h e  l a t t e r  a t  th e  expense 
of  th e  former.
The l in k in g  of  th e  c h i ld  with i t s  mother ' s  c l an ,  d e s p i t e  the  
p a t r i l i n e a l  emphasis,  i s  symbol ical ly  expressed  in th e  Iatmul theory 
of  g e s t a t i o n .  The c h i l d ' s  bones are  thought to  be a product  of  the  
f a t h e r ' s  semen, while i t s  f l e s h  and blood - which are  cons idered 
le ss  impor tant  than i t s  bones - are thought t o  de r ive  from the  
mother ' s  menstrual  blood. Therefore i t  would seem t h a t  a c h i ld  is  
cons idered t o  be a member both of  t h e  f a t h e r ' s  and th e  mother ' s  
' c l a n '  (1936: 42) .  Accordingly,  th e  c h i ld  i s  given two s e t s  of 
names, one r e f e r r i n g  t o  the  to temic  ances to rs  of  the  f a t h e r ' s  c l an ,  
while th e  o th e r  s e t  r e f e r s  t o  th e  to temic ances to rs  of  th e  mother ' s  
c lan .  I t  i s  necessary  to  emphasise he re ,  as I have a l ready  noted 
(NOTE (2 ) , Chapter Three) and in read ing my fo l lowing  chap te r  
(Chapter  S ix ,  below) t h a t  Bateson provides no da ta  t o  suppor t  any 
claim t h a t  Iatmul s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  con ta ins  anything approximating 
t o  a p a t r i l i n e a l  o r  a m a t r i l i n e a l  descent  system.
Two kinds  of  s u f f ix e s  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  th e s e  two s e t s  of  names; those  
f o r  the  p a t r i l i n e a l  names have meanings l i k e  'man' ,  'woman', ' body ' ,  
e t c ,  while t h e  mother ' s  clan  names
'end in t h e  s u f f i x  - awan, which probably means "mask" and is  
perhaps connected with th e  c u s to m . . .o f  dancing in masks which 
r e p re s e n t  t h e  to temic ances to rs  of th e  maternal  c l a n '  (1936: 42).
Bateson 's  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  here a re  doubly un fo r tuna te  in t h a t  not  only 
is  he not su re  as t o  the  equivalence between - awan and 'mask ' ,  but 
he does not  expand as to  p r e c i s e ly  what i s  meant by th e  notion  of  
'mask' he re .  I t  i s ,  of  course ,  an English word of  g r e a t  power which h in t s  
a t  a wide range of  conno ta t ions .  I t  i s  t h i s  double lack of  c l a r i t y  
with regard t o  both deno ta t ion  and connota t ion  which th e  r eade r  misses
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here in Ba teson 's  use of  th e  term 11 mask1*.
Bateson seems to  imply t h a t  th e  mother ' s  c lan  names a re  given t o  
the  laua by t h e  wau. He then sugges ts  t h a t  th e  two s e t s  of names 
can be seen as an express ion  of  an ac tua l  i d e n t i t y  which spr ings  
from the  f a t h e r ,  in c o n t r a s t  t o  a symbolic i d e n t i t y  which is  t r a c e d  
through t h e  mother; t h i s  i s  why, according t o  th e  p a t r i l i n e a l  name, 
th e  c h i ld  i s  a 'man' ,  'woman' or  'b o d y ' ,  while the  m a t r i l i n e a l  name
denotes only a 'mask' .  In th e  same way, according to  th e  p a t r i l i n e a l
theory  of  r e in c a r n a t i o n  th e  c h i ld  i s  c o n c re te ly  s t a t e d  t o  be the  
r e in c a r n a t i o n  o f  a f a t h e r ' s  f a t h e r ,  whereas
' h i s  i d e n t i t y  with the  ances to rs  of  h is  mother ' s  clan  i s  only 
symbolica l ly  expressed in r i t u a l  and ceremonial  behav iour '
(1936: 43, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
Some of  t h e  more important  items which make up t h i s  ' r i t u a l  and 
ceremonial behaviour '  connected with m a t r i l i n e a l  personhood a re  as 
fo l lows:
1. The g iv ing  of  spec ia l  names t o  th e  c h i l d .
2. The use of  p a r t i c u l a r  kin terms ( i ,  e,» between wau and l a u a ) . A
prominent example of  t h i s  i s  t h e  use of  compound terms by wau 
when he addresses  l a u a , terms which denote t h e  names of  to temic 
ances to r s  of  wau's ( i  e ,  l a u a ' s  mother's^ c l a n .  But Bateson a l so  
remarks here t h a t  many of th e  names which a re  used in t h i s  way 
might a l so  be given to  sons of  the  wau' s  own c l a n .  He f e e l s  
j u s t i f i e d ,  however, in concluding t h a t  ' t h e  laua i s  ceremonia l ly 
addressed as i f  he were a random c o l l e c t i o n  of  h i s  mother ' s  
impor tant  a n c e s to r s '  (1936: 45).
3. The laua performs dances in masks which r e p r e s e n t  th e  maternal  clan  
an c e s to r s ,  he plays f l u t e s  which a re  a l so  considered  to  be maternal  
clan a n c e s t o r s ,  and he carves r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  of  t h e se  ances to r s
on th e  house-posts  of  t h e i r  ceremonial  house.  He a l so  carves masks 
f o r  t h e  maternal  c l an ,  masks which he w i l l  l a t e r  wear f o r  dancing.  
T^e l auas ea t  th e  s a c r i f i c e s  made by th e  members of  t h e i r  maternal  
c l an .
5. The death r i t u a l  f o r  the  laua i s  d iv ided in to  two p a r t s ;  th e  f i r s t  
h a l f  i s  performed by members o f  th e  dece ased ' s  c l a n , " t h e  second by 
members of  h is  mother 's  c l a n .  I t  i s  dur ing  th e  second h a l f  of  t h i s
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r i t u a l  t h a t  th e  members o f  th e  mother ' s  c lan  p u l l  th e  f i g u r a t i v e  
r e p r e s e n t a t io n  of  the  laua towards themselves with a hooked 
s t i c k .  In another  mortuary r i t u a l ,  given on th e  occasion of  th e  
death of  a g r e a t  man, th e  number of  h is  k i l l s  and th e  number of 
h is  wives had been symbolica l ly  r ep resen ted  by a d i s p la y  of  
spears  and b ask e ts .  But the  number of  h is  ch i ld ren  had not 
been s i m i l a r l y  marked. In th e  e q u iv a len t  r i t u a l  f o r  a woman, 
however, a pos t  i s  s e t  up and i s  decora ted with ornaments 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  her  so n ' s  achievements.  Thus i t  seems t h a t " a  
woman's ' g r e a t n e s s '  l i e s  not  in her  own achievements but  in those 
of her  sons.  Bateson adds here t h a t  naven a re  c e l eb ra te d  f o r  
a boy on marr iage,  but  not a t  th e  b i r t h  of  h is  f i r s t  son.  For a 
g i r l ,  on th e  o the r  hand, naven are c e l e b ra te d  when she gives  
b i r t h ,  but  no t  f o r  her  marriage  (1936: 48).
We must remember t h a t  i s  i s  th e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  who is  speaking 
here ,  and not  th e  Iatmul.  What I s tBa teson  doing by d esc r ib ing  
behaviour apparen t ly  connected with t h e  m a t r i l i n e a l  name as p e r t a in in g  
to  a "symbolic i d e n t i t y " ,  while a p p ro p r ia t in g  th e  "ac tua l  i d e n t i t y "  
f o r  behaviour connected with t h e  p a t r i l i n e a l  name? I suggest  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  a c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  s t r a t e g y  which al lows Bateson to  m arg ina l i se  
a c e r t a i n  f i e l d  of behaviour which he c a l l s  symbol ic ; t h i s  he w i l l  
l a t e r  exp la in  in terms of  "ac tua l"  behaviour .  At t h i s  s tage  in h is  
a n a l y s i s ,  Bateson i s  regard ing a l l  " ac tua l"  behaviour as e t h o lo g ic a l ;  
i t  would appear ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  any behaviour which he regards  as 
"symbolic" must be marg ina li sed  as e i d o l o g i c a l .  But t h i s  dichotomy 
between " ac tu a l"  and "symbolic" i d e n t i t y  and behaviour immediately 
causes problems. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  wau and th e  laua  is  
Bateson 's  paradigm f o r  "ac tua l"  behaviour th roughout the  book, and 
i t  i s  c r u c i a l ,  o f  course,  f o r  h i s  a n a ly s i s  of  th e  naven, but  a t  t h i s  
ea r ly  s tage  o f  h is  argument Bateson i s  m a rg ina l i s ing  behaviour between 
th e  wau and th e  laua as " sy m b o l ic 1*. Apparently,  the n ,  f o r  Bateson 
"ac tua l"  behaviour i s  being "symbolised" by "symbolic" behaviour.
I t  could be argued here in c r i t i c i s m  of Bateson t h a t  a l l  i d e n t i t y  
is  " sym bol ic "  in some sense,  c e r t a i n l y  a l l  human i d e n t i t y ;  so t h a t  
any at tempt t o  s ep a ra te  an "ac tua l"  from a "symbolic" i d e n t i t y  is  
doomed from th e  o u t s e t .
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This s e c t io n  of  Bateson 's  t e x t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  important  in terms 
of h is  conclus ions  as t o  th e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  kinds of  a c t i v i t y  
express ive  of  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  t h e  laua t o  h is  mother ' s  c l a n .  He 
says of th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  th e  c h i ld  t o  h i s  f a t h e r ,  mother and 
maternal  c l an :
'These may be summed up in a form e s p e c i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  naven 
by saying t h a t  the  c h i ld  i s  c l o s e l y  i d e n t i f i e d  with i t s  f a t h e r  
but  competes with him. The c h i l d ' s  i d e n t i t y  with i t s  mother 
and i t s  l i n k  with the  maternal  c lan  a re  more obscure .  But here 
th e  c h i ld  i s  not  a competi tor  bu t ,  r a t h e r ,  an achievement of  
th e  mother; and th e  c h i l d ' s  achievements a re  her  achievements,  
th e  tr iumph o f  her  c l a n 1 (1936: 48, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
Therefore ,  says Bateson,  we are  faced with a d iscrepancy  in th e  
m a t e r i a l .  The da ta  i n d i c a te s  on th e  one hand t h a t  th e  c h i ld  i s  the  
achievement of  th e  mother and t h a t  i t s  achievements a re  her  ach ieve­
ments.  On t h e  o th e r  hand th e  da ta  a l so  in d i c a t e s  t h a t  th e  c h i ld  i s  
the  a nce s to r s  of  the  mother ' s  c l a n .  Why Bateson should s t r e s s  th e  
d iscrepancy  here i s  not e n t i r e l y  c l e a r .  But he sugges ts  t h a t  the  
common f a c t o r  which connects achievement and ances to r s  i s  t h a t  of 
p r i d e . Achievement and an c e s to r s ,  he says ,  a re  ' two apparen t ly  
d i f f e r e n t  id e a s ,  a l i k e  only in t h e i r  emotional  c o n t e n t '  (1936: 49) .
This sugges t ion  looks forward t o  t h e  l a t e r  d e t a i l e d  d i scu ss io n  of  
the  e thos  of  th e  Iatmul men.
The thi^d kin i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h a t  between a b ro th e r  and s i s t e r ,  
i s  a l so  expressed  through te rminology;  th e  term wau-nyame (mother 's  
b ro th e r  and mother) i s  used as a c o l l e c t i v e  deno ta t ion  f o r  th e  maternal  
c l a n .  F u r th e r ,  the^ terms f o r  s i s t e r ' s  husband and w i f e ' s  b ro th e r ,  
lan-ndo and tawontu r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  can be t r a n s l a t e d  as 'husband­
man' . Here th e  male ego i s  seen as i d e n t i f y i n g  with h is  own s i s t e r  
in the  former case ,  and in th e  l a t t e r  he i s  seen as i d e n t i f y i n g  
h is  w i f e ' s  b r o th e r  with h is  w ife .  Bateson a l s o  records  some b r i e f  
d e t a i l s  o f  fune ra ry  r i t e s  which would seem to  sugges t  some i d e n t i f ­
i c a t i o n  between b ro th e r  and s i s t e r  (1936:' 49-51) .
F i n a l l y ,  Bateson dea l s  with husband-wife i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  But he 
admits t h a t  t h i s  i s  l im i ted ,  and w r i t e s  t h a t  ' t h e  woman i s  t o  some 
e x te n t  i d e n t i f i e d  with her  husband'  (1936: 52) .  The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
i s  no t  r e c i p r o c a l ,  and t h i s  he observes i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with a p a t r i l i n e a l
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bias  and v i r i l o c a l  marr iage.  Nei ther  p a r tn e r  changes name'at  
marr iage,  and kin terms f o r  marr ied p a r tn e r s  d i s c r i m in a t e  between 
them, a p a r t  from a few excep t ions .  The term mbuambo i s  used f o r  
mother ' s  f a t h e r  and h is  wives,  and f o r  mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  son and 
h is  wives.  Bateson mentions t h e  case of  t s h a i s h i  ( e ld e r  b r o t h e r ' s  
wife)  as being o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t .  She c a l l s  her  husband's  
younger b ro th e r  tshuambo, a term u sua l ly  used in address ing  
younger s i b l i n g s  of  t h e  same sex as ego; in t h i s  way she would appear 
t o  i d e n t i f y  with her  husband. Although'~the usual  r e c i p ro c a l  term 
fo r  tshuambo i s  nyamun - e l d e r  s i b l i n g  of  same sex - th e  husband's  
younger b r o th e r  does not use t h i s  term f o r  h i s  e l d e r  b r o t h e r ' s  wife 
except  in t h e  naven (see Diagram 1, page 48 above).
Bateson sees  h i s  da ta  as evidence t h a t  husband and wife a re  
i d e n t i f i e d  in t h e i r  dea l ings  w i th c o u t s id e r s ,  bu t  d isc r im in a ted  in 
t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with near k in .  Husband and wife share a
' c l o s e  economic dependence. . . i t  i s  almost p o s s ib le  t o  see th e  
household as a s in g l e  economic u n i t '  (1936: 53).
The theme of  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  between d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  kin 
i s  taken f u r t h e r  in Bateson 's  Chapter  VI, ' S t r u c t u r a l  Analysis  of  th e  
Wau-Laua R e l a t i o n s h i p ' .  Such i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  a re  seen by Bateson 
as th e  underly ing r a t i o n a l e  f o r  th e  s p e c i f i c  kind of  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
ob ta in ing  between a c h i ld  and i t s  m other ' s  b ro th e r .  In a f oo tno te  
to  th e  beginning of  h is  chap te r  (1936: 74) ,  Bateson acknowledges 
h is  debt  t o  Radcl if fe-Brown 's  paper 'The Mother 's  Brother  in South 
A f r i c a ' ,  and inr.his Chapters VI and VII Bateson uses th e  s t r u c t u r a l -  
f u n c t i o n a l i s t  s t r a t e g y  of  grounding in t e rp e r s o n a l  a t t i t u d e s  and 
behaviours w i th in  a s t r i c t l y  de l im i ted  domain of  k insh ip  r e l a t i o n s  
as h is  foundation  f o r  a p o s s ib le  a n a ly s i s  of  t h e  naven. But the  
notion of  descen t  does not  emerge as th e  impor tant  paradigm f o r  
Bateson 's  a n a l y s i s  of  Iatmul k insh ip  and marriage p a t t e r n s .  His 
account d i f f e r s  c r u c i a l l y  from the  ethnograph ies  o f  h is  contemporaries 
in t h a t  he argues t h a t  th e  ideology of  a f f i n i t y  and th e  r e p e t i t i o n  
of  a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s  i s  th e  most powerful dynamic in th e  Iatmul 
k in sh ip  u n iv e rs e .  His account of  marriage  p a t t e r n s  amongst the  
Iatmul develops in to  an e x e rc i s e  a m ance theory  which p re -d a t e s
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Levi -S t rauss  by over a decade.
Bateson s t r e s s e s  t h a t  t h e  term f o r  mother (nyame) i s  used by 
laua t o  r e f e r  t o  wau in the  naven, as well as dur ing  i n i t i a t i o n  
and t o  a c e r t a i n  e x ten t  in everyday conve rsa t ion .  From t h i s  
Bateson concludes t h a t  th e  l a u a ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with th e  maternal  
cl an  as a whole might be coloured  by the  l a u a ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with 
th e  mother,  and t h a t  t h i s  would show i t s e l f  most s t r o n g ly  in the  
l a u a ' s  d ea l ings  with t h e  wau. The laua w i l l  i d e n t i f y  h is  mother 
with her  b r o th e r ,  namely th e  wau. However, th e  wau w i l l  be a 
'male mother '  f o r  th e  laua a l so  in th e  sense t h a t ,  f o r  t h e  wau, 
the  laua w i l l  t o  some e x te n t  be i d e n t i f i e d  with h i s  f a t h e r .  The 
wau could then  be expected t o  behave towards t h e  laua in some 
ways as i f  t h e  l a t t e r  were th e  wau's s i s t e r ' s  husband. Behaviour 
shown t o  t h e  laua  by th e  wau w i l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f a l l  in to  a t  l e a s t  
two s e p a ra t e  c a t e g o r i e s ;  behaviour in which th e  laua i s  regarded 
as a c h i ld  of  wau, and behaviour in which th e  laua i s  regarded as 
wau's s i s t e r ' s  husband (i»e„, b r o t h e r - i n - l a w ) .  From th e  p o in t  of  
view of t h e  l a u a , wau in tu rn  in tu r n  w i l l  be t r e a t e d  both as a 
mother and as a w i f e ' s  b ro th e r  ( b r o th e r - i n - l a w ) .  Bateson adds 
t h a t  t h e r e  may well  be o th e r  elements in t h e  wau- laua r e l a t i o n s h i p ;  
t h e r e  may be o th e r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  not  y e t  cons idered ,  or  ' t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  may have c e r t a i n  f e a t u r e s  sui g e n e r i s 1 (1936: 75).
Batson now formula tes  an important  o p e ra t io n a l  procedure f o r  h is  
a n a ly s i s :
'Thus we a re  led t o  an exper imental  a n a ly s i s  of  th e  wau-laua 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  under th e  t h r e e  fo l lowing heads:
1. Behaviour which i s  t y p i c a l  of  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a 
mother and her c h i l d .
2. Behaviour which i s  t y p i c a l  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a 
w i f e ' s  b ro th e r  and a s i s t e r ' s  husband.
3. Other d e t a i l s  of  behaviour which do not  f i t  e i t h e r  of  the se  
p a t t e r n s .
By working with th e se  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  we s h a l l  be ab le  t o  s e t  
out  a l l  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  in format ion about t h e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  
in a scheme which w i l l  show c l e a r l y  how much or  how l i t t l e  of  a 
wau's and l a u a ' s  behaviour i s  t o  be regarded  as sui  gener i s  
ancT how much i s  based upon th e se  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s '  (1936: 75).
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This c r u c i a l  fo rmulat ion i s  th e  b a s i s  of  Ba teson 's  at tempt  to  
analyse  t h e  naven in terms of  " so c ia l  s t r u c t u r e " .  We can see t h a t  
he i s  indeed indebted to  Radcliffe-Brown he re ,  but  t h a t  th e  one­
dimensional  model o f  th e  l a t t e r  has been developed and l e f t  open to  
f u r t h e r  development.  The mother ' s  b ro th e r  i s  seen as being i d e n t i f i e d  
not  only with th e  mother,  but  with a b r o th e r - i n - l a w  and, perhaps ,  
with o th e r  kinds of  k in .  There i s ,  f u r t h e r ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e r e  a re  some d e t a i l s  of  behaviour between wau and laua which are 
not  r e d u c ib le  t o  any kin i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s .  I f  t h i s  were th e  case ,  
where could a s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r a l  a n a ly s i s  lead? I f  t h e  con ten t  of  the  
wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  not  red u c ib le  t o  kin  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s ,  then 
Bateson w i l l  have to  leave t h i s  kind of  a n a l y s i s  behind.  I t  i s  h is  
own concepts  o f  e thos ,  eidos  and schismogenesis  which w i l l  enable 
him to  do t h i s ,  once t h i s  s e c t i o n  of  h i s  t e x t  comes t o  an end with 
th e  complet ion o f  h is  Chapter  VII.
As rega rds  th e  f i r s t  s e t  of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in B a teson 's  procedure,  
which views t h e  wau as a "mother",  t h e  most important  element in the  
m other -ch i ld  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  seen as th e  g iv ing  of  food.  (2 ) The 
mother i s  rewarded f o r  t h i s  by th e  growth of  t h e  c h i ld  and her  p r ide  
in i t s  achievements.  In one example o f  naven, i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  
according t o  one of  Bateson 's  informants th e  boy had stepped over 
th e  p r o s t r a t e  bodies of  t h e  women, who had dec la red  1 "That so small 
place  out  o f  which t h i s  big man come!" 1 (1936: 76) Humility and 
s e l f - a b n e g a t io n  in th e  contempla t ion o f  t h e  c h i l d ' s  deeds a re  seen 
as th e  c o r r e c t  a t t i t u d e  of  th e  mother.  The mother i s  a l so  regarded 
as p rovid ing  comfort f o r  th e  c h i ld  in terms of  s i c k n e s s .  Thus, the  
mother ' s  behaviour  towards th e  c h i ld  i s  summarised in terms of
(1) f eed in g ,  (2) p r ide  and s e l f - a b n e g a t io n  and (3) comfort ing 
(Bateson 1936: 75-76) .
Bateson now asks ,  what f a c e t s  of  behaviour between wau and laua 
can be adduced as being r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  th e s e  t h r e e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ?  
In what ways does t h e  laua t r e a t  t h e  wau l i k e  a mother, or  as I would 
suggest  t h e  m a t te r  could be phrased,  "as i f "  he were a mother? And in 
what ways does t h e  wau t r e a t  th e  laua "as i f "  th e  former were h is  own 
ch i ld ?  We might ask i f  a_U s o c ia l  r o l e s  played w i th in  c u l t u r a l
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d e f i n i t i o n s  take  th e  form of "as i f "  behav iour .  I f  so,  i t  i s  
p o s s ib le  t o  see a mother ' s  behaviour towards her  c h i ld  as being 
l i k e  th e  behaviour of a mother,  in th e  sense t h a t  she i s  behaving 
according to  c e r t a i n  c u l t u r a l  va lues ,  be they  Iatmul,  or  English ,  
or  whatever.  Is th e  behaviour of  th e  wau here ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  not  
merely "as i f "  but  "as i f  as i f " ?  Is  t h e r e  a t  th e  h e a r t  of  the  
naven a double play on s o c ia l  r o l e  and c u l t u r a l l y  def ined behaviour? 
For a r e c e n t  a n a ly s i s  of  t h e  naven which emphasises i t s  lud ic  
a spec t ,  cf*Handleman (1979), an account  t o  which I w i l l  r e f e r  in 
Chapter 8 .
B a teson 's  da ta  on t h i s  aspec t  of  th e  wau- laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  can 
be summarised as fo l lows (1936: 76-78).
1. Feeding. A con t inua l  s tream of g i f t s  of  food i s  given by wau to  
l a u a . Fowls and pigs  a re  p resen ted  a t  the  naven. The Iatmul say 
t h a t  th e  wau i s  concerned l e s t  h is  laua goes hungry, :but t h e r e  is  
a h i n t  of  exaggera t ion  in t h i s  concern,  e , g * i f  th e  c h i ld  asks h is  
wau f o r  a yam, th e  wau w i l l  make a show of running o f f  t o  k i l l  a
pig .
2. S e l f -abne ga t ion  and p r id e .  Vicar ious  p r id e  i s  shown by wau in 
the  h a i l i n g  of  laua with a s e r i e s  of  prominent names from the  
r e p e r t o i r e  of  maternal  to temic  clan names. The wau w i l l  throw lime 
over th e  laua whenever the  l a t t e r  makes an impor tan t  pub l ic  
appearance,  in debate f o r  example. The element of  s e l f - a b n e g a t io n  is  
apparent  in t h e  naven when th e  wau wears f i l t h y  garments - as 
Bateson w r i t e s ,  'shaming h im se lf  t o  express  h i s  p r ide  in h i s  laua '  
(1936: 76).  This is
'an exaggerated  s ta tement of  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  aspec t  o f  m a te rn i ty ,  
th e  m othe r ' s  s e l f - ab n e g a t io n  combined with p r ide  in t h e  boy' 
(1936: 76-77) .  .
Bateson con t inues  by admitt ing however t h a t
'many d e t a i l s  of  the  naven s t i l l  remain t o  be accounted f o r  - 
e s p e c i a l l y  th e  element of  bur lesque  in th e  wau' s  behaviour 
and th e  wau' s  o f f e r in g  of  h i s  bu ttocks  t o  l a u a ' (1936: 77).
In t h e  l i g h t  of  l a t e r  developments in Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  th e  
naven, and in my exegesi s  of  h i s  a n a ly s i s  from th e  p e r s p e c t iv e  of  
performance,  h i s  emphasis on ' e x a g g e ra t io n '  and 'b u r l e s q u e '  should
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be noted.  In t h i s  s ec t ion  o f  h i s  t e x t ,  Bateson dea ls  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  
t ime with t h e  element of  c a r i c a t u r e  which i n i t i a l l y  proves puzzl ing 
t o  him, but  which u l t im a te ly  w i l l  be c r u c i a l  t o  h i s  a n a l y s i s .
3. Comfort ing.  In th e  i n i t i a t i o n  ceremonies t h e  wau i s  c a l l e d  
11 mother11 and comforts  the  boy during th e  p a in fu l  s c a r i f i c a t i o n s .
4. Laua t r e a t s  wau as a mother.  He i s  loya l  t o  h i s  wau, as a c h i ld  
i s  supposed t o  be loyal  t o  i t s  mother.  A boy should always t a k e  h i s  
wau' s  s id e  in a q u a r r e l ,  even t o  th e  e x t e n t  o f  s id in g  a g a i n s t  h is  
own f a t h e r .  A more important  aspec t  of  l a u a ' s  behaviour in t h i s  
r e s p e c t  i s  t h e  exaggerated boas t ing  which complements th e  wau' s  
p r ide  in h i s  achievements.  The laua w i l l  swagger and parade in 
f r o n t  o f  t h e  wau, s inging  h i s  own p r a i s e s .  Bateson notes  t h a t  t h i s  
element of  exaggera ted boas t ing  does not  appear in t h e  l a u a ' s 
behaviour towards th e  ac tua l  mother,  and t h a t  i t  i s  probably l inked 
with th e  exaggerated  c h a ra c te r  of  th e  wau' s  behav iour.  When th e  
wau g ives  food t o  th e  l a u a , i t  i s  always in h i s t r i o n i c  s t y l e  in
a r i t u a l  c o n te x t ,  and/or  accompanied by la rge  g e s tu r e s .
' I n  every  in s ta nce  th e  behaviour of  t h e  wau i s  an exaggera ted  
and dramatic  vers ion  of  t h a t  of  t h e  mother1 (1936: 78).
Bateson asks again ;  how are  t h e s e  elements of  bur lesque  and 
exaggera t ion  in t h i s  behaviour t o  be expla ined?
Next, Bateson cons iders  those  elements in th e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  
which can be seen as being based on th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  th e  laua 
with h i s  f a t h e r ,  i»e„by th e  wau t r e a t i n g  laua in some sense as a 
s i s t e r ' s  husband.  Bateson uses a term much used by f u n c t i o n a l i s t s  
t o  d e s c r ib e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between b r o t h e r s - in - l a w  amongst th e  
Iatmul.  This r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  marked, he says ,  by 'mutual ambivalence'  
(1936: 79) .  One might ask, of  course ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  any r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between human beings which i s  not  so marked.
According t o  Bateson,  t h e  b r o th e r - i n - l a w  r e l a t i o n s h i p  amongst 
t h e  Iatmul i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  on th e  one hand by indebtedness  and 
d i s t r u s t  a r i s i n g  from th e  g iv ing  of  th e  s i s t e r  of  one man to  be wife 
f o r  th e  o th e r ,  but  on the  o th e r  hand i t  i s  a l so  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  
co -o p e ra t io n .  Antagonism over b r ide  p r i c e  and r e t u r n  p r e s t a t i o n s  and 
th e  f e a r  of  so rce ry  on th e  p a r t  of  in- laws cause t e n s io n s  which are
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o f f s e t  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b r o th e r s - in - l a w  a re  expected to  co -opera te  
in any l a r g e - s c a l e  communal t a s k ,  l i k e  t h e  b u i ld in g  o f  a house.  
F ur the r ,  t h e  b r i d e ’s b ro th e r  o f ten  t a k es  an a c t i v e  p a r t  in t h e  
arrangements f o r  th e  marr iage .  B ro th e rs - in - l aw  make jokes  about 
each o th e r .  As with th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  wau and th e  
mother ' s  c l a n ,  t h e r e  i s  an i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  a man should be loyal  
to  h i s  w i f e ' s  b ro th e r ;  in f a c t
'a  man should suppor t  h i s  w i f e ' s  people in a l l  t h e i r  q u a r r e l s ,  
even a g a i n s t  h is  own c l a n '  (1936: 80) .
Here, th e n ,  Bateson i s  ab le t o  claim t h a t  th e  l a u a ' s  l o y a l ty  t o  th e  
wau i s  c o n s i s t e n t  both with t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  wau with the  
mother, and t h a t  o f  a boy with h i s  f a t h e r .  This s u gges t s ,  in f a c t ,  
t h a t  t h e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  con ta ins  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  a kind of  
ambivalence which Bateson h imse lf  does not  mention.  I am r e f e r r i n g  
to  the  ambivalence, of  gender i d e n t i t y  which i s  apparen t ly  subsumed 
here in t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  a man with ano ther  man, i*e»of a man 
with h i s  f a t h e r ,  and th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  a man with a woman, U e a 
of a wau with h i s  s i s t e r ,  l a u a ' s  mother.
Bateson a l s o  views ' t h e  uneasy economic aspec t  of  t h e  b r o t h e r - i n -  
law r e l a t i o n s h i p 1 (1936: 81) as being incorpora ted  in t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between wau and l a u a . The g i f t s  t h a t  th e  wau makes to  h is  laua 
makes, the  c h i ld  f e e l  indebted t o  h is  wau, and he makes r e tu rn  
p r e s t a t i o n s  o f  s h e l l  v a lu a b le s .  Th is ,  Bateson seems t o  be sugges t ing ,  
i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  of  b r ide  p r i c e  and g i f t  g iv ing  which 
ta ke  p lace  between b r o th e r s - in - l a w .  F u r th e r ,  t h e  laua  o f ten  has to  
depend on h i s  f a t h e r  f o r  th e  p rov is ion  of  such va luab les  and t h i s  i s  
another express ion  of  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  s i s t e r ' s  husband with 
s i s t e r ' s  c h i l d  (1936: 81) .
The o f f e r i n g  of  th e  bu t tocks  by wau t o  laua  in th e  naven i s  now 
in t e r p r e t e d  by Bateson as a r i s i n g  from th e  double i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
th e  mother ' s  b ro th e r  with h i s  s i s t e r ,  and t h a t  o f  t h e  s i s t e r ' s  son 
with t h e  s i s t e r ' s  husband. I f  t h e se  two i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  a re  jo ined  
to g e th e r ,  we can see t h a t
' i t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  " lo g ic a l "  f o r  the  wau t o  o f f e r  h im se lf  s exua l ly  
to  t h e  boy, because he i s  th e  boy 's  w i f e 1 (1936: 81 ) .
A fo o tn o te  in h i s  t e x t  here makes i t  p l a in  t h a t  t h e  " log ic "  i s  Bateson 's
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and not t h a t  of  th e  Iatmul (1936: 81 ) .  F u r th e r ,  in the  l i g h t  of  t h i s  
" log ic"  t h e  exclamation by wau t o  laua during naven, " lan men t o ! 11 
( t r a n s l a t e d  by Bateson as "Husband thou indeed]")  becomes 
comprehensible.  Also,  t h i s  l i n e  of  argument sugges ts  t h a t  as th e  
wau' s  g e s tu r e  i s  supposed t o  make t h e  laua procure  g i f t s  f o r  
p r e s e n t a t io n  t o  th e  wau, t h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  s tands  in some way f o r  
b r ide  p r i c e .  The l a u a , according to  B a teson 's  reading but  in my 
fo rm ula t ion ,  i s  t r e a t e d  "as i f "  he were a husband by th e  wau.
But t h i s  conclus ion  on Bateson 's  p a r t  i s  s u r e ly  v i t i a t e d  by th e  
f a c t  t h a t  such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  of  laua as wife by wau, would 
involve t h e  c o l l a p s e  of t h r e e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  in to  one,  and a t  
the  same t ime a l l  t h r e e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  being s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  
maintained  l a rg e ly  r e g a rd l e s s  of  co n te x t .  These' would be; f i r s t ,  
a s i b l i n g  t i e ,  between mother ' s  b ro th e r  and h i s  s i s t e r ;  second,  
an a f f i n a l  or  descen t  t i e ,  t h a t  between s i s t e r ' s  son and s i s t e r ' s  
husband; and t h i r d ,  t h e  maternal  t i e  between mother and c h i ld  - an 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  which involves two g e n e ra t i o n s .  Later  in my 
e x p o s i t io n ,  in Chapter  Eight  below, I w i l l  sugges t  a d i f f e r e n t  
reading o f  t h e  phrase "lan  men t o i " .
N ever the les s ,  with t h i s  p iece of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  I sugges t  t h a t  
Bateson s t e p s  a t  once out  of  a s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  framework 
and in to  a new area  o f  r e s e a r c h .  His use o f  a s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  
model of  k in sh ip  r e l a t i o n s  has led him t o  a view of s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  
among th e  Iatmul which i s  not  amenable t o  f u r t h e r  s t r u c t u r a l  
a n a l y s i s .  Why, asks Bateson, have th e  Iatmul produced t h i s  
e x t r a o rd in a ry  kind of  behaviour? Even i f  we can say t h a t  t h e  u l t im a te  
express ion  of  th e  kin i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  desc r ibed  e a r l i e r  does lead 
to  t h e  wau o f f e r in g  himse lf  s exua l ly  t o  th e  l a u a , t h i s  does not  
expla in  why t h i s  development should have been followed in t h i s  way 
and to  t h i s  e x t e n t  (1936: 82) .  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  between kin types  
a re  made in many s o c i e t i e s ,  but  th e  g ro tesque  a b s u r d i t i e s  a s s o c ia t e d  
with th e  naven - t r a n s v e s t i s m ,  th e  sexual  g e s tu r i n g  and so on -  are 
comparat ively  r a r e .  Why has t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e  s e l e c t e d  the se  
p a r t i c u l a r  behaviours  f o r  express ion  in t h i s  way? What i s  the  "motive 
fo rce"  behind i t  a l l  (1936: 82)?
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At the  c lo se  of  th e  ch a p te r ,  Bateson d e s c r ib e s  th e  var ious  
kinds of  behaviour of  wau_ which cannot  be seen as being p red ic a ted  
on th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  e i t h e r  of  th e  wau with t h e  mother,  or  of  the  
laua with wau' s  s i s t e r ' s  husband. There are  t h r e e  items which, says 
Bateson,  show t h e  wau to  be behaving in some ways l i k e  a f a t h e r  
towards h i s  son: th e  wau w i l l  not  t a k e  f i r e  from th e  l a u a ' s  house,  
he avoids c rude ly  commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s  with th e  laua and, l a s t ,  
t h e  laua i s  sometimes r e f e r r e d  t o  as h is  wau' s  ' d o g ' ,  t h e  owner of  
a dog u s u a l ly  being spoken o f  as i t s  ' f a t h e r ' .  In another ca tegory  
are th e  behaviours  which suggest  t h a t  laua i s  a s s o c ia t e d  with the  
ances to rs  of  t h e  maternal  c l an ;  t h e  no tions  of  p r id e ,  a n c e s to r s ,  
lauas and achievement being l inked here (1936: 83) .
F in a l ly ,  Bateson cons iders  th e  only elements in th e  behaviour of 
th e  wau which appears t o  him t o  be sui  g e n e r i s , in t h a t  i t  cannot be 
l inked with any p a t t e r n  of  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s .  This i s  th e  exaggerated 
q u a l i t y  of  th e  wau' s  behaviour towards t h e  l a u a . In summary,
Bateson w r i t e s :
'We s t i l l  do not  know why th e  wau' s  behaviour tends  t o  be 
exaggerated  and comical ,  why th e  laua i s  regarded as th e  
an c e s to r s  o f  th e  maternal  c l a n ,  and why t h i s  c u l t u r e  has 
fol lowed th e  logic of  i t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  t o  such extreme 
conc lu s ions .  These problems must be l e f t  f o r  s o lu t i o n  in 
terms of  aspec ts  of  Iatmul c u l t u r e  o th e r  than th e  pu rely  
s t r u c t u r a l '  (1936: 85).
I sugges t  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  paraphrase  t h e  above quote 
by saying t h a t  a so c ia l  s t r u c t u r a l  a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
implica ted  in th e  naven led Bateson t o  a p o s i t i o n  in which he r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  t h e  most r e co n d i te  aspec t  of naven behaviour ,  which ' I  would 
de f ine  as "as i f "  behaviour,  might prove t o  be th e  most c r u c i a l  
f a c t o r  in h i s  at tempt  t o  understand th e  naven phenomena. The 
bur lesque "as i f "  of  th e  wau - and of  th e  laua and o th e r  kin 
involved - performances withou t  any sense in t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n tex t ,  
must be taken  out  o f  th e  framework of  s t r u c t u r a l  e x p lan a t io n .
Bateson here  begins h i s  move away from e idos  and towards e thos ,  
from an a n a l y s i s  of  s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  towards th e  fo rmula t ion  of  
th e  notion  o f  schismogenesis .
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Might not  t h e  element of  bur lesque ,  which appears marginal  t o  
the  logic  o f  a s t r u c t u r a l  a n a l y s i s ,  prove c e n t r a l  t o  an unders tanding 
of th e  naven?
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NOTES to  Chapter Five
( D  A more re c e n t  account of  t h i s  view, which a t tempts  to
c r i t i c i s e  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  s t r u c t u r a l i s m  of Lev i -S t rauss  
by emphasising th e  a n a l y t i c a l  p r i o r i t y  of  p r a x i s ,  has 
been given by P i e r r e  Bourdieu (1977).
(2 ) I t  can be argued t h a t  Bateson comes near  t o  an a n a l y s i s  of
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between an Iatmul mother and her  c h i ld  which 
sugges ts  a primary d iv i s i o n  between na tu re  and c u l t u r e  
(Footnote ,  1936: 75).
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CHAPTER SIX: KINSHIP, SOCIOLOGY AND STRUCTURE IN NAVEN
BATESON'S NEXT CHAPTER, 'The Sociology of  Naven1, s e t s  the  
naven a t  t h e  ce n t r e  of  a model of  Iatmul s o c ie ty  s p e c i f i c a l l y  in 
terms of  p a t t e r n s  of  marriage.  He w r i te s  t h a t ,  u n t i l  t h i s  po in t  
in h i s  t e x t ,  he has cons idered t h e  naven from th e  viewpoint  of  a 
'h y p o th e t i c a l  i n t e l l e c t  in s id e  the  c u l t u r e 1 t o  whom the  behaviour 
i s  ' l o g i c a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  with the  o th e r  given f a c t s  of  Iatmul 
c u l t u r e '  (1936: 8 6 ) .  Now, however, he w i l l  look a t  th e  m a te r ia l  
from a d i f f e r e n t  po in t  of  view,
' t h a t  o f  an observer  o u ts id e  th e  c u l t u r e  and i n t e r e s t e d  in th e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  of  Iatmul communit ies'  (1936: 8 6 ) .
How, he asks ,  does naven c o n t r i b u t e  t o  th e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of  the  
soc ie ty?  He f e e l s  j u s t i f i e d  in asking t h i s  ques t ion  because he has 
a l ready  shown t h a t  the  naven expresses  and s t r e s s e s  t h e  wau-laua 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .
The notion  of  th e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of  s o c ie ty  has a long h i s t o r y  in 
s o c ia l  anthropology,  from Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown to  Levi- 
S t rauss  and beyond, but the  term is  o f ten  employed loose ly  and 
im prec ise ly .  For h is  p a r t ,  Bateson assumes t h a t  th e  s t reng then ing  
of  th e  wau- laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  c lo s e ly  connected with a wider form 
of " i n t e g r a t io n "  amongst the  Iatmul.  His Chapter  VII i s  an at tempt 
t o  j u s t i f y  t h i s  in s o c io lo g ica l  te rms .  He w i l l  then  be f r e e  t o  
pursue a new kind of  a n a ly s i s  in terms of  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r a t e g y  
o u t l ined  e a r l i e r .
This i s  p r e c i s e ly  what happens. His next  ch a p te r ,  'Problems and 
Methods o f  Approach' ,  cont inues  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  polemic and 
in t roduces  t h e  d e t a i l e d  d i s cuss ions  of  e thos ,  e idos  and schismogenesis  
which express  Bateson 's  developing argument dur ing  th e  second 
h a l f  of th e  book.
A f o o tn o te  t o  h is  “ soc io log ica l '*  chap te r  shows t h a t  th e  author  
was extremely  unce r t a in  as t o  t h e  value of  i t s  co n te n t .  In the  
t e x t ,  he s t a t e s  t h a t  s o c io lo g ica l  as opposed to  s t r u c t u r a l  enqui ry 
should be based on s t a t i s t i c s ,  in th e  form of  answers t o  ques t ions
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such as ' "What percentage of  such and such in d iv id u a l s  do so-  
and-so?" (1936: 87) .  But h is  foo tno te  to  t h i s  page of  h is  t e x t  
reads:
'U nfo r tuna te ly  I have no s t a t i s t i c s  and took no random samples.  
The conclus ions  of  t h i s  chap te r  are t h e r e f o r e  unproven. The 
ch ap te r  i t s e l f  i s  only included f o r  th e  sake of  g iv ing an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  th e  problems and methods of  approach of 
socio logy in th e  s t r i c t  sense of  th e  word' (1936: 87).
S oc io log ica l  a n a l y s i s ,  w r i te s  Bateson,  i s  s t a t i s t i c a l -  or  should 
be - because i t  dea l s  not  with d e t a i l s  of  c u l t u r a l  behav iour ,  but  
with th e  behaviour of  in d i v id u a l s .  I t  would appear t h a t  he means 
here t h a t  s t a t i s t i c s  should t e l l  us about th e  ac tua l  inc idence of  
d e t a i l s  of behav iour.  d )  He s e l e c t s  one item of  h is  da ta  as 
being p a r t i c u l a r l y  important  from a s o c io lo g ic a l  p e r s p e c t iv e :
' i t  i s  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  waus who perform naven 1 (1936: 8 8 ) .
This obse rva t ion  leads Bateson in to  a d i s cu s s io n  o f  Iatmul 
marriage p a t t e r n s  and the  behaviour between groups sa id  by th e  Iatmul 
to  have been l inked  in p a s t  g en e ra t io n s .  This  s e c t i o n  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  because in h is  t r ea tm e n t  of  Iatmul marriage  Bateson 
approaches an app rec ia t ion  of  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between idea l  marriage 
p re fe rences  and ac tua l  marriage  p a t t e r n s  in a way which p r e -d a t e s  
th e  d i s c u s s io n s  surrounding a l l i a n c e  theory  of  t h e  1950s and 1960s.
He i s ,  however, unable to  t a k e  f u l l  advantage of  th e  i n t u i t i o n  he 
d i sp la ys  in h i s  t e x t ,  owing t o  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c l im a te  of  B r i t i s h  
so c ia l  anthropology in the  1930s.
Many p r im i t i v e  s o c i e t i e s ,  Bateson w r i t e s ,  r e g u la t e  marriage in 
such a way t h a t  a f f i n a l  l inks  of  a l l e g i a n c e  and indebtedness a re  
renewed from genera t ion  t o  gen e ra t io n .  But, when app l ied  to  the  
Iatmul,  such a p i c t u r e  is  problematic because,  al though p re fe rences  
are  s t a t e d  c l e a r l y ,  they do not  in f a c t  agree with ac tua l  p a t t e r n s  
of marr iage:
'The c u l t u r e  does,  i t  i s  t r u e ,  con ta in  a g r e a t  many fo rm ula t ions  
which would r e g u la t e  marriage in a p o s i t i v e  manner i f  they were 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  obeyed1 (1936: 8 8 ) .
These fo rm ula t ions  of  marriage p re fe rences  a re  summarised as fol lows 
by Bateson:
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1. A woman should marry in th e  same house as her  f a t h e r ' s
f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ,  o r  in o th e r  words she should marry her
f a t h e r ' s  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  s o n ' s  son,  o r ,  a man should 
marry h i s  f a t h e r ' s  mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  s o n ' s  daughter ,  or  
h is  i a i . In a fo o tn o te ,  t h i s  i s  expressed  more simply as 
'Laua 's  son w i l l  marry wau1s daughte r '  (1936: 89) .
(See Diagram 1, page 48 above).  I f  th e  p re fe rence  f o r  
i a i  marr iage was fol lowed c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  t h e  a f f i n a l  l inks  
would be repea ted  in every o th e r  g en e ra t io n .  But t h i s  does not 
occur .
2. The Iatmul say t h a t  "The daughter  goes as payment f o r  th e
mother ."  In o the r  words, a man should marry h is  f a t h e r ' s
s i s t e r ' s  daughter .  (Bateson does not  g ive  an eq u iv a le n t  kin 
term f o r  FZD; th e  n e a re s t  he provides  i s  na,  which Bateson 
g lo s s e s  as " f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  c h i ld "  (1936: 90) .  Again, i f  
t h i s  marriage p a t t e r n  was c o n s i s t e n t l y  fo l lowed,  a f f i n a l  l inks  
would be renewed and would a l t e r n a t e  in d i r e c t i o n  in every 
g e n e ra t io n .  This i s  t h e  system of a l l i a n c e  which l a t e r  an throp­
o l o g i s t s  have r e f e r r e d  t o  as p a t r i l a t e r a l  c ro s s -co u s in  
m arr iage .
According t o  Bateson,  t h e s e  two marriage p re fe rences  are  incom­
p a t i b l e  but  can be combined in to  a coheren t  system through s p e c i f i c  
marr iages  which conver t  an i a i  marriage  in one genera t ion  in to  a 
FZD ( f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  daughter)  marriage  in th e  nex t .  He provides  
a diagram which i l l u s t r a t e s  th e - .pos i t ion  ( s ee Diagram 5, page 
112 below).  The marriage  of  th e  b1 woman and th e  A1 man i s  an 
i a i  (see  paragraph 1 , above) marr iage ,  between t h e  woman b and 
th e  man A, two genera t ions  p r ev ious ly .  According t o  Bateson,  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  i a i  system and th e  FZD system depends on 
whether t h e  marr iage between th e  man x and t h e  woman y ta k es  p lace  
in t h e m i d d l e  g e n e ra t io n .  I f  t h i s  marriage does occur
' t h e  whole system i s  converted in to  one based upon marriage with 
th e  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  daughter ,  and th e  f i n a l  m a r r i a g e . . .
(between b1 and A1). . .becomes a marriage o f  a man with h is  
f a t h e r ' s '  s i s t e r ' s  daughte r '  (1936: 90).
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Diagram 5 . From Bateson (1936: 8 9 ) .
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This marr iage  in the  middle genera t ion  i s  l inked t o  a t h i r d  
fo rmula t ion :
3. "Women should be exchanged." S i s t e r  exchange marriage would 
c o n f l i c t  with e i t h e r  i a i  or  FZD marr iage ,  s ince  t h e  opera t ion  
of  both of  the se  l a t t e r  marriage  p a t t e r n s  would be confused 
by s i s t e r s  being exchanged r e c i p r o c a l l y  w i th in  one gen e ra t io n .
However, Bateson w r i t e s ,  ' t h e  fundamental concept  of  the  
exchange of  women is  common t o  both s i s t e r  exchange and 
marr iage with t h e  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  daugh te r '  (1936: 90).
The p o in t  here is  t h a t  Bateson s e t s  out  t o  examine th e  marriage 
" ru le s"  which h i s  t r a i n i n g  has t a u g h t  him must e x i s t  as a c r u c i a l  
and o p e ra t io n a l  bundle of  c o n s t r a i n t s  working w ith in  any "p r im i t ive"  
s o c i e t y .  In one paragraph he can w r i te :
'Thus Iatmul s o c ie ty  i s  b u i l t  upon t h r e e  fo rm ula t ions  in regard
t o  marr iage which though they c o n f l i c t  a re  s t i l l  i n t e r - r e l a t e d  
in a cu r ious  lo g ica l  manner. The f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  daughter  
marr iage i s  comparable with th e  j j u  marr iage s ince  both f i t  
in to  t h e  same p a t t e r n  of  r e p e t i t i o n s  in a l t e r n a t e  g e n e ra t io n s ,  
and th e  s i s t e r  exchange i s  comparable with f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  
daughter  marriage  s ince  both depend upon“t h e  exchange of  
women' (1936: 90).
But h is  next  sen tence reads :
'This  d i s c u s s io n  of  the  marriage  r u l e s  was int roduced t o  show 
th e  s o c i e t y  i s  without  any r e g u la r  r e p e t i t i v e  system whereby
th e  a f f i n a l  l inks  might be~ regu la r ly  renewed'  (1936: 90, my
emphases) .
Then fo l lows a t h e o r e t i c a l  sugges t ion  which enables  him t o  l ink  
Iatmul marr iage ,  or  r a t h e r  t h e  p re fe rences  which th e  Iatmul a r t i c u ­
l a t e ,  with t h e  naven which r e f e r s  not  t o  " s o c io lo g i c a l  f a c t s "  but  
r a t h e r  t o  t h e  arena of  c u l t u r a l  lo g i c s :
'We s h a l l  see t h a t  t h i s  s o c ie ty  c o n s t a n t ly  d o v e t a i l s  ideas  which 
are  incompat ib le  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  perhaps something in common 
between th e  muddled log ic  which u n d e r l i e s  t h e  naven r i t u a l  and 
t h a t  on which the  r u l e s  of  marriage  a re  based'  (1936: 91).
Bateson has j u s t  shown, to  h is  own s a t i s f a c t i o n  a t  any r a t e ,
t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no r u l e s  of marriage  in Iatmul s o c i e t y ,  but  only 
s t a t e d  " fo rm u la t ions" ,  to  use h i s  own term. In t h e  terms of  a l l i a n c e
the o ry ,  i s  he not  w r i t in g  about "p re fe rences"  r a t h e r  than th e  
" p r e s c r ip t i o n s "  implied by th e  phrase ,  " the  r u l e s  of  marriage"
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(Needham 1962, Maybury-Lewis 1965, Overing. 1 9 7 5 )? As I s h a l l  
at tempt  t o  show l a t e r  in t h i s  c h ap te r ,  Bateson i s  a l so  confusing 
c a t e g o r ie s  of  kin with a c tu a l  i n d i v id u a l s .
Another page o r  so of  the  t e x t  i s  given t o  a l i s t  of  "negat ive 
marriage r u l e s "  which appear t o  be more spur ious  than th e  " p o s i t iv e "  
r u l e s .  This s e c t i o n  i s  concluded with t h e  in format ion t h a t  
marriages o f ten  ta k e  p lace  with members of  o u t s id e  groups ( e x t r a -  
Ia tm ul):
'so t h a t  we may sum up t h e  marriage  system by saying t h a t  in 
p r a c t i c e  marriage occurs very nea r ly  a t  random' (1936: 92).
As Iatmul v i l l a g e  tend t o  be la rg e ,  with popu la t ions  ranging from 
two hundred t o  a thousand,  the  renewal of  p a s t  a f f i n a l  l inks  by the  
means of  marr iage procedures seems u n l i k e ly .  But th e  very oppos i te  
p o s s i b i l i t y  could equal ly  well be argued a g a i n s t  Bateson.  He 
concludes :
' I f  t h e r e f o r e  t h e se  old a f f i n a l  l in k s  a re  necessary  f o r  th e  
in t e g r a t i o n  of  the  community, some means must be found of 
diagrammatica l ly  s t r e s s i n g  them, a f u n c t io n  performed by 
naven ' (1936: 92).
Ba teson 's  c h i e f  d i f f i c u l t y  in handling h is  da ta  on Iatmul marriage 
p a t t e r n s  i s  t h a t  he i s  cons t ra ined  by h is  t r a i n i n g  and th e  an throp­
o log ica l  t h e o ry  of  h is  t im es .  He notes  th e  incons i s tency  between 
th e  t h r e e  ' f o rm u la t io n s '  which 'would r e g u la t e  marriage in a p o s i t i v e  
manner i f  they  were c o n s i s t e n t l y  obeyed'  (1936: 8 8 ) ,  but  he is  
unable t o  develop h is  in s ig h t  owing t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he i s  w r i t ing  
some twenty years  before  t h e  debates  surrounding a l l i a n c e  th e o ry .
The k in sh ip  t h e o r i s t s  of th e  1930s were unable t o  d i scuss  apparent  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  in th e  "system", or  indeed t o  d iscuss  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
of  sys tem at ic  p lu ra l i sm ,  because th e  d i s ju n c t io n  between thought ,  
te rminology and behaviour endemic to  "elementary  s t r u c t u r e s  of
kinship"  had not  y e t  become a c r u c i a l  s u b je c t  of  deba te .  u . , .
h i s  aa ta
does show t h a t  t h e  Iatmul a re  concerned with t h e  ideology of  th e  
r e p e t i t i o n  o f  marr iages ,  but  Bateson does not  have access to  th e  
underly ing log ic  of  t h i s  ideology.  While he i s  c a r e fu l  not  to  
s t r e s s  t h e  "descent  metaphor" which was so powerful in t h e  B r i t i s h  
s o c ia l  anthropology of  h is  contemporar ies ,  h i s  con t inua l  use of the
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terms " p a t r i l i n e a l “ and " m a t r i l i n e a l 11 shows t h i s  metaphor t o  have 
been a s t rong  in f luence  on th e  way he concep tua l i sed  th e  Iatmul 
so c ia l  u n iv e rs e .  (2) He cannot ,  f o r  example, make sense of  the  
f a c t  which was apparent  t o  him, namely t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  " th ree  
fo rm u la t io n s " ,  ' i n  p r a c t i c e  marriage occurs very nea r ly  a t  
random' (1936: 92).
B a teson 's  d i scuss ion  of  what he c a l l s  Iatmul 'marr iage  r u l e s '  
(1936: 90) a re " i l lu m in a te d  by the  important  d i s t i n c t i o n s  which 
a l l i a n c e  th e o ry  was l a t e r  t o  make between "genealogy" and "ca te gory" ,  
and between " p re s c r ip t i o n "  and "preference"  (Needham 1962;
Schneider 1965; Maybury-Lewis 1965). An important  e a r l y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
to  a l l i a n c e  theory  was t h a t  of  Dumont in a famous paper on 
Dravidian k in sh ip  terminology (1953).  For Dumont, t h i s  terminology 
was^an express ion  of  marriage and was grounded in a f f i n i t y  and not  
in consangu in i ty .  L in ea r i ty  i s  not  d i s t i n g u i s h e d ;  what is  
important  f o r  Dravidian terminology i s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  made by any 
one ego between d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r ie s  of  k in ,  some of  which conta in  
p o t e n t i a l  marriage p a r tn e r s ,  and some of  which do no t .  In a 
Dravidian system of te rminology a f ema*e m a t r i l a t e r a l  c r o s s ­
cousin i s  no t  so much cons idered as a "mother 's  b r o t h e r ' s  daughter" ,  
as a woman who belongs in a marr iageable  ca tegory .
One of  Ba teson 's  problems with Iatmul marr iage p a t t e r n s  i s  t h a t  
he is  t r a c i n g  th e  consequences of  h i s  ' f o rm u la t io n s '  in terms of  
genealogy, and not  of  ca tegory .  Another way of  s t a t i n g  the  problem 
i s  t o  say t h a t  Bateson d o e s n o t  r e a l i s e  t h a t  he may be dea l ing  with 
a s e t  of  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  claiming p a r t n e r s , r a t h e r  than  a s e t  of  
"marriage r u l e s " .  The Iatmul might a c t u a l l y  sometimes phrase 
some of t h e s e  s t r a t e g i e s  in terms which might sound l i k e  " ru le s "  
t o  th e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ,  or  they might no t;  Bateson i s  not  e n t i r e l y  
c l e a r  as to  how he a r r ive d  a t  h is  fo rm u la t ions ,  but  presumably they 
were ob ta ined  from information supplied  by in formants .  He does not
provide any d e t a i l e d  case h i s t o r i e s  of  a c tu a l  Iatmul m arr iages .  I t  i s  
c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  h is  t h r e e  fo rmula t ions  can be s t a t e d  as t h r e e  
ve rs ions  of  a bas ic  model; t h a t  of  s i s t e r  exchange in a l t e r n a t e
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g e n e ra t io n s ,  th e  s t a t e d  p re fe rence  of  both FZD and of FMBSD 
determining  an idea l  system of  delayed r e c i p r o c i t y .  (See Diagram 
6, page 117 below.)
B a teson 's  t h i r d  formula t ion  can be viewed as t h e  genera l  s t a t e ­
ment of  t h e  ideology of  marr iage ,  u e , t h a t  s i s t e r s  should be 
exchanged. His second formula t ion  i s  a s t r i c t  a r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
ideology,  i » e 4t h a t  a male ego should marry a woman in t h e  category  
which inc ludes  h is  FZD, a marriage which s e t s  up a system of delayed 
r e c i p r o c i t y .  F i n a l ly ,  Bateson 's  f i r s t  fo rmula t ion  can be considered 
as a more genera l  a p p l i c a t io n  of  the  p re fe rence  s t a t e d  in formula t ion
(2);  i * e at h a t  a male ego can marry any woman in th e  ca tegory  which 
inc ludes  h i s  FMBSD, or  i a i . This fo rmula t ion  pushes th e  marriage  
a l l i a n c e  back by one gene ra t ion .
Thus, t h e  t h r e e  fo rmula t ions  can be seen as t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  ways 
of  d e s c r ib in g  kin with a view t o  the  manipulat ion of  the  membership 
of  marriage  c a t e g o r i e s .  Bateson makes a case th roughout h is  book 
t h a t  t h e  Iatmul a re  "maximisers".  This would c e r t a i n l y  appear to  
apply t o  t h e  wau 's i n t e r e s t  in pursuing naven a c t i v i t y  with h is  
laua in t h e  expec ta t ion  of  s o l i d i f y i n g  a f u t u r e  a l l i a n c e  with the  
boy. Is  t h e r e  a connection between th e  s t r a t e g i e s  t h e  Iatmul 
employ in claiming marriage p a r t n e r s ,  and th e  a l l i a n c e  s t r a t e g y  
d isp layed  in naven behaviour? Can th e se  both be viewed as s t r a t e g i e s  
f o r  th e  maximising of a l l i a n c e s ?  (3) I s h a l l  comment l a t e r  on 
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between such maximising and th e  "dramat is ing"  
which a l so  appears as a fundamental t r a i t  of  Iatmul c u l t u r e  and which 
I w i l l  t u r n  t o  when I deal  with Ba teson 's  d e s c r i p t i o n  of~male 
ethos  and h i s  d e t a i l e d  d is cuss ion  of  h i s  not ion of  schismogenesis .
For the  moment, I can only suggest  t h a t  i t  would have been advant­
ageous t o  h i s  a n a ly s i s  i f  Bateson had cons idered  more c l o s e l y  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between more fo rmal ised  s ta tem en ts  of  marriage  " ru le s"  
made by t h e  Iatmul,  a c tua l  marriage  choices made by ind iv idua l  
Iatmuls and t h e  " r i t u a l  behaviour" between th e  members of  the  
kin c a t e g o r i e s  wau and laua.
Any marr iage according t o  Ba teson 's  t h r e e  fo rm ula t ions  w i l l  
r ep ea t  previous  marr iages ,  al though not  n e c e s s s a r i l y  th e  marriages  
in th e  p a r e n t a l  gen e ra t io n .  The " formula t ions"  express  d i f f e r e n t
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pre fe rences  which a r t i c u l a t e  and put  in to  opera t ion  d i f f e r e n t  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  claiming p a r t n e r s .  Two d i s t i n c t i o n s  are 
impor tant .  The f i r s t  i s  between p r e s c r i p t i o n , which e n t a i l s  
th e  composit ion of  c a teg o r ie s  of  p o t e n t i a l  p a r t n e r s ,  and 
p r e f e r e n c e , which in d i c a te s  which p a r t i c u l a r  p o t e n t i a l  p a r tn e r s  
wi th in  t h e  ca tegory  w i l l  be p r e f e r r e d  and a c t u a l l y  chosen.  The 
second impor tant  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  between t r a c i n g  kin of  ego through 
genea logy , t h e  method employed by Bateson which emphasises th e  
ex i s t en ce  of  a "marriage r u l e " ,  and viewing a l l  o f  e go ' s  kin as 
belonging t o  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s , some of which con ta in  p o t e n t i a l  
spouses and some o f  which do no t .  This l a t t e r  method emphasises 
marriage "preferences"*  th e  former i s  more i n t e r e s t e d  in marking 
out  " p r e s c r ip t i o n s "  with in  a s t r i c t l y  encoded "system".  Thus, 
in terms of  ca tegory ,  we can view th e  Iatmul term i a i  as poss ib ly  
c o n s t i t u t i n g  a marr iageable kin ca tegory  from th e  p e r s p ec t iv e  
of any Iatmul male ego. The p re fe r re d  p a r tn e r  with in  t h i s  
category we might de f ine  gen ea lo g ic a l ly  as a FMBSD. But 
according t o  t h e  c h a r t  of  Iatmul kin terminology  provided by 
Bateson,  i a i  r e f e r s  a l so  t o  the  F a t h e r ' s  Mother. (See- Diagram 1, 
page 48 above. )  I t  would be in form ative  t o  know i f  t h e r e  a re  any 
o the r  kin covered by the  term i a i . But we can perhaps summarise 
Bateson 's  da ta  here by saying t h a t  Iatmul marriage  ideology c r e a t e s  
a ca tegory  of  marr iageab le  kin t r a c e a b l e  through th e  f a t h e r  (from 
the  male v iewpoin t ) .
An important  f e a t u r e  of  Dravidian te rminology i s  t h a t  i t  
d i s c r im in a t e s  c r u c i a l l y  between s i s t e r s  and p a r a l l e l  cous ins  on the  
one hand, and cross  cousins on t h e  o th e r  (Dumont, 1953).
Cross cousins  nan be marr ied;  s i s t e r s  and p a r a l l e l  cous ins  can­
not  be m arr ied .  Dumont's c h a r t  r ev ea ls  major d i f f e r e n c e s  from 
Iatmul te rminology as l i s t e d  by Bateson (see  Diagram 1, page 48 
above) .
The impor tan t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between Dumont's account  of  Dravidian 
te rminology and Bateson 's  da ta  can be summarised as fo l lows:
1. Dumont: F a t h e r ' s  S i s t e r  and Mother in Law are  c l a s s i f i e d  
t o g e t h e r .
Bateson shows F a t h e r ' s  S i s t e r  and Mother in Law as c l a s s i f i e d  
s e p a r a t e l y ,  as iau and na i sagu t  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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2. Dumont: Mother's  Brother  and Father  in Law are  c l a s s i f i e d  
t o g e th e r  if
Bateson shows Mother's  Brother and Father  in Law as 
c l a s s i f i e d  s e p a ra t e ly ,  as wau and n a i sag u t  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
An important  po in t  here i s  t h a t  Bateson does not  say 
whether a Mother's  Brother can be th e  same in d iv idua l  
as a Fa ther  in Law, or  i f ,  on marr iage ,  e g o ' s  term 
f o r  wau changes to  or  comes t o  inc lude t h a t  f o r  
n a i s a g u t .
3. Dumont::Mother in Law and Fathe r  in Law a re  c l a s s i f i e d  
s e p a r a t e l y .  Bateson shows Mother in Law and Father in 
Law as c l a s s i f i e d  t o g e th e r ,  as n a i s a g u t .
4.  Dumont: male cross  cousins a re  c l a s s i f i e d  t o g e th e r  and 
female c ross  cousins a re  c l a s s i f i e d  t o g e t h e r .  Bateson shows 
F a t h e r ' s  S i s t e r ' s  Daughter and F a t h e r ' s  S i s t e r ' s  Son
as c l a s s i f i e d  to g e th e r  as na,  whereas Mother 's  B ro th e r ' s  
Daughter (nyame) and Mother 's  B r o th e r ' s  Son (mbuambo) are  
c l a s s i f i e d  s e p a ra t e ly .
Bateson does not  provide s u f f i c i e n t  da ta  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  h is  
claim t h a t  Iatmul marriage 'occurs  very nea r ly  a t  random',  but  on 
the  o th e r  hand we can see t h a t  th e  data he does provide  with 
r e s p e c t  t o  terminology m i l i t a t e s  a g a in s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  Iatmul 
kin terminology fol lows the  c l a s s i c  Dravidian system. I t  is  
p o s s ib le ,  however, t o  suggest  t h a t  th e  Iatmul might have operated  
on th e  p r i n c i p l e  of  a Dravidian type  b i l a t e r a l  c ro s s -cous in  
marriage ideology which s t r e s s e d  a p re fe rence  f o r  females c l a s s i f i e d  
with th e  f a t h e r ' s  mother ' s  kin* Whether or  no t ,  and how f a r ,  t h i s  
ideology was manipulated such t h a t  marriage  would a l so  be p o s s ib le  
with a woman belonging to  th e  ca tegory  including  MBD i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  say.  Ba teson 's  da ta  i s  not  s u f f i c i e n t  he re .  (See below, page 120 
f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  marriage  between c h i ld r e n  of  wau and of  
l a u a . ) I would sugges t ,  however, t h a t  'marr iage  a t  random' 
in d i c a te s  such a manipula t ion of  c a t e g o r i e s ,  as of  course does 
Bateson 's  t h i r d  fo rmula t ion ,  i, e * th a t  s i s t e r s  should be exchanged.
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I t  might be f r u i t f u l  here t o  compare B a teson 's  Iatmul data 
with a Dravidian terminology from South America as s tud ied  by 
Overing (1975).  {4 ) Overing shows t h a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  marriage
category f o r  t h e  P ia roa ,  chi rekwa, inc ludes  both MBD and FZD, 
but t h a t  t h e  p re fe rence  i s  f o r  th e  MBD. For a Piaroa male,  both 
a f f i n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are t r a c e d  through th e  
w i f e ' s  b ro th e r  or  s i s t e r ' s  husband. The s i t u a t i o n  is  summarised 
in Diagram 7, page 121 below. Overing s t r e s s e s  t h a t  the  r e l a t i o n ­
ship with t h e  w i f e ' s  b ro the r  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  b a s i s  f o r  Piaroa 
soc ie ty ;  a f f i n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  a l l i a n c e  are in s e p a ra b le .  We 
can compare t h i s  with the  Iatmul s i t u a t i o n  as repor ted  by 
Bateson (see  Diagram 8, page 121 below).  Here the  c r u c i a l  r e l a t i o n ­
ship  f o r  an Iatmul male ego i s  with the  s i s t e r ' s  husband. Thus, 
whereas f o r  t h e  Piaroa marriage i s  t r a c e d  through th e  WB or  ZH 
and the  marriage p re fe rence  i s  f o r  th e  MB c h i l d ,  f o r  t h e  Iatmul 
marriage i s  t r a c e d  through the  s i s t e r ,  and th e  marriage  p re fe rence  
is  f o r  th e  FZ c h i l d .  Marriage a l l i a n c e  i s  s t r e s s e d  through a 
d i f f e r e n t  kind of  b ro th e r - in - l a w  in each case .
Later  in t h i s  chap ter  I w i l l  cons ider  Ba teson 's  observa tion  t h a t  
th e  Iatmul d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between two kinds of  a f f i n e s ,  those  
tr ac ed  through a contemporary marr iage ,  and those  t r a c e d  through a 
pas t  marr iage .  (5)
A f u r t h e r  p iece  of  Bateson's  da ta  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  with re fe ren c e  
t o  a South American s o c ie ty ,  namely h i s  s ta tement t h a t  'marriages  
with c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  "mothers" a r e . . . n o t  uncommon' (1936: 92) .  I f  
t h i s  i s  so,  then  i t  might make s t r u c t u r a l  sense of  Bateson 's  r ep o r t  
t h a t  during naven ceremonies th e  laua stepped over t h e  p r o s t r a t e  
body of  h i s  mother.  This would make naven more of  a dramatic 
c e l e b ra t i o n  of  l a u a ' s  s t r u c t u r a l  p o s t i t i o n .  R iv ie re  r e p o r t s  a skewing 
r u l e  amongst t h e  Trio such t h a t  marriage  with a "mother" is  
po s s ib le  (1969: 87) .  I f  amongst t h e  Iatmul wau's  daughter  (MBD) 
and Mother a re  c l a s s i f i e d  to g e th e r ,  as they appear t o  be from 
Bateson 's  c h a r t  (both a re  termed nyame) , then marriage  between 
l a u a ' s  son and wau' s  daughter  can be considered as marriage  with a
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  mother. The s i t u a t i o n ,  from R i v i e r e ' s  r e p o r t ,  appears 
s im i l a r  f o r  th e  Trio (see  Diagram 9, page 122 below).
121
. £ G O  ] V
A  ■= o
JWS
A  =  o
P o u l T l c f t L  R l . L l f i N C €
P lr=)
M o T -  < 3ft t-i. )f? a/c*£f ^Jf5 .
PfKt* Ffi'fteNCfi' * h  B, Cb ,
Diagram 7 . WB as Focus fo r  A llia n c e .
& r
O 2 =  o
■ f f&o
CV flu)
h RR.1C. 119 G-G ^ e F e R f A / c e  ; p z  D- 
Diagram 8 . Z as Focus fo r  A llia n c e .
122
& b <V y
CLROR^
'TR . \ a j S  R t m u l  * Mo,  is fv
^ ^ R l f t O f f i C L P  <- ___  v  , K L e  o R ,y f
c O O * 5  M b*.*U E .S E g - o ' s  5 ©l 4 *
Diagram 9 . Skewing Rule* T rio/Iatm ul. 
c f .  R iv iere (1969: 8 7 ).
123
Thus, f o r  t h e  Iatmul as f o r  many South Amerindian s o c i e t i e s ,  
p o l i t i c a l  o rg an iz a t io n  i s  based on a f f i n i t y .  In th e  Iatmul case ,  
however, r e c i p r o c i t y  i s  delayed by one g e n e ra t io n ;  t h i s  i s  the  
s t r u c t u r a l  consequence of  th e  s t r e s s  on marriage by males in to  
th e  f a t h e r ’ s l i n e .  But whereas f o r  t h e  P ia roa  and o th e r  Amerindian 
s o c i e t i e s ,  a f f i n i t y  i s  a l so  t h e  b a s i s  of  f i s s i o n  (Overing 1975), 
Bateson 's  arguement i s  t h a t  f o r  t h e  Iatmul f i s s i o n  occurs along 
" p a t r i l i n e a l "  l i n e s :
•These ( a f f i n a l )  l inks  form a network which runs across  the  
p a t r i l i n e a l  system of  c l a n s ,  moie t ies  and i n i t i a t o r y  groups 
and the reby  t i e s  the  c o n f l i c t i n g  groups t o g e t h e r 1 (1936: 107).
We might ask here i f  t h e  " c u t - o f f  po in t"  f o r  t h e  r e tu r n  of  women 
in th e  p a t t e r n  of  delayed r e c i p r o c i t y  i s  th e  same as t h a t  a t  which 
h o s t i l i t y  i s  p o s s i b l e .  Again, Bateson 's  da ta  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  here .
The importance of  the  f a c t  t h a t  FZD marr iage n e c e s s i t a t e s  a 
s i t u a t i o n  of  delayed r e c i p r o c i t y ,  and how t h i s  might r e l a t e  c r u c i a l l y  
t o  the  naven, w i l l  be examined below in Chapter  Eight .
We can summarise Bateson 's  d i f f i c u l t y  with regard t o  Iatmul 
marriage p a t t e r n s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  by saying t h a t  h i s  confusion between 
genealogy and ca tegory  leads him t o  regard h is  t h r e e  " ' fo rm u la t io n s ’1 
as being i m p l i c i t l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  This i s  because he cannot  see 
t h a t  th e  p o in t  of  th e  arrangements i s  t o  maximise t h e  number of 
po s s ib le  marr iage  a l l i a n c e s ,  r a t h e r  than to  ope ra te  a s t r i c t l y  
d e l im i ted  number of  marriage " r u l e s " ,  of  e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  or  a 
nega t ive  v a r i e t y .  An Iatmul male does not  have t o  know ex ac t ly  
how women a re  r e l a t e d  t o  him g e n e a lo g ic a l ly ,  o r  even i f  they  are  
r e l a t e d  t o  hiim a t  a l l ;  t h e  important  p o in t  f o r  him i s  whether or  
no t  they  a re  in a marr iageable  ca tegory .  And, no doubt ,  c a t e g o r ie s  
can be manipula ted;  perhaps t h a t  i s  t h e i r  r e a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
I have at tempted to  argue t h a t  Ba teson 's  da ta  shows t h a t  we 
can view t h e  Iatmul ideology of  marriage as a k in sh ip  network which 
t r a c e s  a f f i n i t y  and p o l i t i c a l  a l l i a n c e  through th e  s i s t e r .  A 
general  p o in t  worth noting i s  t h a t  Ba teson 's  d i scuss ion  of  Iatmul 
marriage  arrangements i s  pursued,  f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  from a male
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viewpoint and not  from a female one.
For the  Iatmul,  a f f i n i t y  and p o l i t i c a l  a l l i a n c e  a re  coterminous.  
S i s t e r s  must be d i sc r im ina ted  from wives, b ro th e r s  from husbands.
The power of  th e  f i g u r e  of  th e  s i s t e r  in t h i s  s o c i e t y  must Ibhus be 
c o n s id e ra b le ,  s ince  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in Iatmul l i f e  a re  
defined through  her  and by means of  he r .  Indeed,  we might go so 
f a r  as t o  say t h a t  Iatmul s o c ie ty  i s  based around t h e  s i s t e r .  Her 
c h i ld  i s  made t h e  focus of  th e  naven, which can now indeed be seen 
as an express ion  of  th e  c o n t in u i t y  of  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  forged  through 
her  and her  husband.  This i s  one way of  viewing t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  but  
I would a l so  suggest  t h a t  we might see th e  naven as c o n s t i t u t i n g  such 
a c o n t in u i t y  r a t h e r  than express ing  i t .
Does t h i s  image of  the  power of  th e  s i s t e r  throw any l i g h t  on the  
kinds of  behaviour  exh ib i ted  by th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in th e  naven?
Perhaps th e s e  can now be seen as a way of  defus ing  t h e  s i s t e r ' s  power 
by means of  t h e  c a r i c a tu r e d  pantomime o f  th e  r o l e  of  women.
The next  s ec t i o n  of  Ba teson 's  t e x t  i s  a d i s cu s s io n  of  th e  
importance of  a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  f o r  t h e  " i n t e g r a t i o n "  of 
Iatmul s o c i e t y .  He w r i t e s :
' I t  remains f o r  us to  cons ide r  whether t h e s e  l ink ings  a re  r e a l l y  
impor tan t  and how they^are  used in th e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of  s o c i e t y 1 
(1936: 92).
The c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  na tu re  o f  Iatmul kin terminology i s  important  here,  
al though Bateson does not  see t h a t  t h i s  f a c t o r  might put  h is  own 
genea log ica l  b ia s  in h is  a n a ly s i s  of  marriage  p a t t e r n s  in doubt .
' I n  t h i s  connection th e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t  i s  t h a t  t h e  
fo rm u la t ions  of  proper  behaviour towards a f f i n a l  r e l a t i v e s  can 
be app l ied  in t h i s  c u l t u r e  not  only to  own w i f e ' s  own 
r e l a t i v e s  and to  own s i s t e r ' s  husband 's  r e l a t i v e s ,  but  can be 
extended t o  a whole s e r i e s  o f  r e l a t i v e s  who are  grouped around 
t h i s  c e n t r a l  nucleus in a c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  manner'  (1936: 92) .
There i s  much ex tension  of  kin i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  with in  th e  network 
of  a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and, l o g i c a l l y ,  t h i s  would seem to  imply
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t h a t  t h e  no t ions  of  proper behaviour towards a man's w i f e ' s  r e l a t i v e s  
would spread f a r  and wide w ith in  Iatmul s o c i e t y .  But t h i s  does 
not  happen:
' I f  a l l  a f f i n a l  l inkages  were observed no one would be able  
t o  q u a r r e l  with anyone e l s e  in s id e  th e  community, and every­
body would have t o  go everywhere and do every th ing  with 
everybody e l s e ,  s ince  th e  genea log ica l  l i n k s  a re  a c t u a l l y  
u b iq u i to u s '  ( 1936: 93).
Q u a r re l l in g  i s  r i f e ,  and mobi l i s ing  work groups f o r  house-bu ild ing  
and s i m i l a r  t a s k s  i s  d i f f i c u l t .  But co -o p e ra t iv e  groups are  formed 
ev e n tu a l ly ,  and t h i s  is  made p o s s ib le
'by th e  i n s i s t e n c e  upon a f f i n a l  t i e s  which extend in a p e r f e c t l y  
d e f i n i t e  manner along c e r t a i n  chosen l i n e s  of  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  
system'  (1936: 93).
Two of t h e s e  ex tens ions  a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t .  The commonest 
c o l l e c t i v e  terms f o r  people grouped by them a re  lanoa nampa 
( 'husband p e o p l e ' )  and laua nyanggu ( ' s i s t e r ' s - c h i l d  c h i l d r e n ' ) .
The former term i s  appl ied  t o  people whose a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
a r i s e s  from a contemporary marr iage .  Lanoa nampa t h e r e f o r e  inc ludes  
such kin as s i s t e r ' s  husband ( la n-ndo) , s i s t e r ' s  husband 's  b ro th e r  
(a l so  l a n -n d o ),  s i s t e r ' s  husband 's  f a t h e r  ( l a u a ) and s i s t e r ' s  
husband's  son (aga in ,  l a u a ) . Here, th e  term lan i s  extended to  
inc lude  va r ious  lauas (1936: 93).
The laua nyanggu t r a c e  t h e i r  a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  through a pas t  
marr iage .  Such r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  expressed  in th e  naven. Here th e  
term laua i s  extended t o  inc lude c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  s i s t e r ' s  husbands.  
According t o  Bateson, an Iatmul proverb - 'Legs o f  a Caryota j  legs 
of  a Pandanua; women h i t h e r ,  women t h i t h e r '  - expresses  t h e  way in 
which t h i s  format ion of  lauas i s  based on th e  p e rp e tu a t io n  o f  p a s t  
marr iages :
' t h e  meaning of  the  proverb i s  t h a t  d iv e rs e  groups a re  t i e d  
t o g e t h e r  by a f f i n a l  bonds due to  pas t  marr iages  of  p a i r s  of 
s i s t e r s '  (1936: 94).
Here Bateson provides  a diagram which i l l u s t r a t e s  how t h i s  can occur ,
in such a way t h a t  the  wau-laua l ink  can be repea ted  over t h r e e  
gene ra t ions  ( see  Diagram 10, page 126 below).
F i r s t ,  two s i s t e r s  in clan  A ge t  m arr ied .  (6) One s i s t e r
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Diagram 10. R epetition  o f  Wau-Laua Link over Three 
G enerations. From Bateson (1936: 9 4 ).
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marr ies  i n t o  c lan  B, th e  o the r  in to  c lan  C. Thei r  ch i ld re n  are  
regarded as c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  s i b l i n g s .  In t h i s  next  g e n e ra t io n ,  the  
g i r l  of  c lan  B marr ies  a man of cl an  E, and th e  g i r l  of  c lan  C 
marr ies  a man of  clan  D. The grandch i ld ren  r e s u l t i n g  from th e  
o r ig i n a l  marr iages  again regard  themselves as c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  s i b l i n g s .  
Bateson con t inues :
'The members of  what i s  now t h e  middle gene ra t ion  w i l l  become 
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  " f a t h e r s " ,  "mothe rs" ,  " m o th e r ' s  b r o th e r s "  and 
" f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r s "  of  th e se  c h i ld r e n :  so t h a t  owing to  the  
o r i g i n a l  marriage  of  two s i s t e r s  of  cl an  A i t  has come about 
t h a t  a man in  clan  B has a laua in c lan  D and a man in c lan  C 
has a laua in clan  E' (1936: 95).
Although th e  term laua nyanggu, i. e . t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  lauas,  
can inc lude  a l a rge  number of  c h i ld r e n ,  a wau w i l l  s t r e s s  h is  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  c e r t a i n  laua groups in p re fe renc e  t o  o t h e r s ,  t h a t  
is  to  those  groups whose a l l e g i a n c e  he s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e s i r e s .  The 
wau w i l l  give t o  th e  baby laua of  h is  choice th e  name which, accord­
ing t o  Bateson,  might t e rm ina te  with t h e  word f o r  "mask",  and the  
giving of  t h i s  name i s  accompanied by the  g i f t  of  a coconut.  In 
l a t e r  yea rs  t h e  various  forms of  naven behaviour between th e  wau 
and laua fo l low .  The wau w i l l  c o n s ta n t ly  remind th e  laua of  t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  c a l l i n g  the  c h i ld  by h is  "mask" name, he w i l l  express 
p r ide  a t  t h e  l a u a ' s  achievements and he w i l l  g ive  p re s en ts  of  meat 
to  th e  l a u a . The laua, w i l l  give r e tu r n  g i f t s  of  va luab les  t o  the  
wau, and w i l l  help whenever the  wau needs a s s i s t a n c e  in bu i ld ing  a 
house, c l e a r in g  a garden and s im i l a r  t a s k s  (1936: 95).
One of  Ba teson 's  informants expressed t h i s  d i f f e r e n t l y  by saying 
t h a t  he had two s o r t s  of  tawontu ( i . e a, w i f e ' s  b r o t h e r ) :  one s o r t  of  
tawontu were ' t h e  men who had rece ived  a p a r t  of  t h e  b r id e  p r i c e  he 
gave f o r  h is  w i f e 1 (1936: 95).  Bride p r i c e  was seen as the
def in ing  f a c t o r  in the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with one group of  a f f i n e s ,  and 
the  system of name-giving by th e  maternal  c lan  and th e  naven 
behaviour were seen as de f in ing  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with th e  o th e r  a f f i n a l  
group.  I t  i s  t h e  combination of  th e se  two networks of  a l l i a n c e ,
Bateson a rgues ,  which enables  th e  Iatmul t o  engage in c o -o p e ra t iv e  
t a s k s .
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Proof of  t h i s  i s  to  be found in th e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on th e  s i z e  
of  Iatmul v i l l a g e s ,  which are due, according to  Bateson,  t o  the  
weakness o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  cohesion of  Iatmul communit ies.  In th e  
l a rg e r  v i l l a g e s ,  f i s s i o n  i s  a common occurrence;  groups a re  c o n s ta n t ly  
leaving  and founding new v i l l a g e s .  These s p l i t s  a re  always sa id  by 
th e  Iatmul t o  be caused by q u a r r e l l i n g .  Moreover, t h e se  f i s s i o n s  
in v a r i a b ly  fo l low what Bateson c a l l s  th e  ‘ l i n e s  of  th e  p a t r i l i n e a l  
groups '  (1936: 97) - t h a t  i s / a  c l an , r . a "ph ra t ry  o r ' a t jn o ie ty  s p l i t t i n g  
o f f  from th e  pa ren t  community and the reby  rending  t h e  system of 
a f f i n a l  l i n k a g e s '  (1936: 97).  This sugges ts  t h a t  a f f i n a l  l in k s  are 
f a r  weaker than  the  p a t r i l i n e a l  connec t ions ,  and here Bateson has 
a r r ive d  a t  a key po in t  in h i s  s o c io lo g ic a l  argument.
'Under t h e s e  circumstances th e  importance of  any f a c t o r  which 
s t r e n g t h e n s s t h e  a f f i n a l  l in k s  becomes apparent  and we a re  j u s t i f ­
ied in saying t h a t  th e  v i l l a g e s  could not  be as big as they are  
i f  i t  were not  f o r  naven ceremonies o r  some analogous phenomenon1 
(1936: 97 ).
What might such an analogous phenomenon be? Bateson says t h a t  i t  
could only t a k e  the  shape of  e i t h e r  a un ive rsa l  a l l e g i a n c e  amongst 
the  Iatmul t o  some c h i e f l y  system, o r  a system of co d i f i e d  law?
Nei ther  of  t h e s e  i n t e g r a t i v e  mechanisms e x i s t  amongst the  Iatmul.
There i s  no c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y .  The maintenance of  s o c i a l  o rde r  i s  
a m a t te r  f o r  t h e  in d iv idua l s  concerned in any p a r t i c u l a r  cases  of  
offences  or  a f f r o n t s .  Opponents in d i spu te s  c a l l  upon t h e i r  r e l a t i v e s ,  
fe l low c lan  members o r  members of  t h e i r  i n i t i a t o r y  groups, a f e a t u r e  
of Iatmul s o c i e t y  descr ibed  in an e a r l i e r  ch ap te r  of  Ba teson 's  t e x t ,  
'Sorcery  and Vengeance1. These m a t te r s  a re  always,  in Bateson 's  
words, ' between two p e r ip h e ra l  groups,  never t a k i n g r t h e  c e n t r i p e t a l  
form which we might phrase as "Rex or  S t a t e  versus  So-and-so" '
(1936: 99, a u t h o r ' s  emphases).  Bateson then g ives  d e t a i l s  of four  
d i spu te s  which i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p a t t e r n .  This m a te r i a l  a l so  shows, 
Batson c la im s ,  how d i spu te s  between members of  d i f f e r e n t  ' p a t r i l a t e r a l  
c l a n s '  o f ten  seem t o  be mediated by mutual a f f i n a l  kin (1936: 99-106).
Summing up a t  th e  end of  h is  ch a p te r ,  Bateson argues t h a t  th e  
importance of  a f f i n a l  l inks  f o r  t h e  Iatmul i s  ev iden t  from th e  f a c t  
t h a t  d i s p u te s  between competing p a t r i l i n e a l  groups tend t o  be
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mediated by men who stand in a mutual a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with 
both p a r t i e s .
'These ( a f f i n a l )  l inks  form a network which runs across  the  
p a t r i l i n e a l  systems of  c l a n s ,  m oie t ie s  and i n i t i a t o r y  groups 
and the reby  t i e s  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  groups t o g e t h e r . . . t h e  
p a t t e r n in g  and ub iqu i ty  of  th e  a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  such 
as t o  ensure t h a t  whenever a qua r re l  reaches  s e r io u s  dimensions 
t h e r e  s h a l l  be some in d iv id u a l s  marked out  t o  a c t  as peace­
makers'  -(1936: 107, my p a re n th e s e s ) .
Rules among the  Iatmul,  such as they  a re ,  a re  meant t o  be broken 
by those  who a re  strong  enough.
'T he i r  f i s s i o n s  spr ing not  from c o n f l i c t i n g  d o c t r i n e s  but  from 
r i v a l r y  between in d iv id u a l s  or  groups '  (1936: 107).
From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  claims Bateson,  t h e  naven i s  an express ion  of  
the  c r u c i a l  i n t e g r a t i v e  func t ion  of  a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in Iatmul 
s o c ie ty .
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NOTES to  Chapter S ix
( t )  Bateson here p re f ig u re s  L e v i - S t r a u s s 1s d i s t i n c t i o n  between
mechanical and s t a t i s t i c a l  models, al though f o r  L§vi-St rauss  
i t  i s  th e  mechanical and not  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  model which i s  
b u i l t  on th e  same s c a le  as th e  phenomena under s tudy 
( L i v i - S t r a u s s ,  1968).
(2) F o r ? a r t i c l e s  dea l ing  with the  c o n t ro v e r s i e s  surrounding the  
notion  of  descent  in New Guinea s o c i e t i e s ,  see p a r t i c u l a r l y  
Langness, 1964; de Lepervanche, 1967; La Fonta ine,  1973; 
Barnes,  1962.
(3) Viewed in t h i s  l i g h t ,  t h e  Iatmul would seem t o  c o n s t i t u t e  an
oppos i te  case from t h a t  of th e  Bal inese  who, with t h e i r  s t a t e d
p re fe renc e  f o r  marriage with th e  FBD, appear t o  engage in th e
minimising o f  marriage a l l i a n c e s  (M.Hobart, personal  
communication).
(4) I am indebted t o  Dr Joanna Overing f o r  her  advice and he lp fu l
sugges t ions  as to  t h i s  comparison,  and in th e  p r ep a ra t io n  of  
t h i s  c h ap te r  of  my t h e s i s  in ge n e ra l .
(5) An a l t e r n a t i v e  marriage p o s s i b i l i t y ,  between ch i ld r e n  of  wau
and of  l a u a , i s  mentioned by Bateson in a f o o tn o te  (1936: 89) .
(6) I am using  th e  term "clan" here  f o r  t h e  sake of  s i m p l i c i t y ,  in
fo l lowing  Batesonts  account  of  h i s  own diagram, bu t ,  as 
th roughout h is  t e x t ,  I am unable t o  say e x a c t ly  what he means 
by th e  term.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ETHOS
BATESON OPENS HIS next  ch a p te r ,  'Problems and Methods of  
Approach' ,  with th e  claim t h a t  by means of  (1) a s t r u c t u r a l  
a n a ly s i s  he has shown t h a t
' t h e  c u l t u r a l  s t r u c t u r e  provides  a s e t t i n g  with which 
- the~ceremonies a re  c o n s i s t e n t '
and t h a t  by means of  (2 ) a s o c io l o g ic a l  a n a l y s i s  he has shown t h a t
' t h e  ceremonies perform an impor tant  fu n c t io n  in s t r e s s i n g  
c e r t a i n  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and the re by  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of  Iatmul s o c i e t y '  (1936: 108).
So, i f  not  f o r  t h e  naven, Iatmul v i l l a g e s  would not  be so l a rg e ;
He con t inues :
‘a l l  c u l t u r a l  and s o c ia l  anthropology i s  a s tudy of  e q u i l i b r i a . 1
In such s t u d i e s  we can never be su re  t h a t  a l l  r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s  
have been accounted f o r .
' I t  i s  exceed ingly dangerous to  po in t  t o  c e r t a i n  f a c t o r s  
and t o  say t h a t  they c o n s t i t u t e  th e  whole cause of  th e  e f f e c t  
which we want to  e x p l a i n . '
Both h is  s o c io l o g i c a l  and h is  s t r u c t u r a l  approach have been 
important  bu t  we must
'go on with t h e  search f o r  o th e r  types  of  f a c t o r s  which may 
a l so  c o n t r i b u t e  t h e i r  quota t o  th e  eq u i l ib r iu m .  For i t  i s  
apparent  t h a t  many problems remain unexplained by e i t h e r  
s t r u c t u r a l  o r  so c io lo g ic a l  a n a l y s i s '  (1936: 108).
In r e s p e c t  o f  th e  naven th e s e  problems a re :
Why is  t h e  wau' s  naven behaviour so exaggerated?
Why i s  i t  comic?
Why in s t r e s s i n g  h is  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with t h e  l a u a ' s  mother does he 
dress  as a f i l t h y  old hag, in c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  th e  f a t h e r ' s  
s i s t e r  who wears t h e  bes t  male f i n e r y ?  (1936: 109).
But we a l so  need to  know why Iatmul v i l l a g e s  a re  so l a rg e .  I t  
is  not  enough t o  take  t h i s  f a c t  as a given because
'a  s t a b l e  c u l t u r e  i s  i t s e l f  a complete fu n c t i o n a l  system and 
th e r e f o r e  we cannot assume c e r t a i n  f a c t s  as f ix ed  in t h i s  way, 
but  must s t i l l  t r y  t o  r e l a t e  them back t o  th e  o th e r  f e a t u r e s  
of  t h e  c u l t u r e  u n t i l  we have a completely  c i r c u l a r  or  r e t i c u l a t e
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expos i t ion  o f  causes and e f f e c t s '  (1936: 109).
This reads  l i k e  a c l e a r  express ion  of  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  i n t e n t .  
However, Bateson then leads in to  a d i scuss ion  of  t h e  problems of 
in d iv idua l  m o t iva t ion ,  a d i scuss ion  which d r a s t i c a l l y  changes the  
p e r s p e c t iv e  of  th e  argument. Anth ropo log is ts  cannot  accept  
s o c io lo g ic a l  func t ions  of  behaviour as under ly ing  motives f o r  
in d iv idua l  behaviour .  Again, we cannot t a k e  t h e  lo g ic a l  reasons 
given by informants  as evidence of  m ot iva t ion .  But, d e s p i t e  th e  
doubtful  n a tu re  of  e i t h e r  s t r u c t u r a l  o r  s o c io l o g i c a l  phras ings  as 
s ta tements  of  motive,  t h e  da ta  so f a r  has seemed t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
the  naven a c t i v i t i e s  are somehow connected with th e  gaining of  the  
l a u a ' s  a l l e g i a n c e  by th e  wau.
This exp lana t ion ,  however, assumes t h a t  t h e  wau seeks t h e  a l l e g ­
iance of  h i s  l a u a , and t h i s  seems t o  Bateson an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
assumption to  make. Can we phrase such a d e s i r e  in terms of  the  
f u r t h e r  assumption t h a t  a l l  male human beings n a t u r a l l y  seek such 
a l l e g ia n c e ?  Or is  i t  a m a t te r  of  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  more of  Iatmul 
c u l tu r e ?  The d e s i r e  f o r  a l l e g ia n c e  may t a k e  var ious  forms in 
d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s .  Such a l l e g i a n c e  may be an express ion  of  var ious  
needs and a n x i e t i e s ,  ranging from th e  r e co g n i t io n  of  th e  importance 
of th e  kind o f  emotional w el l -be ing  which comes from having the  
lo y a l ty  of  o n e ' s  f e l lo w s ,  to  t h e  f e a r  of  i s o l a t i o n  as a r e s u l t  of  
being withou t  loyal  sup p o r te r s ,  o r  again th e  m a t te r  might be one 
of  p r id e .
'The crude assumption t h a t  a l l  men d e s i r e  th e  a l l e g i a n c e  of  
t h e i r  fe l lows  ignores a l l  th e se  var ious  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and so 
t e l l s  us v i r t u a l l y  nothing about th e  wau's  motives '  (1936:
110 - 1 1 1 ).
Bateson again l i s t s  t h e  main problems r a i s e d  by h is  da ta  so 
f a r ,  and sugges ts  t h a t  they  are  c lo se ly  r e l a t e d :  (1) Why i s  th e  
wau a buffoon? (2) Why are  t h e  v i l l a g e s  la rge?  (3) What a re  th e  
wau's  motives? Bateson sugges ts  t h a t
'All  th e sea q u es t io n s  might be answered in terms of  emotional 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  given to  th e  in d iv id u a l s  by th e  var ious  phenomena, 
buf foonery ,  la rge  v i l l a g e s  and naven'  (1936: 111).
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Bateson had e a r l i e r  d iscussed  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved in th e  
an a ly s i s  of  what he descr ibed  as t h e  " e t h o s " of  a c u l t u r e  , in t h a t  
i t  e n t a i l s  th e  pre l iminary  d i s cu s s io n  of  th e  a f f e c t i v e  func t ions  
p rev a len t  in t h a t  c u l t u r e .  He now tu r n s  t o  a development of  h is  
formula t ion  of  th e  concept of  e th o s ,  and he r e l a t e s  i t  t o  th e  
p h i lo soph ica l  t r a d i t i o n s  from which i t  had been der ived  (1936:
111- 1 1 2 ).
Bateson de r ive s  ethos from th e  German notion  of  Z e i t g e i s t , 
promulgated by such scho la r s  as D il they  and Spengler ,  v ia  Ruth 
Bened ic t ’s use of  th e  t e r m *'c o n f ig u r a t i o n "  t o  d e s c r ib e  th e  emphases 
of p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e s  (1935). Bateson d i s cu s s e s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between t h e  synchronic and th e  d iachron ic  study of  c u l t u r e  and 
s o c i e t y .  Func tional  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s ,  says Bateson,  have r e j e c t e d  
the  use of  d iach ron ic  study because of  i t s  i n s i s t e n c e  on th e  search
f o r  o r ig i n s  which, i f  appl ied  t o  p r im i t i v e  s o c i e t i e s ,  can only lead
t o  s p e c u l a t i v e e n a r r a t i v e s .  But t h i s  i s ,  in f a c t ,  a mis- read ing  of  the  
t r u e  n a tu re  of  h i s t o r y .  He w r i t e s :
'H i s to ry ,  in so f a r  as i t  i s  a s c ienc e ,  i s  concerned not  with 
n a r r a t i v e s  and o r ig in s  but  with g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  from n a r r a t i v e ,  
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  based upon t h e  comparat ive study of  t h e  processes  
of  c u l t u r a l  and s o c ia l  changed (1936: 111, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
Many of  t h e  f u n c t io n a l  concepts  employed by a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  in 
synchronic s t u d i e s  have been used by h i s t o r i a n s  in t h e i r  d iach ron ic  
ana ly se s .  H i s to r i a n s  have, however, formula ted  one concept  which 
has only r e c e n t l y  (Bateson i s  w r i t i n g  in t h e  mid-1930s) been adopted 
by a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s .
'Th is  i s  t h e  concept  of  Z e i t g e i s t , t h e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  t im es ,  a
concept  which owes i t s  o r ig i n s  t o  th e  D i l they-Speng le r  school
of p h i lo so p h ic a l  h i s t o r y . '  Thessuggest ion of  t h i s  school is  
t h a t  t h e  occurrence of  c u l t u r a l  changes i s  in p a r t  c o n t ro l l e d  
by some a b s t r a c t  p roper ty  of  th e  c u l t u r e ,  which may vary from 
per iod  t o  per iod so t h a t  a t  one t ime a:.-given change i s  
ap p ro p r ia t e  and occurs e a s i l y  "though a hundred yea rs  e a r l i e r  
th e  same innovation may have been r e j e c t e d  by th e  c u l t u r e  
because i t  was in some way i n a p p r o p r i a t e ’ (1936: 112).
B e n e d ic t ' s  use of  t h i s  concept ,  in terms of  her  use of
’' c o n f i g u r a t i o n " ,  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by her  claim t h a t  t h e  r e f u s a l  of  th e  
Zuni Indians  o f  New Mexico to  use ha l luc inogen ic  drugs o r  alcohol
was an express ion  of  th e  seda te  “ Apollonian!’ c o n f ig u ra t io n  of  t h e i r
c u l t u r e ,  while t h e i r  neighbours,  cond i t ioned  by an e c s t a t i c
134
' ‘D ionys ian11 co n f ig u ra t io n ,  used both th e se  kinds of  s t im u lan t s  
with enthusiasm (1935).
Such n o t i o n s '  as Z e i t g e i s t  and c o n f ig u ra t io n  have,  Bateson 
con t inues ,  been a t tacked  on t h e  grounds t h a t  they have mysti ca l  
c o n no ta t ions ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  defence through t h e  use o f  concre te  
examples by t h e i r  adheren ts .  For Bateson t h e  e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c  of  such concepts  i s  t h a t  they  are  based upon
‘an h o l i s t i c  r a t h e r  than upon a crudely  a n a l y t i c  s tudy of  th e  
c u l t u r e .  The t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  when a c u l t u r e  i s  cons idered as a 
whole c e r t a i n  emphases emerge b u i l t  up from th e  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  
of  t h e  d iv e rs e  t r a i t s  of  which th e  c u l t u r e  i s  composed1 (1936: 
113). (1)
These emphases a re  composed o f  e i t h e r  systems of  thought  or  s c a le s  
of va lues .  But t h e  words " th ough t"  and " v a l u e "  come from th e  realm 
of ind iv id u a l  psychology; can we say t h a t  a c u l t u r e  possesses  a 
s y ten ro f  thought or  a s c a le  of  values? The no tion  of  a ‘group mind1 
i s  d ismissed;  we must regard  a l l  t h e  t h in k in g  and f e e l i n g  in a 
c u l t u r e  as being connected with th e  ind iv idua l  members of  t h a t  
c u l t u r e .  What we mean here i s  t h a t  th e  c u l t u r e  a f f e c t s  t h e  psychology 
of  i t s  in d iv id u a l  members, so t h a t  a range of  th in k in g  and f e e l i n g  
i s  c r e a te d  w i th in  which th e se  ind iv idua l  members a re  co n s t r a in e d .
(I sugges t  t h a t  here me can see Bateson s h i f t i n g  th e  b a s e l in e  of  
h i s  argument from th e  “ Biosphere11 t o  " C u l t u r e ' 1 - from Level One 
t o  Level Two, Diagram 2 page 77 above.)  A c u l t u r e  could do t h i s  
through e i t h e r  educa t ion ,  o r  s e l e c t i o n .  Education works by inducing 
and promoting c e r t a i n  psychological  p rocesses  in a l l  i n d i v id u a l s ,  
while s e l e c t i o n  would promote those  in d iv id u a l s  with inna te  
psychologica l  processes  favoured by t h e  c u l t u r e .  We must suppose 
t h a t  both educa tion  and s e l e c t i o n  are  impor tant  in t h i s  way in 
every c u l t u r e  t o  some e x t e n t ,  but  we cannot e s t im a te  a t  p re sen t  th e  
r e l a t i v e  importance of  each w ith in  any one c u l t u r e .  Bateson fol lows 
Benedict  by subsuming both educa tiona l . ’.and s e l e c t i v e  processes  
under th e  heading of  the  " s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n "  of  ind iv idua l  psychology 
by c u l t u r e .  Bateson w r i t e s :
'This  indeed i s  probably one of  t h e  fundamental axioms o f  th e  
h o l i s t i c  approach in a l l  s c ien c es :  t h a t  t h e  o b je c t  s tu d ie d  - 
be i t  an animal,  a p la n t  o r  a community -  i s  composed of  u n i t s
whose p r o p e r t i e s  a re  in some way s t anda rd i se d  by t h e i r  p o s i t i o n
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in t h e  whole o r g a n i s a t i o n 1 (1936: 113-114, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
S t a n d a rd i s a t io n  w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  s c a le  of  values  of  th e  members 
of  th e  c u l t u r e ,  such t h a t  t h e i r  i n s t i n c t s  and emotions w i l l  be 
programmed t o  respond in c e r t a i n  ways t o  th e  var ious  important  
s t im u l i  of  l i f e .  For example, in one c u l t u r e  p r id e  may be assoc­
ia ted  with t h e  possess ion of  p ro p e r ty ,  while in ano ther  i t  may be 
a s so c ia ted  with pover ty ,  while in a t h i r d  i t  may even be g r a t i f i e d  
by pub l ic  r i d i c u l e .  But the  ques t ion  of  how a c u l t u r e  a f f e c t s  th e  
systems of  thought of  in d iv idua l s  i s  not  so c l e a r .
'That  t h e  ci rcumstances o f  a man's l i f e  w i l l  a f f e c t  th e  con ten t  
of  h i s  thought i s  p la in  enough, but  t h e  whole ques t ion  o f  what 
we mean by a system of thought  remains t o  be e l u c i d a t e d 1 
(1936: 114, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
Bateson says t h a t  he w i l l  leave t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  ques t ion  t o  a 
l a t e r  c h a p t e r ,  i«e«to  th e  chap te r  on eidos  which occurs a t  th e  end 
of the  book and t h e  con ten t  of  which shows t h a t  he cons idered h is  
t r ea tm en t  of  Iatmul eidos  t o  be cons ide rab ly  l e s s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  than 
h is  t r e a tm e n t  of  e th o s .  He now asks i f  any l i g h t  can be shed on the  
d i scuss ion  by a c o n s id e ra t io n  of  psychologica l  t h e o r i e s  of  s o c ia l  
phenomena, of  th e  kind which claim t h a t  a l l  human be ings ,  of  a l l  
races  arid c u l t u r e s ,  have c e r t a i n  f ixed  p a t t e r n s  of  emotional  r e a c t i o n s ,  
With regard  t o  t h e  naven, such crude psychologica l  determinism might 
claim t h a t  a l l  men n a t u r a l l y  have c e r t a i n  a t t i t u d e s  towards women, 
and t h a t  t h i s  would lead any t r a n s v e s t i t e ? b e h a v i o u r  by men t o  take  
the  form of  buffoonery  and c a r i c a t u r e  whereas women's behaviour in 
such ci rcumstances  might " n a t u r a l l y "  lead t o  an oppos i te  exaggerated 
p r id e .  The argument t h a t  Bateson advances a g a i n s t  such crude 
psychologica l  determinism i s  i n t e r e s t i n g :
'When s t a t e d  in t h i s  way th e  t h e o r i e s  have a s l i g h t l y  r id icuous  
appearance,  bu t  i t  i s  worth while t o  cons ide r  th e  p o s i t i o n  in 
which we should f ind  ourse lves  i f  we indulged t h e  f a c i l e  bu i ld ing  
of  t h e s e  t h e o r i e s  t o  an un limited  e x t e n t .  We should f in d  t h a t  
we had a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  human race  a l a rg e  number of  c o n f l i c t ­
ing te ndenc ie s  and t h a t  we had invoked c e r t a i n  tendenc ie s  in 
th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  one c u l t u r e  and o th e r ,  perhaps oppos i te ,  
te ndenc ie s  in th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  another* (1936: 115).
I would sugges t  t h a t  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  of  crude psychologica l  d e t e r ­
minism i s  e q u a l ly  ap p l i c a b l e  to  the  kind o f  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  determinism 
with which Bateson was s t ru g g l in g  and from which he was a t tempt ing  to
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escape,  and t h a t  th e  above quote i s  a p a r a l l e l  c r i t i c i s m  t o  h is  
c r i t i q u e  of  func t iona l i sm  in an thropology.  What i s  needed, he 
s t a t e s ,  i s  some c r i t e r i o n  whereby th e  choice of  a p a r t i c u l a r  
psychologica l  emphasis or  p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  th e  use of  th e  i n t e r p r e t ­
a t ion  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e  may be j u s t i f i e d .  Such a c r i t e r i o n ,  
he argues ,  i s  provided by th e  notion of  th e  s ta n d a rd i s in g  processes 
of c u l t u r e .  The psychological  t h e o r i e s ,  from t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  
must be re -ph rased  thus :
'A human being is  born in to  t h e  world with p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  and 
te ndenc ie s  which may be developed in very var ious  d i r e c t i o n s ,  
and i t  may well be t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  in d iv id u a l s  have d i f f e r e n t  
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .  The c u l t u r e  in to  which an ind iv idua l  i s  born 
s t r e s s e s  c e r t a i n  of  h is  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  and suppresses  o th e r s ,  
and i t  a c t s  s e l e c t i v e l y ,  favour ing th e  in d iv id u a l s  who are 
b e s t  endowed with the  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  p r e f e r r e d  in th e  c u l t u r e  
and d i s c r im in a t in g  ag a in s t  those  with a l i e n  te n d e n c ie s .  In t h i s  
way t h e  c u l t u r e  s tan d a rd i se s  th e  o rg a n i s a t io n  of  the  emotions 
of  i n d i v i d u a l s '  (1936: 115).
I sugges t  t h a t  here Bateson has moved away r a d i c a l l y  from the  f u n c t io n ­
a l i s t  model o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  ind iv idua l ,  and s o c ie ty .
The in f luence  of  the  concepts  of  c u l t u r a l  emphasis and s t a n d a r d i s ­
a t ion  has led t o  a new formula t ion  which, i t  could be argued,  p r e ­
date l a t e r  r e l e v a n t  models such as Wal lace ' s  "mazeway" (1961). 
and Bourdieu 's  "habitus"  (1977).  The e l a b o ra t i o n  of  e thos ,  and i t s  
use in th e  a n a l y s i s  of  the  naven, i s  Ba teson 's  major t r a n s i t i o n  in 
the  book.
Equipped with th e  not ion of  a s t anda rd i se d  e thos ,  says Bateson,  
we are  now ab le  to  invoke th e  sentiments  of  in d iv id u a l s  in o rder to  
analyse  th e  c u l t u r e ,  as long as we ensure t h a t  th e se  sent iments  are 
a c t u a l l y  f o s t e r e d  by the  c u l t u r e . F o r  example, we would only be 
j u s t i f i e d  in regard ing  a s t r e s s  on g regar iousness  as being important  
in Iatmul c u l t u r e  i f  we could show t h a t  th e  q u a l i t y  of  g r e g a r io u s ­
ness i s  in f a c t  a s tandard ised  component of  th e  Iatmul e th o s .  This 
is  not t h e  case ,  but  Iatmul c u l t u r e  does con ta in  a comparable 
component, namely a s t r e s s  on p r id e .  Bateson says he w i l l  show l a t e r  
- p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the  fol lowing chap te r  which d esc r ibe s  th e  ethos 
of  Iatmul men - t h a t  p r ide  i s  a c r u c i a l  f a c t o r  in t h e  o rg an is a t io n  
of  the  l a rg e  Iatmul ceremonial houses,  in th e  ceremonials  and 
dances,  in th e  performative  na tu re  of s o c ia l  l i f e  g e n e ra l ly  and, in 
th e  pas t  a t  l e a s t ,  in the  a c t i v i t i e s  a s s o c ia ted  with head-hunting.
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'Thus th e  la rge  s i z e  of  the  v i l l a g e s  serves  an important  
f u n c t io n  in g r a t i f y i n g  p r ide  - an a t t r i b u t e  o f  human na tu re  
which i s  much s t r e s s e d  in Iatmul c u l t u r e  and to  which t h e r e f o r e  
we a re  j u s t i f i e d  in r e f e r r i n g 1 (1936: 116).
Bateson notes  t h a t  the  methodology o u t l in e d  above i s  c i r c u l a r ;  
a sentiment which i s  emphasised by th e  c u l t u r e  i s  a t  f i r s t  i d e n t i f i e d  
and then r e f e r r e d  back to  as a f a c t o r  which has shaped th e  c u l t u r e .  
This c i r c u l a r i t y ,  he argues ,  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  because i t  i s  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c  of  a l l  s c i e n t i f i c  methods. Any s c i e n t i f i c  a n a ly s i s  involves  
th e  obse rva t ion  of  a number of  comparable phenomena before any 
t h e o r e t i c a l  s ta tement can be made about any one of  t h e  phenomena.
But, f u r t h e r ,  t h e  c i r c u l a r i t y  here i s  a l so  due t o  th e  na tu re  of  the  
phenomena under co n s id e r a t io n .
But here Bateson shows h imse lf  t o  be s t i l l  very much under th e  
sway of  fun c t io n a l i sm .  I f  we study je a lo u s y  and th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
which r e g u l a t e  sexual  l i f e  in a s o c i e t y ,  we can conclude b o t h . t h a t  
the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  s t r e s s  j e a lo u s y  and t h a t  j e a lo u s y  has c on t r ibu ted  
to  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  He then says t h a t  c i r c u l a r i t y  i s  a un ive rsa l  
proper ty  o f  fu n c t io n a l  systems.  Running through t h i s  argument i s  
th e  uns ta ted  assumption,  of  course ,  t h a t  s o c i a l  phenomena are  
fu n c t io n a l  in na tu re  and can be adequately analysed in f u n c t i o n a l i s t  
te rms.  The magneto of  a motor c a r  produces e l e c t r i c i t y  because-the  
engine i s  running,  but  the  engine runs because o f  th e  e l e c t r i c i t y  
produced by th e  magneto. (The mechanical metaphor Bateson uses here 
is  t y p i c a l  of  those  used in f u n c t i o n a l i s t  arguments. )  Thus:
'Each element in the  fu n c t io n a l  system c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  th e  
a c t i v i t y  of  the  o the rs  and each i s  dependent  upon the  a c t i v i t y  
of  t h e  o t h e r s '  (1936: 117).
He then says t h a t ,  i f  a d e s c r ip t i o n  of  a f u n c t io n a l  system 
remains o u t s id e  th e  system, th e  c i r c u l a r  na tu re  o f  such systems can 
be ignored,  f o r
'a s  long as we take  an e x t e rn a l  - b e h a v i o u r i s t i c  - view of a 
fu n c t i o n a l  system we can avoid s ta tements  of  c i r c u l a r i t y '
(1936: 117).
From th e  e x t e r n a l  viewpoint a motor c a r  can be seen as a th in g  in to  
which p e t r o l  i s  poured and which runs along th e  road producing 
smoke and k i l l i n g  people.  But once we ge t  i n s id e  t h e  system and begin
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t o  acknowledge i t s  i n t e r n a l  coherence 'we are fo rced  t o  accept  the  
fundamental c i r c u l a r i t y  of  th e  phenomena' (1936: 117).
Bateson even produces a quote from Malinowski here  in o rder  t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  h i s  p o s i t i o n .
But then comes another argument in favour  of  th e  c i r c u l a r i t y  of  
soc ia l  phenomena o r ,  in Bateson 's  words, of  ' f u n c t i o n a l  sy s tem s ' ,  
namely t h a t ,
'any o th e r  view would d r ive  us to  b e l i e f  e i t h e r  in a " f i r s t  
cause" or  in some s o r t  o f  t e l e o lo g y  -  in f a c t  we should have 
to  accep t  some fundamental dualism in na tu re  which i s  p h i l o s ­
o p h ic a l ly  inadmissab le '  (1936: 117)
This argument i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  not  only in terms of  Ba teson 's  an a ly s i s  
of  Iatmul s o c i e t y ,  but  a l so  from th e  p e r s p e c t iv e  of h i s  l a t e r  work.
He con t inues :
'Thus,  s in ce  t h e  phenomena which we a re  s tudying a re  themselves 
in te rdependen t  i t  i s  c e r t a i n  t h a t  our d e s c r ip t i o n s  must con ta in  
in te rdependen t  s ta tem en ts ;  and s ince  t h i s  i s  so th e  d e s c r ip t io n  
must f o r  ever  be regarded as "not proven” un less  we can dev ise  
some method of  t ranscending  th e  l i m i t s  of  th e  c i r c l e s '  (1936: 
117).
I would add a comment here ,  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  an important  im plic­
a t ion  of  t h i s  s tatemen t i s  t h a t  any o b je c t  of  s tudy  w i l l  tend to  
reproduce th e  model of  t h a t  ob je c t  which e x i s t s  in t h e  o b s e r v e r ' s  
mind. I t  a l s o  s t r e s s e s  a lo g ica l  r e d e f i n i t i o n  of  r e a l i t y ,  and a 
strong  tendency towards lo g ica l  p o s i t i v i s m .  A foo tno te  to  th e  
page of  B a teson 's  t e x t  under c o n s id e ra t io n  r e f e r s  t o  Whitehead's  
The Concept of  Nature (Bateson 1936: 117), and Whitehead was th e  
co-au thor  with Bert rand  Russel l  o f  P r in c i p i a  Mathematica. The 
above quote i s  an important  comment on t h e  e x p lo ra t io n  of  epistemology 
which marks Ba teson 's  l i f e ' s  work. We see here an e a r l y  re fe ren c e  
t o  t h e  notion  of  " typologies  of  lo g i c " ,  o r  " l e v e l s  of  mind", which was 
t o  become so important  f o r  Bateson,  in h is  use o f  R u s s e l l ' s  th eo ry  
of  lo g ica l  types  which was developed in th e  P r in c i p i a  Mathematica.
This theo ry  was t o  f e a t u r e  in th e  Second Epilogue t o  t h e  1958 
e d i t i o n  of  Naven. But f o r  the  moment Bateson only mentions th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a h ie ra rchy  of  lo g i c a l  types  in o rde r  t o  complete h is
pla tform f o r  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  from a f u n c t i o n a l i s t  model to  ethos  in 
h i s  handling  o f  th e  Iatmul m a te r i a l .
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Statements about the  func t ions  of  i n s t i t u t i o n s , h e c la ims ,  w i l l  
only be v e r i f i a b l e  when a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  a re  ab le t o  e x t r a c t  compar­
able a spec t s  of  d i f f e r e n t  s o c ia l  systems and t o  show t h a t  a given 
element has t h e  same func t ion  in d i f f e r e n t  systems.  As long as they 
conf ine themselves  t o  the  d e s c r ip t io n  of  a s i n g l e  s o c i e t y ,  s t a t e ­
ments about  func t ion  are  bound to  be c i r c u l a r  and w i l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
remain unproven.  But, he con t inues ,  s ince  t h e  same i n s t i t u t i o n ,  
e . g .  m arr iage ,  can be shown t o  f u l f i l  d i f f e r e n t  f unc t ions  in diff- .  
e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s ,  th e  f i n a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  t h e o r i e s  
i s  impossible!  Here Bateson a t t a c k s  a c e n t r a l  claim of f u n c t i o n ­
a l i s t  and comparat ive anthropology.
'we f in d  t h a t  th e  r e l a t i v e  importance of  t h e s e  fu nc t ions  
in d i f f e r e n t  c u l tu r e s  v a r i e s  so widely t h a t  i t  i s  almost 
imposs ib le  t o  v e r i f y  by comparat ive methods t h e  t r u t h  of  any 
s ta tem en t  which we may make about marriage in any one c u l t u r e 1 
(1936: 118).
The approach which s t r e s s e s  e thos ,  however, subdiv ides  c u l t u r e  
in a d i f f e r e n t  way from func t iona l i sm .
' I t s  t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  we may a b s t r a c t  from c u l t u r e  a c e r t a i n  
sy s tem a t ic  a s p e c t s c a l l e d  ethos  which we mav d e f in e  as the  
express ion  of  a c u l t u r a l l y  s tanda rd i se d  srcem of o rg a n i s a t io n  
of  t h e  i n s t i n c t s  and emotions of  th e  i n d i v i d u a l s 1 (1936:
118, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis).
As t h e  e thos  o f  any one c u l t u r e  i s  an ' a b s t r a c t i o n  from th e
whole mass of  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and fo rm u la t io n s '  (1936: 118),
then we might expec t  t h a t  e thoses  w i l l  vary widely from c u l t u r e
to  c u l t u r e ,  in th e  way t h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  vary in d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s .
But i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  con ten t  of  a f f e c t i v e  l i f e  which
v a r i e s ,  while t h e  ethoses  from which they a re  der ived  a re  perhaps
c l a s s i f i a b l e  in t o  ty p e s .  ' I t  seems l i k e l y . . . t h a t  we may u l t im a te ly
be ab le  t o  c l a s s i f y  the  types  o f  e th o s '  (1936: 118). I t  seems
as i f  Bateson i s  unwil l ing  t o  leave f u n c t i o n a l i s t  i d e a l s  of
typology behind,  even a t  t h i s  s tage  of  t h e  fo rmula t ion  of  h is
own methodology,  which depar t s  so r a d i c a l l y  from t h e  s t r u c t u r a l -
f u n c t i o n a l i s t  model of  s o c i e t y .  Indeed,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  argue
t h a t  th e  th e o ry  o f  log ica l  types  w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  Ba teson 's  own 
form of f u n c t i o n a l i s t  exp lana t ion ,  both in th e  development of  h is
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ana lys i s  in Naven and in h is  l a t e r  work.
The f i n a l  s ec t io n  of  Bateson 's  Chapter VIII at tempts  to  e l u c i ­
da te  and i l l u s t r a t e  th e  concept  of  ethos  by drawing on examples 
from our own s o c i e t y  o r ,  more p r e c i s e l y ,  from t h a t  s e c t o r  of  
English middle c l a s s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  s o c ie ty  with which Bateson him­
s e l f  was f a m i l i a r .  F i r s t ,  Bateson asks us to  cons ide r  a group of  
young i n t e l l e c t u a l  English men and women t a l k i n g  and jok ing 
to g e th e r  ' w i t t i l y  and with a touch of  l i g h t  cyn ic i sm 1 (1936:
119). For a t im e ,  a ' d e f i n i t e  tone  of  a p p ro p r ia te  behav iou r1 
wi l l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  among them, and t h i s  i s  i n d i c a t i v e  of  th e  
e s tab l i shm en t  of  an e thos ,  or  a s t anda rd i se d  system of  a t t i t u d e s .
In t h i s  example, t h e  group w i l l  tend to  joke about any s u b je c t  of  
conversa t ion  which might a r i s e ,  and t h i s  w i l l  apply t o  s u b jec t s  which, 
a t  o th e r  t imes  and in o the r  co n te x t s ,  they  might t r e a t  more 
s e r i o u s l y .  I f  a member of  t h e  group should say something in a more 
se r ious  v e in ,  t h e  r e s u l t  w i l l  be a temporary embarrassment or  
h ia tu s  in t h e  proceedings .  On another  occas ion ,  i f  t h e  same group of  
in d iv id u a l s  adopts a more se r ious  ethos then th e  in t r u s i o n  of  a 
f l i p p a n t  o r  j o c u l a r  remark may be considered s i m i l a r l y  embarrassing 
and i n a p p ro p r i a t e .  This i s  an example of  ' l a b i l e  and temporary 
e thos '  on a small s c a l e ,  but  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  n e v e r th e le s s  a t  
work. I f ,  on e i t h e r  occasion in the  above examples,  th e  b lundere r  
had been s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  in t h e  group he might have been 
ab le t o  change t h e  ethos  from t h e  j o c u l a r  t o  t h e  s e r io u s ,  or  v ice  
v e r s a .
When we tu rn  t o  some more permanent,  complex'group of  in d i v id u a l s ,  
we f in d  t h a t  t h e  ethos i s  much more s t a b l e  in t h a t  ' i n  any formed 
group we f in d  c e r t a i n  types  of  remark, c e r t a i n  tones  of  conversa t ion  
permanently t aboo '  (1936: 120). Here, Bateson i s  focus ing on 
s i l e n c e s ,  on what cannot  be s a id  between people ,  in a way which 
Radcliffe-Brown and h is  contemporaries could no t  do. This marks 
an important  move away from p o s i t i v i s m .
Change, however, s t i l l  occurs in th e s e  more permanent , but
such change w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  be more gradual  and w i l l  t a k e  p lace  over
cons ide rab le  per iods  of  t ime.
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Bateson examines th e  ethos of  h i s  own Cambridge c o l l e g e ,  and 
in so doing he looks a t  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between e thos  and t r a d ­
i t i o n .
'The dons of  St John 's  College drink  w ate r ,  bee r ,  c l a r e t ,  
she r ry  and p o r t  - but  not  c o c k t a i l s ;  and in t h e i r  choice they  
are  guided both by t r a d i t i o n  and by t h e  e thos  of  th e  group.  
These two f a c t o r s  work to g e th e r  and we may say t h a t  th e  dons 
d r ink  as they  do both because gene ra t ions  of  dons have drunk 
on th e  same sound system in th e  pas t  and because a c t u a l l y  in 
th e  p r e s e n t  t h a t  system seems t o  them ap p ro p r ia t e  t o  the  
e thos  of  t h e i r s  s o c i e t y '  (1936: 121).
All t h e  o th e r  c u l t u r a l  d e t a i l s  of  th e  system, such as t h e  Latin 
Grace, t h e  a r c h i t e c t u r e  of  t h e  College and so on, combine to  form 
a complex s e r i e s  of channels  which ' express  and guide th e  e t h o s ' .  
These d e t a i l s  were s e le c te d  by t h e  ethos in the  p a s t ,  and they are  
s t i l l  p reserved  by i t .  Again, Bateson p o in t s  out  th e  c i r c u l a r i t y  
of  the  system:
' t h e  very a t t i t u d e  which t h e  dons adopt  towards th e  p as t  has 
been h i s t o r i c a l l y  formed and i s  an express ion  of  t h e i r  p resen t  
e th o s '  (1936: 121).
A f o o tn o te  here  showsf tha t  Bateson i s  aware of  t h e  danger of 
h y p o s ta t i s in g  such concepts  as t h a t  o f  e th o s ;  he r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
' f a l l a c y  of  misplaced co ncre teness '  which he borrows from White­
head and which he~was t o  develop f u r t h e r  and use in h is  l a t e r  
work. (2)
‘Such metaphors a re  of  course,  dangerous.  The ir  use encourages 
us t o  th in k  of  ethos  and s t r u c t u r e  as d i f f e r e n t  " th ings"  
in s tead  of  r e a l i s i n g  as we should t h a t  they  a re  only d i f f e r e n t  
aspec ts  of  the  same behaviour '  (1936: 121, a u t h o r ' s  
em phas i s ) .
I t u r n  now t o  Bateson 's  d e s c r ip t i o n  of  male and female ethos  
in Ia tm u l^ so c ie ty .  Chapters IX and X of  Naven can be cons idered 
to g e th e r ;  they  conta in  Bateson 's  account of  t h e  e thoses  o f ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  Iatmul men and Iatmul women. Chapter  IX begins 
with an important  cla im,  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  only so c ia l  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in Iatmul s o c ie ty  i s  t h a t  which ob ta in s  between 
th e  sexes ,  s in c e  Iatmul c u l t u r e  ' r e co g n i se s  no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
of  rank or  c l a s s '  (1936: 123). The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between th e  
sexes must be considered ' s i n c e  thecproblems which we a re  studying 
are connected with t r a n s v e s t i s m 1 (1936: 123). Bateson would seem
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t o  be implying here t h a t  al though d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between the  
sexes i s  t h e  only d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  ob ta in ing  in Iatmul s o c i e t y ,  
t h i s  i s  no t  one of  rank or  c l a s s .  I would sugges t  t h a t  Bateson i s  
making two unwarranted assumptions he re .  Both of  th e s e  assumptions 
r e s t  on h i s  use of  a r i g i d ,  " s c i e n t i f i c " ,  view of  th e  notion of  
" c l a s s ' 1.
The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  he views gender d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  among the  
Iatmul as?an unproblematic given;  t h i s  i s  not  borne out  by h is  
d a ta ,  as we s h a l l  see .  The apparent  in c o n s i s t e n c i e s  w ith in  and 
between male and female ethos a re  noted by Bateson, but  he does 
not  fo l low through th e  po s s ib le  im pl ica t ions  of  th e s e  i n c o n s i s t e n ­
c i e s .  In t h e  same way, he had noted th e  in c o n s i s t e n c i e s  between 
s t a t e d  marriage p re fe rences ,  but  had not  in v e s t ig a t e d  t h e  im plic ­
a t ions  o f  t h e s e  (see Chapter  Six above).  The l a t t e r  m isrecognit ion  
stems from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Bateson 's  own ethos  as an a n th ro p o lo g i s t ,  
t r a i n e d  in t h e  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  school of  h is  day, m i l i t a t e d  ag a in s t  
a f u l l  r e c o g n i t io n  of  the  im p l ica t ions  of  such s t r u c t u r a l  i n c o n s i s t ­
en c ie s .  I would argue t h a t  h is  f a i l u r e  t o  deal  adequate ly  with 
Iatmul gender d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  can be viewed as stemming from th e  
same source .  Ba teson 's  enthusiasm f o r  reduc t ion  leads  him to  
p o s i t  a s i m p l i s t i c  p a t t e r n  of  dual gender s t e r e o ty p y .  His second 
assumption i s  t h a t  any s o c ia l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  among th e  Iatmul 
would n e c e s s a r i l y  be implicated  in notions  of  ' r ank  o r  c l a s s ' ,  
r a t h e r  than in some o th e r  realm, e . g .  w i th in  t h a t  of  gender d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t i o n  i t s e l f .  Thus, by excluding c l a s s -b a s e d  power a l t o g e t h e r  
from Iatmul s o c i e t y ,  Bateson prec ludes  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  any 
co n s id e ra t io n  o f  Iatmul not ions  of  gender as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a source 
of  power r e l a t i o n s .  There would be g r e a t  scope f o r  a d e s c r ip t i o n  
of  what Bourdieu r e f e r s  t o  as 'symbolic c a p i t a l '  (1977: 171-183) 
in th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Iatmul men and Iatmul women. Again, 
we must conclude t h a t  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c l im a te  in which Bateson 
was w r i t i n g  prevented such a c o n s id e ra t i o n .
Bateson summarises the  d i f f e r e n c e  in e thos  between Iatmul men 
and women th u s :
'Broadly ,  we may say t h a t  t h e  men a re  occupied with the  sp e c ta c ­
u l a r ,  d ramatic ,  and v io l e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  which have t h e i r  c e n t r e
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in th e  ceremonial  house, while t h e  women are  occupied with th e  
usefu l  and necessary r o u t in e s  of  fo o d - g e t t i n g ,  cooking,  and 
r e a r in g  c h i ld ren  - a c t i v i t i e s  which c e n t r e  around the  dwell ing 
house and th e  gardens '  (1936: 123)•
By means of  a number of s t ro n g ly  e v a lu a t iv e  a d j e c t i v e s  - ' s p e c t a c ­
u l a r ' ,  ' d r a m a t i c '  and ' v i o l e n t '  f o r  th e  men, and ' u s e f u l '  and 
'n e c e s s a ry '  f o r  th e  women - Bateson p a in t s  a p i c t u r e  of  the  
c o n t r a s t  between th e  world of  th e  men, symbolised by th e  ceremonial 
house, and th e  world of t h e  women, symbolised by th e  dwell ing 
house and garden.  This c o n t r a s t  i s  seen as fundamental .
For t h e  men, t h e  ceremonial house i s  t h e  domain of  masculine 
p r ide  and d i s p l a y .  Within i t s  w a ll s  a v a r i e t y  of  a c t i v i t i e s  t ake  
p lace ,  from r i t u a l  and debate  t o  gossipp ing and brawling.  Bateson 
w r i te s  t h a t  t h e  ceremonial house can be compared t o  some e x t e n t  
with a church ,  but  t h i s  comparison i s  not  e n t i r e l y  sound.
'Where we th in k  of  a church as sacred  and coo l ,  they  th in k  of  
a ceremonial  house as "hot" ,  imbued with hea t  by th e  v io lence  
and k i l l i n g  which were necessary  f o r  i t s  b u i ld ing  and 
c o n s e c ra t io n '  (1936: 124).
(Head hunting had only r e c e n t ly  been suppressed a t  t h e  t ime of  
Bateson 's  f i e ld w o rk . )  The behaviour of  men in the .ce rem onia l  house 
i s  marked by p r id e ,  boas t ing  and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  This emphasis 
on what I would g loss  as "showmanship" on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  men veers 
between harsh swaggering a t  one end of  th e  spectrum, and clowning 
and buffoonery on the  o th e r .  Reactions as well as behaviour are
' t h e a t r i c a l  and s u p e r f i c i a l .  E i th e r  p r ide  or  clowning i s  accepted 
as r e s p e c t a b l e  and normal behaviour '  (1936: 124).
Again, t h e  r ead e r  should note Ba teson 's  use of  a d j e c t i v e s  here .
Iatmul men gain s t a t u s  in a v a r i e t y  of  ways, by f i g h t i n g ,  and 
by ga in ing a r e p u ta t io n  f o r  so rcery  and e s o t e r i c  knowledge, but  a 
genera l  p lay ing  up to  the  pub l ic  eye i s  a l so  impor tan t .  Bateson 
uses th e  word 'conspicuous '  t o  sum up t h i s  c r u c i a l  element in t h e  
behaviour of  Iatmul males (1936: 124). In t h e  sm a l le r ,  j u n i o r  
ceremonial  house t h e  boys can p r a c t i s e  t h e i r  boas t ing  and o th e r  
conspicuous behaviour in p re p a ra t io n  f o r  manhood. Bateson d es c r ib e s  
th e  ethos  o f  th e  ceremonial  house as t h a t  of  a c lub ,  but
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' n o t  a club in which th e  members a re  a t  t h e i r  ease ,  bu t  a 
club in which, though sepa ra ted  from t h e i r  womenfolk, they 
a re  ac u t e ly  conscious of  being in p u b l i c '  (1936: 125).
Even when t h e r e  i s  no s p e c i f i c  fo rm a l i ty  t a k in g  p la c e ,  th e  s e l f -  
consciousness  of  th e  men i s  apparen t ,  but  debates  and r i t u a l  
performances provide th e  con tex ts  f o r  t h e  f u l l  d i s p la y  of  t h e  male 
e thos .
Iatmul men engage in cons tan t  deba t ing .  These debates  are 
organ ised  fo rmal ly  around th e  spec ia l  s too l  which has p r ide  of  
p lace  in every  ceremonial house.  The atmosphere of  th e  deba tes 
i s  loud and angry; each speaker works h im se lf  up t o  a high p i t ch  
of  exc i tement,  and the  speeches a re  laced with harsh g es tu re s  
and mocking buffoonery .  E rud i t ion  in Iatmul e s o t e r i c a  combines 
with v io lence  and clowning.  Men who a re  well versed in th e  h ighly  
valued s p e c i a l i s t  knowledge o f  th e  complex system of p o ly s y l l a b ic  
to temic  names employ t h e i r  e r u d i t i o n  t o  g r e a t  advantage.  Other 
speakers w i l l  at tempt t o  make t h e i r  case  using  tone  and ges tu re  
r a t h e r  than  e s o t e r i c  con ten t .  They may t a u n t  t h e  oppos i t ion  with 
scorn and mockery, th r e a te n in g  a c t s  of  rape and accompanying such 
t h r e a t s  with an obscene dance.  At t h i s ,  members of  t h e  oppos i t ion  
pa r ty  w i l l  r e a c t  with i r o n i c  encouragement. Other speakers  may 
a t tempt  th e  e r u d i t e  s t y l e  without  success ,  t o  t h e  mocking d e l i g h t  
of  t h e i r  audience .  -During th e  debate  both s id es  become g radua l ly  
more e x c i t e d ,  more enraged and ag g re s s iv e .  Sporadic bouts  of  
h o s t i l e  g e s tu r in g  and dance ev e n tu a l ly  r e s u l t  in brawling and 
v io lence .  This w i l l  occur p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  one speaker  g ives  away 
some e s o t e r i c : s e c r e t  belonging to  t h e  o th e r  s ide  (1936: 125-126).  
Bateson does not  provide any d e t a i l e d  account of  ac tua l  in s tances  
here which, aga in ,  makes h is  use of  th e  terms "vio lence"  and 
"clowning" p rob lem atic .  We do not  know p r e c i s e l y  what he means 
by " v i o l e n c e "  here .
The p r id e  d isp layed  in th e  debates  i s  connected with th e  
e s o t e r i c a  p e r t a in in g  t o  the  to temic  ances to rs  o f  each c lan ;  indeed,  
most of  t h e  deba tes a re  couched in terms of  arguments about the  
d e t a i l s  of  t h e  to temic  system. Bateson goes in to  t h i s  in some 
d e t a i l .  Each j a-(:rnui ind iv idua l  bears  a number of  personal  names
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of to temic  a n c e s t o r s .  They a re  names of  s p i r i t s ,  b i r d s ,  s t a r s ,  
animals,  domestic implements o r  anything e l s e .  One in d iv idua l  
may have over  t h i r t y  such names. These p o ly s y l l a b i c  a n c e s t r a l  
names r e f e r  t o  th e  s e c r e t  myths of  each c l a n .  The e f f e c t  of  group 
r i v a l r y  on th e  o r ig in  myths has been t o  e l a b o r a t e  and co r ru p t  them.
Each moiety has i t s  own vers ion  of  th e  o r ig i n  of  t h e  world,  which is  
expressed to  th e  de t r iment of  t h e  vers ion  claimed by th e  o the r  
moiety.  This r i v a l r y  is  a l so  pursued a t  cl an  l e v e l .  Sec re t  
mythologies a re  be l ieved  to  suppor t  th e  claims o f  each group. The 
debates in t h e  ceremonial house a r e ,  u s u a l ly ,  con tex ts  in which 
one group a t tempts  t o  s t e a l  th e  to temic  a nce s to r s  o f  another  group 
by s t e a l i n g  t h e  names belonging to  th e  l a t t e r . (1936: 127).
Bateson comments t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  ' a s  a r e s u l t  
of th e  over lapping  mythology and t h e  s t e a l i n g  of  names, t h e  system 
i s  in a t e r r i b l y  muddled s t a t e  ' ,  t h e  Iatmul themselves rf e e l  
t h a t  th e  whole g ig a n t i c  system is  p e r f e c t l y  schematic and 
c o h e r e n t1 (1936: 128). One could perhaps ask i f  t h e  confusion 
here a r i s e s  from Bateson 's  f a i l u r e  t o  cons ide r  how t h i s  naming 
system r e l a t e s  t o  Iatmul no tions  o f  personhood and i d e n t i t y .
Bateson would appear t o  assume an in d iv idua l i sm  among th e  Iatmul 
s im i l a r  t o  t h a t  of  our own c u l t u r e .
' Bateson compares and c o n t r a s t s  th e  f i e r c e  compet i t iveness  of  
th e  debates  with th e  r i t u a l s  connected with th e  ceremonial  house.
In r i t u a l
'we see th e  men, as a group,  s t i l l  vying with each o th e r ,  but  in 
s p i t e  of  t h e i r  r i v a l r y  -:managing t o  work t o g e th e r  t o  produce 
a s p e c t a c l e  which the  women s h a l l  admire and marvel a t 1 (1936: 
128).
He d es c r ib e s  th e  ceremonial house as a 'Green Room1 in which th e
'show' i s  p repared .  In t h i s  d re s s ing  room, th e  men put  on t h e i r
make up, costumes and masks before  going out  t o  dance before  t h e i r
audience,  namely th e  women of t h e  v i l l a g e .  The women a re  assembled
a t  th e  s ides  o f  t h e  dancing ground.  There i s  an element o f  t h i s
s i t u a t i o n  even in t h e  e x c lu s iv e ly  male r i t u a l  o f  i n i t i a t i o n .  P ar t s
of th e  i n i t i a t i o n  r i t u a l  w i l l  be v i s i b l e  t o  th e  women, who w i l l  
a l so  be ab le  t o  l i s t e n  t o  th e  music coming from behind th e  wall s  of
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the  ceremonial  house, music played by th e  men on t h e i r  s e c r e t  
musical ins truments  such as f l u t e s ,  gongs and b u l l  r o a r e r s .  The 
p layers  a re  extremely conscious of  t h e i r  unseen audience,  and th e  
women's la u g h te r  i s  a dreaded consequence of  t e c h n ic a l  blunders  
(1936: 128).  Bateson throws t h i s  l a t t e r  p o in t  away, withou t  
fol lowing i t  u p ,b ut  i t  would appear t o  be impor tant  as an in d i c a t io n  
t h a t  th e  r o l e  of  audience which he ass igns  t o  th e  women is  not 
merely a pas s ive  one. This does not  appear l i k e l y  i f  th e  men do 
indeed f e a r  t h e  r i d i c u l e  of  t h e i r  audience in t h i s  way. F u r the r ,  
we should perhaps ask i f  t h e  men's performances a re  r e a l l y  as 
formal as Bateson sugges ts ,  and i f  t h e i r  audiences  r e a l l y  are 
l im i ted  t o  women. Wouldn't t h e se  "shows" be seen not  only by the  
women, but-; a Iso by c h i ld r e n ,  v i s i t o r s  t o  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  o th e r  men 
who happen t o  be hanging around and by anyone who i s  prepared  to  
watch ( in c lu d in g ,  i t  might be s a id ,  th e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t ) ?
The ceremonial  house i s  not  only a debat ing  s o c ie ty -cu m - th ea t r e  
c lub .  I t  i s  a l so  th e  p lace  in which th e  men meet t o  d iscuss  and plan 
t h e i r  everyday t a s k s ,  such as hunting ,  f i s h i n g ,  bu i ld ing  and canoe 
making. Music and dance accompany th e se  t a s k s ,  and th e  complet ion 
of  every impor tant  t a sk  i s  c e l e b ra te d  by th e  performance of  a dance 
or  ceremony. Symbolism is  not  cons idered impor tant  by th e  men on 
th e se  occas ions .  Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t
' t h e  r i t u a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  ceremonies i s  almost completely 
ignored and th e  whole emphasis i s  l a id  on th e  func t ion  o f  the  
ceremony as a means of  c e l e b r a t i n g  some labour  accomplished 
and s t r e s s i n g  th e  g rea tnes s  of  th e  c lan  a n c e s t o r s '  (1936: 129).
In one ceremony c e l eb ra te d  on the  occasion of  t h e  laying of  a new 
f l o o r  in t h e  ceremonial  house, Ba teson 's  informants  showed a lack 
of i n t e r e s t  in th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  as f a r  as th e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  had 
understood,  t h e  ceremony was connected with f e r t i l i t y  and p r o s p e r i t y .
'Only a very few men were conscious o f ,  or  i n t e r e s t e d  in ,  the  
r i t u a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  of  thereeremony; and even th e s e  few were 
i n t e r e s t e d  not  in th e  magical e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  ceremony but  
r a t h e r  in i t s  e s o t e r i c  o r ig i n s  -  m a t te r s  o f  g r e a t  importance 
t o  c l an s  whose p r id e  i s  based l a rg e ly  upon d e t a i l s  of  t h e i r  
to temic  an ce s t ry .  So th e  whole c u l t u r e  i s  moulded by the  
con t inua l  emphasis upon t h e  s p e c t a c u l a r ,  and by th e  p r ide  of
th e  male e th o s .  Each man o f  s p i r i t  s t r u t s  and shouts ,  p la y ­
ac t ing  t o  convince h im se lf  and o the rs  of  th e  r e a l i t y  of  a 
p r e s t i g e  which in t h i s  c u l t u r e  rece ives  but  l i t t l e  formal 
r e c o g n i t i o n 1 (1936: 129).
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Before cont inuing  my expos i t ion  of t h e  chap te r  on male e thos ,
I would l i k e  to  cons ider  the  data Bateson p re sen ts  in h is  companion 
chap ter  which dea ls  with the  ethos of  the  women. Here, he says,  
' t h e r e  i s  no such emphasis on p r ide  and s p e c ta c u la r  appearance1 
(1936: 142). Iatmul women spend most of t h e i r  time a t tend ing  to  
' t h e  necessary  economic labours connected with th e  dwell ing house - 
fo o d -g e t t i n g ,  cooking and a t t e n t i o n  t o  b a b i e s ' (1936:  142). In 
car ry ing  out  such t a sks  the  behaviour of  t h e  women provides a 
d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h a t  of th e  men. The men work p u b l i c ly ,  n o i s i l y  
and c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  while the  women go about t h e i r  t a s k s  p r iv a t e l y  
and q u i e t l y  (1936: 143). Again, we should note th e  value-loaded  
a d j e c t i v e s  Batson uses here.  He descr ibes  how the  women tend t h e i r  
f i s h  t r a p s  in t h e  e a r ly  morning, an a c t i v i t y  which involves wading 
in th e  cold water  up to  t h e  b r e a s t .  A f te r  t h i s ,  t h e r e  i s  f irewood 
to  be c o l l e c t e d  and ' then  the  r e tu rn  t o  th e  house,  where food must 
be cooked and household chores a t tended  t o .
An Iatmul household is  shared by two or t h r e e  men who are  r e l a t e d  
by p a t r i l i n e a l  t i e s .  Male c o - r e s id e n t s  a re  s t i l l  and formal in 
t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  towards each o th e r .  But c o - r e s id e n t  women are  f a r  
more re laxed  with each o the r  and engage in f r i e n d l y  conversa t ion  
throughout th e  working day. This f r i e n d l i n e s s  between women is  a l so  
ev ident  on market days, when th e  women t r a v e l  up r i v e r  to  th e  bush 
v i l l a g e s  t o  t r a d e  t h e i r  su rp lus  f i s h  f o r  sago. The behaviour of  th e  
women here c o n t r a s t s  sharp ly  with t h a t  of  the  men when they  negot­
i a t e  dea l s  involv ing canoes or  s leep ing  bags.  The women t a l k  p l e a s ­
an t ly  with each o th e r ,  and t h e r e  i s  very l i t t l e  haggling between 
them; the  men, on the  o the r  hand, t r y  to  ou twit  and h u s t l e  each 
o th e r ,  with th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  o f ten  no bus iness  w i l l  be completed.  The 
women, w r i t e s  Bateson,
' a r e  j o l l y  and r e a d i ly  co -o p e ra t iv e  while th e  men are  so obsessed 
with p o in t s  of  p r ide  t h a t  co -opera t ion  i s  rendered d i f f i c u l t '  
(1936: 144).
Bateson now rep o r t s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a t w i s t  to  the  women's e thos ;  
they a re  not  ’mere submissive mice'  (1936: 144). Women are of ten  
prepared t o  a s s e r t  themselves,  and to  take  the  i n i t i a t i v e  in love 
a f f a i r s .  Women of ten  make th e  f i r s t  advances in r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which 
end in marr iage .  In Tambunum v i l l a g e  Batson was t o l d  t h a t  in cases 
of i a i  marr iage ,  i f  a woman should go to  th e  house of  her  ianan
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{ i . e . ,  her  FFZSS), then the  man so chosen cannot  r e fu s e  th e  p roposa l .  
Here Bateson r e p o r t s  the  case of  a l e s s  fo rm al ised  marr iage ,  in 
which one of  h i s  cook-boys was approached by a g i r l  from a fo re ign  
v i l l a g e  which Bateson 's  pa r ty  had r e c e n t ly  v i s i t e d .  The g i r l  
t r a v e l l e d  alone to  Kankanamun and, through an in te rmedia ry ,  
approached th e  boy. This g i r l  showed g r e a t  courage in t r a v e l l i n g  
unaccompanied t o  a fo re ign  v i l l a g e ,  but  such conduct ,  Bateson 
sugges ts ,  was regarded as normal by th e  Iatmul.  Again he recounts  
a myth which shows t h a t  women had o f ten  been rep resen ted  as playing 
an important  p a r t  in head-hunting feuds  (1936: 145-147).
Bateson s t a t e s  t h a t  th e  Iatmul household revolves  around the  
a c t i v i t i e s  of  th e  women. They feed th e  p igs and ca tch  th e  f i s h  and 
they  command cons ide rab le  a u t h o r i t y  in th e  house.  I t  i s  upon the  
women's economic a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  th e  men depend f o r  the  wealth which 
they need t o  make a show in th e  ceremonial  house (1936: 147). This ,
I sugges t ,  i s  a f a c e t  of  Iatmul ethos  which i s  of  cons ide rab le  
importance.  Bateson might be r i g h t  when he says t h a t  the  only s o c ia l  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in Iatmul s o c ie ty  i s  t h a t  which ob ta ins  between 
the  sexes ,  but  su re ly  he misses th e  po in t  when he a l so  mainta ins  t h a t  
th e  c u l t u r e  recognised no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in rank or  c l a s s .  I would 
sugges t  t h a t  h i s  data on th e  e thos  of  th e  women in d i c a t e s  th e  workings 
of a system in which the  women work in o rde r  t h a t  th e  men can 
perform. In th e  performances of  th e  men - p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the  naven 
- th e  women a re  o f ten  derided and scorned,  but  perhaps t h i s  a t t i t u d e  
of contempt conceals  the  f a c t  t h a t  without  th e  work of  th e  women th e  
men would not  be ab le t o  e a t .  There i s  an irony here  which Bateson 
does not  develop.  I t  seems from h is  account t h a t  t h e  g r e a t  bulk of  
food product ion  i s  c a r r i e d  out  by th e  women. But i t  is  apparent  
t h a t  a c e n t r a l  p a r t  o f  the  male ethos  c o n s i s t s  of  th e  express ion  of 
contempt f o r  th e  female e thos .  This i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  in terms 
of sexual  m a t t e r s .
'Though t h e  women may take  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  in sexual  advances, i t  
is  t h e  a c t i v i t y  of the  male which is  s t r e s s e d  in th e  na t iv e  
remarks about  copu la t ion ,  while t h e  p a r t  played by th e  female 
i s  de sp ised .  In th e  Iatmul language t h e  o rd ina ry  verb f o r  
copu la t ion  and the  j o c u l a r  synonyms which a re  used f o r  i t  a r e ,  
so f a r  as I know, a l l  of  them t r a n s i t i v e  and in t h e i r  a c t iv e  
forms r e f e r  t o  th e  behaviour of  t h e  male.  The same verbs may 
be used of  th e  female r o l e ,  but  always t h e  p a s s i v e 1 (1936: 148).
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We can perhaps read in to  t h i s  quote a play on th e  notion  of  perform­
ance as both s p e c ta c u la r  d i sp la y  and as e r o t i c  a c t i v i t y .
For t h e  most p a r t  then ,  Bateson r e p o r t s  t h a t  t h e  ethos  of the  
women i s  in d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  with t h a t  of  th e  men. The men s t r u t  
through t h e i r  l i v e s  in a never-ending process ion  o f  melodrama, 
dancing and brawling,  a l l  t h e  t ime occupying th e  c e n t r e  of  th e  Iatmul 
s tage .  But th e  women engage c h e e r fu l ly  in th e  c o -o p e ra t iv e  ro u t in e s  
of food p rep a ra t io n  and domestic chores .  The women's l i v e s  are 
enl ivened by th e  en te r ta inments  and excitements  af fo rded  by the  men's 
dramatic d i s p l a y s .  I have suggested above t h a t  t h i s  p i c t u r e  
perhaps becomes a l i t t l e  c l e a r e r  with a g r e a t e r  emphasis on th e
economic r e a l i t y  of  the  s i t u a t i o n .  But the  s i t u a t i o n  i s  more comp­
l i c a t e d  than t h i s .
The women's ethos has what Bateson c a l l s
'a  double em phas i s . . .women occ a s io n a l ly  adopt something approach­
ing t h e  male e t h o s . . . t h e y  are admired f o r  so doing '  (1936: 148).
We have seen t h a t  t h i s  i s  so in making sexual advances.
Bateson claims t h a t  the  double emphasis can a l so  be seen in the
women's ceremonial a c t i v i t i e s ,  al though h i s  d a ta  here i s  t h i n  in
comparison with t h a t  concerning t h e  mens' ceremonial .  General ly ,  he 
says t h a t  t h e  more usual  women's e thos  i s  most ev iden t  when the  
women g a th e r  t o  c e l e b r a t e  without  men being p r e s e n t ,  but  t h a t  when 
they c e l e b r a t e  in public on th e  v i l l a g e  dancing ground,  with men 
in th e  audience ,  t h e i r  behaviour i s  more l i k e  t h a t  of  the  men 
(1936: 149).
In th e  former case ,  the  men r e s e n t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they  are  
excluded from th e  more p r i v a t e  women's ceremonials  and do a l l  they 
can t o  d iscourage  such even ts .  Husbands and wives o f ten  quar re l  
over t h i s ,  and wives w i l l  r e fu s e  t o  cook f o r  t h e i r  husbands.
Bateson d es c r ib e s  how on one occasion  he found a husband in the  
ceremonial house,  a t tempt ing without  success t o  r o a s t  sago.  Iatmul 
men b e l iev e  they  a re  unable t o  cook sago pancakes. This man was 
de r id ing  t h e  pass ive  sex r o l e  of  th e  women, shou ting across  the  
v i l l a g e  a t  th e  women dancing in h i s  house.  Despite  t h i s  contempt­
uous a t t i t u d e ,  th e  men withdrew from t h e i r  houses when th e  women's 
darices were about  t o  begin.  The women are l e f t  in complete comm­
and of  th e  house in which t h e i r  dance i s  t o  be performed.  On 
another  occasion when th e  women were dancing
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p r i v a t e l y ,  Bateson asked th e  men in the :ee rem onia l  house i f  he 
could go and watch the  dancing.  The men t r i e d  t o  d e n ig ra te  the  
women's dancing,  but  when Bateson th rea ten ed  t o  go to  another  v i l l a g e  
in o rde r  t o  watch some dancing,  the  men r e l e n t e d  and one young man 
r e l u c t a n t l y  e sco r te d  him to  t h e  house where th e  women were dancing.  
Ba teson 's  r e p o r t  of t h i s  dance summarises i t  as being,  in e f f e c t ,  
composed o f  r a t h e r  'n a iv e '  c a r i c a t u r e s  o f  copu la to ry  p o s i t i o n s .
'The mere d e s c r ip t io n  of  what4, t h e s e . . .women did  g ives  very l i t t l e  
idea o f  th e  e x t ra o rd in a ry  n a iv e te  of  t h i s  "obscen ity"  and 
th e  c o n t r a s t  between i t  and t h e  ha rshe r  obscen i ty  of  the  men' 
(1936: 150).
Bateson c o n t r a s t s  th e se  p r i v a t e  dances with those  in which the  
women c e l e b r a t e  p u b l i c ly  on th e  dancing ground.  Thei r  audiences on 
th e se  occas ions  i s  a mixture of  th e  men and o th e r  women o f  th e  v i l l a g e .  
Their  bear ing  i s  proud,  and they  a re  decora ted  with ornaments u sua l ly  
worn by men. This i s  s im i l a r  t o  th e  behaviour of  c e r t a i n  women dur ing  
the  naven and, as in the  nayen, i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a mild form of t r a n s ­
ves t i sm on t h e  p a r t  of women.
'T he i r  marching g a i t  in t h e se  p rocess ions  i s  indeed more c lo se ly  
comparable with t h e i r  swaggering demeanour, when dressed  in 
f u l l  homicidal  war p a in t  f o r  th e  naven ceremonies than t h e i r  
p a t t e r n s  o f  behaviour on o th e r  occas ions '  (1936: 151).
I t  seems from Bateson 's  da ta  here t h a t  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  
women's p r i v a t e  dances,  and t h e i r  pub l ic  dances and t h e i r  p a r t i c i p ­
a t ion  in Naven, i s  one of  t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y .  The former,  p r i v a t e ,  
dances a re  u n t r a n s l a t a b l e  because the-men a re  kept  o u t .  The l a t t e r  
forms of  women's c e l e b r a t i o n ,  however, are t r a n s l a t a b l e  because 
they  a re  pub l ic  and use th e  male idiom.
In two sm al le r  ch ap te r s ,  'A t t i t u d e s  Towards Death'  and 'The
P re fe r red  Types ' ,  Bateson adds some i n t e r e s t i n g  da ta  t o  t h i s
m a te r i a l .  In th e  former ch ap te r ,  he r e p o r t s  t h a t  th e  mourning of
Iatmul women i s  ' e a s y '  and ' n a t u r a l '  (1936: 153), while th e  g r i e f
of  th e  men tends  to  be a r t i f i c i a l  and t h e a t r i c a l .  We should ask 
here i f  any form of t h e  express ion  of  g r i e f  can in f a c t  be p r e - s o c i a l  
as Bateson i s  sugges t ing  here .  Is  not  a l l  express ion  of  g r i e f
learned in some way?
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Here, Bateson w r i t e s  about th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered by the  
an th ro p o lo g i s t  in r e p o r t in g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  e thoses  of  var ious  s o c ia l  
groups:
' I  have descr ibed  th e  ethos of  t h e  men as h i s t r i o n i c ,  d ram a t is ­
ing,  over-compensating,  e t c ,  but  th e se  words a re  only a d e s c r ip ­
t i o n  o f  th e  men's behaviour as seen by me, with my p e r s o n a l i t y  
moulded t o  a European p a t t e r n .  My comments a re  in no sense 
abso lu te  s ta t em en t s .  The men themselves would no doubt d esc r ibe  
t h e i r  own behaviour as " n a tu r a l " ,  while they  would probably 
d es c r ib e  t h a t  of  the  women as "sen t im enta l"  1 (1936: 157).
No one ethos  i s  more " n a t u r a l " than another f o r  t h e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t ,  
but  Bateson would seem to  be sugges t ing  above t h a t  on occasions  of 
mourning, t h e  ethos  of  the  Iatmul women i s  more " n a t u r a l "  than t h a t  
of  the  men.
In th e  chap te r  'The P re fe r red  Types ' ,  Bateson adds t h a t  th e  ethos 
of  th e  men, to o ,  has a double emphasis t o  a c e r t a i n  degree .  The 
Iatmul approve of  two main types  of  men. Bateson d es c r ib e s  the se  
as ' t h e  man of v io lence  and t h e  man of d i s c r e t i o n '  (1936: 161).
The f i r s t  type  i s ,  of  course,  in th e  mould of  th e  male ethos  
descr ibed  by Bateson in h is  Chapter  IX. However, Iatmul men are  
d i s t r u s t f u l  of  an ind iv idua l  who seems t o  be too  much of  an extreme 
case of  t h i s  v io l e n t  type .  One of  Ba teson 's  informants was j u s t  
t h i s  s o r t  o f  man, who Bateson r e p o r t s  was too  u n s tab le  even f o r  th e  
Iatmul.
'They regarded him as somewhat "cranky" and warned me a g a in s t  
him when I took him as an informant .  In t h i s  c ap a c i ty  he proved 
more cu r ious  than useful  - very e n t h u s i a s t i c ,  but  too  has ty  
and a s to n i s h in g ly  ina c c u ra te .  He seemed indeed t o  lack a l l  
power of  c r i t i c a l  thought and t o  have no sense of  lo g i c a l  
co n s i s t e n c y .  When h i s  c o n t ra d i c t o r y  s ta tements  were p resented  
to  him he had no r e a l i s a t i o n ' o f  t h e i r  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y 1 
(1936: 161).
Bateson seems r a t h e r  ambivalent  about  Iatmul a t t i t u d e s  towards t h i s  
extreme case .
'Such men though admired would, I was t o l d ,  not  be - t rus ted with 
e r u d i t e  in fo rm a t io n 1
This i s  because i t  was f e l t  tha t~he  would be l i a b l e  t o  revea l  e s o t e r i c  
s e c r e t s  u n n ece s s a r i ly  in deba tes ,  and
'provoke a brawl by too  r a s h ly  exposing h i s  opponents '  
s e c r e t s '  (1936: 162).
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This i s  in form ative  about Iatmul c a t e g o r i e s ;  whereas a c e r t a i n  kind 
of  v io l e n t  behaviour in men i s  approved,  an excess o f  v io lence  is  
no t .
The more d i s c r e e t  type of  man i s  q u i e t e r  and more re laxed  in 
pu b l i c .  He w i l l  tend to  be an exper t  in e s o t e r i c  knowledge, and 
h i s  balance and caut ion  w i l l  be va luab le  in deba te s ,  s ince  h is  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  a b i l i t i e s  w i l l  al low f o r  sys temat ic  and knowledgable 
d i s c u s s io n .  Again, in th e  deba tes  th e  d i s c r e e t  man w i l l  be able  
t o  watch speakers  on the  opposing s id e ,  and determine whether or  
not t h e i r  claims t o  e s o t e r i c  knowledge a re  v a l i d '  (1936: 162).
Iatmul mythology c o n t r a s t s  th e  two types  of  men. In only a very 
few cases did  Bateson f ind  th e  two types  combined in th e  same 
i n d i v i d u a l .
I t  might be useful  here to  compare Ba teson 's  d e s c r ip t io n  with 
Rosaldo 's  account  of  the  l i f e - c y c l e  among I longo t  males, in which 
she claims a s i m i l a r  d i f f e r e n c e  in th e  c a t e g o r i s a t i o n  of  males,  
al though in t h i s  case  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  one of  age (1980).
There a re  obvious in c o n s i s t e n c ie s  in Ba teson 's  account  of  gender 
ethos among th e  Iatmul.  Bateson recognises  th e  irony inhe ren t  in 
th e se  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s ,  but  he does not  inco rpo ra te  i t  f u l l y  in to  h is  
a n a ly s i s  of  Iatmul c u l t u r e .  As I w i l l  show, he does use i t  t o  
a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  in h is  account of  th e  naven, but  in doing so he 
m arg ina l i se s  i t  without  drawing out  th e  im p l ic a t ions  o f  such irony 
f o r  Iatmul not ions:  of  gender,  i d e n t i t y  and personhood,  and f o r  the  
importance of  performance in t h a t  c u l t u r e .  From Bateson 's  account ,
I would sugges t  t h a t  such no t ions  f o r  t h e  Iatmul a re  r id d l e d  with 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s .  We can in f a c t  see t h e  c u l t u r e ' s  preoccupa tion with 
dramatic performance as a way in which such in c o n s i s t e n c i e s  a re  
i n i t i a l l y  c r e a t e d ,  and then compressed and concealed .
We can t a k e  a h i n t  from th e  l i t e r a r y  c r i t i c  Kenneth Burke who 
has claimed t h a t  th e  t rope  irony can be c r u c i a l l y  pa i red  with the  
notion  of  d i a l e c t i c  (1969: 511).  D ia l e c t i c  can be equated with
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dramatic a c t i o n .  Any dramatic r o l e  con ta ins  a number of  s i t u a t i o n s  
or  s t r a t e g i e s  which can be summarised in th e  form of ‘' i d e a s ' 1. These 
" i d e a s "  a re  both i n s t r i n s i c  to  th e  r o l e ,  and developed in r e l a t i o n  
t o  th e  dramatic  ac t ion  and t o  th e  o th e r  c h a r a c t e r s  in t h e  a c t i o n .
Drama is  a form in which ideas can be seen in a c t i o n ,  and d i a l e c t i c  
a r i s e s  where agents  a re  the  media f o r  ideas .  As Burke w r i t e s :
'Where t h e  ideas are in a c t i o n ,  we have drama; where th e
agents  a r e  in id e a t io n ,  we have d i a l e c t i c '  (1969: 512).
But Bateson p r i v i l e g e s  the  realm of i d e a s ,o r  d i a l e c t i c ,  over t h a t
of  drama, o r  a c t i o n .  For Bateson, ideas  e x i s t  i n i t i a l l y  and are  
then -  in t h e  case ,  f o r  example, of  th e  naven - l i t e r a l l y  "acted 
upon". But ideas  and ac t ion  themselves have a more s u b t l e ,  
d i a l e c t i c a l ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  and i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  view ac t ion  as the  
primary r e f e r e n t  f o r  ideas ,  r a t h e r  than th e  o th e r  way round.  I t  is  
p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  naven does not  so much express Iatmul gender ro le s  
-  and th e  in c o n s i s t e n c ie s  inhe re n t  in t h e s e  -  but  c r e a t e s  them in 
the  f i r s t  p l a c e .
Bateson sees  many in c o n s i s t e n c ie s  in Iatmul c u l t u r e ,  but  he i s  
unable t o  give them the  a n a l y t i c a l  importance which they  w arran t .
This i s ,  s imply,  because h i s  i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  p r e ju d ic e  i s  seeking 
a pure id e a l  Iatmul efdos which seems t o  him to  be merely obfusca ted  
by the  i r o n i c  i n c o n s i s t e n c ie s  which th e  e thos  i s  c o n s ta n t ly  
producing.  But th e  t r u t h  of  the  m a t te r  i s  p l u r a l i s t i c  r a t h e r  than 
u n i t a ry ;  and i t  i s  t h i s  p lu ra l i sm  which Bateson 's  epistemology 
re fu ses  t o  acknowledge. The po in t  about drama, and about  performance,  
i s  t h a t  t h e s e  p e r s p e c t iv e s  can and do cope with p lu ra l i s m .
I. can perhaps i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  the~naven as
a per format ive  con tex t  which r e v e a l s  an e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between
th e  ro l e s  of  t h e  younger and o ld e r  Iatmul male,  i . e .  those  of  the  
laua and wau r e s p e c t i v e l y .  From one p o in t  of  view, we can see the  
wau as assuming th e  d i s p o s i t i o n  of  a n eg a t iv e ly  s te reo typed  woman, 
clumsy, i n e f f e c t u a l  and r i d i c u l o u s .  In c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  laua plays 
th e  p a r t  o f  th e  idea l  e f f e c t i v e ,  boas t ing ,  achiev ing male. But we 
can a l so  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  scene as a s i t u a t i o n  in which t h e  wau, 
because of  h i s  m a tu r i t y ,  i s  ab le  t o  inc o rpo ra te  something of  t h e  
feminine in to  h i s  r o l e .  Can we read here a p rog res s ion  from th e
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s t a t u s  of  th e  younger male, who can only "play" a t  being himself  
(him- s e l f ) ,  t o  t h a t  of  th e  o lde r  man who can play a t  being "o the r " ,  
i . e .  femin ine,  o r  " a s - i f - f e m in in e " ?  Although,  i t  must be added, t h i s  
feminine o th e r  i s  nega t ive ly  s t e reo ty p ed .  Perhaps th e  matur i ty  
and s u p e r i o r i t y  of  th e  wau c o n s i s t s  in h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  play a t  o the r  
ro le s?
This ques t ion  leads to  ano ther .  For th e  Iatmul,  does an import­
ant  d i f f e r e n c e  between men and women inhere  in t h e  f a c t  t h a t  whereas 
women can only be women, men a t  c e r t a i n  t imes in t h e i r  l i f e  cycle 
a re al lowed t o  in co rpora te  something of  the  female ethos?  This 
might be t h e  locus of  male s u p e r i o r i t y  f o r  th e  Iatmul,  and be a l l i e d  
to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  maleness i s  c u l t u r a l l y  achieved through a success ion 
of  s t a g e s .  Is  t h i s  t h e  form of  h ie ra rchy  f o r  t h e  Iatmul? I f  so,  i t  
would be an example of  what Dumont, in h i s  a n a ly s i s  of  Indian c a s t e ,  
has c a l l e d  th e  "encompassing" na tu re  of  h ie ra rch y ;  Dumont desc r ibe s  
the  h igher  c a s t e s  as encompassing t h e  lower (1972).  But the  
wau's p laying of  a woman's r o l e  in th e  naven r e p re s e n t s  a c a r i c a tu r e d  
female.  Perhaps t h i s  f a c t ,  along with the  r e s t  of  t h e  aggress ive  
male e th o s ,  i s  a way of keeping th e  feminine -  o r  feminized - aspec ts  
of  the  men a t  bay.  Is the  naven from t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  not  a kind 
of  a n t i - i n i t i a t i o n  r i t e ?
An important  t e n s ion  in Bateson 's  account of  Iatmul gender ethos 
is  t h a t  between the  "vio lence" of  th e  men and t h e  " p a s s iv i ty "  of 
th e  women. He assumes a mutual commensurabil i ty and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  
between male and female ethos which i s  no t ,  however, i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
h is  da ta .  This t e n s io n  and th e  in c o n s i s t e n c ie s  which e x i s t  with in  
i t  a re  not  examined c r i t i c a l l y  in th e  book. We have no account of  
any d ia logue  between Iatmul men and Iatmul women which allows 
Iatmul in d iv id u a l s  t o  t a l k  about t h e i r  ideas on th e se  t o p i c s  with 
each o th e r .  How much do Bateson 's  own preconceptions  about v io lence  
and p a s s i v i t y  co lour  h is  account?
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NOTES to  Chapter Seven
(1) Bateson’s espousal of  a " h o l i s t i c "  s tudy  of  c u l t u r e  gives a 
r e t r o s p e c t i v e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  my in t ro d u c t io n  of  hermen­
e u t i c s  in my ana ly s i s  of  h is  f i v e  c a t e g o r ie s  (see Chapter  
Four, pp 79-80 above),  s ince  holism i s  concerned with 
w hole -par t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
(2) See p a r t i c u l a r l y  h i s  r e fe re n c e  t o  Korzybski 's  dictum
"The map is  not  the  t e r r i t o r y " ,  in h is  paper 'Form, Substance 
and D i f f e r e n c e ' ,  (1973 (e ) ; 423).
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ETHOS AND NAVEN
I WOULD NOW l i k e  to  r e tu rn  to  Ba teson 's  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  male 
e thos .  The second h a l f  of  h is  Chapter  IX dea ls  with male i n i t i a t i o n ,  
and i t  w i l l  perhaps be useful  to  cons ider  t h i s  t o p i c  in th e  l i g h t  
of  Ba teson 's  da ta  on ethos  d e a l t  with in my previous  ch a p te r .
According t o  Bateson 's  account ,  Iatmul male i n i t i a t i o n  is  a 
pa in fu l  p rocess ,  during which th e  boys are sub jec ted  t o  p r i v a t i o n ,  
d iscomfort  and th e  agonies of  s c a r i f i c a t i o n .  Bateson d esc r ibe s  
th e  atmosphere surrounding th e  r i t e s  as n e i t h e r  t h a t  of  a sce t ic i sm  
nor of  c a r e f u l n e s s ,  but  ' i t  i s  t h e  s p i r i t  of  i r r e s p o n s i b l e  bu l ly ing  
and swagger'  (1936: 130). L i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  i s  paid during s c a r ­
i f i c a t i o n  t o  how th e  boys bear t h e i r  pa ins ;  gongs w i l l  be beaten 
to  drown out  t h e  screams,  and th e  s c a r i f i e r s  a re  more i n t e r e s t e d  in 
technique  than in th e  r e a c t io n s  of  t h e i r  v ic t im s .  S pec ta to rs  tend 
to  be s i l e n t ,  perhaps because they  a re  uneasy a t  pain being i n f l i c t e d  
ou ts id e  t h e  normal h i s t r i o n i c  s e t t i n g s .  A few, Bateson r e p o r t s ,  
seem amused by t h e  p rocess .  There would appear t o  be a c o n t r a d i c ­
t i o n  in B a teson 's  account here with regard t o  th e  a t t i t u d e  of  th e  
i n i t i a t o r s .
'When pain i s  i n f l i c t e d  in o th e r  p a r t s  of  i n i t i a t i o n ,  i t  i s  done 
by men who enjoy doing i t  and who ca r ry  out  t h e i r  bus iness  in 
a c y n i c a l ,  p r a c t i c a l - j o k i n g  s p i r i t .  The dr ink ing  of  f i l t h y  
water  i s  a g r e a t  joke and th e  wretched novices are t r i c k e d  
in to  d r in k in g  p len ty  of  i t '  (1936: 130).
Surely th e  a t t i t u d e  of  "enjoyment" repo r ted  here c o n t r a d i c t s  th e  
' c y n i c a l ,  p r a c t i c a l - j o k i n g  s p i r i t 1 which Bateson desc r ibe s  as th e  
mood of th e  i n i t i a t o r s .  He cont inues  by r e p o r t in g  t h a t  in the  
r i t u a l  washing
' t h e  p a r t l y  healed backs of  th e  novices a re  scrubbed,  and they 
are  sp lashed  and splashed with icy water  t i l l  they are whimper­
ing with cold and misery .  The emphasis i s  upon making them 
mise rab le  r a t h e r  than c l e a n '  (1936: 131).
Bateson does not  explore the  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  between th e  i r o n ic  
d i s ta n c in g  implied by a ' c y n ic a l ,  p r a c t i c a l - j o k i n g  s p i r i t '  and the  
immediate involvement implied by a mood of p o s i t i v e  "enjoyment".
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One problem might  be t h a t  he does no t  provide a d e t a i l e d  account  of  
any one Iatmul i n i t i a t i o n  r i t e .
Bateson s t r e s s e s  t h a t  i n i t i a t i o n  i s  used as y e t  ano ther  con tex t  
in which d i f f e r e n t  groups of  men - in t h i s  case ,  i n i t i a t o r s  - can 
score p o in t s  of  p r ide  ag a in s t  each o th e r .  On one occas ion ,  one 
moiety of  i n i t i a t o r s  claimed t h a t  th e  novices had been b u l l i e d  enough 
and t h a t  one of  t h e  r i t u a l s  could be omi tted .  The o th e r  moiety 
involved then boasted t h a t  th e  former group were a f r a i d  of  th e  e f f i c ­
iency with which they  would perform th e  r i t u a l .  The f i r s t  moiety 
then proceeded t o  car ry  out  th e  r i t u a l  with e x t r a  savagery (1936: 131).
Thus, says Bateson,  i n i t i a t i o n  - which in t roduces  t h e  boys to  
th e  l i f e  of  th e  men's ceremonial house -  p repares  t h e  s u b je c t  f o r  
the  c a r e e r  of  h i s t r i o n i c  p r ide  expected of  men.
'As in o th e r  c u l tu r e s  a boy i s  d i s c i p l i n e d  so t h a t  he may be able  
t o  wie ld  a u t h o r i t y ,  so on th e  Sepik he i s  sub jec ted  t o  i r r e s p o n s ­
i b l e  b u l ly ing  and ignominy so t h a t  he becomes what we should 
d es c r ib e  as an over-compensating,  harsh man - whom th e  n a t iv e s  
desc r ib e  as a "hot" man' (1936: 131).
During t h e  e a r l y  s tages  of  i n i t i a t i o n  th e  novices are b u l l i e d ,  
taun ted  and tormented.  The i n i t i a t o r s  r e f e r  t o  them as t h e i r  
'w i v e s ' .  The novices are forced  t o  handle th e  i n i t i a t o r s '  g e n i t a l s  
(1936: 131), Bateson r e l a t e s  t h i s  t o  the  naven,
' I  t h in k  we may see a c o n s i s t e n t  c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n  running through 
th e  c o n t r a s t i n g  sex e thos ,  th e  shaming of  th e  novices,  th e  wau 
shaming h im se lf  by ac t ing  as th e  wife of  th e  laua,  and th e  use 
of  t h e  exclamation "Lan men t o ! "  (husband thou indeed!)  to  
express  contemptib le  submission.  Each of  th e s e  elements of  
c u l t u r e  i s  based upon the  bas ic  asssumption t h a t  th e  pass ive  
r o l e  in sex i s  shameful '  (1936: 132).
But i s  t h i s  "contempt" an a s s e r t i o n  of  s u p e r i o r i t y ,  o r  contempt a t  
the  o t h e r ' s  submission? ( 1)
Bateson compares and c o n t r a s t s  th e  ethos  of  th e  i n i t i a t o r s  and t h a t  
of the  nov ices .  That of  t h e  former i s  c l e a r l y  l inked  with th e  ethos  of  
the  men's ceremonial  house. But th e  ethos  o f  t h e  novices i s  more
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complica ted .  In th e  e a r ly  phases of  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  they c e r t a i n l y  
play the  p a r t  o f  women, perhaps t o  a l a rg e  e x t e n t .  Bateson supposes 
t h a t  t h i s  might be because th e  l i t t l e  boys who a re  ready t o  commence 
i n i t i a t i o n  have been incorpora ted  in to  the  ethos of  the  women in t h e i r  
e a r ly  y e a r s .  Whether or  not  t h i s  i s  th e  case (and Bateson i s  not 
su re ,  s ince  he admits  t h a t  he did not  s tudy Iatmul c h i l d r e n ) ,  t h e r e  
is  c e r t a i n l y  something o f  t h i s  notion  in th e  a t t i t u d e  of  th e  
i n i t i a t o r s .
'The response of  the  i n i t i a t o r s  t o  t h i s  r e a l  or  nominal c o n t r a s t  
between t h e  novices and themselves i s  to  f o r c e  th e  boys f u r t h e r  
in to  th e  complementary p o s i t i o n ,  dubbing them "wives" and 
bu l ly ing  them in to  express ions  of t h e  w ife ly  r o l e '  (1936: 132).
I t  might well be th e  case t h a t  th e  novices a re  made in to  "women" 
through th e  p rocesses  of  the  e a r l y  s tages  of  i n i t i a t i o n ,  j u s t  as the  
ro l e s  of  wau and laua a re  r e - c r e a t e d  in t h e  naven.
A f te r  i n i t i a t i o n  i s  completed,  the  boys are  accepted and incorpor ­
ated in to  th e  male e thos .  The f i r s t  s tep  in t h i s  process  i s  th e  
bu l ly ing  of  th e  novices in to  acceptance of  th e  women's e th o s .  Why 
should t h i s  seemingly c o n t ra d ic to ry  s i t u a t i o n  ob ta in?  Bateson l i s t s  
fou r  processes  which he regards  as exp lana to ry .  F i r s t l y ,  the  novice 
is  made ' c o n t r a - s u g g e s t i b l e '  t o  th e  female ethos  (1936: 133). Bateson 
does not exp la in  what he means by t h i s  term, which had d i f f e r e n t  
meanings as app l ied  by d i f f e r e n t  schools of  psychology.  The bu lly ing  
o f  th e  novices here  i s  an extreme case o f  th e  t r ea tm e n t  which 
Iatmul men (according t o  themselves ,  a t  any r a t e )  mete out  t o  the  
women. Whereas t h e  wives accep t  t h e i r  submissive r o l e  withou t  d i f f i c ­
u l t y ,  the  novices a re  made c o n t r a - s u g g e s t ib l e  t o  i t  and r e b e l .  
Coun te r - rep ress ive  measures on th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  i n i t i a t o r s  w i l l  not 
cool th e  resen tment of  the  nov ices .  Second, th e  novices a re  made 
to  f e e l  proud of  t h e  male e th o s .  The boys are very soon proud of 
t h e i r  s c a r s ,  and show them o f f  (1936: T33). But i s  t h i s  not  because in
an important  sense they have a l ready  been made "women" dur ing th e  
e a r l y  i n i t i a t o r y  s tages?  The novices may very well f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  
s ep a ra t io n  from th e  women makes them s u p e r io r  in some way, p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s ince  women and sm al le r  ch i ld ren  a re  excluded from i n i t i a t i o n .  At
the  same t ime,  a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  week of  bu l ly ing  and v io lence  and a f t e r  
th e  complet ion o f  s c a r i f i c a t i o n ,  th e  a t t i t u d e  of  th e  i n i t i a t o r s  
towards th e  novices  changes d r a s t i c a l l y .  The novices a re  now waited
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on by the  i n i t i a t o r s ,  who hunt f o r  them, te ach  them how t o  play the  
f l u t e s  and manufacture ornaments f o r  them. The novices a re  no longer 
regarded as v ic t im s .  The i n i t i a t o r s  a re  now descr ibed  not  as 
“e l d e r  b ro the rs "  o r  as "husbands", but  as "mothers" of  th e  novices ,  
who in t u rn  a re  regarded as "ch i ld ren"  (1936: 134).  Again, t h e r e  i s  
a switching of  gender ro l e  here ,  in t h a t  i t  i s  now th e  i n i t i a t i n g  
o lde r  men who ta k e  an important feminine r o l e .  But Bateson does not  
expand on t h i s .
A f te r  t h e  complet ion of  i n i t i a t i o n ,  t h e  novices a re  e x h ib i ted  
t o  t h e  women as heroes ,  and naven a re  ce l e b ra te d  f o r  t h e  young men 
(1936: 134).
The t h i r d  process  which Bateson l i s t s  as f u r t h e r i n g  th e  boys '  t r a n s ­
i t i o n  from th e  female t o  the  male e thos  takes  p lace  when groups of 
younger boys a re  i n i t i a t e d  a l i t t l e  l a t e r .  These l a t t e r  groups w i l l  
be in th e  same i n i t i a t o r y  grade as th e  former nov ices ,  who w i l l  take  
p a r t  again t o  some ex ten t  in the  i n i t i a t o r y  p roces s .  But they w i l l  
not  again endure t h e  s c a r i f i c a t i o n  and the  more d r a s t i c  forms of  
b u l ly in g .  The o ld e r  boys are " f rank ly  bored" (1936: 134). Bateson 's  
s ta temen t i n d i c a t e s  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  th e  c u l t u r a l  importance of  
boredom, of  boredom as being c u l t u r a l l y  c r e a t e d .  We can view the  
women's boredom, f o r  example, as being e s s e n t i a l  i f  they  are  to  be 
e n t e r t a i n e d  by t h e  men's shows. For d ive rs ion  to  be e f f e c t i v e ,  t h e r e  
has to  be a need f o r  i t  in the  f i r s t  p lace .
S t i l l  l a t e r ,  when they themselves w i l l  be expected t o  a c t  as 
i n i t i a t o r s ,  t h e  o ld e r  boys w i l l  themselves become th e  b u l l i e s ,  
'completely a s s im i la t e d  in to  the  system1 (1936: 134). F in a l ly ,
Bateson notes  t h a t  r i v a l r y  between groups o f  i n i t i a t o r s  promotes an 
atmosphere o f  scrupulousness and thoroughness in t h e  harsh behaviour 
adopted towards th e  novices,  as he had commented e a r l i e r .  This appears 
t o  be a c l e a r  express ion  of  what l a t e r  in h is  t e x t  Bateson c a l l s  a 
' symmetrical schismogenesis '  between groups of  Iatmul males (see 
Chapter Nine p. 179 below).  Ba teson 's  account implies  t h a t  th e  
Iatmul have cons t ruc ted  a f u l l y  e l ab o ra ted  s e t  of  i n i t i a t o r y  proced­
ures which have been c rea ted  because of  t h e i r  need t o  compete. We 
could r e v e r s e  t h i s ,  however, and ask i f  t h e  need to  compete, and
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t h e  r e s u l t i n g  scrupulousness in th e  procedures ,  i s  not  c rea ted  by
the  enactment and re-enactment (o r  r e - c r e a t i o n )  of  th e  procedures
themselves?
Bateson then descr ibes  how th e  atmosphere surrounding i n i t i a t i o n  
i l l u s t r a t e s  an extreme tendency o f  th e  male e thos ,  namely the  tendency 
to  ' c u t  o f f  t h e i r  own noses t o  s p i t e  th e  o th e r  f e l l o w ' s  f a c e 1 (1936: 
135). What he means by t h i s  i s  t h a t  on occasions  when i n i t i a t o r y  
taboos a re  broken,  f o r  example i f  a woman should see one of  th e  
sacred o b je c t s  o r  i f  somebody should a c t  d i s r e s p e c t f u l l y  towards 
the  o b j e c t s ,  then th e  men th r e a t e n  t o  revea l  th e  e n t i r e  i n i t i a t o r y  
system to  th e  whole v i l l a g e .  This does not  a c t u a l l y  o f ten  happen, but 
on occasions th e  men f e e l  so exaspera ted  and shamed t h a t  they w i l l  
ca r ry  out  a w i l fu l  d e s t r u c t i v e  a c t  aimed a t  r ev ea l in g  a l l  t h e i r  
s e c r e t s .  This may bring th e  ceremonial  l i f e  of  th e  v i l l a g e  t o  a 
h a l t  f o r  many y e a r s .  Bateson records  two indigenous accounts of  
ins tances  o f  t h i s  (1936: 135-138). (2)
These t h r e a t s  to  "give th e  game away" would appear to  be ide a l iz ed
t h r e a t s ,  in t h a t  they th r e a t e n  th e  male-female dichotomy by th e  
removal of  one h a l f  of  i t .  Thus, f o r  th e  Iatmul,  a t h r e a t  t o  put  
an end t o  performance i s  a t h r e a t  t o  end s o c i a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and 
c u l t u r a l  meaning. I t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  view t h i s  as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of 
th e  s o c i a l l y  c o n s t i t u t i v e  ( r a t h e r  than  th e  "express ive" )  na tu re  of  
performance.
I suggest  we should cons ider  Iatmul i n i t i a t i o n  as a t h e a t r i c a l  
performance,  r a t h e r  than fo l lowing Bateson 's  a n a l y s i s  which regards  
i t  as a methodica l ly  planned,  p s e u d o - s c i e n t i f i c  p rocess .  This reading 
sugges ts  t h a t  th e  performance - whether i t  be i n i t i a t i o n ,  naven or  
o the r  " r i t u a l "  a c t i v i t y  - is  c o n s t i t u t i v e  of  male and female e thos ,  
r a t h e r  than t h e  mere express ion of  them. The imagery thus  c rea ted  
through performance i s  then r e - c r e a t e d  in subsequent  performances;  
c r e a t io n s  and r e - c r e a t i o n s  o f  images provide t h e  stock  of  r o l e s ,  
s t e reo types  and s t r a t e g i e s  which c o n s t i t u t e  Iatmul e th o s .
From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  we can view th e  l i f e  cyc le  o f  the  Iatmul 
male as p rogress ing  through t h r e e  s t a g e s .  Stage (1) i s  r ep resen ted  
by th e  r o l e  of  " f e m a l e " i n i t i a t e ;  th e  boy then moves t o  s tage  (2)
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in which t h e  "male" who k i l l s  the reby  becomes laua performing one 
r o l e  in naven, u n t i l  f i n a l l y  he becomes (3) wau, who performs the  
o the r  r o l e  in naven, a r o le  which demands a p a r t i a l  r e v e r s a l  t o  the  
"female" r o l e .  The t h r e e  ceremonies in t h i s  cycle p re s en t  us with 
t h r e e  p e r s p e c t iv e s  on Iatmul manhood. The f i r s t  i s  i n i t i a t i o n ,  th e  
second is  t h e  naven from th e  l a u a ' s  p e r s p e c t iv e  and th e  t h i r d  i s  th e  
naven from t h e  wau1s p e r s p e c t iv e .  There is  an i r o n i c  r e v e r s a l  in 
the  second and t h i r d  s t a g e s ,  namely from female t o  male,  and then 
from male t o  female.  Thus, th e  t h r e e  s tages  a re  r e f l e c t e d  in each 
o th e r .  I w i l l  e l a b o ra te  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a t  th e  end of  th e  
c hap te r .
Bateson ends h is  chap ter  on th e  male e thos  with a b r i e f  co n s id e r ­
a t ion  of  head-hunt ing ,  in which he says th e  masculine e thos  had 
reached i t s  peak of  express ion .  Bateson does not  say e x ac t ly  how 
r e c e n t ly  head-hunt ing  had been stopped by th e  c o lo n ia l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
but  he claims t h a t  t h e r e  were enough t r a c e s  of  t h i s  a c t i v i t y  l e f t  
in th e  c u l t u r e  f o r  him to  be ab le t o  w r i t e  about i t s  im pl ica t ions  
(1936: 138).
Perhaps th e  most no ta b le  of  t h e s e  im p l ica t ions  i s  t h a t  the  head­
hunting e thos  did not  emphasise courage or  honour. K i l l in g  a woman 
was admired as much as k i l l i n g  a man, k i l l i n g  by t r i c k e r y  and s t e a l t h  
as much as k i l l i n g  in open combat. Bateson r e p o r t s  one case in which, 
he was t o l d ,  a man had been ornamented f o r  k i l l i n g  h i s  own wife in 
revenge f o r  a homicide committed by members o f  her  v i l l a g e .  I 
would sugges t  t h a t  t h i s  appears t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  Iatmul e t h i c a l  values 
are more concerned with the  e f f i c a c y  of  ac t io n s  than  with an a b s t r a c t  
theory  of  moral s .  Iatmul warfare  comes across  here as having been 
a m a t te r  of  extreme ind iv idua l i sm,  r a t h e r  than one of  group s o l i d a r i t y  
and powerful l e a d e r s .  This a l so  h i g h l ig h t s  Iatmul ind iv idua l i sm ,  as 
does Ba teson 's  s ta tement t h a t  th e  motives f o r  t h e  head-hunter  were 
ind iv idua l  personal  p r ide  and h is  s a t i s f a c t i o n  in th e  p r o s p e r i t y  
and s t r e n g th  of  h i s  v i l l a g e  (1936: 139). Successful  head-hunters  
were decora ted  with ornaments,  and the  most e l a b o r a t e  naven was given 
f o r  a boy 's  f i r s t  homicide.  The k i l l e r  was a l so  admired by the  
women (1936: 139).  The kin of  a r e l a t i v e  who had been k i l l e d  were 
considered duty bound to  take  revenge.  This theme o f  vengeance is
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important  in Iatmul soc ia l  l i f e ,  as i l l u s t r a t e d  in Bateson 's  
e a r l i e r  c h ap te r  on sorcery  (1936: 54 -73) .  Bateson notes t h a t
'a  po in ted  r e fe re n c e  t o  an unavenged r e l a t i v e  i s  one of  t h e '  
most dangerous i n s u l t s  t h a t  one Iatmul can use in r a n t in g  
a g a in s t  ano ther  - an i n s u l t  which is  f e l t  t o  be s p e c i a l l y  
aggrava ting  now t h a t  head-hunting i s  f o rb id d e n 1 (1936: 140).
So'head-hunting  involved the  p r ide  and shame of  th e  in d i v id u a l .  The 
s p e c ta c u la r  ceremonial  d i sp la ys  and dances c e l e b ra t e d  f o r  each 
v ic to ry  emphasised the  communal importance o f  head-hunt ing  f o r  th e  
whole v i l l a g e .  The k i l l e r  was a t  once th e  hero of  th e se  c e l e b r a t i o n s  
and th e  hos t  of  th e  f e a s t s  which accompanied them (1936: 140).
Chapter XIV, 'The Expression of  Ethos in Naven1, con ta in s  the  
core of  B a teson 's  a n a l y s i s .  I t  i s  grounded in th e  d i f f e r e n c e  in 
ethos between Iatmul men and women. Bateson cla ims t h a t ,  fo l lowing 
his  d e t a i l e d  d e s c r ip t i o n  of  Iatmul e th o s ,  i t  i s  apparent  t h a t  th e  
exaggerated behaviour of  th e  wau in th e  naven i s  q u i t e  in keeping 
with th e  male e t h o s .  For th e  women, with t h e i r  dual e th o s ,  naven 
behaviour can again be seen as c o n s i s t e n t  with both elements of  th e  
female e t h o s .  The mother, in ly ing naked with t h e  o th e r  women while 
her  son s t e p s  over them, is  behaving in accordance with th e  women's 
everyday e thos  o f  acceptance and s e l f - a b n e g a t io n .  The t r a n s v e s t i t e  
women, th e  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r  and th e  e l d e r  b r o t h e r ' s  w ife ,  demonstrate 
on th e  o th e r  hand th e  occasional  p r id e  and d e l i g h t  in d i s p la y  
which marks th e  o th e r  s ide  of  th e  female e thos  (1936: 198-199).
But why is  so much of  th e  naven behaviour t r a n s v e s t i t e ?  Why do—i--------
the  men d ress  as women and th e  women d ress  as men? This "why?" 
ques t ion  i s  th e  c r u c i a l  problem f o r  Bateson, and h i s  at tempt a t  
answering i t  leads  him t o  th e  c e n t r e  of  h is  a n a l y s i s .
He claims t h a t  th e  t r a n s v e s t i s m  a r i s e s  because,  in th e  naven
a c t i v i t i e s ,  i n d iv id u a l s  of  each sex a re  requ i red  t o  express  emotions
which a re  c o n t r a - in d ic a t e d  by th e  normal demands of  each gender
r o l e  in th e  s o c i e t y .  The formal con tex t  of  th e  naven revolves  
around t h e  accomplishment by a c h i ld  of  some no ta b le  achievement.
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The c h i l d ' s  r e l a t i v e s  then p u b l i c ly  express  t h e i r  joy  in t h i s  
even t .
'This  situafij/on i s  one which i s  fo re ig n  t o  t h e  normal s e t t i n g s  
of  t h e  l i f e  of  e i t h e r  sex.  The men by t h e i r  unrea l  s p e c ta c u la r  
l i f e  a re  p e r f e c t l y  hab i tua ted  t o  th e  "ordea l"  of  pub l ic  
performance.  But they a re  not  accustomed to  t h e  f r e e  express ion  
of  v ic a r io u s  personal  emotion.  Anger and scorn they can 
express  with a good deal  of  over-compensation,  and joy  and sorrow 
they  can express  when i t  i s  t h e i r  own p r id e  which i s  enhanced 
o r  abased;  but  to  express  joy  in the  achievements of  another  is  
o u t s id e  th e  norms of  t h e i r  behav iour .  In th e  case  of  t h e  women 
th e  p o s i t i o n  i s  reve rsed .  Thei r  c o -o p e ra t iv e  l i f e  has made them 
capable of  th e  easy express ion  of  u n s e l f i s h  joy  and sorrow, but 
i t  has not  t a ugh t  them to  assume a pub l ic  s p e c t a c u la r  r o l e 1 
(1936: 201).
But, as I have suggested e a r l i e r ,  why should Bateson assume t h a t  
the  s i t u a t i o n  i s  b e s t  phrased t h i s  way round? We can equa l ly  well 
view th e  naven as a con tex t  in which th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  gender 
r o l e  a re  c r e a te d  and r e - c r e a t e d .  As f o r  th e  r o l e  o f  th e  wau in th e  
naven, could t h i s  not  re p re s e n t  th e  giv ing way by an o ld e r  male to  
a younger, weaker example of  h is  own kind ( i . e .  t h e  l a u a ) , with whom 
his  l in k s  a re  normally schismogenic (see  my Chapter  Nine below)0
The naven con ta in s  two elements each of  which i s  problemat ic  f o r  
in d iv idua l s  o f  each sex.  These elements a re  'p u b l i c  d i s p l a y ' ,  which 
is  problemat ic  f o r  th e  women, and ' v i c a r io u s  persona l  em ot ion ' ,  which 
is  problemat ic  f o r  t h e  men. The problemat ic  component i s  in each 
case 'embarrass ing  and smacks r a t h e r  of  s i t u a t i o n s  normal t o  th e  l i f e  
of t h e  oppos i te  s e x ' .  Bateson regards  t h i s  embarrassment as a 
'dynamic f o r c e '  which
'pushes t h e  ind iv idua l  towards t r a n s v e s t i s m  - and to  a t r a n s v e s t i s m  
which t h e  community has been ab le  t o  accep t  and which in course  
of  t ime has become a c u l t u r a l  norm' (1936: 201-202).
So f o r  Bateson i t  i s  the  c o n t r a s t i n g  sex e thos  which has shaped 
th e  naven in t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  way; i t  has provided t h e  ' l i t t l e  push'  
which had led th e  Iatmul to  fo l low t h e i r  s t r u c t u r a l  premises t o  th e s e  
'e x t r e m e s ' .  Bateson f u r t h e r  j u s t i f i e s  t h i s  conclus ion  by s t a t i n g  
t h a t  when th e  women take  p a r t  in ceremonies o th e r  than  naven, they 
wear only a few masculine ornaments. In such ci rcumstances  th e n ,  t h e  
premises which might warrant  complete t r a n s v e s t i s m  on t h e i r  p a r t  a re  
lacking (1936: 202).
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But t h e r e  i s  a f u r t h e r  p o in t  t o  be e l u c id a t e d .  Why, in the  
naven, do th e  waus wear widow's c lo th in g ,  and t h e  women th e  f i n e s t  
masculine costumes they can f ind?  There i s  not  only a push towards 
t r a n s v e s t i s m  bu t ,  apparen t ly ,  a mot ivat ion  t o  d e n ig ra te  th e  women in 
th e  t r a n s v e s t i t e  behaviour of  t h e  men, and towards approbat ion  of  
the  men in t h e  t r a n s v e s t i t e  behaviour of  th e  women. Bateson claims 
t h a t  th e  behaviour of  the  men here a r i s e s  out  of  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  
con tex t  of  mourning is  one in which th e  c o n t r a s t  between th e  e thos  of  
each sex can be seen most s t r o n g ly .  The p o r t r a y a l  o f  a widow by the  
wau is  l i k e  th e  men c a r i c a t u r i n g  th e  s ing ing  of  th e  widows (1936:202 ) .  
He adds:
' i n  shaming h im se lf  he ( the  wau) i s ,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  express ing  
h is  contempt f o r  th e  whole e thos  of  those  who express g r i e f  
so e a s i l y ’ (1936: 202, my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
The women, however, f a r  from being contemptuous of  t h e  male e thos ,  
a c t u a l l y  appear t o  enjoy express ing  i t  whenever they  have t h e  oppor t ­
un i ty  t o  do so.  In t h e  naven th ey  exaggera te  i t ,  sc rap ing  t h e i r  
husbands ' lime s t i c k s  u n t i l  th e  s e r r a t i o n s  are worn away. I t  would 
seem t h a t  t h e  men a l so  exaggerate t h e i r  performance of  the  female 
ethos  by t h e i r  c a r i c a t u r e  o f '  the  widow, but  Bateson does not  s t r e s s  
t h i s .
Bateson then  comments t h a t  th e  exaggera t ion  o f  t h e  women's p o r t r a y a l  
of the  male e thos  has d i s t r a c t e d  them from th e  bus iness  of  c e l e b r a t i n g  
the  achievement of  a c h i ld .
'Thus t h e  presence  of  c o n t r a s t i n g  e thos  in th e  two sexes has 
almost completely  d iv e r t ed  th e  naven ceremonial  from simple 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  i t s  o s t e n s i b l e  o b j e c t  (1936: 203).
Despite  t h i s ,  however, th e  laua w i l l  unders tand t h a t  th e  naven i s  the  
group 's  way of  co n g ra tu la t in g  him on h i s  achievement.
The r e s t  o f  h i s  chap te r  i s  s u b t i t l e d  'Kinship Motivat ion and 
Naven1. Having demonstrated h i s  main t h e s i s  as t o  th e  c r u c i a l  p a r t  
played by t h e  c o n t r a s t i n g  e thos  of  t h e  Iatmul sexes in th e  naven 
behaviour ,  Bateson now at tempts t o  d e l i n e a t e  th e  mot iva t ion  of  th e  
various  kin involved .  Most o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  dea l s  with t h e  r o l e  of
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t he  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  wau.
Bateson sees  t h i s  r o l e  as express ing  two degrees of  f a l s i t y .
The c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  wauy Bateson had claimed e a r l i e r ,  seeks th e  
fu r th e ra n c e  of  a l l e g ia n c e  towards h imse lf  on t h e  p a r t  of  h is  l a u a .
He seeks t o  make t h e  laua r e l a t e  t o  him in some sense as i f  he 
were th e  own wau, o r  even th e  boy 's  mother.  He does t h i s  by 
ac t ing  th e  p a r t  of  the  boy 's  wife and mother. I t  i s ,  however, doubt­
fu l  how much r e a l  w ife ly  or  maternal  f e e l i n g s  can be a t t r i b u t e d  
to  th e  l a u a ' s  own wau. This ,  Bateson argues ,  must lead to  th e  
conclusion t h a t  t h e  performance of  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  wau in th e  
naven
'c o n t a i n s ,  in a sense,  two degrees of  f a l s i t y .  He i s  ac t ing  th e  
p a r t  of  an own wau who i s  a c t in g  th e  p a r t s  of  mother and wife '  
(1936: 204).
But we must s t i l l  seek ' t h e  mot iva t ion  of  t h e  performances '
(1936: 204). Because the  wau' s  behaviour i s  ac ted  r a t h e r  than spon­
taneous does not  mean t h a t  th e  mot iva t ions  which produce i t  w i l l  
be any th e  le s s  unconscious.
'An a c t o r  p laying Hamlet may behave as i f  he h im se lf  were driven  
by Hamlet 's  emotions,  but  th e  a c t o r  may remain t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t
i n a r t i c u l a t e  as t o  the  na tu re  of  t h e  d r iv e s  which he is
e x p re s s in g '  (1936: 204).
This quote implies  a theo ry  of  the  mind, consciousness  and unconscious­
ness which Bateson does not  en la rge  upon, but  i t  leads  Bateson in to
a complex argument about t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between what he c a l l s  th e  
' r e a l  m ot iva t ion  o f  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  wau1 and ' t h e  i n a r t i c u l a t e l y  
presumed mot iva t ions  of  the  own wau' (1936: 205).  The language of  
'm o t iv a t io n s '  here  again implies  a d e f i n i t e  model o f  an e s s e n t i a l i z e d  
consciousness  con ta in ing  “r e a l  m o t iva t ions" ,  s p l i t  o f f  from an 
e s s e n t i a l i z e d  unconscious,  from which we can only i n f e r  i n a r t i c u l a t e l y
presumed m o t i v a t i o n s ' .  This model of  th e  mind looks p a r t i c u l a r l y
Freudian;  i t  i s  a l so  worthy o f  note  t h a t  th e  not ion  of  "motivat ion"  
(whether o v e r t  o r  cover t )  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  th e  S t a n i s l a v s k ia n  method of 
r e h ea rs a l  and r o l e  c re a t io n  in th e  c l a s s i c  European n a t u r a l i s t i c  
t h e a t r e  t r a d i t i o n .  I w i l l  r e tu r n  t o  t h i s  theme in my Chapter  
Twelve.
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The " re a l  mot iva t ions"  of  th e  wau have a l re ady  been d i scussed .
They inc lude t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  wau's p le a su re  in h i s  own buffoonery ,  
h is  scorn of  t h e  female e thos ,  h is  awkwardness in express ing  p r ide  
in t h e  achievements of  another  and h is  d e s i r e  f o r  t h e  l a u a ' s  
a l l e g i a n c e .  The m at te r  of  th e  presumed m ot iva t ions  of  t h e  c l a s s i f ­
i c a to ry  wau i s  more complicated,  as Bateson admits ,  f o r
' i t  i s  s i n g u l a r l y  easy to  c o n s t r u c t  hypotheses about  i n a r t i c u ­
l a t e  m o t iva t ion ,  but exceedingly d i f f i c u l t  t o  t e s t  them, s ince  
no two such hypotheses a re  ever  mutual ly  e x c lu s iv e '  (1936:
205).
Bateson adds t h a t  t h e r e  i s  the  f u r t h e r  d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  exp lana t ions  
from a p sycho -ana ly t ic  viewpoint w i l l  tend t o  regard  every indigenous 
stat emen t as e i t h e r  meaning what i t  says ,  or  th e  o p pos i te .  
Never the less ,  he con t inues  with h is  own p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c a l l y  shaded 
a n a l y s i s .
Bateson analyses  th e  presumed m o t iv a t io n i s  o f  th e  own wau in 
o rder  t o  prov ide various  hypotheses none of  which he admits is  
more probable then any o th e r .  He r e f e r s  t o  t h r e e  myths in which 
a wau k i l l s  h is  l a u a . In each of  t h e se  myths, th e  k i l l i n g  i s  followed 
by the  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  of  the  community. Bateson sugges ts  t h a t  th e se  
myths i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  composed of  two 
complementary but  a n t a g o n i s t i c  elements,  namely a r e co g n i t io n  of  the  
importance of  m a t r i l i n e a l  t i e s  and f e e l i n g s  of  under ly ing h o s t i l i t y  
between wau and l a u a . The motives f o r  t h e  own wau's  symbolic 
behaviour in t h e  naven can be t r a c e d  to  t h i s  ambivalence,  which must 
i t s e l f  be t r a c e a b l e  to  one or  more of  th e  components which make up 
th e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  (1936: 206). Once aga in ,  I would sugges t  
t h a t  r a t h e r  than viewing th e se  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  as being o r ig i n a r y  and 
th e n 's u b s e q u e n t ly  expressed in r i t u a l ,  we can equa l ly  well view them 
as being c r e a te d  and r e - c r e a t e d  in success ive  naven performances.
I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  Bateson had concluded t h a t  t h e r e  is
nothing sui  g en e r i s  in the  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  and t h a t  i t  is
made up o f  components of  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  These i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  of
the  wau were with th e  l a u a ' s  mother, wife ,  w i f e ' s  b ro th e r  and f a t h e r .
The f i r s t ,  second and t h i r d  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  a re  d ismissed  by
Bateson as bases  f o r  wau' s  ambivalence.  The mother ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
with her  c h i l d  i s  not  ambivalent ,  so t h e r e  i s  no h o s t i l i t y  t o
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express .  In a d d i t io n ,  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with mother and with the  
wife are not  a c t u a l l y  s t r e s s e d  in t h e  naven. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  with 
the  f a t h e r  only appears as a minor m o t i f .  We are  l e f t  then with 
the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  wau with t h e  b r o th e r - i n - l a w .  Bateson had 
a l ready  po in ted  t o  th e  ambivalence o f  th e  b ro th e r - i n - l a w  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  in an e a r l i e r  ch a p te r .  But in t h e  naven t h e  wau 
seems to  exaggera te  h is  f r i e n d s h ip  t o t h e  l a u a , r a t h e r  than h is  
h o s t i l i t y  (1936: 206-207).  Why should t h i s  be so? A f u r t h e r  
d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  h o s t i l i t y  between Iatmul b r o th e r s - in - l a w  is  
openly expressed and acknowledged. Bateson says t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  
t h i s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  conclude t h a t  the wau, in h i s  naven 
behaviour,  i s  dea l ing  with r e a l  or  imputed g u i l t  of  h o s t i l i t y  to  
h is  s i s t e r ' s  marr iage .  But i t  i s  equa l ly  p o s s i b l e  t o  see th e  wau 
as a g u i l t y  man making amends, and as an innocent  man s t a t i n g  h is  
innocence.
'Whether we see th e se  agna t ic  r e l a t i v e s  as innocent  persons 
p r o t e s t i n g  t h e i r  innocence o r  as g u i l t y  persons making amnends, 
w i l l  depend - in th e  absence o f  a d d i t io n a l  f a c t s  -  upon the  
view which we take  of  p sycho-ana ly t ic  t h e o r y 1 (1936: 208-209).
Opposit ion  between b r o th e r s - in - l a w  jus c u l t u r a l l y  assumed.
Perhaps th e  wau1s h o s t i l i t y  to  h is  b ro th e r - i n - l a w  i s  extended 
t o  t h e  o f f s p r in g  of  th e  marriage?
'This  imputat ion  th e  wau i s  perhaps denying when he s t r e s s e s  the  
f a c t  t h a t  he i s  a mother and a w ife '  (1936: 208).
Bateson remarks . t h a t  s im i l a r  occurrences  can be seen in our c u l t u r e .  
Uncles and aunts  who have opposed t h e  p a r e n t s '  marriage l a t e r  f a l l  
over themselves in t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  be f r iend  t h e i r  nephews and n ie c e s .  
The Iatmul wau might be in th e  same p o s i t i o n  -  but  in t h e  naven he 
f a l l s  over not  m e tapho r ica l ly ,  but  l i t e r a l l y  (1936: 208).
Bateson does not  ques t ion  whether t h e  language of  g u i l t  and shame
evoked here i s  s u i t a b l e  f o r  so outgoing a people as t h e  Iatmul appear
to  be from t h e  r e s t  of  h is  account .  Perhaps t h e  notion of  " loss  of
fa c e " ,  and o f  o b l i g a t i o n  or  debt  would be more s u i t a b l e .  I t  should
a l so  be noted t h a t  th e  episode in t h e  naven in which th e  wau " f a l l s
over" i s  too  v a r i a b l e  to  be a co n s tan t  f a c t o r  in t h e  kind of  k inship  
s t r u c t u r a l  model Bateson adduces here .
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Bateson cont inues  by saying t h a t  an a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  in th e  
r o l e  played by t h e  wau in th e  naven might be connected with th e  
f a c t  t h a t  f o r  t h e  Iatmul a c h i l d ’ s achievements a re  regarded as 
being those  of  th e  mother 's  c l a n .  We can see in t h i s  r e s p e c t  
the  wau' s  naven behaviour as a symbolic way o f  claiming th e  l a u a ' s  
achievement.  But t h i s  claim can only be a v ic a r io u s  one,  and so
the  male e thos  demands t h a t  th e  wau_ can only make i t  while he i s
play ing a woman's r o l e .  Here Bateson sees  th e  e thos  of  th e  Iatmul 
men and th e  wau' s  k in sh ip  p o s i t i o n  as working to g e t h e r ,  and 
expressed in t h e  wau' s  behaviour (1936: 209-210).
Bateson then  dea l s  b r i e f l y  with th e  o th e r  male p a r t i c i p a n t s  in
th e  naven, namely th e  w i f e ' s  b ro th e r  (tawontu) , and th e  f a t h e r ,  e l d e r  
b ro th e r  and younger b ro th e r  (n y a i , nyamun and tshuambo) . The 
tawontu ' s  behav iour ,  t h a t  of  rubbing h is  bu t tocks  on th e  shin  of  
h is  lando ( s i s t e r ' s  husband) on th e  occasion o f  t h e  l a t t e r 1s marr iage,  
is  a behaviour which s t r e s s e s  t h e  w i f e ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  r o l e  as "wife" 
in t h e  absence of  t h e  ta wontu1s a d d i t io n a l  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with th e  
mother (un l ike  th e  naven behaviour of  th e  wau, which s t r e s s e s  th e  
wau' s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with both th e  wife and mother of  
the  l a u a ) (1936: 210).
As f o r  t h e  f a t h e r  and b r o th e r s ,  t h e i r  naven behaviour i s  marked 
by p a s s i v i t y .  They may be beaten by t h e i r  t s h a i s h i  ( e ld e r  b r o t h e r ' s  
wives ) ,  and th e  f a t h e r  w i l l  help h i s  son to  f in d  va luab les  t o  give 
to  the  wau. But how should we account f o r  t h e i r  i n a c t i v i t y ,  given 
t h a t  they a re  th e  l a u a ' s  n e a r e s t  male r e l a t i v e s ?  Bateson cons iders  
t h i s  problem in s o c io l o g i c a l ,  economic, s t r u c t u r a l  and emotional 
t e rm s .
S o c io l o g ic a l ly ,  the  i n a c t i v i t y  of  th e  f a t h e r  and th e  b ro th e r s  i s  to  
be explained by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Iatmul s o c ie ty  does not  r e q u i r e  any 
f u r t h e r  s t r e s s i n g  of  p a t r i l i n e a l  l i n k s .  S ince ,  f o r  Bateson,  th e  
in t e g r a t i o n  of  t h e  s o c ie ty  depends on th e  s t r e n g th  of  m a t r i l i n e a l  and 
a f f i n a l  t i e s ,  then any f u r t h e r  s t r e s s i n g  of  p a t f i l i n y  might tend to  
undermine t h e  s o c i e t y  r a t h e r  than  t o  lead to  inc reased  i n t e g r a t i o n .  
Economically,  Bateson says t h a t  s ince  p roper ty  r i g h t s  both between
f a t h e r  and son and between b ro th e r s  a re  very much l e s s  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
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than  between wau and l a u a , i t  would not  be ap p ro p r ia t e  f o r  e i t h e r  
the  f a t h e r  or  th e  b ro the rs  t o  o f f e r  ceremonial  p r e s t a t i o n s  t o  the  
laua during th e  naven. From th e  s t r u c t u a l  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  n e i t h e r  the  
f a t h e r  nor t h e  b ro th e r s  could a c t  th e  foo l  in d i v e r t i n g  a c e l e b ra t i o n  
of th e  boy 's  achievements in to  buf foonery ,  by t a k in g  on th e  r o l e  
of  some o th e r  r e l a t i v e .  Thus, in any a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in th e  
naven on t h e i r  p a r t  they would be fo rced ,  l i k e  th e  mother, t o  
emphasise t h e i r  own r e l a t i o n s h i p  with t h e  boy. Emotionally,  th e  
f a th e r - s o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  does not con ta in  th e  kinds of  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
which make th e  wau' s  s u b d iv i s ib l e  in to  s e p a ra t e  component i d e n t i f i c ­
a t i o n s ;  t h e  f a t h e r  has a ' u n i t a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with h i s  s o n ' .  Bateson 
sees t h i s  as a l so  being t r u e  f o r  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between b ro the rs  
(1936: 212).  (3)
The naven behaviour of  t h e  women, Bateson cla ims ,  must be seen 
in a d i f f e r e n t  l i g h t  from t h a t  of  th e  men. Male r o l e s  are determined 
by f i v e  f a c t o r s .  These are  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  .pos i t ion  of  th e  man in the  
k insh ip  system, t o g e th e r  with t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  which de f ine  i t ;  
the  male Iatmul e thos ;  the  need of  t h e  wau f o r  h is  l a u a ' s  a l l e g i a n c e ;  
the  ambivalence of  th e  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p  and f i n a l l y  a number of  
economic c o n s id e r a t io n s .
The naven behaviour of th e  women, however, i s  not  in f luenced  by 
c o n s id e ra t io n s  connected with- ' the l a s t  t h r e e  of  t h e s e  s e t s  of  mot ives.
'Ra the r ,  I b e l iev e  t h a t  we should see th e  women's naven as almost 
s o l e l y  t h e  express ion  of  t h e i r  e thos  and of  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  implied in t h e i r  k insh ip  s t a t u s .  Icam inc l ined  
to  see t h e  naven of  th e  wau as in some sense primary and as 
s e r io u s ly  motivated by d e s i r e  f o r  a l l e g i a n c e ,  economic ga in ,  
e t c . ,  while I would see th e  naven of  th e  women as an amusement, 
a gay occasion when they embroider upon s t r u c t u r a l  premises 
analogous t o  those  fol lowed by th e  wau and when they  enjoy th e  
s p ec ia l  p r i v i l e g e  of  wearing men's a t t i r e '  (1936: 213-214).
Bateson a t tempts  t o  demonstrate f u r t h e r  t h e  primacy of  th e  wau's  
naven over and above t h a t  of  t h e  women by s t r e s s i n g  t h a t  only a few 
waus take  p a r t .  But a t  t h e  naven Bateson observed in Mindimbit,  he
w r i t e s ,
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' i t  appeared as i f  a l l  the  women had gone mad. Every woman who 
could regard  h e r s e l f  as a p p ro p r ia t e ly  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  ch i ld ren  
made a show o f  naven behav iour1 (1936: 214).
Again, Bateson had been t o l d  t h a t ,  in the  naven f o r  a boy 's  homicide,  
a l l  th e  women except  the  boy 's  wife and own s i s t e r  had l a in  down 
f o r  the  boy t o  walk across them. The women here had been e x h ib i t i n g  
behaviour not  governed by any s p e c i f i c  kin r o l e ,  but  only by t h e i r  
sex. The women's naven, then ,  un l ike  t h a t  of  t h e  men, can be 
seen as unmotivated by s p e c i f i c  kin s t a t u s .
Bateson claims t h a t  t h i s  s t r u c t u r a l  t r u t h  i s  backed up by a 
so c io lo g ic a l  t r u t h .  The women's naven i s  'much more d i f f u s e  than 
t h a t  o f  th e  wau's  naven' (1936: 214).  The behaviour of th e  l a t t e r  
s t r eng thens  th e  community's s o l i d a r i t y  by s t r e s s i n g  a f f i n a l  l i nkages ,  
while th e  behaviour of  the  women 'seems r a t h e r  t o  spread a more 
d i f f u s e  euphor ia  throughout th e  community' (1936: 214).
Bateson now dea ls  r a t h e r  summarily with th e  naven behaviour of  
the  women, in t h e  l i g h t  of  t h i s  conclus ion .  The mother ' s  r o l e  has 
no s t r u c t u r a l  b a s i s  f o r  t r a n s v e s t i s m ,  and her nakedness in the  
naven i s  an example of
' abnegat ion  or  negat ive  s e l f - f e e l i n g ,  an express ion  which may 
be accompanied by e i t h e r  joy or  sorrow'  (1936: 215),
q u i n t e s s e n t i a l  as Bateson would assume to  the  female e th o s .  The 
iau (FZ) d i s p la y s  ' t h e  a s s e r t i v e  s id e  of  f a the rhood '  in her  i d e n t i f ­
i c a t io n  with th e  f a t h e r ,  r a t h e r  than  t h a t  element in th e  f a t h e r ' s  
r o l e  which gives way before  the  s o n ' s  advancement. Thus, she wears 
f i n e  ornaments and bea ts  her  "son" (1936: 216). The naven 
behaviour of  t h e  e l d e r  b r o t h e r ' s  w ife ,  or  t s h a i s h i , i s  based upon 
her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with her  i^ j^ and .  Since t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  e l d e r  
b ro the r  t o  an ego i s  s im i l a r  to  t h a t  of a f a t h e r ,  th e  t s h a i s h i ' s  
p o s i t i o n  i s  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  of th e  i a u , who i d e n t i f i e s  h e r s e l f  with 
her  husband, t h e  boy 's  f a t h e r .  Thus, th e  naven behaviour of  the  
t s h a i s h i  i s  s i m i l a r l y  a s s e r t i v e  t o  t h a t  of  th e  iau .
The s i s t e r  plays l i t t l e  p a r t  in the  naven, but  she does, Bateson 
r e c a l l s ,  s t ep  over t h e  p r o s t r a t e  women with her  b ro th e r ,  th e  hero.  
She then a t t a c k s  th e  women's g e n i t a l s  with her  hands,  p a r t i c u l a r l y
those  of  t h e  t s h a i s h i . To the  s i s t e r ' s  cry "A v u lva !" ,  the  t s h a i s h i
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(who i s  d ressed  in male f in e ry )  r e p l i e s  "No! A p e n i s i "  Bateson 
i n t e r p r e t s  t h i s  exchange as being based on th e  f a c t  t h a t  owing 
to  th e  kin i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  a t  work here th e  s i s t e r  is  a p o t e n t i a l  
'husband'  o f  t h e  t s h a i s h i , while th e  l a t t e r  sees  h e r s e l f  as poten­
t i a l l y  an ' e l d e r  b ro th e r '  of  th e  hero (1936: 216-217).  I t  might,  
however, be more than t h i s ,  i f  considered as a d ia logue  af f i rm ing  
the  d i f f e r e n c e  between c u l t u r a l l y  p re f e r r e d  Iatmul gender r o l e s .  
F in a l ly ,  Bateson cons iders  th e  naven behaviour of  th e  mbora, 
mother ' s  b r o t h e r ' s  w ife .  She i d e n t i f i e s  with th e  wau, and rece ives  
va luables  from the  l a u a . As she i s  i d e n t i f i e d  with a man who is  
himself  play ing  a t r a n s v e s t i t e  r o l e ,  she i s  ambivalent in her  
gender r o l e  and appears in naven sometimes as a man and a t  o the r  
t imes as a woman. But the  confusion here seems to  be reso lved  when 
she ac t s  t h e  p a r t  o f  th e  man in th e  r i t u a l  copu la t ion  with her  
husband, th e  t r a n s v e s t i t e  wau (1936: 217).
I would l i k e  t o  r e tu rn  t o  Bateson 's  claim t h a t  th e  use by th e  wau
of th e  exclamation "Lan men t o !" in the  naven i s  an express ion  of
' con te mptib le  submission'  t o  th e  l a u a , p a r a l l e l  with the  wau shaming 
h imself  by ' a c t i n g  as the  wife of  t h e  l a u a ' and a l so  c o n s i s t e n t  with 
th e  hum i l ia t ion  of  the  novices dur ing  i n i t i a t i o n  (1936: 132). 
Handelman, in an i n t e r e s t i n g  r e - e v a lu a t io n  o f  Bateson 's  a n a l y s i s ,  
has focused on th e  " lud ic"  aspec ts  of  the  wau-laua r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
and has analysed th e  naven as a play on th e  anomalies inhe ren t  in
the  r o l e  of  t h e  wau in h is  t r a n s v e s t i t e  guise  (1979).  But Handelman's
a n a ly s i s  lacks a wider c ons ide ra t ion  of  th e  ideology of  Iatmul 
c u l t u r e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  with regard  to  marriage p a t t e r n s .  Handelman 
fol lows  Bateson in seeing  th e  behaviour of  t h e  wau as a ' " c a r i c a tu r e "  
of  Iatmul male sentiments of  shame, submission and subo rd ina t ion '  
(1979: 180), which a r i s e s  from h is  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  as a w i f e - f ig u re  
t o  th e  l a u a ; " Lan men t o !" ("Husband thou indeed!")  i s  a p a r t  of  
th e  s c r i p t  enac ted between wau and laua  as a p a r t  of  t h i s  ludic  
e x e rc i s e .
While I would agree with both Bateson and Handelman t h a t  th e  
submission of  th e  wau i s  a c a r i c a t u r e ,  I would sugges t  t h a t  n e i t h e r
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author hayp- adequately accounted f o r  t h i s  impor tant  element,  
embodied in th e  exclamation "Lan men t o !",  in which th e  wau 
i r o n i c a l l y  names h is  laua as "husband".  Is  i t  c o r r e c t  t o  loc a te  
th e  ' con tem pt ib le  submission'  of th e  wau in h i s  own se l f - a b n e g a t io n ?  
Is i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  see th e  irony here  in th e  exac t  wording of  th e  
wau's exclamation,  namely t h a t  he i s  i r o n i c a l l y  cla iming the  
laua as a husband? But why should he do t h i s ?  To' answer t h i s  
ques t ion ,  we need to  r e c a l l  t h a t  Bateson had e a r l i e r  described  
th e  ideology of Iatmul marriage as being p red ic a ted  on th e  
exchange of  s i s t e r s  (see Chapter  Six above).  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  
we can see th e  wau and laua as belonging t o  d i f f e r e n t  groups,  
th e  former as a w i fe -g iv e r  and th e  l a t t e r  as a w i f e - t a k e r .
P rev ious ly ,  t h e  wau had given a woman to  l a u a 1s group; her  son, 
the  l a u a , i s  t h e  c e n t r a l  focus of  th e  naven. At t h i s  p o in t  in 
th e  marriage cyc le ,  th e  laua should give h i s  s i s t e r  in marriage 
to  the  o th e r  group.  This might in f a c t  mark th e  t r a n s i t i o n  from 
laua t o  wau.;. I f  t h i s  is  so,  t h e " naven can be read as a d ramat iz ­
a t ion  of  t h e  young man's t r a n s i t i o n  from "husband" (synonym f o r  
w i f e - t a k e r )  t o  "bro ther"  (synonym f o r  w i f e - g i v e r ) .  I f  th e  laua 
is  to  grow up and achieve f u l l  m a tu r i t y ,  he must f u l f i l  h i s  o b l i g ­
a t ion  t o  provide  a wife to  t h e  o th e r  group.  The t r a n s v e s t i t e  r o l e  
of  th e  wau in t h e  naven can thus  be seen as an i r o n i c  meta-commentary 
on the  ambivalent  s t a t u s ,  not  of  th e  wau, but  of  th e  l a u a .
"Husband thou indeed!" i s  then a d ism issa l  of  th e  laua as a mature 
male. The wau i s  in e f f e c t  saying,  "You owe us a woman! You 
have a l ready  had a woman from us.  Unti l  you give us a woman, y o u ' r e  
a woman y o u r s e l f .  Husband, indeed? W ife - taker ,  indeed? No!" The 
wau is  being more contemptous than con tempt ib le .  The shame is  th e  
l a u a ' s ,  i r o n i c a l l y  expressed by t h e  wau in th e  naven.
This reading  i s  demonstrated perhaps in t h e  naven inc iden t  
repor ted  by Bateson in which th e  wau and h is  wife climb a ladder  to  
th e  roof of  a house and engage in a t r a n s v e s t i t e  mock copu la t ion ,  
r eve rs ing  t h e  male and female ro l e s  (Chapter  Three,  page 62 above).  
As wau's wife i s  a c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  mother to  th e  l a u a , t h i s  "sketch" 
again can be seen as an i ro n i c  comment on th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  wau's  
$roup a re  owed a wife by the  l a u a ' s  group.  The wau' s  group,  or  
"m a t r ic la n" ,  perhaps,  in Bateson 's  te rm s ,  a re  fo rced  t o  copula te
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amongst themselves in a highly  pub l ic  p lace  - on a roof  - because 
of th e  f a i l u r e  of  th e  l a u a ' s  group to  provide  th e  woman owed. In 
f a c t ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  view t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  even t ,  and naven 
a c t i v i t y  as a whole, as a r e v e r s a l  not  only of  ind iv idua l  r o l e s ,  
but  a l so  of  m o ie t i e s  as marriage exchange groups.  Thus, t h e r e  is  
a r e v e r s a l  of  sexual i d e n t i t i e s ,  of  in d iv idua l  and moiety r o l e s  
and, in t h e  mock-copulat ion of  th e  wau and h is  w ife ,  a r e v e r s a l  
of  p h ys io log ica l  o r i f i c e s  - s ince  th e  wau puts  a f r u i t  in to  h is  
anus. The f a c t  t h a t  the  wau and h is  wife perform t h i s  e x t ra o rd in a ry  
ac t  on th e  top  of  a ladder  in d i c a t e s  an express ion  of  s u p e r i o r i t y  
on th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  wau' s  group; no wonder, the n ,  t h a t  t h e  laua i s  
ashamed a t  t h i s  a c t ,  and t h a t  l a u a ' s  s i s t e r  b u r s t s  in to  t e a r s ,  
as Bateson r e p o r t s  (1936: 20),  s ince  th e  laua i s  being reminded 
t h a t  i t  i s  she who i s  owed in marr iage .
Thus th e  dramatic i rony on th e  p a r t  of  th e  wau shows th e  o the r  
group t h a t  a woman is  owed, and h i s  c a r i c a tu r e d  t r a n s v e s t i t e  
behaviour i s  a c a r i c a t u r e  of  t h i s  deb t .  The r o l e  r e v e r s a l  in th e  
naven a c t i v i t i e s ,  exempli f ied in th e  exclamation "Husband, thou 
indeed!" ,  r e v e a l s  a r e v e r s a l  in t h e  g iv ing  and r e c e iv in g  of  women, 
the  o s c i l l a t i o n  of  w i fe -g iv e r s  and w i f e - t a k e r s .  The naven does 
not  so much express  a soc ia l  f a c t ,  as i n i t i a t e  one. I t  is  
per formative  in A u s t in ' s  te rms;  i t  does something.  The wau's  
exclamation can be t r a n s l a t e d  as ,  "You won' t  g ive  us a woman, so 
I must become one t o  make up f o r  your f a i l u r e  t o  f u l f i l  your p a r t  
in th e  t r a n s a c t i o n . "
I do not  o f f e r  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  as a f i n a l  read ing  of  th e  
naven, but  only in th e  s p i r i t  of  sugges t ing  t h a t  th e  imagery 
involved o f f e r s  t h e  Iatmul a number of  ambiguous c u l t u r a l  p o s s i b i l i t ­
ies  which a re  not  l im i ted  t o  any one e s s e n t i a l  meaning, as Bateson 
seemed to  assume. I am not saying t h a t  Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  the  
naven i s  wrong, only t h a t  i t  i s  only one in a t o t a l  f i e l d  of  
p o s s ib le  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .
One should a l so  note  t h a t  h is  informants might well have taken 
f o r  gran ted a wealth of  im p l ica t ions  which they did  not  bo ther  to
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make e x p l i c i t  t o  him, j u s t  because they  were taken f o r  g ran ted .  
This i s ,  of  course ,  always a problem f o r  any a n t h ro p o l o g i s t .
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NOTES to  Chapter Eight
( D  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  view Bateson 's  a n a l y s i s  o f  Iatmul i n i t i a t i o n ,
i f  not  o f  Iatmul e thos  g e n e r a l ly ,  in t h e  l i g h t  of  the  
a u t h o r ' s  own education in t h e  B r i t i s h  pub l i c  school system 
(see  L ipse t  1982: 61-62) .
(2 ) This can be c o n t ra s t ed  with t h e  B a l inese ,  who would respond
t o  a s i m i l a r  " c r i s i s "  by performing ano ther  r i t u a l  to
am el io ra te  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  (M,Hobart,  personal  communication).
(3) I t  i s  no ta b le  t h a t  while Ba teson 's  concerns here ,  which
i l l u m i n a t e  much of  h is  t h in k in g  in Naven, a re  c lo se  t o  those  
of  L^v i -S t rauss  - a t  l e a s t  in th e  e a r l i e r  phase of  the  
l a t t e r 1s c a r e e r  - Lev i -S t rauss  devotes  very l i t t l e  space t o  
B a teson 's  Iatmul ethnography in h is  own works.  There are 
two mentions in The Elementary S t r u c t u r e s  of  Kinship,  one 
quot ing Bateson 's  r e p o r t  on the" i n t e l l e c t u a T  debates  amongst 
Iatmul men as to  the  na tu re  of  Night and Day, and th e  o the r  
b r i e f l y  r e f e r r i n g  t o  Ba teson 's  a n a l y s i s  o f  Iatmul k insh ip  
s t r u c t u r e  in the  con tex t  o f  a review of  da ta  on A u s t r a l i an  
ab o r ig i n a l  marriage systems (1969: 127, 202).  The only o the r  
mention of  Bateson I have been ab le  t o  f in d  in L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  
works appears in an essay r e p r in t e d  in h i s  f i r s t  volume of 
c o l l e c t e d  papers ,  in which he,  again b r i e f l y ,  p r a i s e s  Bateson 's  
a n a l y s i s  in Naven as marking an improvement on 'R a d c l i f f e -  
Brown's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  dyadic r e l a t i o n s  according t o  o rde r .
He (Bateson) has at tempted t o  p lace  them in s p e c i f i c  c a t e g o r i e s ,  
an under taking which implies  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  something more
t o  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  than th e  dyadic r e l a t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  the  
s t r u c t u r e  i t s e l f '  (1968: 304, my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
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CHAPTER NINE: SCHISMOGENESIS
BATESON'S CHAPTER XII r e p re s e n t s  th e  climax of h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  
in th e  book from a concern with s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  t o  a th eory  of  
a c t io n .  This t r a n s i t i o n  i s  made by means of  h is  own fo rm ula t ions ,  
notably t h a t  of  e thos .  He himse lf  might not  have phrased the  
s i t u a t i o n  in th e s e  terms,  but  I s h a l l  argue t h a t  the  process of 
schismogenesis ,  which is  the  s u b je c t  m a t te r  of  h i s  Chapter  XIII ,  
is more a the o ry  of  ac t ion  than a theo ry  of  e th o s .  I t  i s  th e  cl imac­
t i c  s tep  in h i s  ana ly s i s  of  th e  naven, and i t  can be a l l i e d  t o  a 
performative  model, r a t h e r  than t o  an e s s e n t i a l i s t  notion of  an 
immanent e th o s .  At t h i s  po in t  in h is  argument Bateson produces a 
t e x t  which i s  un l ike  any o the r  anthropology w r i t t e n  in th e  1930s; 
i t  i s  th e  he igh t  of  h is  o r i g i n a l i t y  in Naven.
His ch a p te r ,  c a l l e d  'E tho log ica l  C on t ra s t ,  Competit ion and 
Schismogenes is ' ,  begins with a b r i e f  c o n s id e ra t io n  of th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
surrounding deba tes on the  cause of  e t h o lo g ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e .  Are 
d i f f e r e n c e s  in temperament between th e  sexes in any one s o c ie ty  
due t o  h e r e d i ty ,  or  to  c u l t u r a l  and environmental f a c t o r s ?  Here, 
Mead's da ta  on gender ro l e s  among th e  Arapesh, th e  Mundugumor and 
and th e  Tchambuli i s  quoted (1936: 171-172).
As f a r  as c h i ld  rea r in g  i s  concerned,  Bateson r e p o r t s  t h a t  th e re  
i s  no marked d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  way t h a t  male and female 
Iatmul babies  a re  t r e a t e d ;  nor did i t  seem to  him t h a t  babies of 
one sex were more welcome than those  of  th e  o th e r  (1936: 174). I t  
i s  in t h e  l a t e r  t r a i n i n g  of  boys and g i r l s ,  he t h i n k s ,  t h a t  we w i l l  
f ind  t h e  o r ig i n s  of  the  c o n t r a s t i n g  sex e th o se s .  These a re  l e a r n t  by 
in s t r u c t i o n  and im i ta t io n  in th e  p o s t - i n f a n t  y e a r s .  For th e  boys, 
lea rn ing  how t o  be an Iatmul man i s  a process  which ta kes  p lace  
c o n t in u a l ly  in t h e  j u n i o r  ceremonial  house,  where they im i ta t e  the  
s p e c ta c u la r  and boas t ing behaviour of  t h e i r  s e n i o r s .  Then comes the  
p a i n fu l ,  f r i g h t e n i n g  ordeal  of  i n i t i a t i o n .  In e a r l i e r  days ,  a l l  
t h i s  would have been combined with th e  a c t i v i t i e s  and ceremonials 
connected with head-hunting .  The naven given f o r  th e  boy 's  f i r s t  
k i l l ,  in which he i s  made th e  "hero",  would have been c r u c i a l  in
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t h i s  r e s p e c t .  In the  case of  the  women, the  female ethos  would be 
learned by th e  l i t t l e  g i r l  as she works with her  peers and with th e  
o lde r  women, occupying themselves with f o o d - g e t t i n g ,  c h i l d - r e a r i n g  
and domestic t a s k s  (1936: 174-175).
But th e s e  problems of  le a rn ing  and im i ta t io n  do not  exhaust  the  
mechanisms which accompany e th o lo g ic a l  c o n t r a s t ,  says Bateson.  They 
maintain th e  s t a t u s  quo, but  o th e r  f a c t o r s  a re  a t  work which, i f  
l e f t  u n r e s t r a i n e d ,  would lead t o  changes in t h e  c u l t u r a l  norms.
Bateson sees  th e  s t a t u s  quo as a 'dynamic equ i l ib r ium  in which changes 
are  c o n t in u a l l y  t a k ing  p lace '  (1936: 175). The use of  the  
phrase 'dynamic e q u i l i b r i u m 1 i s  an express ion  of  Bateson 's  s c i e n t i f i c  
background and im p l i c i t  assumptions he re .  He claims t h a t  the se  
changes c o n s t i t u t e  processes of  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  which on th e  one hand 
tend towards an inc rease  in e t h o lo g ic a l  c o n t r a s t ,  and on th e  o the r  
c o n t in u a l ly  co u n te rac t  the  tendency towards such increased  d i f f e r e n t ­
i a t i o n .  These processes  of  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  Bateson def ines  as 
sch ismogenes is .
' I  would de f ine  schismogenesis  as a process  of  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
in t h e  norms o f  ind iv idua l  behaviour r e s u l t i n g  from cumulative 
i n t e r a c t i o n  between i n d i v i d u a l s 1 (1936: 175, Bateson 's  emphasis) .
Ins tead  of  de f in ing  th e  process s p e c i f i c a l l y  v i s - a- v i s  th e  
various  d i s c i p l i n e s  which he had t r i e d  t o  s e p a ra t e ,  Bateson sugges ts  
t h a t  we should study schismogenic p rocesses  from th e  d i f f e r e n t  po in t s  
of  view which he had advocated:  t h a t  i s ,  th e  s t r u c t u r a l ,  e t h o l o g i c a l ,  
and s o c i o l o g i c a l .  Also, he sugges ts  t h a t  schismogenesis  p lays an 
important  p a r t  in th e  moulding of  i n d i v id u a l s .  I t  w i l l  be ev iden t  
t h a t  h i s  concern here ,  as noted in Chapter  Four, i s  t h e  r e d e s c r i p t io n  
of  b io l o g i c a l  d r ives  or  p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s  in s o c ia l  or  c u l t u r a l  
te rms.  Bateson cont inues :
' I  am in c l in e d  t o  regard  the  study of  th e  r e a c t io n s  o f  in d iv id -  
ual s  t o  th e  r e a c t io n s  of  o th e r  in d iv id u a l s  as a usefu l  d e f i n i t i o n  
of  t h e  whole d i s c i p l i n e  which i s  vaguely r e f e r r e d  t o  as Social  
Psychology.  This d e f i n i t i o n  might s t e e r  th e  s u b je c t  away from 
mys t ic i sm 1 (175-176, Ba teson 's  emphasis) .
Bateson argues t h a t ,  when h is  su b je c t  i s  so de f ined ,  then  we
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must regard  any r e l a t i o n s h i p  between two in d iv id u a l s  as being 
l i a b l e  t o  a l t e r  from time to  t ime,  even withou t  any o u ts ide  
in f luence .
'We have t o  cons ide r ,  not  only A's r e a c t io n s  t o  B's behaviour,  
but  we must go on t o  cons ider  how th e s e  a f f e c t  B's  l a t e r  
behaviour  and the  e f f e c t s  of  t h i s  on A' (1936: 176).
Bateson 's  r e fe re n c e  to  ' s o c i a l  psychology 1 i s  important  here .
Against Durkheim, he i s  arguing t h a t  human ac t io n  i s  both
ind iv idua l  and c o l l e c t i v e .  This r e f e r s  t o  h is  notion  of  ' s o c io lo g i c a l  
f u n c t i o n ' .  In a t tempt ing t o  fo rmula te  a theory  of  a c t io n ,  he is  
moving towards an ontology and away from an epistemology;  t h i s  
may exp la in  why "eidos" has now disappeared  form h is  a n a l y s i s .  The 
use of th e  labe l  ' s o c i a l  psychology' in t roduces  t h e  su b je c t  of  
r e l a t i o n s ,  and thus  moves away from a d e s c r ip t i o n  of  th in g s  and 
o b j e c t s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  Bateson i s  pursuing a s i m i l a r  development 
to  t h a t  of  two of h is  contemporar ies,  namely Evans-Pr i t chard  (1940) 
and Nadel (1951).  Second, Ba teson 's  d e f i n i t i o n  of  h is  s u b jec t  as 
Social  Psychology provides f o r  t h e  use of  a r e f l e x i v e ,  i n t e r - s u b j e c t ­
ive and hermeneutic p e r s p e c t iv e .  Re la t ions  a re  by d e f i n i t i o n  
"double";  they  have a dual f a c e .  The a n th ro p o lo g i s t  is  noting p e o p le ' s  
r e a c t i o n s ,  but  th e  people themselves a re  a l so  i n t e r p r e t i n g  the  
r e a c t io n s  of  o t h e r s .
But t h i s  model of  hermeneutic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  a l so  a model 
of  a c t io n .  Bateson i s  here at tempt ing  to  cu t  through and t ranscend 
t h e  C ar te s ian  d u a l i t y  between body (as exem pli f ied  in behaviour)  
and mind ( i l l u s t r a t e d  by meaning). The notion  of  schismogenesis  
is  a model of  both ac t ion  and r e a c t io n ;  i t  i s  n e i t h e r  behav ioura l ,  
nor i s  i t  pure ly  hermeneutic ( i n t e r p r e t i v e )  or  symbolic. Bateson 's  
co l l a p s e  of  t h e  Car te s ian  d u a l i t y  here p a r a l l e l s  h i s  co l l a p s e  of 
ethos  and e id o s .
The problem can be phrased in terms of  th e  ques t ion ;  i s  t h e r e  
a s e l f  p r i o r  t o  any soc ia l  o r  c u l t u r a l  f a c t s ,  o r  i s  th e  s e l f  a 
product  of  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n ?  Although Bateson h im se l f  does not  
use th e  t e r m - h e r e , : t h e  argument i s  a d i a l e c t i c a l  one.  I t  has
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been developed by, among o th e r s ,  P e i r ce ,  Collingwood and p a r t i c u l a r l y  
Taylor (1985), whose c o n t r ib u t io n  I w i l l  d i scuss  a t  some length 
in my Chapter Eleven below. The wider ques t ion  of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  as 
c o n s t i t u t i v e  of  s o c ia l  r e a l i t y  goes back t o  Hegel,  Marx and 
Nietzsche.  ( D
Bateson con t inues  by saying t h a t  many systems of  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
e i t h e r  between in d iv idua l s  or  between groups of  i n d i v id u a l s ,  contain  
te ndenc ie s  towards p rogress ive  change.  Bateson d e l i n e a t e s  stwo 
p a t t e r n s  of  schismogenic change. I f  an in d iv idua l  A behaves in a 
way which i s  c u l t u r a l l y  expected of  him towards an in d iv idua l  B,
f o r  example in an a s s e r t i v e  way, and B i s  expected t o  r e a c t  towards
A in a way which i s  c u l t u r a l l y  l a b e l l e d  as submission,  then i t  is  
probable t h a t  B's  submission w i l l  encourage a f u r t h e r  a s s e r t i o n  from 
A. This in tu rn  w i l l  lead t o  a f u r t h e r  submissive r e a c t io n  from B,
and so on. This i s ,  p o t e n t i a l l y ,  an un limited  p ro g re s s iv e  p a t t e r n
and, in th e  absence of  a d d i t io n a l  f a c t o r s  which might tend to  
am el io ra te  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  A w i l l  become more and more a s s e r t i v e ,  
while B w i l l  become more and more submiss ive.  This w i l l  be l i k e l y  
whether A and B a re  s epa ra te  in d iv id u a l s  o r  members of  d i f f e r e n t  
groups (1936: 176). P rogress ive  change o f  t h i s  kind Bateson c a l l s  
complementary 'sch ismogenesis . The o th e r  schismogenic p a t t e r n  occurs 
in cases  where, f o r  example, A's a s s e r t i v e  behaviour i s  met by 
s i m i l a r l y  a s s e r t i v e  behaviour on th e  p a r t  of  B. Here, a s s e r t i o n  
r e s u l t s  in more a s s e r t i o n ,  and so on. This kind of  p rog res s ive  
change Bateson c a l l s  symmetrical schismogenesis  (1936: 176-177).
Bateson now asks ,  can th e se  fo rm ula t ions  be app l ied  t o  h is  
Iatmul da ta?  Can we say,  f o r  example, t h a t  th e  c o n t r a s t  in Iatmul 
sex e thbs  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  in terms of  complementary schismogenesis? 
He claims t h a t  a complementary p a t t e r n  i s  ev iden t  in th e  f a c t  t h a t  
the  women a re  regarded by the  men as an audience f o r  t h e i r  s p ec ta c ­
u l a r  d i s p l a y s ,  and
' t h e r e  can be no reasonable  doubt t h a t  t h e  presence  of  an audience 
is  a very important  f a c t o r  in shaping th e  men's b e h a v i o u r . . .  
i t  i s  probable  t h a t  th e  men a re  more e x h i b i t i o n i s t i c  because 
th e  women admire t h e i r  performances '  (1936: 177).
At the  same t ime ,  th e  s p e c ta c u la r  behaviour of  th e  men is
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‘a s t im ulus  which summons th e  audience t o g e t h e r ,  promoting in 
th e  women t h e  app rop r ia te  complementary b ehav iou r 1 (1936: 177).
But t h i s  c o n t r a s t  between exh ib i t ion i sm  and admira t ion i s  only a 
p a r t  of  t h e  wider sex c o n t r a s t  in Iatmul s o c i e t y .  Bateson asks 
i f  t h i s  wider c o n t r a s t  con ta ins  schismogenic p a t t e r n s .  The only 
evidence which Bateson f e e l s  ab le  t o  produce here i s  t h e  r e a c t io n  of 
the  men t o  t h e  sad songs of  t h e  widow in mourning, when th e  former 
engage in harsh c a r i c a t u r e  of  t h e  l a t t e r  (1936: 177-178).
I would sugges t  t h a t  th e  problem with Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  here 
i s  t h a t  ftecx o n f l a t e s  th e  n o t i o n :o f  " p a s s i v i t y "  with  t h a t  of 
"submission";  t h i s  i s  the  d i r e c t  im p l ica t ion  of  h is  d e s c r ip t i o n  
of  th e  women's r o l e  as audience as one of  ' a d m i ra t i o n '  as opposed to  
t h a t  of  th e  men as ' e x h ib i t io n i s m '  (1936: 177). In a r e ce n t  essay
on agency in B a l i ,  Hobart has c r i t i c i s e d  t h i s  kind of  model in
which he cla ims t h a t  e x i s t i n g  modes of  a n a l y s i s  r e p r e s e n t  people as
' e i t h e r  d r iven  cau s a l ly  by t h e i r  needs and d e s i r e s  (whether 
shaped by na tu re  o r  the'  market)  or  d ram a tu rg ic a l ly  they  are 
a c t o r s  in a play whose s u b j e c t i v i t y  i s  dec ided by someone 
e l s e ' s  s c r i p t '  (1986: 3 ) .
Hobart fo l lows  Collingwood in saying t h a t  s in c e
' a c t i o n s  and agents  may d i f f e r  both by degree and k i n d . . .  
c l a s s i f y i n g  bysexclus ive p r o p e r t i e s  and s u b s t a n t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
i s  vacuous and o f ten  profoundly m i s l e a d in g 1 (1986: 3 ) .
In Ba teson 's  ca se ,  he has f a l l e n  in to  a h o l i s t i c  t r a p  of  s i m p l i s t i c
comparison between Iatmul men and women, in s te ad  of  cons ide r ing  th e
many v a r i e t i e s  of  day-to-day s i t u a t i o n s  in which complementary 
schismogenesis  occurs .
The impor tant  po in t  t o  be made here i s  t h a t  t h e  women a re  not
mere o b j e c t s  on whom the  males simply a c t  and f o r  whom they perform;
they  a re  s u b je c t s  who c o n s t i t u t e  an audience,  f o r  whom and t o
whom th e  performance i s  d i r e c t e d .  Bateson should acknowledge t h a t
the  women a re  in a sense both a c t i v e  and pass ive  -  t h a t  i s  t o  say,
they are  both "agents"  and " p a t i e n t s "  (Hobart 1986) -  in t h a t  they
shape th e  e x h i b i t i o n s  which a re  d i r e c t e d  a t  them and, i r o n i c a l l y ,
t h a t ^ t h e  more women are  made p a t i e n t s  th e  more male agents  depend 
on them f o r  t h e i r  cont inuing  agency.  This would be th e  lo g ica l  
im p l ica t ion  of  Bateson 's  admission in h i s  sch ismogenetic  model t h a t
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the  women a re  r e a c t in g  to  the  men, s ince  schismogenesi s ,  whether 
complementary or  symmetrical ,  i s  a cont inu ing  p a t t e r n  of i n t e r -  
a c t i o n . We can a l so  perhaps view Iatmul men's dependency on th e  
"patiency"  of  th e  women in th e  l i g h t  of  t h e i r  apparent  dependency 
on women's economic and household labour f o r  more m a te r ia l  goods 
(see Chapter  Seven, page 148 above).  (2)
In h is  claim t h a t  ' e x h ib i t ion i sm  and admira t ion i s  only a p a r t  of  
the  genera l  sex c o n t r a s t  which inc ludes  a whole nexus of  i n t e r ­
r e l a t e d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s '  (1936: 177) we can see Bateson now 
wishing t o  f in d  an o v e r - a l l  system on which he can ground h is  
a n a l y s i s .  Thus he qu ickly  moves from a view of schismogenesis  
as a con tex tua l  p ro c e s s , a view which in my opin ion con ta ins  a g r e a t  
deal of i n s i g h t ,  to  a view of i t  as a determining and c o n s t i t u t i v e  
system. This i s  a theme of much o f  Ba teson 's  work; he c o n t in u a l ly  
works hard t o  c o l l a p s e  a n a l y t i c a l  oppos i t ions  (h i s  own as well as 
those of  o th e r  w r i t e r s ) ,  only immediately t o  c o n s t ru c t  new ones.
Male i n i t i a t i o n ,  w r i te s  Bateson, i s  ano ther  con tex t  of  complement­
ary schismogenes is .  Here, though,  th e  schismogenesis  i s  not  between 
male and female,  but  between two groups o f  males - i . e .  t h e  i n i t i a t o r s  
and th e  novices (1936: 178). But th e  p a t t e r n  of  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
example of  complementary schismogenesis  i s  not  th e  c i r c u l a r  one which 
Bateson has o u t l i n e d .  The i n i t i a t o r s ,  with Iatmul masculine e th o s ,  
a t t r i b u t e  t h e  women's ethos to  t h e  novices,  and t r e a t  them accord­
ingly f o r  a while ,  during th e  e a r l y  phases of  th e  r i t e s .  But the  
novices themselves  do not  r e a c t  in a complementary manner; r a t h e r ,  
Bateson 's  da ta  suggest  t h a t  t h e i r  t r e a tm e n t  pushes them towards 
tak ing  on th e  masculine ethos themselves ,  so t h a t  in th e  f u t u r e  they  
w i l l  behave in t h e  mould of  th e  Iatmul man. Here, t h e r e f o r e ,  
complementary behaviour on the  p a r t  of  one group r e s u l t s  in a r e a c t io n  
which i s  ev e n tu a l ly  pa t te rned  in e x a c t ly  th e  same way; o r ,  in 
Bateson 's  term,  in t h e  form of a symmetrical r e a c t io n  - a l b e i t  a t  
one remove, s ince  t h e  novices must wai t  u n t i l  i t  i s  t h e i r  t u rn  to  
become i n i t i a t o r s  befo re  they  are ab le  t o  t r e a t  ano ther  group of  
un fo r tuna te  youths in th e  same way t h a t  th ey  themselves have been
t r e a t e d  (1936: 178).
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Symmetrical schismogenesis  does not  apparen t ly  ob ta in  between 
th e  sexes .  I t  does,  however, occur during i n i t i a t i o n ,  when the  r i v a l  
moie t ies  of  i n i t i a t o r s  compete with each o th e r  in t h e  harshness 
with which they  t r e a t  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  groups of  novices (1936: 178).
The nex t  s e c t i o n  of  Bateson 's  t e x t ,  which i s  an account  of  th e  
var ious  c on tex ts  in which schismogenic p a t t e r n s  might be found, 
i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  in t h e  l i g h t  of  h i s  l a t e r  work. He 
sugges ts  t h a t  th e  concept of  schismogenesis  might be a p p l icab le  
to  the  s tudy of  in d iv idua l s  involved in dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  by 
which he means marr iage,  and th e  t r e a tm e n t  o f  neuros is  
in th e  i n d i v id u a l .  As f a r  as marriage  i s  concerned,  he notes t h a t
' a  g r e a t  many of the  maladjustments of  marriage a re  nowadays 
desc r ibed  in terms of  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  spouse with parent* 
(1936: 178).
We might be ab le  t o  understand why i t  i s  t h a t  many marr iages  appear 
t o  begin well but  l a t e r  become u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  by applying  th e  
concept  o f  p ro g re s s iv e ,  or  schismogenic,  change.  For example, i f  
a husband i d e n t i f i e s  h i s  wife with h is  mother, we can s e e e t h a t  as 
th e  mother-son r e l a t i o n s h i p  in our c u l t u r e  i s  t y p i c a l l y  complement­
ary -  with f o s t e r i n g  behaviour on t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  mother,  and 
h e lp le s s n es s  on t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  c h i ld  -  then such a marriage  may 
well be s a t i s f a c t o r y  in i t s  e a r l y  s t a g e s ,  s ince  t h e  schismogenetic  
na tu re  of  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  not  y e t  be e v id e n t .  But given 
t h a t  schismogenic change i s  p ro g re s s iv e ,  then  t h e  complementary 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between w i f e - id e n t i f i e d -w i th -m o th e r  and husband- 
i d e n t i f i e d - w i t h - c h i l d  w i l l  ev e n tu a l ly  produce more and more extreme 
complementary behaviour between t h e  p a r t n e r s ,  with t h e  wife becoming 
more and more "motherly" and th e  husband more " c h i l d l i k e "  (1936:
179). This p a r t  o f  Bateson 's  t e x t  addresses  i t s e l f  t o  problems 
which were t o  i n t e r e s t  him l a t e r ,  in h is  work on d i s j u n c t i v e  commun­
ic a t io n  p a t t e r n s  which led t o  h i s  r o l e  in th e  beginnings  of  family 
therapy  in t h e  United S t a t e s .
In h i s  s e c t io n  on th e  a p p l i c a t io n  of  th e  theo ry  of  schismogenesis  
t o  the  t r e a tm e n t  of  n e u ro s i s ,  th e se  themes a re  even more apparen t .
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' I n  many cases  the  growth of  th e  symptoms of  t h e  paranoid 
ind iv idua l  a re  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with 
those  n e a r e s t  t o  him1 (1936: 180).
Freudian psychoanalysi s  emphasises t h e  d iach ron ic  view of th e  p a t i e n t ,  
who i s  encouraged t o  see h i s  s i t u a t i o n  in terms of  h i s  e a r l y  l i f e  
exper iences ,  in even ts  which took p la ce  long ago. However, a more 
synchronic d iagnos i s  would encourage an examination o f  p re sen t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and t h i s  might lead t h e  p a t i e n t  t o  a p o s i t i o n  where 
he i s  ab le  t o  con t ro l  the  schismogenic p rogress ions  between h imse lf  
and h is  f r i e n d s  and r e l a t i v e s .  Bateson again uses a d i s j u n c t i v e  
marriage  r e l a t i o n s h i p  as an example.
' I  unders tand t h a t  i t  i s  usual  t o  f in d  t h a t  th o se  parano ids  who 
bu i ld  t h e i r  de lus ions  around a b e l i e f  in t h e  u n f a i t h f u ln e s s  of 
t h e i r  wives,  almost in v a r i a b ly  have wives whose u t t e r  f a i t h f u l -  
ness i s  obvious to  every o u t s i d e r . -  Here we may suspect  t h a t  
t h e  schismogenesis  takes  t h e  form of con t inua l  express ion  of  
anx ie ty  and susp ic ion  on th e  husband' s  s i d e ,  and con t inua l  
response to  t h i s  on th e  s id e  o f  t h e  w ife ,  so t h a t  she,  
e i t h e r  c o n t in u a l l y  humouring him o r  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  him, i s  
promoting h is  maladjustment,  and he, in t u r n ,  becoming more 
m a lad ju s t ,  demands more and more exaggera ted  responses  from 
h e r '  (1936: 180).
Bateson con t inues :
' I t  i s  probable  t h a t  schismogenesis  i s  an impor tan t  f a c t o r  in 
n eu ros i s  as well  as in psychos is ,  and t h a t  a new d i s c i p l i n e  
of  psychoanalys is  could be b u i l t  up on th e s e  l i n e s  supplementing 
t h e  systems which are now being used 1 (1936: 181).
He goes on t o  sugges t  t h a t  i t  might be c o n s t r u c t i v e  t o  examine 
not  only schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between t h e  p a t i e n t  and o th e r s ,  
but  a l so  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  such r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e x i s t  w i th in  the  
p a t i e n t ,  so foreshadowing th e  e x i s t e n t i a l  psycho the rapeu t ic  approach 
of  R,D*Laing. Indeed,  the  t i t l e  of  one of  L a ing 's  b e s t  known t e x t s  
i l l u s t r a t e s  Ba teson 's  theme here p e r f e c t l y  (1965).
' I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  in f a c t ,  t h a t  one h a l f  of  th e  s p l i t  p e r s o n a l i t y  
promotes th e  o th e r  and v ice  v e r s a , producing an ever-widening 
breach and in c i d e n t a l l y  causing each h a l f  o f  th e  p e r s o n a l i t y  
t o  be l e s s  and le s s  capable  o f  adap t ive  behaviour in th e  p a t i e n t ' s  
s o c i a l  s e t t i n g '  (1936: 182).
Bateson sugges ts  t h a t  we might see t h e  ex h ib i t io n i sm  and the  
n a rc i ss i sm  of t h e  Iatmul men as two s id e s  of  a ' s p l i t  p e r s o n a l i t y '  
such t h a t  t h e i r  e x h i b i t i o n i s t  behaviour ,  al though connected t o  a 
la rge  e x t e n t  with th e  admiring r e a c t io n s  of  th e  women (and o th e r  men),
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is  a l so  im plica ted  in th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s e l f - a d m i r a t i o n  of  h is  own 
performance.  Thus, an e x te rn a l  schismogenesis  might induce th e  
i n t e r n a l  n a rc i s s i s m  (1936: 182). The s p l i t  here in th e  Iatmul 
man, th e n ,  i s  t h a t  he performs and a t  t h e  same t ime enjoys watching 
himself  perform; t h i s  would make f o r  a complex schismogenic s p l i t  
with in  th e  ind iv idua l  male. But Bateson does not  e l a b o r a t e  on t h i s  
theme; such an e lab o ra t i o n  would, aga in ,  r e q u i r e  a more s u b t l e  
notion of  agency than  the  one with which he i s  working.
Bateson emphasises t h a t  he i s  not  claiming  t h a t  t h e  notion  of  
schismogenesis  exp la ins  a l l  t h e  p rocesses  o f  c h a r a c t e r  format ion .
I t  i s  necessary  t o  enqui re  in to  t h e  cond i t ions  upon which t h e  e x i s t ­
ence of  schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  depend, f o r
'schismogenesis  i s  impossible un less  th e  s o c i a l  ci rcumstances 
a re  such t h a t  t h e  in d iv id u a l s  concerned a re  held t o g e th e r  by 
some form of common i n t e r e s t ,  mutual dependence,  or  by t h e i r  
s o c i a l  s t a t u s  (1936: 182-183).
But I would add t h a t  'mutual dependence'  s u r e ly  implies  a mutual 
r e c o g n i t io n ,  and 'common i n t e r e s t '  might cover a m u l t i tude  of 
f a c t o r s ,  inc lud ing  concerns,  goals  and purposes .  Again, Bateson 
con t inues ,  t h e  e th o lo g ic a l  component i s  necessary ;  schismogenic 
behaviour i s  always grounded in c u l t u r a l l y  p a t t e rn e d  r o l e  p laying 
of some k ind .  Thus, we must examine not  so much th e  con ten t  of  the  
behaviour as ' t h e  emotional emphasis with which i t  i s  endowed in 
i t s  c u l t u r a l  s e t t i n g '  (1936: 182-183).
The ch a p te r  ends with a s ec t io n  s u b t i t l e d  'The Progress  and 
Control  o f  Schismogenes is ' .  The m a te r i a l  in t h i s  s e c t io n  has imp­
o r t a n t  im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  t h e  naven. His f i r s t  
po in t  i s  t h a t  th e  p a r t i e s  t o  a symmetrical o r  complementary r e l a t ­
ionship  may a t  f i r s t  f ind  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  But, s ince  
the  model i s  p ro g re s s iv e ,  Bateson argues t h a t  e i t h e r  a complementary 
or  a symmetrical p a t t e r n ,  once adopted,  w i l l  be l i k e l y  to  a f f e c t  
th e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  of  th e  p a r t i e s  in a d i s t o r t i n g  way. They w i l l  
f ind  themselves becoming o v e r - s p e c i a l i s e d  in th e  p a r t i c u l a r  terms 
requ i red  by t h e i r  r o l e  in t h e  schismogenesis ,  whether t h i s  r o l e  
re q u i r e s  e x h ib i t i o n i s m ,  f o s t e r i n g ,  a s s e r t i o n ,  or  submission .  I f  t h i s  
o v e r - s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  reaches  a p o in t  of  d iscom for t ,  then t h e  in d iv id -
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ual s  concerned might at tempt  t o  r e t u r n  t o  th e  i n i t i a l  phases of 
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  o r  to  break out  o f  i t  a l t o g e t h e r ;  but  t h i s  might 
a c t u a l l y  lead  t o  t h e i r  s p e c i a l i s i n g  even f u r t h e r  in t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
r o l e s .  A schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  ne t  to  ge t  out  
of  (1936: 187). This d i s t o r t i o n  of  p e r s o n a l i t y  w i l l  probably lead 
to  t h r e e  consequences.  F i r s t ,  each p a r ty  w i l l  exper ience  h o s t i l i t y  
towards t h e  o th e r ,  who w i l l  be seen as th e  cause o f  i t s  own 
d i s t o r t i o n .  Second, in complementary schismogenesis  at. l e a s t ,  
each p a r ty  w i l l  become p ro g re s s iv e ly  more unable t o  unders tand th e  
emotional  r e a c t i o n s  of  t h e  o th e r .  Thi rd ,  f e e l i n g s  of  mutual 
j e a lo u s y  w i l l  be exper ienced .
'Thus t h e  members of  each group see th e  s tu n te d  p a r t s  of  t h e i r  
own a f f e c t i v e  l i f e  f u l l y  developed -  indeed over-developed  - 
in t h e  members of  th e  oppos i te  group! (1936: 188).
Bateson then  asks i f  t h i s  mutual j e a lo u s y  i s  a f e a t u r e  of  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  sexes in Iatmul c u l t u r e .  He f e e l s  t h a t  the  
women enjoy t a k in g  th e  male r o l e  in t h e  naven, and t h a t  t h i s  envy 
of  th e  masculine ethos may be seen as an important  motive in t h e i r  
t r a n s v e s t i t e  behav iour .  He i s ,  however, more doubtfu l  about th e  
m a t te r  with rega rd  t o  t h e  men. He acknowledges t h a t  they  outwardly 
d e sp ise  t h e  female e thos ,  and t h a t  t h i s  might i n d i c a t e  some kind 
of  r ep re s s ed  envy.  In any case ,  t h e  male e thos  would prevent  them 
from acknowledging such envy which might r evea l  i t s e l f  in t h e  ove r t  
scorn o f  women. Such scorn can be seen ,  perhaps ,  in t h e  wau' s  
naven behaviour  (1936: 188).
But in a f o o tn o te  Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t ,  al though th e  psychoana ly t­
i c a l  t h e o ry  of  inve rs ion  i s  an a t tempt t o  express  an impor tant  
t r u t h ,  he h im se l f  i s  r e l u c t a n t  t o
' launch  in to  phras ings  which would render  my " b e h a v io u r i s t i c "  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  emotion ambiguous by implying t h a t  t h e  behaviour 
may be t h e  r ev e r s e  of  t h a t  p r im a r i ly  a p p ro p r ia t e  t o  th e  
em otion1 (1936: 188).
Thus, Bateson does not  want t o  use p s y ch o an a ly t ic a l  the o ry  here 
because i t  r e f e r s  back t o  an e s s e n t i a l i z e d  model of  emotion and, 
u l t i m a t e l y ,  t o  t h e -b io s p h e re ;  fu r therm ore ,  i t  i s  u n f a l s i f i a b l e .
His model o f  schismogenesis  i s  a c t io n -b a s e d ;  he does not  want t o  
have t o  r e f e r  t o  any sep a ra t e  realm. In Chapter  Eleven I w i l l  draw 
on an es say  by Charles Taylor,  which c r i t i c i s e s  t h e  not ion t h a t
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any behaviour o r  emotion can e x i s t  p r i o r  t o  any s o c i a l  ac t ion  
(1985).
As th e  schismogenesis  develops,  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  concerned 
become f u r t h e r  and f u r t h e r  a p a r t ,  u n t i l  i t  i s  imposs ib le  f o r  each 
t o  see t h e  o t h e r ’ s po in t  of  view. The r e a c t io n s  of  each pa r ty  
now become simply th e  express ion  of  d i s t a s t e  f o r  t h e  emotional 
adjustment which has been made by t h e  o th e r ;  t h e  p a r t i e s  a re  now, 
in Ba teson 's  te rms ,  'mutual ly  c o n t r a - s u g g e s t i b l e '  (1936; 189).
So, th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  becomes more and more u n s ta b l e .  Bateson 
sugges ts  t h a t  i t  might be p o s s ib le  t o  p l o t  mathematica l ly  th e  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  schismogenic p rogress ion  by means of  t h e  
i s o l a t i o n  of  some d e t a i l  o f  behaviour which can a c t  as an index 
of  degree or  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n ,  and t h a t  t h i s  index should fol low 
an exponent ia l  curve i f  p lo t t e d  through t ime .  However, no in d i c ­
a t ion  i s  given of  how t h i s  might be achieved.
Progress in a schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  be has tened by two 
kinds of  f a c t o r s .  F i r s t ,  i t  may be encouraged by t h e  in c u lc a t io n  of  
d e s i r a b l e  behaviour  p a t t e r n s  congenia l  t o  t h e  schismogenic r o l e  
with in  i n d i v id u a l s .  On th e  o th e r  hand, a f e a r  of  ove r - s tepp ing  
c u l t u r a l  taboos  might a c t u a l l y  r e s t r a i n  schismogenic behaviour .
The second f a c t o r  which might has ten a schismogenesis  i s  an 
a t t i t u d e  o f  t r a g i c  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  by th e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
The sch izo id  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p reoccupat ion with d es t i n y  i s  c i t e d  here 
(1936: 189-190).
I t  i s  apparen t ,  however, t h a t  schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  do 
not  always progress  inexorab ly  from bad to  worse.  Not a l l  sch izo id  
in d iv id u a l s  become sch izophren ics .  Not a l l  marr iages  with some 
degree of  schismogenic input  break down. ( I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  of  course ,  
t h a t  a l l  marr iages  conta in  some such inpu t ,  but  Bateson does not  
mention t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y . )
'We must t h e r e f o r e  th ink  of  schismogenesis ,  not  as a process 
which goes in e v i t a b l y  forward,  but  r a t h e r  as a process  of  
change which i s  in some cases  e i t h e r  c o n t ro l l e d  o r  c o n t in u a l ly  
coun te rac ted  by inverse  p ro ces s e s '  (1936; 190).
He then says t h a t  th e  term 'dynamic e q u i l i b r i u m ' ,  borrowed from
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chemis try ,  i s  usefu l  as an analogy f o r  s o c i a l  p rocesse s ,  bu t  t h a t  
th e  analogy cannot be pushed too  f a r .  I t  should in f a c t  remind 
us t h a t  what we c a l l  ' e q u i l ib r iu m '  may vary g r e a t l y  from one c u l t u r e  
to  ano the r ,  and from one schismogenesis  t o  ano the r .  There are  
a l so  l i k e l y  t o  be d i f f e r e n c e s  in t h e  s t r e n g t h s  of  r e s t r a i n i n g  
f a c t o r s  from con tex t  t o  con tex t  w ith in  one c u l t u r e .  We should ask 
i f  t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  a re  dangerous in one co n te x t ,  and s a f e  in 
ano ther .
The term 'dynamic equ i l ib r ium '  i s  used in chemist ry
' t o  d e s c r ib e  apparently  s t a t i o n a r y  e q u i l i b r i a  which t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
can only be descr ibed  in terms of  two or  more opposed chemical 
r e a c t io n s  occurring  s imul taneously '  (1936: 190).
But, I would add, i t  should be noted t h a t  a chemical r e a c t i o n ,  which 
is  Bateson 's  model here ,  can be descr ibed  in terms of  behav iour , but 
not in terms o f  meaning-or iented a c t i o n . This ,  in o th e r  words, i s  
a language which can be used to  descr ibed  o b j e c t s ,  but  not  human 
be ings.  In f a c t ,  Bateson 's  a n a ly s i s  c o n s ta n t ly  s h i f t s  between a 
d e s c r ip t i o n  of  behaviour,  and t h a t  of  ac t ion  and meaning. His use 
of  a term taken from chemistry in t h i s  p a r t  o f  h is  t e x t  implies t h a t  
Bateson i s  conceiving of  human beings as o b je c t s  p a s s iv e ly  caught  
up in ro l e s  and in var ious so c ia l  p rocesses .
Next, Bateson sugges ts  two main groups of  f a c t o r s  which can 
r e s t r a i n  schismogenesis .  F i r s t  t h e r e  a re  those  f a c t o r s  which merely 
l im i t  schismogenic p rogress ion .  Second, t h e r e  a re  those  f a c t o r s  which, 
i f  l e f t  e n t i r e l y  u n re s t r a in e d ,  would br ing about changes in t h e  bas ic  
p a t t e r n  of  th e  schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p  (1936: 190-191).
The f i r s t  group of  f a c t o r s  - those  which would only l i m i t  the  
schismogenesis  -  a re  connected with th e  s o c i a l i s a t i o n  of  in d i v id u a l s .  
For example, al though the  Iatmul boy i s  brought  up t o  be harsh and 
to  admire harshness  in o th e r s ,  he i s  a l so  ta u g h t  t h a t  c e r t a i n  
extremes of  harshness  a re  s o c i a l l y  unaccep tab le .  E a r l i e r ,  Bateson 
had given t h e  example of  an Iatmul man who was considered too 
v io l e n t ,  t o  t h e  po in t  of  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  by h i s  pee rs .  I f  a man is  
too  v i o l e n t ,  he w i l l  s u f f e r  ac tua l  or  a t  l e a s t  p ro f fe red  v io lence
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in r e t u r n ,  inc luding  the  t h r e a t  of  so rce ry ,  from those  around him 
(1936: 191-192).
The second group of  f a c t o r s  - those  which might br ing  about 
bas ic  changes in t h e  schismogenic p a t t e r n  -  a re  e i g h t  in number.
F i r s t ,  Bateson sugges ts  t h a t  no hea l thy  r e l a t i o n s h i p  can be e i t h e r  
purely symmetrical or  purely  complementary, and t h a t  any r e l a t i o n s h i p  
can be cons ide rab ly  s t a b i l i s e d  by an admixture o f  p a t t e r n in g  which 
c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  primary p a t t e r n .  A V i l l age  Squire ,  f o r  example, 
has a predominantly complementary r e l a t i o n s h i p  with th e  v i l l a g e r s ,  
but  t h i s  might be eased i f  he pa r takes  in th e  annual c r i c k e t  match 
which a f fo rd s  an oppor tun i ty  f o r  him t o  engage in a l i t t l e  symmetrical 
r i v a l r y  (1936: 193). Bateson notes t h a t  among th e  Iatmul t h e  ethos 
of each sex i s  marked by d u a l i t y .  The men admire not  only the  harsh ,  
aggress ive  d eb a te r  but  a l so  th e  speaker of  d i s c r e t i o n .  According 
to  Bateson,  t h i s  might in d i c a te  an undercu r ren t  of  female e thos  
providing a symmetrical input  in to  th e  u su a l ly  harsh mode of  
i n t e r - a c t i o n  between males. The women a re  f o r  th e  most p a r t  co­
o p e ra t iv e  and k indly  towards each o th e r ,  but  they seem to  enjoy 
e x h i b i t i n g  th e  proud male ethos  on some occas ions .  Does t h i s  
admixture of  complementary behaviour by the  u s u a l ly  symmetrical ly 
behaving women reduce the  oppos i t ion  between Iatmul sexes? Bateson 
views th e  ceremonial occasions when women tend t o  adopt  the  proud 
male ethos  as evidence of  t h i s  (1936: 193).
The second and t h i r d  f a c t o r s  which might a l t e r  th e  bas ic  s c h i s ­
mogenic p a t t e r n  would be a change in mode w i th in  a complementary 
and symmetrical r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  In t h e  complementary 
case ,  a marr iage based upon a r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  a s se r t ion -subm iss ion  
might be a l t e r e d  by i l l n e s s  o r  a cc iden t  towards a r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  
f o s t e r i n g  and dependency. An example of  such a change in a 
symmetrical r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  r i v a l r y  i s  a f fo rded  by th e  way in which 
the  behaviour of  th e  Iatmul males in t h e  men's house can swing from 
harshness t o  buffoonery (1936: 193-194).
Bateson i s  now bu i ld ing  a model of  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in which 
a l l  c o n f l i c t  i s  seen as involving  one s ide  as pas s ive  o b j e c t s ,
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r a t h e r  than a model in which both s ide s  a re  viewed as s u b je c t s ,  
who a re  both c o n t r ib u t in g  towards t h e  schismogenetic  - p a t t e r n . - 
We a l so  have t o  cons ider  a wider q ues t ion ,  which Bateson does not 
address^ This i s  whether a l l  c o n f l i c t  can be descr ibed  in th e se  
kinds of  te rm s .  Bateson would seem to  be sugges t ing  t h i s ;  a t  
l e a s t ,  he does not  al low f o r  any o th e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in h i s  a n a l y s i s .  
Another problem here is  t h a t  Ba teson 's  a n a l y s i s  does not  al low 
f o r  th e  co n s id e ra t io n  of  the  h i s t o r y  of  a c t io n ,  f o r  example the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  any one naven i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by previous  navens.
In the  model of  a chemical r e a c t i o n ,  we do not  have to  worry about 
the  p a s t ,  s ince  t h e  f a c t o r s  involved are not  consc ious ly  ac t ing  
s u b j e c t s .  But in t h e  f i e l d  of  s o c ia l  l i f e ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t .
Next, Bateson cons iders  a s i t u a t i o n  in which a schismogenesis
between two groups i s  ha l t e d  by e x t e rn a l  f a c t o r s  which u n i t e  the
two groups in e i t h e r  loya l ty  o r  oppos i t ion  to  an o u t s id e  element.
There a re  p a r a l l e l s  here with E v a n s -P r i t c h a rd ' s  a n a ly s i s  of  Nuer
s o c ia l  o rgan isa ton  (1940). An obvious example here  i s  th e  way
in which th e  outbreak of  war can,  o s t e n s ib l y  a t  l e a s t ,  reduce th e  
o
schismogenic te ns i j i s  within a n a t io n .  Of course ,  Bateson con t inues ,  
t h i s  means t h a t  one schismogenesis  i s  only rep laced  by ano ther ;  
and th e  second might be more d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n t ro l  than  th e  f i r s t .
The next  f a c t o r  fol lows on from t h i s  example. How, .p re c i s e ly ,  w i l l  
an e x t e rn a l  schismogenesis  a f f e c t  p a t t e r n s  of  behaviour with in  
each of  t h e  groups involved? I f  group A is  involved in a 
complementary r e l a t i o n s h i p  with group B, what w i l l  be th e  r e l a t i o n  
between t h e  behaviour p a t t e r n s  between members of  group A and group 
B, and th e  behaviour  p a t t e r n s  between ind iv idua l  members of  each 
group? Bateson a l so  asks how t h i s  w i l l  a f f e c t  h i e r a r c h i c a l  orders  
with in  each group,  and, in a schismogenesis  involving only a p a i r  
of  i n d i v id u a l s ,  whether d i s t o r t i o n s  and compensations w i l l  occur 
w ith in  each p e r s o n a l i t y  (1936: 194-195).
Next, Bateson mentions th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i f  t h e  in d iv id u a l s  
involved in a schismogenic r e l a t i o n s h i p  could become conscious of  
the  p rocesses  involved,  they might begin t o  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  knowledge
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r a t h e r  than t o  t h e i r  own schismogenic p a t t e r n s  (1936: 196). Here, 
Bateson i s  r e t r e a t i n g  from the  i n s ig h t  behind th e  formula t ion  of  
t h e  schismogenetic  model. For he i s  now saying t h a t  an in d i v i d u a l ' s  
consciousness can somehow be viewed as lying o u t s id e  th e  arena of 
ac t i o n .  Whereas th e  g r e a t  v i r t u e  of  t h e  notion  of  schismogenesis  
i s  t h a t  i t  t r anscends  t h e  d u a l i t y  o f  consciousness and ac t ion  by 
c o l lap s in g  them, he i s  now sugges t ing t h a t  consciousness  can be 
e f f e c t i v e l y  o r  a n a l y t i c a l l y  divorced  from a c t io n .  I t  might ,  
however, be p o s s i b l e  to  escape t h i s  dilemma by t a l k i n g  about 
degrees of  r e f l e x i v i t y  in a c t i o n . But whether or  not  t h i s  would 
u l t im a te ly  al low us to  escape from th e  d u a l i t y  of  consciousness 
and a c t i o n ,  I cannot  say.
The seventh f a c t o r  which might r e s t r a i n  schismogenesis  concerns 
th e  mutual dependence of  two p a r t i e s  involved in a complementary 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  A balance might in t h i s  case be reached between 
such mutual dependence and the  schismogenic tendency in the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  (1936: 196). Bateson would seem t o  be implying 
here t h a t  dependence i s  ex t ra -sch ism ogene t ic  r a t h e r  than ,  as he 
wrote above, merely re spons ib le  f o r  a switch in th e  schismogenesis  
from th e  symmetrical to  th e  complementary mode, or  v ice  v e r s a .
Again, I would sugges t  t h a t  t h i s  sugges ts  t h a t  a mode of  human i n t e r ­
a c t io n ,  in t h i s  case t h a t  of  "mutual dependence",  can be separa ted  
o f f  from a c t i o n .  Consciousness,  whether mutual or  no t ,  is  always 
a c r u c i a l  p a r t  o f  human a c t io n ,  un l ike  the  case of  molecules in 
chemis try .  I t  should a l so  be sa id  t h a t  the  notion  o f  dependence 
is  b u i l t  i n to  t h e  naven, but  i t  i s  c o n s ta n t ly  being reformulated  
in success ive  performances.
F in a l ly ,  Bateson cons iders  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  schismogenesis  
might be coun te rac ted  by inverse  p rog re s s ive  changes in the  r e l a t ­
ionship between two groups or  i n d i v id u a l s .  Such inve rse  changes 
would, l i k e  t h e  schismogenic elements,  t ake  the  form o f  cumulat ive 
r e a c t io n s  t o  t h e  r e a c t io n s  of th e  o th e r  group or  th e  o th e r  in d i v id ­
ua l ,  but  th e  d i r e c t i o n  of  th e  changes would be oppos i te  t o  those  
of  schismogenic te n d en c ie s .  The r e s u l t  would be an inc rease  in 
f e e l i n g s  of  mutual love,  r a t h e r  than an inc rease  in f e e l i n g s  of
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mutual h o s t i l i t y .  Bateson emphasises t h a t  such a change can occur 
not only between groups, but a l so  between in d i v id u a l s ,  and he 
ends h i s  chap te r  with what must be one of  h i s  most memorable 
quo te s ,  when he w r i te s  t h a t
'on t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds,  we must expec t  t h a t  i f  t h e  course of 
t r u e  love ever ran smooth, i t  would fol low an exponent ia l  
curve '  (1936: 197).
The main problem with Bateson 's  model of  schismogenesis  i s  t h a t ,  
al though i t  i s  a good s t a r t i n g  p o in t  f o r  an onto logy ,  in t h a t  i t  
d ispenses  with f a l s e  dichotomies,  i t  ignores  th e  problem of  h i s to r y  
and th e  p a s t  im p l ica t ions  f o r  p re sen t  and f u t u r e  a c t i o n .  This is  
of course a major f a u l t  in s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l  ism, and Bateson is  
only fo l lowing  h i s  contemporaries in t h i s  reg a rd .
In a c r i t i q u e  of  the  dramaturg ica l  model of  s o c ia l  l i f e  as 
proposed by Goffman, Alan Ryan has compared analyses  which s t r e s s  
"maximising" and those  which s t r e s s  "dramat is ing"  (1978).  He notes 
th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between pre tending  and d e p ic t in g ,  and reminds us 
t h a t
'a  th in g  might be both i t s e l f  and a p i c t u r e  of  i t s e l f '
(1978: 74) .
In view o f  Goffman's i n s i s t e n c e  on
' t h e  e s s e n t i a l  gap between agent  and r o l e . . . t h e  only ques t ion  
a t  i s su e  i s  whether we should t r e a t  h i s  ( Goffman's) account 
of  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  as a s to ry  about how we r i g  th e  market,  
or  as a s to ry  about how we engage in p u t t i n g  on a good 
show' (1978: 75-76, my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
Ryan's conclusion  i s  t h a t  th e  answer might be e i t h e r ,  or  both.
In the  case o f  t h e  Iatmul and th e  schismogenetic  model of  t h e i r  
s o c ie ty  proposed by Bateson,  I would suggest  t h a t ,  whereas the  
Iatmul a re  in an important  sense maximisers  l i k e  many New Guiinea 
peoples,  they a re  a l so  d ram at ise rs  and t h a t  t h i s  l a t t e r  f a c t o r  i s  
by f a r  t h e  more important  f o r  t h e i r  ceremonial l i f e .  What Bateson 
desc r ibe s  as “ schismogenesis" among t h e  Iatmul i s  a d ramati s ing  of 
log ica l  models,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  of  th e  im p l ica t ions  of  gender r o l e s .
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This can be seen in the  convoluted p la y -a c t in g  in th e  naven, and 
a l so  in t h e  women's dances, in which th e  women d ramati se  t h e i r  
p r i v a t e  domain as a pub lic one. Here, they a re  ab le  t o  submit the  
men t o  i r o n i c  c a r i c a t u r e ,  j u s t  as th e  men submit th e  women to  
c a r i c a t u r e  in t h e  naven.
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NOTES to  Chapter Nine
( D  The approach ou t l in e d  here d i f f e r s  r a d i c a l l y  from t h a t  of
th e  symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s t  school ,  as rep re sen ted  by 
G*H*Mead and E„Goffman. I t  i s  more s u b t l e ,  s ince  i t  does 
not  r e q u i r e  the  dichotomy between symbol and r e f e r e n t ,  
"game" and " rea l  motives" ,  e t c . ,  used by th e s e  w r i t e r s .
I s h a l l  r e tu rn  to  t h i s  theme in Chapter  Eleven below.
(2) The hidden dependency of  men upon women in our own c u l t u r e
has been an important  t o p i c  in contemporary f e m in i s t  
l i t e r a t u r e .  See f o r  example Eichenbaum & Orbach (1984).
194
CHAPTER TEN: EIDOS AND EPILOGUES -  FROM SYSTEM TO CONTEXT
AND BACK
THE FINAL THREE chap ters  of  Naven, namely 'The Eidos of  Iatmul 
C u l t u r e ' ,  and th e  1936 and 1958 Epilogues ,  a re  r e c u r s iv e  in 
n a tu re .  They look back on and complement th e  main body of  Bateson 's  
a n a l y s i s .  I w i l l  comment f i r s t  on Chapter XV which dea l s  with 
Iatmul e id o s .
In Naven Bateson c r e a t e s  two g e n e ra t iv e  models.  Ethos is
genera ted  by schismogenesis .  In h is  Chapter  XV he a t tempts  t o  provide
a second g e n e ra t iv e  model to  deal with e id o s .  This second model 
i s  not as success fu l  as th e  f i r s t .  I t  is  apparent  from h is  t e x t  
t h a t  the  notion  of  eidos i s ,  by th e  end of  th e  book, marginal  t o  the  
an a ly s i s  of  th e  naven. There i s ,  f o r  example, no e i d o lo g ic a l  comp­
lement t o  Chapter  XIV: t h e r e  i s  no chap te r  on The Expression of  
Eidos in Naven. There i s  a l so  th e  important  p o in t  t h a t  whereas 
Bateson d i s c r im in a t e s  between male and female e th o s ,  he does not  
do so with regard  t o  e idos .  In a foo tno te  he admits t h i s ,  and notes 
t h a t  t h i s  i s  due to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  from th e  e id o lo g ic a l  p e r sp ec t iv e  
' I  have no d a t a '  al though he adds t h a t
'from th e  c o n t r a s t  in ethos between th e  sexes I should expect  to  
f in d  c ons ide ra b le  d i f f e r e n c e s  in t h e i r  e i d o s '  (1936: 226).
But t h i s  exp e c ta t io n  i s  not  r e a l i s e d  in h is  t e x t .
In Chapter  Four above I t r i e d  t o  show how Ba teson 's  i n i t i a l  
a n a l y t i c a l  model, which we can d es c r ib e  as " g e n e ra t iv e " ,  i s  reduced 
to  a " s t r u c t u r a l "  model by th e  reduc t ion  from f i v e  t o  t h r e e  a s p ec t s .  
La ter ,  Bateson reduces the  aspec ts  from t h r e e  t o  one, in h is  form­
u la t i o n  of  t h e  notion of schismogenesis .  The l a t t e r  does not  have 
i n t e r n a l  complexity as a gene ra t ive  model; Bateson cannot  genera te  
co g n i t iv e  complexity from schismogenesis .  His problem now is  how 
to  gene ra te  such complexity from th e  notion  of  e id o s .
Eidos i s  def ined by Bateson as ' c u l t u r a l  s t r u c t u r e 1, which is
def ined in tu r n  as ' a  c o l l e c t i v e  term f o r  t h e  coherent  " lo g ic a l "
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system which may be cons t ruc ted  by th e  s c i e n t i s t ,  f i t t i n g  t o g e th e r  
th e  var ious  premises of  the  c u l t u r e '  (1936: 218).  One might 
note here t h a t  Bateson 's  "premises" a re  very s i m i l a r  t o  Col l ing-  
wood's "p resuppos i t ions"  (1972: 21-48) .  For Collingwood, c u l t u r a l  
premises c o n s t i t u t e  a soc ia l  and h i s t o r i c a l  r e a l i t y ,  and a re  not 
pure ly  a b s t r a c t .  They are formed by p a r t i c u l a r  h i s t o r i c a l  
c i rcumstances;  h i s t o r y  i s  what people do.
But, f o r  Bateson,  th e  c r u c i a l  e id o lo g ic a l  r e f e r e n t  i s  th e  
" s t a n d a rd i s a t io n "  of the  i n d iv id u a l .  He has s tandard i sed  ethos  by 
means of  schismogenesis;  he now needs t o  s t a n d a rd i se  e id o s .  His 
chap ter  on Iatmul eidos i s  an at tempt t o  do t h i s .  Schismogenesis 
cannot cover much of  h is  m a te r i a l ,  inc luding  e id o s .  Bateson now sees 
eidos as a n eg a t iv e ly  defined c l a s s ;  i t  i s  t h a t  which i s  "not-  
e thos" .  This i s  s im i l a r  to  the  way in which philosophy has t r e a t e d  
emotion,  i . e .  as a negat ive  ca tegory ,  as t h a t  which i s  not  i n t e l l e c t .  
Philosophy 's  n e g lec t  of  emotion as an a n a l y t i c a l  ca tegory  in i t s  
own r i g h t  has been descr ibed  by Rorty (1980).
Ba teson 's  s t r a t e g y  f o r  dea l ing  with eidos  i s  t o  reduce i t  t o  th e  
c u l t u r a l l y  s t anda rd i se d  in d iv id u a l .  He does t h i s  by concen t ra t ing  
on t r a i n i n g  and s o c i a l i s a t i o n ,  and then on th e  a c t i v a t i o n  of  memory.
Bateson 's  theme a t  the  beginning of  h is  chap te r  i s  t h a t  of  
cogn i t ive  complexity.  He a s s e r t s  t h a t
' t h e  c u l t u r e  has apparently  some i n t e r n a l  tendency t o  complexity,  
some p roper ty  which d r ives  i t  on t o  t h e  f a b r i c a t i o n  and maint­
enance of  more and more e l a b o ra te  c o n s t r u c t s ,  and s ince  t h i s  
tendency has ev iden t ly  co n t r ib u ted  to  th e  shaping of  naven, 
i t  i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  examine i t s  na tu re  in d e t a i l 1 (1936: 218).
He then asks i f  t h i s  complexity r e a l l y  e x i s t s  in th e  c u l t u r e ,  or  i f  
i t  i s  the  r e s u l t  of  a d i s p a r i t y  between two languages and c u l t u r e s ,  
namely th o se  of  th e  an th ro p o lo g is t  and those  of  the  c u l t u r e  he is  
s tudying (1936: 219).  Bateson can only t r u s t  t o  h is
' im pre ss ions  as evidence t h a t  th e  complexity is  not  e n t i r e l y  a 
c r e a t i o n  of  my own methods of  t h i n k in g '  (1936: 219).
I f ,  then ,  t h i s  complexity somehow e x i s t s  in t h e  c u l t u r e ,  and i f  t h i s
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complexity r e f l e c t s  na t iv e  ideas and assumptions ( the  "premises" 
d iscussed  e a r l i e r ) ,  i t  must fo l low t h a t  we a re  dea l ing  with the
' c u l t u r a l  express ion  of  c o g n i t iv e  or  i n t e l l e c t u a l  aspec ts  of  
Iatmul p e r s o n a l i t y 1 (1936: 220).
I would add here t h a t  su re ly  'some i n t e r n a l  tendency to  complexity '  
is  a hal lmark not  only of  Iatmul c u l t u r e ,  but  of  many o th e r s .
Bateson 's  s ta tement t h a t  such complexity must r e l a t e  t o  the  
'c o g n i t i v e  o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  aspec ts  of  Iatmul p e r s o n a l i t y '  i s  based 
on h is  assumed dichotomy between th e  ind iv idua l  and s o c i e t y .
J u s t  as e thos  r e p re s e n t s  the  s t a n d a r d i s a t io n  of  emotions in ind iv idua l
members of  a c u l t u r e ,  so here we are dea l ing  with
'a  s t a n d a r d i s a t io n  of  th e  co g n i t iv e  aspec ts  of  th e  p e r s o n a l i t y  
of  t h e  " ind iv idua ls . Such a s t a n d a r d i s a t io n  and i t s  express ion
in c u l t u r a l  behaviour I s h a l l  r e f e r  t o  as t h e  eidos  of  a
c u l t u r e '  (1936: 220, Bateson 's  emphasis) .
The ques t ion  here  i s  Bateson 's  c r i t e r i a  f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between 
the  s o c ia l  and th e  ind iv idua l  aspec ts  of  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  which he does 
not  d e f in e .
He l i s t s  some of t h e  more apparent  evidence f o r  t h e  complexity of 
Iatmul eidos  in t h i s  way:
' I t  i s  a c u l t u r e  which c o n t in u a l ly  s u r p r i s e s  us by th e  mass of 
s t r u c t u r a l  d e t a i l  which i t  has b u i l t  up around c e r t a i n  c o n tex ts .  
Most conspicuously we have th e  f a b r i c  of  fancy he ra ld ry  and 
totemism b u i l t  up around th e  personal  names and a n ce s to r s :  but  
a s i m i l a r  tendency to  what we can only d e s c r ib e  as hypertrophy 
may be recognised in the  i n i t i a t o r y  system, with i t s  plexus of  
c r o s s - c u t t i n g  dual d iv i s io n s  and staggered  i n i t i a t o r y  grades ;  and 
again in t h e  naven ceremonial ,  where we have seen t h a t  th e  c u l t u r e  
has proceeded upon simple s t r u c t u r a l  premises t o  such leng ths  
t h a t  th e  wau behaves as in some senses a wife of  th e  laua '
(1936: 2 1 S T
Bateson then desc r ibe s  th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  every Iatmul male to  
memorise the  d e t a i l s  of  nomenclature involved in t h e  naming system,
In such f e a t s  of  memory, which a re  of  g r e a t  s t r a t e g i c  importance in 
debates but  which a re  regarded as c r u c i a l  in a l l  a spec ts  of  so c ia l  
l i f e ,  a v a r i e t y  of  mnemonic techn iques ,  and v i s u a l  and k in a e s t h e t i c  
imagery, a re  employed (1936: 222-225).
'We have seen t h a t  va s t  and d e t a i l e d  e r u d i t i o n  i s  a q u a l i t y  which 
i s  c u l t i v a t e d  among th e  Iatmul.  This i s  most 
in th e  debat ing  about names and totems,  and i d£arnauca l ly  f £ ° J n
’ haves  c ta + e sH  +ha-t-
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a learned  man c a r r i e s  in h is  head between ten  and twenty thousand 
names' (1936: 222).
This i s  r e l a t e d  by Bateson to  th e  pervas ive  tendency to  r e p re s e n t
s o c ia l  o r g a n i s a t io n  diagrammatica l ly .
' I n  almost every ceremony, th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a re  arranged in groups 
so t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  p a t t e r n  i s  a diagram o f  th e  s o c ia l  system. In 
th e  ceremonial house th e  c lans  and m oie t ie s  a re  normally a l l o t t e d  
s e a t s  according to  th e  to temic  system of  groupings:  but  when 
i n i t i a t i o n  ceremonies a re  t o  be performed t h i s  arrangement is  
d iscarded  and in i t s  p lace  comes another  based upon th e  c r o s s ­
c u t t i n g  i n i t i a t o r y  moie t ies  and g rades '  (1936: 225).
Bateson claims t h a t  we can a l so  see t h e  naven
'a s  a f u r t h e r  example o f  t h i s  proneness t o  v i s u a l  and k i n a e s t h e t i c  
though t .  We have seen how the  a b s t r a c t  geomet r ical  p ro p e r t i e s  
of  th e  k in sh ip  system are  here  symbolised in costume and g e s tu re ;  
and we may note  t h i s  in pass ing as a c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  eidology 
t o  our unders tanding  of  th e  ceremonies '  (1936: 226).
In th e  m a t t e r  of  memorising names, Bateson s t a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
not confined  t o  a small number of  s p e c i a l i s t s  but  i s  a s k i l l  p r ized  
in t h e  m a jo r i ty  of  men (1936: 226).  The importance a t tached  to  names, 
and a s k i l l  in memorising and using them, i s  pe rvas ive  throughout 
the  c u l t u r e  and i s  not  l im i ted  t o  t h e i r  combative use in deba tes .
'The naming system i s  indeed a t h e o r e t i c a l  image o f  t h e  whole 
c u l t u r e  and in i t  every formulated  a spec t  of  th e  c u l t u r e  i s  
r e f l e c t e d . . .Every s p e l l ,  every s o n g . . . c o n ta in s  l i s t s  of  names.
The u t t e r a n c e s  of  th e  shamans a re  couched in terms of  names . . .  
Marriages a re  o f ten  arranged in o rde r  t o  gain names. Reincarn­
a t ion  and success ion  are  based upon th e  naming system. Land 
t e n u re  i s  based on clan  membership and c lan  membership i s  vouched 
f o r  by names. The man who buys names acqu i res  a t  t h e  same 
t ime membership in th e  clan  t o  which th e  names belonged,  and a 
r i g h t  t o  c u l t i v a t e  th e  land of  t h a t  c l a n .  Every product  of  th e  
r i v e r  and gardens has i t s  p lace  in t h e  system'  (1936: 228).
The s u b je c t  of  memory i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  and important  f o r  two reasons .  
F i r s t ,  i t  i s  one which philosophers  f in d  hard to  deal  w ith .  Second, 
memory i s  i n h e re n t ly  h i s t o r i c a l .  This i s  one of  t h e  reasons  t h a t  
ph i losophers  have d i f f i c u l t y  with i t ;  memory i s  an a c t i v e  p rocess ,  
in t h a t  i t  i s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  of  human r e a l i t y .  Memory and knowing are  
in te rdependen t ,  each being implied by th e  o th e r .  Memory c o n s t i t u t e s  
the  na tu re  of  knowing, and br ings  back in d iv id u a l s  and h i s t o r y  to  
th e  s o c ia l  s t a g e .  We can see th e  naven , f o r  example, as both a 
knowing and a remembering. Each performance can be viewed as a
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re-knowing of  prev ious  performances.
Bateson cont inues  by saying t h a t  much Iatmul thought  i s  concerned 
with i n t e l l e c t u a l  problems which might appear t o  us ' fundamental ly  
u n r e a l 1 (1936: 229) .  He s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s ,  f o r  example, a 
long-s tand ing  argument between t h e  Sun moiety and th e  Mother 
moiety as t o  th e  na tu re  of  Night .  According to  t h e  Mother moiety,  
Night i s  p o s i t i v e ,  due t o  overlapp ing mountains and o th e r  f a c t s  of 
n a tu re ,  while th e  Sun moiety claims t h a t  Night i s  a negat ion of 
Day owing t o  t h e  absence of  t h e i r  totem, t h e  Sun (1936: 229-230).  
Another t o p i c  of  i n t e l l e c t u a l  debate i s  th e  problem of  t h e  na tu re  of 
waves on th e  s u r face  of  water .  According t o  one p r ev a len t  
op in ion,  every th ing  in the  world i s  composed of  p a t t e r n s  of  waves.
But t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t s  th e  Iatmul theo ry  of r e i n c a r n a t i o n ,  according 
to  which t h e  s p i r i t  of  th e  deceased i s  blown by th e  wind up the  
r i v e r  in to  t h e  womb of the  deceased ' s  s o n ' s  w i f e [{1936: 230-231).
A f te r  provid ing  a few more examples of  such deba te s ,  Bateson 
summarises Iatmul thought  as b e i n g t c h a ra c t e r i s e d
'no t  only by i t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y ,  but  a l so  by a tendency to  
i n s i s t  t h a t  what i s  symbol ica l ly ,  s o c i o l o g i c a l l y ,  o r  emotional ly  
t r u e ,  i s  a l so  c o g n i t iv e ly  t r u e '  (1936: 232).
But he goes on t o  admit t h a t
' t h e  same mental t w i s t  i s ,  of  course ,  recogn i sa b le  in d i a l e c t i c ­
ians and the o log ians  in a l l  p a r t s  of  th e  world '  (1936: 232).
Since,  according t o  Bateson,  Iatmul d i a l e c t i c i a n s  and the o log ians  
are  the  c h i e f  c o n t r i b u to r s  to  t h e  c u l t u r e ,  he can then go on to  s t a t e  
t h a t
'many of  t h e  complica t ions  of  the  c u l t u r e  can be descr ibed  as 
t o u r s -de - f o r c e  played upon t h i s  type of paradox, devices  which 
stress~The  c o n t ra d ic t io n  between emotional and c o g n i t iv e  r e a l i t y  
or  between d i f f e r e n t  aspec t s  of  emotional  t r u t h '
(1936: 232).
As examples of  such c o n t ra d i c t i o n s  Bateson l i s t s  th e  fo l lowing .
1) There i s  a d i s c r im in a t io n  between, and th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  among, 
d i f f e r e n t  a spec t s  of  so c ia l  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  f o r  example in the  naming 
of  i n d i v id u a l s .  This d i sc r im in a t io n  of  f a c e t s  of p e r s o n a l i t y  is  a l so  
c a r r i e d  over in to  d e s c r ip t io n s  of  s p i r i t u a l  beings (1936: 232-234).
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2) Bateson claims t h a t  the  tendency to  emphasise th e  more c o g n i t ­
ive ly  obscure o f  two t r u t h s  can be seen in th e  k in sh ip  system. He 
has emphasised t h a t ,  while th e  k insh ip  system i s  p a t r i l i n e a l  in i t s  
morphology, i t  i s  m a t r i l i n e a l  in sen timent .
' I  am in c l in e d  now to  see in t h i s  almost sen t imenta l  s t r e s s i n g  
of  th e  importance of  th e  t i e  with the  mother another  in s ta nce  
of  over-compensation in favour  o f  th e  l e s s  ev iden t  t r u t h . . .
I t  would s e e m . . . t h a t  th e  p a t r i l i n e a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  ev iden t  
enough from c lan  o rg an isa t io n  t o  need no s t r e s s i n g .  But i t s  
c l e a r  e x i s t e n c e  c a s t s  a s l i g h t  o b s c u r i t y  upon th e  m a t r i l i n e a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  which, though no le s s  s o c i a l l y  and emotional ly  
r e a l ,  i s  the reby  rendered le s s  c o g n i t i v e l y  ev id e n t .  Therefore 
th e  m a t r i l i n e a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  th e  more emphasised1 
(1936: 234).
Again, Bateson po in t s  to  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  th e  laua with 
t h e  a nce s to r s  of  th e  maternal  c l a n .  The l ink  in t h i s  equat ion  is  
a pu re ly  emotional  one. Pr ide in th e  achievements of  both lauas 
and ance s to r s  i s  t h e  only common f a c t o r  in th e  two r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in 
ques t ion ,  t h a t  between a clan  and i t s  lauas and t h a t  between a clan  
and i t s  ance s to r s  (1936: 235).
3) The naven provides  another  example of  th e  p re fe rence  f o r  an 
obscure r a t h e r  than an ev iden t  t r u t h .  The Iatmul regard  t h e  wau
as a mother and wife of  t h e  laua in a s o c i a l ,  economic and emotional 
sense .  Bateson argues however t h a t ,  from a pure ly  c o g n i t iv e  view­
p o in t ,  t h e  wau i s  nothing of  t h e  s o r t .
' I n  th e  ca r ry ing  out  of t h e  ceremonia l ,  i t  i s  t h e  emotional  t r u t h  
which i s  s t r e s s e d  which, of  the  two, i s  t h e  more d i f f i c u l t  of  
c o g n i t iv e  a s s i m i l a t i o n 1 (1936: 235).
Bateson then o u t l i n e s  f i v e  more mot i f s  o f  mutual ly  c o n t ra d ic to ry  
premises,  namely: p lu ra l i sm ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say th e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  and 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  o b j e c t s ,  people and s p i r i t u a l  be ings ;  monism, 
the  sense in which every th ing  i s  der ived  from a s i n g l e  o r i g i n ;  
d i r e c t  dual ism, from the  viewpoint o f  which every th ing  has a 
s i b l i n g ;  d iagonal  dualism, from th e  viewpoint  o f  which every th ing  
has a symmetrical co u n te rp a r t ;  and l a s t l y ,  p a t t e r n s  of  co g n i t iv e  
s t r u c t u r e  which govern th e  s e r i a t i o n  of  in d i v id u a l s ,  s e r i a t i o n  which 
i s  based upon th e  premises of  d i r e c t  and diagonal  dualism (1936:
2 3 5 ) .
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Bateson 's  formulat ion of  d i r e c t  and diagonal  dualism can be seen 
as th e  e i d o lo g ic a l  p a r a l l e l  t o  th e  e t h o lo g ic a l  g e n e ra t iv e  model of 
complementary and symmetrical schismogenesis .  D i rec t  dualism, he 
claims,  r e f e r s  t o  th e  kind of  r e l a t i o n s h i p  which e x i s t s  between a 
p a i r  of  s i b l i n g s  of  the  same sex.  In diagonal  dualism th e  r e l a t i o n ­
ship r e f e r r e d  t o  i s  t h a t  between two men who have married each 
o t h e r ' s  s i s t e r s .  In a foo tn o te ,  Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  th e  concepts  
of d i r e c t  and diagonal  dualism a re  in f a c t  e i d o lo g ic a l  analogues 
of complementary and symmetrical e t h o s .  The notion  of  d i r e c t  
dualism prov ides  th e  bas is  f o r  th e  format ion  of  a r t i f i c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which are  pa t te rn ed  on brotherhood;  t h u s ,  f o r  th e  
Iatmul,  every th ing  'in the  world can be seen in terms of  p a i r s .
Each p a i r  c o n s i s t s  of  an e l d e r  s i b l i n g ,  t o g e th e r  with a younger 
s i b l i n g  of  th e  same sex.  The case of  diagonal  dualism i s  more 
complex, s in c e  i t  s t r e s s e s  th e  fundamental e q u a l i t y  and oppos i teness  
of  each member of  a p a i r .  In Iatmul thought ,  t h i s  leads t o  the  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a r t i f i c i a l  a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and t o  th e  notion t h a t  
every th ing  has an equal and oppos i te  c o u n t e rp a r t .  Thus, diagonal  
dualism i s  t h e  b a s i s  of  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  two moie t ies  
of Sun-and Mother with t h e i r  opposed totems Sky and Ear th ,  Day 
and Night .  I t  a l so  unde r l i e s  th e  i n i t i a t o r y  system with i t s  c r o s s ­
c u t t i n g  dual d i v i s i o n s .  Here, one h a l f  of  one moiety i n i t i a t e s  the  
d iagona l ly  oppos i te  h a l f  of  th e  oppos i te  moiety (1936: 237-240).
Both kinds of  d u a l i s t  thought can be seen a t  work in the  naven.
'On th e  one hand we have th e  emphasis upon t h e  var ious  d i r e c t  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  of  s i b l i n g s ,  of  f a t h e r  and son,  and of  husband 
and w ife ,  and on th e  o th e r  hand, as examples of  th e  diagonal  
way of  t h i n k in g ,  we have th e  whole p a t t e r n in g  of  th e  b r o t h e r - i n -  
law r e l a t i o n s h i p  and th e  b e a u t i f u l  reversed  symmetry in naven 
on th e  two s ides  of  the  marriage  t i e ,  whereby th e  f a t h e r 1!  
s i s t e r  d re s se s  up as a man and i d e n t i f i e s  with th e  f a t h e r ,  while 
th e  m o the r ' s  b ro th e r  d res ses  up as a woman and i d e n t i f i e s  with 
th e  mother '  (1.936: 240).
This ch ap te r  con ta ins  a b r i e f ,  but  impor tan t ,  co n s id e ra t io n  of  
Iatmul ph ras ings  of  emotions. These are r a r e  among Iatmul men, ap a r t  
from those  of  an unp leasan t ,  h o s t i l e  k ind.  They name two, 
ngglangga and k ia n ta  (1936: 253).  The former r e f e r s  t o  h u r t  p r id e ,  
or  ' p i q u e ' ,  whi le th e  l a t t e r  i s  th e  Iatmul term f o r  j e a lo u s y .  This 
is  in d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  t o  th e  women, as Bateson w r i t e s  in a passage
which i s  of  c r u c i a l  importance f o r  h i s  summarising a n a ly s i s  of  the  
naven.
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'Both o f  t h e se  terms are  occ a s io n a l ly  used in s t a t i n g  th e  reasons 
f o r  behav iour ,  but I never heard any r e fe re n c e  t o  p le a sa n t  
emotions as th e  cause of  any d e t a i l  of  behav iour.  The term 
wowia kugwa, " to  be in love",  i s  used almost  s o l e l y  of  women, 
and i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  among th e  women emotional  phras ings  of  
reasons  f o r  behaviour a re  very much more f r e q u e n t  than  among 
th e  men' (1936: 253).
I would sugges t  t h a t  Ba teson 's  m a te r ia l  on Iatmul e idos  revea ls  
h is  tendency t o  be caught between what we might c a l l  a "systems" 
view and:a. "contex t"  view of Iatmul s o c i e t y .  I can i l l u s t r a t e  
t h i s  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  the  two ph i losoph ies  of  W i t tg en s t e in ,  t h a t  
of  h i s  f i r s t  book, Trac ta tus  Logico-Philosophicus (1961),  and 
t h a t  of  h is  l a t e r  work, Ph i losophica l  I n v e s t i g a t io n s  (1958).  (1)
In t h e  e a r l i e r  book, Wittgens te in  p o s tu la te d  a correspondence 
between language and r e a l i t y ,  in t h a t  he proposed t h a t  th e  
s t r u c t u r e  of  language r e p l i c a t e s  in some impor tan t  way th e  
s t r u c t u r e  of  r e a l i t y .  The T rac ta tu s  d e l i n e a t e s  a sys temat ic  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between language and r e a l i t y .
The argument o f  W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  l a t e r  and s t i l l  h igh ly  i n f l u e n t i a l  
Ph ilosoph ica l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , al though to  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  b u i l t  
upon t h a t  of  t h e  T r a c t a t u s , i s  profoundly d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of t h e  
e a r l i e r  work. Language is  now seen,  not  as one coherent  system 
in t e r lo c k in g  with a second coherent  system ( i . e . ,  r e a l i t y )  but  as 
an ins trument which can be" used in d i f f e r e n t  ways in p a r t i c u l a r  
languages.  There i s  no longer one language nor one r e a l i t y ;  the  
meaning of  any u t t e r a n c e  i s  now seen t o  depend on th e  use t o  
which i t  i s  put  in a p a r t i c u l a r  co n te x t .  For t h e  l a t e r  W i t tgens te in ,  
use i s  a m a t t e r  of  custom and of  h i s t o r y ,  and i t  i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
r e d u c ib le  t o  a s e t  of  formal r u l e s  w ith in  each language o r ,  as 
Wi t tgens te in  descr ibed  i t ,  w ith in  each language game. P r a c t i c e  
or  use, r a t h e r  than a s e t  of  formal r u l e s ,  c o n s t i t u t e s  the  
prime de terminan t  of  meaning. Meaning i s  thus  something which 
in d iv id u a l s  l ea rn  as a r e s u l t  o f  f in d in g  themselves involved in 
s p e c i f i c  language games (o r ,  as a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  would put  i t ,  
in s p e c i f i c  c u l t u r e s ) ;  i t  i s  not  something which can be seen as 
enshrined  in a b s t r a c t  r u l e s  or  formal d e f i n i t i o n s  which are 
divorced from ac tua l  p r a c t i c e .  W i t tg e n s t e i n ' s  l a t e r  phi losophy,
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in i t s  s t r e s s  on use,  becomes more l i k e  a theo ry  of  ac t io n  than 
a metaphysics ;  i t  opened the  way f o r  the  speech a c t  theory  
developed by Aust in ,  Sear le  and o th e r s .
Genera l ly ,  i t  is  f a i r  t o  say t h a t  while W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  
Trac ta tus  i s  in th e  t r a d i t i o n  of  th e  B r i t i s h  e m p i r i c i s t s ,  th e  
Ph ilosoph ica l  I n v e s t i g a t io n s  e n t e r s  th e  world as descr ibed  by 
Hegel and Collingwood, i . e .  t h e  world as a s e r i e s  of  con tex ts  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  by h i s t o r y ,  c u l t u r e  and so on.
In h i s  a n a ly s i s  of the  naven, Bateson c o n t in u a l l y  advances 
beyond a "systems" view towards a "con tex tua l"  view, but  he always 
r e t r e a t s  back t o  a system. Using W i t t g e n s t e in ' s  term from the  
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , we can say t h a t  what l inks  th e  var ious  performances 
of naven a re  "fami ly resemblances".  There i s  no i d e a l ,  s t anda rd ­
ised naven which i s  t h e  o b je c t  of  Ba teson 's  search  th roughout  the  
book. The naven i s  a shared c r e a t i o n  and r e - c r e a t i o n ,  not  a 
s tanda rd i se d  a c t i v i t y .
W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  development in h i s  philosophy i s  r e v e a l in g  f o r  
the  way in which Bateson dea ls  with Iatmul naming and memory. In 
the  T r a c t a t u s , W ittgens te in  fol lows R u s s e l l ' s  theo ry  of  naming which 
s t a t e s  t h a t  names are  essences ,  not  merely l a b e l s ,  and t h a t  words 
show th in g s  as they a re .  Language i s  a model o f  t h e  world,  and 
a model f o r  t h e  world.  Bateson fol lows W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  T rac ta tu s  
here,  in t h a t  he b e l ieves  t h a t  i f  we can unders tand t h e  Iatmul 
system of  naming, then we w i l l  be ab le  t o  understand Iatmul 
s o c i e t y .  This would seem t o  presuppose some kind of  correspondence 
between language and r e a l i t y .  Bateson th us  r e f l e c t s  t h e  b e l i e f  
of  many a n t h ro p o lo g i s t s  t h a t  we can unders tand c u l t u r e s  by under­
standing  names, f o r  example those  names which c o n s t i t u t e  a k in sh ip  
te rminology.  Bateson notes in h i s  index t o  h i s  ch ap te r  on e idos ,  
' t h e  whole c u l t u r e  r e f l e c t e d  in th e  system'  ( x ix ) .  This i s  a l so  
r e l a t e d  t o  B a teson 's  at tempts t o  d e l i n e a t e  a system underneath 
the  memorising of  names. No s o c ie ty  of  any kind i s  p o s s ib le  
without  memory. Memory i s  always and everywhere 'w ith in  c u l t u r e ;  
i t  i s  not  something t h a t  wai ts  around to  be a c t i v a t e d .
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We can compare th e  W ittgens te in  of  th e  T rac ta tu s  t o  th e  l a t e r  
W i t tgens te in ,  and r e l a t e  t h i s  t o  Ba teson 's  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  naven.
In th e  In v e s t i g a t i o n s  language i s  h i s t o r i c a l  and th e r e f o r e  
p a r t i c u l a r .  From t h i s  nom ina l i s t  viewpoint  naming becomes 
pe r fo rm at ive ,  s ince  f o r  th e  l a t e r  W i t tgens te in  names e x i s t  only 
in use .  Unlike ph i losophers ,  Bateson was a l ready  working within 
a co n tex t ,  in t h a t  he was an a n t h ro p o l o g i s t .  But h i s  con t inua l  
e f f o r t  i s  t o  d iscover  an underly ing system which w i l l  "explain" 
the  con tex t  by s t a n d a rd i s in g  th e  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r a l  " b i t s "  
which he adduces.  An emphasis on s p e c i f i c  use o r ,  in my te rms,  
on performance,  seeks an understanding o f  p a r t i c u l a r  in s tances  
r a t h e r  than t h e  d e l in e a t io n  of  any such assumed coherent  system.
Another important  t o p i c  in Ba teson 's  e idos  ch a p te r  i s  h is  
t r ea tm en t  of  paradox (1936: 232).  He b e l i e v e s  t h a t  paradoxes 
in naming w i l l  revea l  paradoxes in t h e  "system".  Here, he 
fo l lows W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  e a r ly  philosophy as well  as th e  work of 
Russe l l .  Bateson wants to  unravel t h e  paradoxes t o  f in d  the  
system under ly ing them. But th e  paradoxes themselves ,  qua 
paradoxes,  might themselves c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  s o c ia l  r e a l i t y  
of th e  people ;  indeed, as Gel lner  has noted,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  
paradox i s  o f ten  t h e  important  c lue  as t o  what i s  going on in a 
so c ie ty  (1979: 44-46).  (2)
At t h e  end of  the  chap te r ,  Bateson formula tes  h i s  e i d o lo g ic a l  
gen e ra t iv e  model, based on paradoxes and dualism. This i s  in 
p a r a l l e l  with h is  e th o lo g ic a l  model, namely schismogenesis .  But he 
then r e t u r n s  t o  h is  f i v e  p a r t  model, with which he had s t a r t e d  a t  
the  beginning of  h i s  book. He w r i t e s :
' I f  we ask an ind iv idua l  why he behaves in a p a r t i c u l a r  way, 
t h e r e  a re  c e r t a i n l y  f i v e  types  of  answer which he may g ive '  
(1936: 250).
These f i v e  types  of  answer c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  old p e r s p e c t iv a l  model, 
namely s o c i o l o g i c a l  ^ s t r u c t u r a l ,  e t h o l o g i c a l ,  economic and
developmental (1936: 250-251).  Bateson has noted th e  importance of 
c u l t u r a l  v a r i e t y ,  or  con tex t ,  but  he has now re tu rned  to  th e  
s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  of  a system.
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To conclude my account of  Ba teson 's  Naven, i t  remains f o r  me 
to  deal with th e  two Epilogues to  th e  book. The f i r s t  was 
w r i t t e n  as th e  conclusion t o  t h e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  (1936), while 
the  second was added to  t h e  second e d i t i o n  in 1958. (The o r ig i n a l  
t e x t  was l e f t  u n a l t e r e d ) .  The f i r s t  Epilogue dea l s  with the  
problems which Bateson faced in h i s  m a t e r i a l .  The second con ta ins  
an impor tan t  t h e o r e t i c a l  updat ing ,  a c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e  of  which i s  
the  theme o f  c y b e rn e t i c s .
Bateson begins th e  f i r s t  Epilogue with th e  s ta tement t h a t
' t h e " w r i t i n g ‘o f ' t h i s  bdol< hSi been an exper iment ,  o r  r a t h e r  a 
s e r i e s  of  experiments,  in methods of  th in k in g  about an throp­
o lo g ic a l  m a t e r i a l '  (1936: 257).
His f i e ld -w o rk  had been ' scrappy  and d isconnec ted '  (1936: 257).
He did not  have any o v e ra l l  plan in t a l k i n g  t o  h is  in form an ts ;  he 
did not  p r i v i l e g e  any one form of enqui ry  over ano ther .  He was 
inf luenced  g r e a t l y  by h is  reading in th e  f i e l d  of  a p a r t  of  
th e  manuscr ip t  o f  Ruth B ened ic t ' s  P a t t e rn s  of C u l t u r e , and by 
conversa t ions  with Reo Fortune and Margaret Mead. Although he had 
recognised t h a t  th e  c o n t r a s t  in ethos  between th e  sexes in Iatmul 
s o c ie ty  was s i g n i f i c a n t ,  i t  was only a f t e r  h i s  r e tu rn  from th e  
f i e l d  t h a t  he began t o  r e a l i s e  t h e  importance of  t h e  r e a c t io n s  of  
the  members o f  one sex t o  t h e  behaviour  of  members o f  t h e  o th e r .
'The a c tu a l  noting of f a c t s  was done a t  random before  I even 
dreamt of  e th o s ,  eidos  and sch ismogenes i s1 (1936: 258).
He emphasises t h i s  as a defence a g a in s t  any charge t h a t  he might 
have s e l e c t e d  h i s  f a c t s  t o  f i t  h i s  t h e o r i e s .
He reco rds  t h a t  an ou ts tand ing  s tep  f o r  h is  a n a l y s i s  was the  
r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  th e  t r a n s v e s t i t e  wau was a f i g u r e  of  fun .  This 
a l t e r e d  h i s  whole p i c t u r e  of  th e  naven: b e fo re ,  he had only seen
the  proud behaviour of  the  t r a n s v e s t i t e  women.
'Though I did  not  know what i t  meant, I knew t h a t  th e  wau's 
buffooning had a l t e r e d  my whole conception o f  naven, and, i f  
t h i s  was so,  th e  c o n t r a s t  between th e  bed rag g le?  t r a n s v e s t i s m  
of t h e  men and th e  proud wearing of  homicidal  ornaments by 
th e  women must somehow conta in  an impor tan t  c lu e  t o  Iatmul 
c u l t u r e .  The change in my way of t h in k in g  had a r i s e n  from the
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a d d i t io n  of  emotional emphasis t o  what was o r i g i n a l l y  a purely 
formal p i c t u r e ,  and so I came t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  ethos  was the  
th in g  t h a t  ma tte red '  (259-260,  Ba teson 's  emphases) .
The ad d i t io n  of  emotional emphasis t o  th e  p rev ious ly  ' formal 
p i c t u r e '  i s  c r u c i a l .  Bateson now notes  t h a t  on o rd ina ry  occasions  
Iatmul men u su a l ly  wear aprons,  and Iatmul women wear s k i r t s .
C le ar ly  t r a n s v e s t i s m  is  only p o s s ib le  on th e  b a s i s  of  such a con­
vent ion;  but  nowhere in th e  book so f a r  has he remarked on the  
'obv ious '  f a c t  t h a t  th e  conventiona l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  c lo th in g  
between th e  sexes i s  a f a c t o r  which promotes t r a n s v e s t i s m ;  indeed,  
any form of  t r a n s v e s t i s m  is  impossib le  withou t  such a convention 
ob ta in ing  in t h e  f i r s t  p lace  (260-261).
But why should i t  be the  mother ' s  b ro th e r  who th us  a c t s  the  
foo l?  In o rd e r  t o  answer t h i s  q u es i to n ,  Bateson had app l ied  th e  
concepts  of  fo rmula t ion  and s t r u c t u r e . The k in sh ip  system, which was 
b u i l t  up from fo rm u la t ions ,  was p a r t  o f  th e  s t r u c t u r e  of  th e  
s o c i e t y ,  and th e  naven was in t u rn  ' b u i l t  upon' t h i s  s t r u c t u r e .
So Bateson had a r r iv e d  a t  a p o in t  where he had t o  t r y  t o  determine 
t h e  n a tu re  of  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ' e t h o s '  and ' s t r u c t u r e '  
in Iatmul s o c i e t y .
' I f  a man scolded h is  wife,  h is  behaviour was e thos ;  but  i f  
he marr ied h i s  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  daughter ,  i t  was s t r u c t u r e '  
(261).
He confesses  t h a t  he had thought of  th e  s t r u c t u r e  as a network which 
somehow guided th e  e thos ,  and which in tu r n  was shaped by i t .
In th e  1936 Epilogue he argues t h a t  t h i s  l i n e  of  th in k in g  was 
wrong. His f i r s t  s tep  in h i s  a t tempt to  break out  of  what by t h i s  
s tage  he viewed as f a l l a c i e s  was by adding t h e  notion of  pragmatic 
func t ion  t o  h i s  l i s t  of  subd iv is ions  of  c u l t u r e .  This was a combin­
a t ion  of  f a c t o r s  which met th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  th e  needs o f  ind iv ­
id u a l s ,  and o f  those  which c o n t r ib u te d  towards t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of 
so c ie ty  (261).
He was faced immediately with an important  problem, namely t h a t  
he had provided no c l e a r  c r i t e r i a  f o r  d i s c r im in a t in g  between th e
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d i f f e r e n t  elements of  c u l t u r e  which he could c a l l  ' e t h o s '  as 
opposed to  ' s t r u c t u r e '  or  'pragmat ic f u n c t i o n 1. He c a r r i e d  out  a 
s imple exper iment .  He wrote down t h r e e  b i t s  of  behaviour - pragmat ic ,  
a wau g iv ing  food t o  a l a u a ; e t h o l o g i c a l ,  a man sco ld ing  h is  wife ;  
and s t r u c t u r a l ,  a man marrying h is  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r ' s  daughter .
I t  would seem t h a t  'p ragmatic '  here r e f e r s  t o  h is  e l a b o ra t i o n  of 
h is  e a r l i e r  so c io lo g ic a l  f u n c t io n ,  while ' s t r u c t u r a l '  r e f e r s  t o  the  
s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  o f  cog n i t io n ,  or  e id o s .
He then drew a l a t t i c e  of  nine squares  made up of  t h r e e  rows of 
squares with t h r e e  squares in each row. The h o r iz o n ta l  rows he 
l a b e l l e d  with h i s  b i t s  of  behaviour,  while the  v e r t i c a l  rows were 
la b e l l e d  with h i s  c a t e g o r ie s .
'Then I forced  myself t o  see each b i t  as conce ivab ly  belonging 
to  each ca tegory .  I found t h a t  i t  could be done'  (1936: 262).
In o th e r  words, each ' i t em '  of  behaviour could be seen as s t r u c t u r a l ,  
or  in accordance with a s e t  of  r u l e s ;  as pragmatic ,  o r  as s a t i s f y i n g  
e i t h e r  t h e  needs of  th e  in d iv idua l  or  as c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  th e  i n t e g ­
r a t e  of s o c i e t y ;  o r ,  f i n a l l y ,  e t h n o lo g ic a l ly ,  t h a t  i s  as an 
express ion  o f  emotion.  He con t inues :
'This  experiment may seem p u e r i l e ,  but t o  me i t  was very import­
an t ,  and I have recounted i t  a t  some length because t h e r e  may 
be some among my reade rs  who tend to  regard  such concepts  as 
" s t r u c t u r e "  as concre te  p a r t s  which " i n t e r a c t "  in c u l t u r e ,  and 
who f i n d ,  as I d id ,  a d i f f i c u l t y  in t h in k in g  of  t h e se  concepts  
as l a b e l s  merely f o r  po in t s  of  view adopted e i t h e r  by the  
s c i e n t i s t  o r  by th e  n a t i v e s .  I t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  too  t o  perform 
the  same experiment with such concepts  as economics, k in sh ip  
and land t e n u re ,  and even r e l i g i o n ,  language and "sexual  l i f e "  
do not  s tand  too  su re ly  as c a t e g o r i e s  of  behav iour,  but  tend 
t o  r e s o lv e  themselves in to  l a b e l s  f o r  p o in t s  of  view from which 
a l l  behaviour  may be seen. . .We must expec t  t o  f in d  t h a t  
every p iece  of  behaviour has i t s  e t h o l o g i c a l ,  s t r u c t u r a l  and 
s o c io l o g i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e '  (1936: 262).
However, t o  see human s o c i e t i e s  in t h i s  way poses profound 
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The source of  th e  d i f f i c u l t y ,  as Bateson summarises i t ,  
l i e s  in ' t h e  h a b i t  of  thought which a t t r i b u t e s  concre teness  to  
aspec t s  of  phenomena' (1936: 263). He is  w r i t i n g  here of  Whitehead's  
notion of  t h e  f a l l a c y  of  misplaced concre teness ,  which has been
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' an important  p r i n c i p l e  or  mot if  of  European e id o s ,  c e r t a i n l y  s ince  
t h e  days of  Greek ph i losophy1 (1936: 263).  This a t t a c k  on th e  
r e i f i c a t i o n  and h y p o s ta t i z a t io n  of  conceptual  fo rmula t ions  is  
extremely i l lu m in a t in g  and marks a f i n a l  d e c i s i v e  s tage  in Bateson 's  
an a ly s i s  of  t h e  naven. Bateson sees t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s ,  or  
p e r s p e c t iv e s ,  apply to  any one p iece  o f  behaviour .  But he is  
s t i l l  s earching  f o r  a f i n a l  a n a ly s i s  and t h i s  w i l l  be achieved,  
he b e l i e v e s ,  by th e  d e l in e a t io n  of  some kind of  s t r u c t u r e  - in 
the  L ev i -S t r au s s ian  r a t h e r  than th e  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  sense,
I would add - which w i l l  a c t  as an o b je c t i v e  exp lana to ry  r e f e r e n t .
He thus  approaches what could be desc r ibed  in l a t e r  terms as a 
Lev i -S t r auss ian  a n a ly s i s  on t h e  one hand, whi le making a p r o v i s io n a l ,  
and h igh ly  a r t i c u l a t e ,  a t t a c k  on such an a n a ly s i s  with th e  o th e r .
But behaviour can only e x i s t  with in  th e  con tex t  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  
c u l t u r e .  Bateson does not go beyond h i s  p e r s p e c t iv a l  framework 
to  see t h a t  what he a c t u a l l y  needs i s  a n on -pe r spec t iva l  view 
which w i l l  t ake  account of  th e  f a c t  t h a t  behaviour a r i s e s  everywhere 
and always w i th in  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t r i b u t i o n s  of  agency (whether the  
"agents" a re  humans o r  o the rw ise ,  as Hobart (1986) has suggested) 
and, f u r t h e r ,  t h a t  behaviour i s  a way not  only of  "doing t h i n g s " ,  
but  a l so  o f  "seeing  th ings"  and "saying t h i n g s " .  This view takes  
us out  of  t h e  c losed  domain of  a f i n a l i s e d  s t r u c t u r e  qua 
s t r u c t u r e  and a search f o r  s u i .gene r i s  behaviour e x i s t i n g  somehow 
in i t s e l f  o u t s id e  th e  confines  of  c u l t u r a l  s p e c i f i c i t y ,  and towards 
a c o n s id e r a t io n  of  s o c ia l  l i f e  as th e  arena of  i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  
a c t i v i t y  by, through and f o r  exper iencing  agents  o r ,  as I would 
phrase i t ,  t h e  arena of  performance.  Derrida has summarised th e se  
two s t r a t e g i e s  e loquen t ly  as ' two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
or  s t r u c t u r e ,  o f  s ign ,  of  f r e e p l a y ' .  One seeks
'a  t r u t h  or  an originewhich i s  f r e e  from f r e e p l a y  and from the  
o rder  o f  t h e  s ign ,  and l i v e s  l i k e  an e x i l e  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The o th e r ,  which i s  no longer  tu rned  towards 
t h e  o r i g i n ,  a f f i rm s  f r e e p l a y '  (1972: 264).
Bateson then poses a f u r t h e r  problem. I f  informants d i s c r i m in ­
a t e ,  as Western Europeans do, say,  between economics and law as 
subd iv is ions  in t h e i r  own l i v e s  and not  as " aspec t s  o f  c u l t u r e " ,  
should th e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  not  accep t  t h e i r  view, a t  l e a s t  t o  an 
ex ten t?  But, i f  we adopt the  p o in t  of  view t h a t  people sometimes
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th ink  s t r u c t u r a l l y  and sometimes in terms of  economics,  sometimes 
e t h o l o g i c a l l y  and sometimes s o c i o l o g i c a l l y ,  then we need no 
longer be t i e d  e x c lu s iv e ly  t o  how n a t iv e s  subdivide t h e i r  c u l t u r e ,  
any more than t o  an thropolog ica l  r e i f i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  same. His 
next  s ta tement  p re sen ts  a new problem which r e s u l t s  from t h i s  one.
' I  was j u s t i f i e d  in expec ting every aspec t  t o  be rep resen ted  in 
every b i t  of  behaviour,  and th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  n a t iv e s  were 
conscious  only of  one of  t h e s e  a spec t s  in a given con tex t  was 
a p o in t  which might be s i g n i f i c a n t  in an e id o lo g ic a l  examinat­
ion of  th e  c u l t u r e 1 (1936: 264).
The ques t ion  here i s  how, and under what c o n d i t io n s ,  do indigenous 
peoples s t r e s s  one aspect  of  t h e  c u l t u r e  r a t h e r  than another?
Besides t h e  use o f  Whitehead's  f a l l a c y  of  misplaced concre teness ,  
t h e r e  are t h r e e  o th e r  important  s t e p s  in Bateson 's  a n a ly s i s  which he 
d e s c r ib e s .  The f i r s t  i s  the  s e p a ra t io n  of  socio logy from h is  
"pragmatic f u n c t i o n " .  This had been suggested by Radcliffe-Brown, 
who had advised Bateson t h a t  th e  l a t t e r ' s  use of  th e  term 
" s t r u c tu r e "  d i f f e r e d  from h is  own. For Radcliffe-Brown, s t r u c t u r e  
had meant t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of  s o c i e t y ,  whereas f o r  Bateson i t  came 
to  mean something more l i k e  " c u l t u r a l  s t r u c t u r e " .  Bateson had 
then d iv ided  "pragmatic func t ion"  in to  da ta  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  conven­
t i o n a l  socio logy on th e  one hand, and "motiva t ion"  or  the  
"express ion of  e thos  in behaviour" on t h e  o th e r  (1936: 264)„
The second important  s tep  had been t h e  sep a ra t io n  of e idos  from 
e thos .  In a f o o tn o te  to  h is  main t e x t ,  Bateson had commented t h a t  
an th ro p o lo g i s t s  should expect  t o  f in d  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  of  log ic  
in d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s .  For Bateson, th e  term "ethos" had o r i g i n a l l y  
been designed t o  cover a l l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a c u l t u r e  which are 
a s c r ib a b le  t o  t h e  s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  of  i n d i v id u a l s .  He then r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  th e  ques t ion  of  c u l t u r a l  log ic  was an impor tan t  one, and t h a t  
da ta  which had o r i g i n a l l y  been presen ted  under t h e  term ' e t h o s '  had 
to  be d iv ided  in two: in to  "ethos" as des igna t ing  a f f e c t i v e  aspec t s  
of  the  in d i v id u a l ,  and " e idos"  as d es ig n a t in g  c o g n i t iv e  a s p e c t s .
The idea f o r  "e thos"  a rose in th e  f i r s t  p lace  from Ruth B ened ic t ' s  
concept of  " c on f igu ra t ion"  (1936: 264-265).  A performance o r i e n t e d  
view such as t h e  one I am proposing ,  however, would p lace  le ss
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emphasis on a co n t in g en t ,  no t iona l  dichotomy between ind iv idua l  
and s o c i e t y ,  and cons ider  r a t h e r  t h e  way in which human beings 
c r e a t e  and r e - c r e a t e  such dichotomies,  ideo log ies  and r o l e s  - 
c r e a t e  and r e - c r e a t e ,  in f a c t ,  both themselves and s o c ie ty  - 
through performance.  I would see humans not  as "mere" a c to r s  
express ing  through s o c ia l  i n t e r - a c t i o n  a p rev ious ly  cons t ruc ted  
c u l t u r a l  t e m p la te ,  but  r a t h e r  as a c t i v e ,  p a r t i c i p a n t  agents  
c r e a t i n g  and r e - c r e a t i n g  - o f t e n ,  i f  you l i k e ,  through a c t s  of 
" r e c r e a t io n "  -  th e  var ious  a s p e c t s ,  modes, s t y l e s  and models of 
t h e i r  r e a l i t y .
Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  the  concept of  eidos  i s  perhaps th e  weakest 
po in t  in h i s  e x p o s i t i o n .  There a re  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in d i s c r im in a t in g  
th e  a f f e c t i v e  from the  c o g n i t iv e  aspec t s  of  p e r s o n a l i t y .
' I  am aware t h a t  p sycho log is t s  a re  i n c l in e d  nowadays t o  look 
askance a t  t h e  terms c o g n i t iv e  and a f f e c t i v e ,  but  I s t i l l  
hope t h a t  i f  we f i r s t  g ran t  t h a t  t h e s e  terms a re  a s p e c t s ,  
and not  c a t e g o r i e s  of  behav iour ,  and then  go on t o  compare 
th e  e thos  and eidos of  var ious  c u l t u r e s ,  we may in th e  end 
a r r i v e  a t  a b e t t e r  unders tanding of  thought  and emotion1 
(1936: 265).
This issue:becomes even more important  i f  a n t h ro p o lo g i s t s  al low 
indigenous c a t e g o r i e s  in to  t h e i r  ana lyses  and ask,  f o r  example, 
how t h e i r  informants  con ce p tu a l i s e  dichotomies between emotion and 
thought ,  or  i f  indeed they have a p lace  f o r  such dichotomies in 
t h e i r  own scheme of th in g s  in t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  (3) This n e c e s s i t ­
a t e s  th e  c o n s t ru c t io n  of  a double d i s co u r s e  which n e g o t i a t e s  
between two s e t s  of  c a t e g o r i e s ,  ours and t h e i r s ,  r a t h e r  than  a 
one-way i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  d i scou rse  which uses our c a t e g o r i e s  as an 
im p l i c i t  u n iv e rs a l  s u b s t r a t e .  This does not  mean t h a t  we should 
at tempt t o  ignore  our own c o n s t r u c t s ,  f o r  example our  dichotomy 
between emotion and thought ,  s ince  such c o n s t ru c t s  would be p re ­
supposed in any d i scou r se  o r i g i n a t i n g  from th e  West and any at tempt  
to  do without  them would be f a c t i t i o u s ;
The t h i r d  s tep  in h i s  a n a ly s i s  which Bateson summarises a t  t h i s  
p o in t  i s  h i s  fo rmula t ion  of  th e  notion of  schismogenesis .  This 
developed out  of  h is  conversa t ions  with Margaret  Mead and Reo 
Fortune.  The idea of  a complementary aspec t  t o  e thos  was suggested
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by Mead. Bateson then  took t h e  idea of  complementary ethos f u r t h e r ,  
and cons idered  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  e thos  of  each sex might 
have some format ive  or  a c t iv e  in f luence  on th e  ethos  of  th e  
o th e r .  This led t o  the  concept  of  complementary schismogenesis .
A comparison of  h is  s u b je c t  m a t te r  with t h a t  of  European p o l i t i c s  
led t o  th e  idea o f  symmetrical schismogenes is .  The mixture was 
leavened with ' a  l i t t l e  Hegelian d i a l e c t i c 1 (1936: 265-266).
So, Bateson was led t o  th e  i s o l a t i o n  of  f i v e  major p o in t s  of  
view f o r  t h e  study of  s o c ie ty :  s t r u c t u r a l  o r  e i d o l o g i c a l ,  e th o lo -  
log ica l  or  emot iona l ,  s o c i o l o g i c a l ,  developmental and economic.
The l a s t  two items were l e f t  ou t  o f  Ba teson 's  p i c t u r e ,  presumably 
because he had l i t t l e  da ta  on th e s e  i s sues  and they  did not  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t  him a t  t h e  t ime he was in t h e  f i e l d .
But, Bateson c la im s ,  whatever th e  method, 'ou r  m a te r ia l  i s  t h e  same 
and inc ludes  t h e  whole ordered d i v e r s i t y  of  Iatmul behaviour '
(1936: 266).
I would now l i k e  t o  cons ide r  t h e  1958 Epilogue to  th e  second 
e d i t i o n  of  Naven. Here Bateson d i scusse s  h i s  e a r l i e r  work in th e  
l i g h t  of  s ev e ra l  more rece n t  s t r an d s  in h i s  t h i n k in g .  These s t r a n d s ,  
which take  in c y b e rn e t i c s ,  communications theo ry  and R u s s e l l ' s  
theory  of  l o g i c a l  ty p e s ,  can be subsumed under t h e  genera l  heading 
of  a p a r t i c u l a r  form of  epistemology,  o r  theo ry  o f  knowledge.
This epistemology can be seen as th e  c e n t r a l  theme in t h e  volume of 
Bateson 's  c o l l e c t e d  papers (1973).
' Naven' , w r i t e s  Bateson,  ' i s  a weaving of  t h r e e  l e v e l s  of  
a b s t r a c t i o n 1 (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 2 8 1 ) .The f i r s t  c o n s i s t s  of  th e  p r e s ­
e n t a t io n  of  ethnographic  d a t a ,  t h e  second of  th e  a r ranging  of  
t h i s  da ta  in o rde r  to  bu i ld  var ious  p i c t u r e s  of  t h e  c u l t u r e  and the  
t h i r d  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  d is cuss ion  o f  th e  ways in which he had 
at tempted t o  f i t  t o g e th e r  ' t h e  p ieces  of  th e  j i g s a w ' -  The second 
leve l  i s  more a b s t r a c t  than the  f i r s t ,  and t h e  t h i r d  i s  more 
a b s t r a c t  than th e  second (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 281) .  He f u r t h e r
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argues t h a t  ' t h e s e  t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts  have an o rde r  of  o b j e c t iv e  
r e a l i t y '  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 281) .  They e x i s t  as r e a l  d e s c r i p ­
t i o n s  of  p rocesses  of  knowing. The t r a p  c o n s i s t s  in th e  t e m p ta t ­
ion t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  concepts  such as "ethos" or  " so c ia l  s t r u c t u r e "  
have more r e a l i t y  than  t h i s ;  th e  t r a p ,  t h a t  i s ,  i s  t h a t  of  
Whitehead's  f a l l a c y  of  misplaced c o n c r e t e n e s s . .  The way out  of  the  
t r a p  i s  through th e  use of  lo g ica l  ty p in g .
' I f  " e thos" ,  " so c ia l  s t r u c t u r e " ,  "economics",  e t c . ,  a re  words 
in t h a t  language which d esc r ibe s  how s c i e n t i s t s  ar range da ta ,  
then th e s e  words cannot be used t o  "exp la in"  phenomena, nor
can t h e r e  be any " e th o lo g ica l "  o r  "economic" c a t e g o r i e s  of
phenomena. People can be in f luenced ,  of  course ,  by economic 
t h e o r i e s  o r  by economic f a l l a c i e s  - or  by hunger -  but  ■<. 
they  cannot  poss ib ly  be in f luenced  by "economics".  Economics 
i s  a c l a s s  of  ex p lan a t io n s ,  not  i t s e l f  an exp lana t ion  of  
an y th in g 1 (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 281, Ba teson 's  emphasi s) .
This paragraph con ta ins  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  subs tance  of  t h i s  
second Epi logue.  Be liev ing t h a t  human r e a l i t y  can be expla ined  by 
'a  c l a s s  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n s ' i s  an example of  a mistake in lo g ica l  
ty p ing .  Once we have understood how f a l l a c i e s  in lo g i c a l  typing 
occur,  then we can b e n e f i t  from th e  development of  what Bateson 
c a l l s  'an e n t i r e l y  new s c i e n c e ' .  This new sc ience  has no gener ic  
name, but  i t  i s  r ep resen ted  v a r io u s ly  by communications th e o ry ,  
c y b e rn e t i c s  and mathematical  lo g i c .  I t  o f f e r s
'a  new s e t  of  conceptual  frames and problems, rep la c in g  th e
premises and problems s e t  by P la to  and A r i s t o t l e '
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 281-282).
Bateson a l so  wants to  use h is  hew:theore t ica l~framework  in 
o rder  t o  make t h e  book r e l e v a n t  t o  p s y c h ia t ry .  He wrote th e  o r i g i n a l  
book without  any d e t a i l e d  knowledge of  Freudian th e o ry .  This he 
regards  as p o s i t i v e ,  s ince  he might o therwise  have been tempted t o  
concen t ra te  on t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  symbols. This would have been 
a d i s t r a c t i o n  from th e  more impor tant  problems concerning i n t e r ­
group and in t e r - p e r s o n a l  processes  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 282).
Another p i t f a l l  of  a p s y c h i a t r i c a l l y  o r i e n t e d  p e r s p e c t iv e  c o n s i s t s  
of ' t h e  d i s t r a c t i o n s  o f  psychologica l  typo logy '  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 
283).
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This a p p e t i t e  f o r  typology - which, a f t e r  a l l ,  one would expect  
in a t r a i n e d  b i o l o g i s t  - runs a l l  through s o c ia l  and n a tu ra l  
s c ience ,  and he confesses  t h a t  he himse lf  hankers a f t e r
'a  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  a typology ,  of  the  processes  of  i n t e r a c t i o n  
as i t  occurs e i t h e r  between persons or  between groups '
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 283).
Bateson 's  dilemma i s  acc u ra te ly  a r t i c u l a t e d .  Much of  the  ma te r ia l  
in h i s  second Epilogue i s  b u i l t  around R u s s e l l ' s  theo ry  of lo g ica l  
types ,  a d i scuss ion  of  which c loses  h is  t e x t .  But h is  concerns 
about ' t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  of psychologica l  typology '  would seem to  
m i l i t a t e  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r iv i l e g i n g  of  one p a r t i c u l a r  theo ry  of  mind 
and, f u r t h e r ,  a theory  such as R u s s e l l ' s  which p o s i t s  d i s c r im in a t e  
leve ls  of  men ta t ion .
Epistemological  ques t ions  loom la rge  here .  The theory  of 
evo lu tion  p o s i t s  a s im i l a r  problem.
'Do spec ie s  have rea l  e x i s t en ce  o r  are they only a device of 
d e s c r ip t i o n ?  How are  we to  re so lv e  the  old co n t ro v e r s i e s  between 
c o n t i n u i t y  and d i s c o n t in u i t y ?  Or how s h a l l  we r e c o n c i l e  the  
c o n t r a s t  which recurs  again and again in na tu re  between c o n t in ­
u i ty  o f  change and d i s c o n t in u i t y  of  th e  c l a s s e s  which r e s u l t s  
from change?'  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 283).
Bateson claims t h a t  h is  concept of  schismogenesis  provides a 
p a r t i a l  answer t o  th e se  problems.  He i s  now in a p o s i t i o n  to  cons ider  
t h i s  model of  schismogenic process in r e l a t i o n  t o  cybe rne t ic s  and 
log ica l  ty p in g .  A dense d i scuss ion  of  th e  problem of change in 
evo lu t ion  leads in to  a c ons ide ra t ion  of  t h e  na tu re  of  l e a rn in g .
Both evo lu t ion  and learn ing  are  seen as examples of  p rog re s s ive  
change in a u n i t  made up of  an organism plus i t s  environment.
Learning i s  cons idered in r e l a t i o n  to  c h a ra c te r  format ion ,  which 
Bateson sees  as c r u c i a l l y  implicated  in schismogenic i n t e r - a c t i o n  
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 284).
There a re  two l e v e l s  of  l ea rn ing  in t h i s  p i c t u r e .  In any
learn ing  experiment we can see t h e se  two l e v e l s  a t  work (1936: 1958
2nd edn: 285).  On the  one hand, t h e r e  i s  in th e  Instrumenta l
Reward type o f  experiment the  increased  frequency of  th e  condi t ioned 
response of  t h e  s u b je c t .  The r a t  le a rns  to  press  t h e  le v e r .  But
213
t h e r e  i s  a l so  a more a b s t r a c t  leve l  of  l e a rn in g ,  in which the  sub jec t  
learns  t o  deal  with new con tex ts  of a given type .
'The s u b je c t  comes t o  a c t  more and more as i f  con tex ts  of  t h i s  
type  were expec tab le  in h is  u n i v e r s e 1 (1936: 1958 2nd edn:
285).
The animal sub jec ted  t o  Pavlovian experiments framed in terms of 
re in forcement w i l l  acqui re a sense of  ' f a t a l i s m ' .  On th e  o the r  hand, 
th e  animal sub jec ted  to  Ins trumenta l  Reward experiments can be 
expected t o  l ea rn  (o r ,  in Bateson 's  term, to  ' d e u t e r o - l e a r n ' ) a 
c h a ra c te r  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  w i l l  enable  him to  l i v e  in a world in 
which he h im se lf  can con t ro l  t h e  occur rences of  re in forcement .
So le a rn ing  t o  le a rn ,  or  ' d e u t e r o - l e a r n i n g ' , is  th e  mechanism 
by which animals a re  ab le  to  a d j u s t  t o  change in t h e i r  environment 
and, f u r t h e r ,  t o  themselves c o n t r i b u t e  towards change.  What 
Bateson i s  g e t t i n g  a t  here i s  t h a t  p a t t e r n s  of  con tex ts  of  le a rn ing  
a re ,  f o r  c e r t a i n  purposes of  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  more impor tant  than 
what i s  a c t u a l l y  learned;  e . g . ,  in processes  of  schismogenetic  
i n t e r - a c t i o n .  An ind iv idual  in a symmetrical -  say,  a s s e r t i v e -  
a s s e r t i v e  - r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  form th e  h a b i t  of  a c t in g  as i f  he 
expected a s s e r t i o n  from the  o th e r  ind iv idua l  - and, perhaps,  from 
o the r  i n d iv id u a l s  as w e l l .  So h is  own behaviour becomes more and 
more a s s e r t i v e .  This is  obviously t h e  b a s i s  f o r  th e  development of  
p rog re s s ive  change.
'We have here a case in which change in t h e  ind iv idua l  a f f e c t s  
th e  environment of  o the rs  in a way which w i l l  cause a s i m i l a r  
change in them. This w i l l  a c t  back upon th e  i n i t i a l  in d iv idua l  
t o  produce f u r t h e r  change in him in t h e  same d i r e c t i o n '
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 286).
There i s  an important  problem however in applying t h i s  model to  
t h e  Iatmul.  We have here ,  Bateson p o in t s  ou t ,  a one-s ided  p i c tu r e  
of processes  which, i f  permitted'  t o  develop unchecked over t ime,  
would lead t o  e i t h e r  more and more r i v a l r y  between symmetrical 
groups,  or  t o  more and more d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between complementary
groups. The s o c ie ty  would even tu a l ly  explode.  Bateson had been
aware of  t h i s  problem, and had at tempted a so lu t io n  by suggest ing 
t h a t  a dynamic equ i l ib r ium  was maintained in Iatmul s o c ie ty  by.
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means of  a balance  between symmetrical processes  on th e  one hand, 
and complementary processes on th e  o th e r .  This was u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  
s ince  i t  assumed t h a t  the  two v a r i a b le s  w i l l ,  c o i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  
have an equal  and oppos i te  va lue .  I t  i s  improbable,  however, t h a t  
two such processes  could balance each o th e r  out  un less  t h e r e  was 
some " func t iona l  r e l a t i o n s h ip "  between them. But, a t  th e  t ime of 
f i n i s h i n g  t h e  o r i g i n a l  t e x t ,  Bateson had been unable t o  see what 
the  na tu re  of  such a r e l a t i o n s h i p  might be.  The development of  
cyberne t ic s  in th e  1940s provided him with an answer.
For Bateson,  th e  cyberne t ic  model rep re sen ted  a way out  of  t e l -  
eo log ica l  e x p lana t ion .  Teleology exp la in s  purpose and adap ta t ion  
in terms of  t h e  end of  a process ;  th e  end of  a process  i s  regarded 
as i t s  purpose .  (This i s ,  of  course ,  one of  th e  formula t ions  
of  c l a s s i c  f u n c t io n a l i s m . )  Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  t h e  notion of  t e l ­
eology,  in troduced  by th e  Greeks, could be swept a s ide  by means 
of th e  cy b e rn e t ic  model which i s  based on a c i r c u l a r  feedback 
system r a t h e r  than a l i n e a r  chain of  cause and e f f e c t .  Such f e e d ­
back loops are seen as seeking e q u i l i b r i a  or  s teady s t a t e s .  
Cybernetic  ideas had been used in eng ineer ing  and bio logy  before  
the  Macy conferences  which Bateson a t tended  in th e  1940s, but  i t  
was a t  th e s e  conferences t h a t  t h e i r  importance was recognised 
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 287).
Chains of  cause and e f f e c t  in cy b e rn e t ic  systems a re  c i r c u l a r ,  
and not  l i n e a r .  In a c i r c u l a r  system con ta in ing  elements A,B, C 
and D, A a f f e c t s  B, B a f f e c t s  C, C a f f e c t s  D and D then  a f f e c t s  
A, and so on. Such a system has t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  p r o p e r t i e s  from 
those  of  l i n e a r  systems.  There a re  two kinds of  feedback system.
In nega t ive  feedback,  th e  system seeks a s teady  s t a t e  of  ope ra t ion ;  
th e  na tu re  of  t h e  mechanism is  s e l f - c o r r e c t i v e .  Within th e  c i r c u i t  
t h e r e  w i l l  be a t  l e a s t  one l ink  in which the  more t h e r e  i s  of  
something,  th e  l e s s  t h e r e  w i l l  be of  something e l s e .  A p o s i t i v e  
feedback system, on the  o the r  hand, develops e x p o n en t ia l ly  u n t i l  i t  
reaches  t h e  "runaway" p o in t ,  where i t  e i t h e r  runs ou t  of  energy or  
breaks up. I t  i s  t h e  negat ive feedback system which i s  important  
f o r  Bateson here (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 288-289).
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The s u b s t i t u t i o n  of  the  concept  of  s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n  f o r  those  of  
purpose and adap ta t ion  gave Bateson a new p e r s p e c t iv e  on the  processes  
of  schismogenesis  in Iatmul s o c i e t y .  He could now ask whether t h e r e  
might e x i s t  in th e  c u l t u r e  f u n c t io n a l  connec tions  which would 
provide r e s t r a i n t s  ag a in s t  th e  inc rease  of  schismogenic t e n s i o n s .
' I t  was not  good enough t o  say t h a t  symmetrical schismogenesis  
happened by coincidence t o  balance the  complementary. I t  was 
now necessary  t o  ask,  i s  t h e r e  any communicational pathway such 
t h a t  an in c re ase  in symmetrical schismogenesis  w i l l  bring  about 
an inc re ase  in th e  c o r r e c t i v e  complementary phenomena? Could the  
system be c i r c u l a r  and c o r r e c t i v e ? 1 (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 289).
For Bateson,  th e  answer was obvious.  The naven ceremonial  is  
a c a r i c a t u r e  of  a complementary sexual  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between wau 
and l a u a ; and i t  i s  s e t  in motion by exaggerated  symmetrical 
boas t ing  on th e  p a r t  of  th e  l a u a . Bateson w r i t e s  t h a t  i t  might now 
be more acc u ra te  t o  see l a u a ' s  boas t ing  as t h e  primary con tex t  
f o r  naven, and t o  see h is  achievements as p a r t i c u l a r  examples of  
h is  achieved ambition which p lace  him in a symmetrical r e l a t i o n s h i p  
with h i s  wau. But, f o r  t h e  Iatmul,  t h i s  i s  not  t h e  case ;  they 
phrase t h e  reasons  f o r  naven p r im ar i ly  in terms of  l a u a 's  ach ieve­
ments.  For them, th e  l e s s  formal con tex ts  in which laua boas ts  
of  h i s  achievements and thus  t r i g g e r s  the  wau in to  th e  naven 
behaviour a re  secondary (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 289-290).
The l ink  here between symmetrical and complementary behaviour 
i s  doubly in v e r t e d ,  f o r
' t h e  laua makes th e  symmetrical g e s tu r e  and wau responds not 
by overbearing  complementary dominance but  by t h e  rev e r se  of  
t h i s  - exaggerated submission.  Or should we say th e  r eve rse  
of  t h i s  reve rse?  Wau's behaviour i s  a c a r i c a t u r e  of 
submission? '  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 290).
I t  i s  i l l u m in a t in g  to  r e l a t e  Ba teson 's  use of  a cyberne t ic  
model with th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  made by Paul Ricoeur between sem io t ic s ,  
cons idered as a sc ience  of  s ig n s ,  and semant ics ,  cons idered as an 
i n v e s t ig a t i o n  o f  d i sco u r se .  Whereas semio t ic s
' i s  formal t o  th e  ex ten t  t h a t  i t  r e l i e s  on th e  d i s s o c i a t i o n  
of  language in to  c o n s t i t u t i v e  p a r t s ' ,
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sem an t ics ,
' t h e  s c ience  of  the  sen tence ,  i s  immediately concerned with 
th e  concept  of  s e n s e . . . t o  th e  ex t e n t  t h a t  semantics is  
fundamental ly defined by th e  i n t e g r a t i v e  procedures of 
language1 (1976: 8, my emphasis) .
Semiotics i s  unable t o  func t ion  a n a l y t i c a l l y  a t  th e  leve l  of  the  
sentence,  l e t  alone a t  the  leve l  o f  the  complete t e x t .  This is  
important  when we note t h a t  Ba teson 's  use of  th e  term ’c a r i c a t u r e '  
to  def ine  t h e  wau's naven r o l e  can be seen as a p iece  of  l i n g u i s t i c  
a n a ly s i s  w ith in  th e  terms of  h is  cyberne t ic  model.
Meaningful speech c a r r i e s  what Ricoeur c a l l s  ' p ro p o s i t i o n a l  
con ten t '  (1976: 10).  Such con ten t  is  ' c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a s in g le  
d i s t i n c t i v e  t r a i t :  i t  has a p r e d i c a t e '  (1976: 10). Semiotic 
ana ly s i s  cannot deal with p r e d ic a t i o n ,  f o r  th e  s t r u c t u r e  of  
d iscourse
' i s  not  a s t r u c t u r e  in th e  a n a l y t i c a l  sense of  s t r u c t u r a l i s m ,  
i . e .  as a combinatory power based on th e  prev ious  oppos i t ions  
of  d i s c r e t e  u n i t s .  Rather,  i t  i s  a s t r u c t u r e  in th e  s y n th e t i c  
sense,  i . e . ,  as th e  in te r tw in ing  and in t e r p l a y  of  th e  func t ions  
of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  in one and th e  same sen tence '  (1976: 11).
Kenneth Burke has w r i t t e n  of  i rony as a 'mas te r  t r o p e ' ,  or  
f i g u r e  of  speech,  which i s  pa i red  with the  notion of  d i a l e c t i c  
(1969: 511).  For i rony,  we can here  s u b s t i t u t e  c a r i c a t u r e .  Now, 
whatever d i a l e c t i c  i s  r ep resen ted  by the  c a r i c a t u r e  a t  work in 
the  naven r e q u i r e s  not  merely a semantic r a t h e r  than a semio tic  
a n a l y s i s ,  but  r a t h e r  an a n a ly s i s  a t  a t h i r d  and even more complex 
l e v e l ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say an a n a ly s i s  a t  t h e  le ve l  of  th e  t e x t . I 
am sugges t ing  t h a t  in terms of  l i n g u i s t i c s ,  th e  naven i s  n e i t h e r  
a system of s igns  ( s e m io t ic ) ,  nor even merely a p r e d ic a t i v e  
sentence  ( sem an t ic ) ,  but t h a t  i t  can be seen as a t e x t .  D ia l e c t i c  
and irony presuppose not  only d i s co u r s e ,  but  a l so  a t e x t  considered 
as a c o l l e c t i o n  of  sentences  whose sense i n t e r p e n e t r a t e s  each 
o th e r .  We a re  here in the  realm of hermeneutics ,  or  t h a t  of  a 
t e x t  composed of  a number of  co n t r ib u to ry  sen tences .  Fu r th e r ,  any 
t e x t  implies  t h e  workings of  a p r e - t e x t  - o r  p a s t  t e x t s  (pas t  
performances of  naven and o the r  r i t u a l s ? )  - not  t o  mention a 
context  ( o th e r  contemporary performances of  naven and o the r  
r i t u a l s ? ) ,  o r  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a t  work, e i t h e r  i m p l i c i t l y
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or  e x p l i c i t l y ,  between the  t e x t  and o th e r  t e x t s .
Another c r i t i q u e  of  semiotic  a n a ly s i s  has been summarised by 
C u l l e r ,  and t h i s  too  is  r e l e v a n t  t o  Ba teson 's  use of  c y b e rn e t i c s .
For s em io t ic s
' though th e  source of  meanings i s  no longer a consciousness  in 
which they e x i s t  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  exp res s ion ,  t h e i r  source 
becomes a system of d i f f e r e n c e s  which semio t ic s  t r e a t s  as the  
necessa ry  condi t ion  of  any ac t  of  s i g n i f i c a t i o n . . . in s tead  of  
depending on th e  p r i o r  ex i s t e n c e  o f  a system of concepts ,  
express ion  now depends on th e  p r i o r  ex i s t e n c e  of  a system of 
s ig n s '  (1981: 40).  (4)
The re levance  of  t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  of semiotic  a n a l y s i s  f o r  
Bateson 's  use o f  a cyberne t ic  model i s  t h a t  t h i s  model c o n s t i t u t e s  
what C u l l e r  r e f e r s  to  as ' t h e  p r i o r  ex i s t e n c e  o f  a system of  s i g n s ' .  
Bateson f o r g e t s  t h a t  c u l t u r a l  e x i s t e n c e  i s  i t s e l f  an i n t r i n s i c  p a r t  
of  any feedback p rocess ,  s ince  humans ac t in g  in c u l t u r e  a re  a t  the  
same t ime agents  of  c u l t u r e ,  ins truments  of  communication and exper­
iencing  s u b j e c t s .  All c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  i n h e re n t ly  r e f l e x i v e ,  
and is  thus  involved in what can be descr ibed  as "feedback loops" 
of  one kind or  ano ther ,  but  th e  important  f e a t u r e  here  - whatever 
theory  of  consciousness  we wish t o  adduce - i s  t h a t  we are 
dea l ing  with an arena of  d i scourse  r a t h e r  than  a de l im i ted  p r e ­
e x i s t e n t  s t r u c t u r e  which governs t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  The a c t i v i t y  i s  
i t s e l f  c o n s t i t u t i v e  of  th e  models which presuppose i t  and which make 
i t  poss ib le^  There i s  arguably no t r an sce n d an t  or  immanent 
s t r u c t u r e ,  composed of  feedback loops o r  o f  anything e l s e ,  ou ts id e  
t h e  arena o f : d i s c g u r s e .
Bateson 's  use of  the  term ' c a r i c a t u r e '  i s  extremely i l lu m in a t in g ,  
s ince  i t  p o in t s  t o  an i r o n i c ,  d i a l e c t i c a l  p e r s p e c t iv e  which in 
tu rn  reminds us of  th e  r e f l e x i v e  c h a r a c t e r  of  language.  We thus 
r e q u i r e  a hermeneutic ,  r a t h e r  than a semiotic  or  a semantic,  
l eve l  of  a n a l y s i s .  Hermeneutics concerns i t s e l f  with th e  r e l a t i o n s  
between d i f f e r e n t  sentences with in  a t e x t ;  t h i s  can a l so  be seen,
I sugges t ,  as th e  domain of  performance.  But Ba teson 's  epistemology 
preven ts  him from pursuing t h i s  domain. I w i l l  t r y  t o  show in 
my Chapter Eleven below t h a t  more re c e n t  r i t u a l  a n a l y s t s ,  such as
G i lb e r t  Lewis, have not  pursued t h i s  avenue e i t h e r .
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In terms o f  so c io lo g ic a l  d a t a ,  Bateson f in d s  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  
demonstrate h i s  t h e s i s .  He has t o  ask whether excess ive  symmetrical 
r i v a l r y  between t h e  clans  w i l l  inc re ase  th e  frequency with which 
lauas a c t  symmetrical ly towards t h e i r  waus,  thus  t r i g g e r i n g  
exaggerated  complementray naven behaviour on th e  p a r t  of  th e  l a t t e r ,  
and whether th e  r e s u l t i n g  inc rease  in th e  frequency of  naven w i l l  
c o n t r i b u t e  towards the  s t a b i l i t y  of  t h e  s o c i e t y .  He can provide 
no s t a t i s t i c a l  da ta  to  demonstrate t h i s .  But he claims t h a t  t h e r e  
is  a good case  f o r  making th e s e  c la ims ,  s ince  th e  wau and laua 
involved in any one ins tance  of  naven u sua l ly  belong to  d i f f e r e n t  
c l a n s .  Any case of  in tense  symmetrical r i v a l r y  between two c lans  
w i l l  probably involve symmetrical i n s u l t  between th e  r e s p e c t iv e  
clan  members. When the se  members happen to  be r e l a t e d  to  each 
o the r  as wau and l a u a , then we can expect  t o  see th e  performance 
of  th e  complementary naven which w i l l  tend t o  r e s t r a i n  th e  poten­
t i a l l y  d i s r u p t i v e  excess of  symmetrical antagonism (1936: 1958 
2nd edn: 290) .  We should note here  t h a t  Bateson now wants to  
desc r ibe  Iatmul c u l t u r e  only in terms of  th e  system which he has 
d e l in e a t e d .  The naven takes  i t s  p lace  w i th in  a p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  
system, which i s  l o g i c a l l y  coherent  and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t .  There 
is  no p lace  w i th in  t h i s  system f o r  any a c c i d e n t a l ,  con t ingen t  
c u t - o f f  p o i n t s ,  r u l e s  or  im prov isa t ions ,  which would be implied 
by the  r e f l e x i v i t y  of  d i scou rse  or  performance.
Bateson now asks whether t h e r e  i s  a l so  a ' f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p 1 in Iatmul s o c ie ty  which r e s t r a i n s  an excess o f  complementary 
schismogenesis  by means of  a symmetrical inpu t .  I f  h is  cyberne t ic  
model i s  t o  s tand  up, t h i s  must be t h e  case .  He claims t h a t  t h i s  
can be seen in th e  fo l lowing i n s t a n c e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
any sugges t ion  o f  pass ive  male homosexuali ty i s  cons idered 
extremely i n s u l t i n g  by th e  Iatmul,  and t h a t  i t  immediately leads t o  
brawling.  Here, Bateson would claim t h a t  a p o t e n t i a l  in s ta nce  
of extreme complementary r e l a t i o n s h i p  between males i s  o f f s e t  by 
a s s e r t i v e  symmetrical behaviour .  Again, th e  t r a n s v e s t i t e  
behaviour of  th e  f a t h e r ' s  s i s t e r  and th e  e l d e r  b r o t h e r ' s  wife in 
th e  naven can be seen as an express ion  of  symmetrical r i v a l r y
t h e  men and as a compensation f o r  th e  women's more usual
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complementary r e l a t i o n s h i p  with t h e  men. Here, t o o ,  we can see 
t h a t  th e  women a c t  in t h i s  way a t  a t ime when a man, t h e  wau, 
i s  express ing  h i s  complementari ty towards t h e  l a u a . F in a l ly ,
Bateson mentions t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  among t h e  men, t h e  extreme complem­
e n t a r i t y  of  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n i t i a t o r s  and novices  i s  
o f f s e t  by extreme r i v a l r y  between t h e  d i f f e r e n t  i n i t i a t o r y  
groups.  The symmetrical r i v a l r y  between th e  i n i t i a t o r y  groups i s  
seen by Bateson as a counterba lance  a g a i n s t  th e  complementary 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  i n i t i a t o r s  and the  boys (1936: 1958 
2nd edn: 290-291).
Again, t h i s  e x eg e s i s ,  with i t s  cyberne tic -m echan ica l  b i a s ,  
al lows no room f o r  the  r e f l e x i v i t y  and im provisa t ion  of  ind iv idua l  
performances.  This could only be allowed in to  t h e  p i c t u r e  by a 
more broad ly  semantic and hermeneutic,  r a t h e r  than a semiotic  or  
c y b e rn e t i c ,  approach.  The model o f  equ i l ib r iu m  and d i s e q u i l ib r iu m  
w h i c h  Bateson i s  co n s t ru c t in g  here does not  al low f o r  t h e  use of  
c a r i c a t u r e  and i rony ,  which he has j u s t  in d ica te d  i s  a c r u c i a l  
element in t h e  naven. Bateson i s  in e f f e c t  a t tempt ing  t o  c lo se  down 
his  a n a ly s i s  and r e s t r i c t  i t  t o  t h e  conf ines  of  h i s  c y b e rn e t ic  model, 
which he b e l i e v e s  he has ‘to do in o rde r  t o  j u s t i f y  h i s  c o n s t ru c t io n  
of th e  model in t h e  f i r s t  p l a ce .  This c lo sed ,  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  is  
r equ i red  by a semio t ic  approach,  whereas a performance view would 
al low f o r  a wider ,  more open f i e l d  o f  o p t io n s ,  n e c e s s i t a t e d  by 
th e  powerful r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s u b je c t  and p r e d ic a t e  and th e  
r e f l e x i v e  use of  t r o p e s ,  or  f i g u r e s  of  speech,  which semantic and 
hermeneutic a n a ly s i s  would al low f o r .
Bateson again confesses  t h a t  i t  i s  impossib le  f o r  him to  give 
a s o c io l o g ic a l  demonstrat ion t h a t  th e s e  s h i f t s  from complementari ty 
to  symmetry e f f e c t i v e l y  prevent  s o c ia l  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .  But he claims 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  ano ther  aspec t  of  such s h i f t s  which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
th e  o s c i l l a t i o n  from complementary t o  symmetrical behaviour ,  and 
v ice  v e r s a , i s  very important  in th e  s o c i e t y .  He cla ims t o  have 
shown t h a t  Iatmul in d iv id u a l s  r e c u r r e n t l y  exper ience  such s h i f t s ,  
and p a r t i c i p a t e  in them.
'From t h i s  we may reasonably  expec t  t h a t  t h e se  in d iv id u a l s  
l e a r n , bes ides  t h e  symmetrical and complementary p a t t e r n s ,
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t o  expect  and e x h i b i t  s eq u en t i a l  r e l a t i o n s  between the  
symmetrical and the  complementary'  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 291’ 
a u t h o r ’s emphasis) .
Bateson would here be open t o  Quine 's  argument t h a t  experience  
i s  always under-determined by th e o ry ,  or  t h a t ,  f o r  any s e t  of 
f a c t s ,  t h e r e  i s  always more than one p o s s ib le  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  (1960).  
A s c i e n t i f i c  view seeks p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  as th e  c r u c i a l  a d d i t io n a l  
c r i t e r i o n  of  t h e o r e t i c a l  v a l i d i t y .  In th e  world of  phys ica l  o b je c t s  
and of  mechanics t h i s  is  e v id en t ly  an important  c o n s id e ra t io n  
in choosing between t h e o r i e s ;  but  in t h e  realm of s o c ia l  l i f e  
th e  notion  of  " p r e d i c t a b i l i t y "  i s  o f  doubtfu l  re le vance .  R ea l i ty  
is  not  so powerful t h a t  i t  can determine what we th in k  about i t .
For Bateson,  t h e  notion of  c a r i c a t u r e  i s  mechan ic a l ; i t  r e s t s  
on a paradox in th e  naven r o l e  of  t h e  wau - i . e . ,  the
paradox between h i s  " r ea l"  r o l e  as Iatmul man and h is  "assumed" 
r o l e  as Iatmul woman. Bateson does not  open out  h i s  use of  th e  
no tion  of  c a r i c a t u r e  t o  th e  f u l l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  i r o n i c  
r e f l e x i v i t y  which would r e q u i r e  an i n v e s t ig a t i o n  of  d i scou rse  and 
of  performance.  This app l ie s  t o  a l l  the  o th e r  schismogenic i n t e r ­
ac t io n s  in Iatmul s o c ie ty  which Bateson adduces in h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  
al though we can see th e  performance of  what i t  i s  t o  be an Iatmul 
to  be exempli f ied  in the  naven.
There i s  th e  ad d i t io n a l  p o in t  t o  be made, t h a t  schismogenesis  
as an exp lana to ry  device would not  work so r e a d i l y  f o r  s o c i e t i e s  
which do not  lay such exc lu s ive  value on ind iv idua l i sm  and compet­
i t i o n .  P re suppos i t ions  of  s e l f  d i f f e r  from c u l t u r e  t o  c u l t u r e .
In a t tempt ing  t o  desc r ibe  s o c ia l  p r a c t i c e s ,  an th ro p o lo g i s t s  need 
t o  look c l o s e r  a t  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  kinds of  p r e s uppos i t ions  as t o  the  
na tu re  of  " s e l f " ,  "person" and " in d iv id u a l "  which a re  a t  work in 
th e  p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e .  We know t h i s  to  be so from Bateson 's  own 
l a t e r  w r i t i n g s ;  in one of  h is  papers on Bali he admits  t h a t  the  
schismogenic model of  i n t e r - a c t i o n  could not  be app l ied  t o  the  
Bal inese ,  who p r e f e r  to  maximise notions  such as balance  and 
e t i q u e t t e  (1973 : 85-93) .  But schismogenesis  reappears
in th e  Ba l inese  m a te r ia l  w r i t t e n  with Margaret Mead as an i n t e r n a l
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t en s ion  w i th in  th e  Balinese in d iv idua l  . (1942) anc^s
l a t e r ,  as a model of  d i s j u n c t i v e  communication in the  sch izophren-  
eg ic family  and w ith in  th e  confused psyche of  th e  sch izophren ic  
(1973 ; (d) ) .
I would sugges t  t h a t  naven and o th e r  schismogenic performances 
in f luence  each o th e r  and c r e a t e  each o th e r .  These c r e a t i o n s  - and 
r e - c r e a t i o n s  -  c o n s t i t u t e  Iatmul c u l t u r e .  There i s  no " e s s e n t i a l ", 
" s t a n d a r d i s e d "  Iatmul in d iv idua l  beneath t h e s e  c r e a t i o n s  and r e ­
c r e a t i o n s .  A performance view s t r e s s e s  t h a t  becoming and showing 
cannot  be d ivorced one from the  o th e r ,  t h a t  they  a re  mutually 
c o n s t i t u t i v e ;  i t  i s  about showing who you are  and becoming who you 
are  a t  th e  same t ime .  In Chapter  Eleven below I w i l l  r e f e r  to  
S a r t r e ' s  famous p o r t r a i t  o f  th e  ca fe  w a i t e r  in Being and Nothing­
ness in o rde r  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  dual na tu re  of  performance.
Engaging in naven i s  an important  p a r t  o f  what c o n s t i t u t e s  being 
an Iatmul wau. Naven and o the r  p r a c t i c e s  a re  th e  con tex ts  in 
which th e  Iatmul s e l f  i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  in what Charles Taylor (1985) 
has c a l l e d  ' p u b l i c  space '  (see Chapter  Eleven pp. 251-265 below).
Bateson has adopted th e  s t r a t e g y  t h a t  most a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  have
adopted in dea l ing  with " r i t u a l " ;  he asks what aspec ts  of a given
co n tex t ,  in t h i s  case t h a t  of the  m othe r ' s  b r o t h e r - s i s t e r ' s son 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  produce naven a c t i v i t y .  In adopting t h i s  s t r a t e g y  he 
needs to  adduce a system and then t o  e l im in a te  any c o n t r a d i c t i o n
from the  p i c t u r e .  This system is  a t  f i r s t  th e  k insh ip  s t r u c t u r e ,  then
e thos ,  then schismogenesis  and, f i n a l l y ,  a system of cyberne t ic  
feedback loops .  We see in t h i s  p rogress ion  th e  con t inua l  o s c i l l a t ­
ion in th e  development of  Bateson 's  a n a ly s i s  from a system view to  
a con tex t  view, which I ou t l in ed  e a r l i e r .  His f i n a l  s ta tement in 
h is  1936 Epilogue:
'Our u n s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge of  the  d iv e rs e  f a c t s  of  human na tu re  
i s  p rod ig ious ,  and only when t h i s  knowledge has been s e t  in 
a s c i e n t i f i c  framework s h a l l  we be ab le to  hope f o r  new ideas 
and t h e o r i e s '  (1936: 279)
is  f i n a l l y  underw r i t t en  by th e  con ten ts  of  h i s  1958 Epilogue,  al though
the  l a t t e r  does end with a doubting cau t ion  about th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
posed by a l l  t h i s  s c i e n t i f i c  endeavour:
'C e r ta in  m ys te r ies  a re  f o r  formal reasons  im penet rable ,  and 
here i s  t n e  v a s t  darkness of t h e  s u b j e c t 1 C1936: 1958 2nd edn:
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3 0 2 ) .
The t r u t h  s u re ly  i s  t h a t  per fo rmative  s o c ia l  a c t i v i t y  is  more 
f l e x i b l e  and s u b t l e  than can be allowed f o r  by any "system".  A good 
performance may be about many th in g s  and many aspec t s  of  s o c ia l  
r e a l i t y  a t  once.
Ba teson 's  s t r a t e g y  is  a l so  t h a t  of  l a t e r  commentators on h is  
m a te r ia l  such as Handelman, who a l so  see c o n t r a d i c t io n s  as inheren t  
in th e  wau-iaua r e l a t i o n s h i p  which a re  then expressed in naven 
(1979). But th e  naven performance c r e a t e s  and h ig h l ig h t s  th e  r e l a t ­
ionship  a t  th e  same t ime.  Any one performance i s  a r e - c r e a t i o n  of  
previous performances;  i t  i s  a l s o ,  of  course ,  a r e c r e a t i o n .  There 
is  no r e f e r e n c e  in Bateson 's  an a ly s i s  t o  th e  p o s s i b i l i l i t y  of improv­
i s a t i o n ,  nor how much t h i s  might be encouraged o r  frowned upon. 
Bateson ignores  t h e  c r u c i a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  naven performances 
might be not  so much s t r i c t l y  co d i f i e d  and s e t  " r i t u a l  t e x t s "  as 
improvisat ions  on a theme, th e  theme of  what i t  i s  to  be an Iatmul.
For Bateson,  i t  i s  not  only important  to  look a t  changes in a 
so c ia l  network,  and th e  e f f e c t s  of  th e se  changes on th e  in d iv idua l s  
concerned,  but  we must a l so  remember t h a t  th e  i n d i v i d u a l s : i n t t h a t  
network are themselves t r a i n e d  in some way t o  i n t e r n a l i s e  the  
p a t t e r n s  of  change,  t o  i n i t i a t e  change and to  a d ju s t  and respond to  
i t .  They are  t r a i n e d ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  ' d e u t e r o - l e a r n '  such p a t t e r n s  
of  change.  So Bateson 's  cyberne t ic  model r e f e r s  not  only to  the  
soc ia l  system regarded as a nexus of  in d iv id u a l s  but  a l so  to  an 
i n t e r n a l i s e d  mechanism of adap t ive ,  s e l f - c o r r e c t i v e  change with in  
each in d i v id u a l .  But t h i s  model leads to  a major problem f o r  
a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s .
‘ I t  i s  t h i s  f a c t  - t h a t  the  p a t t e r n s  of  s o c ie ty  as a major 
e n t i t y  can by le a rn ing  be i n t r o j e c t e d  o r  concep tua l ized  by 
the  p a r t i c i p a n t  ind iv idual s ,  - t h a t  makes anthropology and 
indeed t h e  whole of  behavioural  sc ience  p e c u l i a r l y  d i f f i c u l t .
The s c i e n t i s t  i s  not  the  only human being in t h e  p i c t u r e .  His 
s u b je c t s  a re  a l so  capable of  a l l  s o r t s  o f  le a rn ing  and 
c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  and even, l i k e  th e  s c i e n t i s t ,  they  a re  capable 
of  e r r o r s  of c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n 1 (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 192).
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This passage i s  important  and i l lu m in a t in g  f o r  contemporary an throp­
o l o g i s t s  in th e  debates  about such t o p i c s  as r a t i o n a l i t y  and r e l a t ­
ivism, but  i t  a l so  h ig h l ig h t s  Ba teson 's  ep i s tem olog ica l  p re jud ice  
t h a t  concepts  exp la in  a c t io n .  For Bateson, t h e r e  i s  always a bedrock 
of  e s s e n t i a l  cogn i t ion  which u n d e r l i e s  behaviour ;  concepts  are 
a n a l y t i c a l l y  p r i o r  to  p r a c t i c e .  I t  is  t h i s  p re ju d i c e  which preven ts  
him from opening out  h is  an a ly s i s  of  th e  naven as p r a c t i c e ,  t h a t  
is  as c o n s t i t u t i v e  s o c ia l  a c t io n ,  or  performance.
This p r e ju d i c e  i s  f u r t h e r  demonstrated in th e  f i n a l  s ec t ion  
of  h is  1958 Epilogue,  in which he d i scusses  R u s s e l l ' s  theo ry  of  
log ica l  ty p e s ,  and i t s  a p p l i c a t io n  t o  th e  problem o u t l in e d  in the  
above q u o ta t io n .  This d iscuss ion  i s  important  f o r  an unders tand­
ing of  much o f  Bateson 's  l a t e r  work s ince  t h e  1930s, but  a b r i e f  
review must s u f f i c e  here .  Logical typ ing  i s  c l o s e l y  a s so c ia ted  
with cy b e rn e t i c s  in Bateson 's  t h i n k in g ,  in t h a t  f o r  him i t  provides 
a way out  of  th e  b l ind  a l l e y  of  a c e r t a i n  kind of  f u n c t io n a l  
exp lana t ion ;  i t  does no t ,  however, al low him t o  escape f u n c t i o n a l i s t  
exp lanation  per  s e .
Ba teson 's  t h e o r e t i c a l  con tex t  here i s  composed .of messages,  
parameters  and h i e r a r c h i e s .  I t  i s  th e  same con tex t  as t h a t  which 
he descr ibed  in h is  e a r l i e r  passage about o rders  of  l e a rn ing .  
R u s s e l l ' s  c e n t r a l  notion
' i s  th e  t ru i sm  t h a t  a c l a s s  cannot be a member of  i t s e l f .  The 
c l a s s  of  e lephan ts  has not  got  a t runk  and i s  not  an e l ephan t '  
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 293).
The theory  s t a t e s  t h a t  th e  c l a s s  "elephant"  i s  o f  a
d i f f e r e n t  o rde r  from ac tua l  e l ep h an ts ,  and i t  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
means of  t h e  example of  a s e l f - c o r r e c t i v e ,  t h e r m o s t a t i c a l l y  con­
t r o l l e d  hea t ing  system. This system can be div ided  in to  " v a r i a b l e s "  
and"parameters" ,  which con t ro l  th e  v a r i a b l e s .  Here th e  v a r i a b le s  
c o n s i s t  of  t h e  range of  tempera tures  around which th e  system
o s c i l l a t e s ,  as s e t  by the  th e rm o s ta t .  But th e  the rm os ta t  s e t t i n g s
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can be changed by th e  householder;  thus  t h e  parameters of  th e  system 
can be a l t e r e d  a t  a higher o rder  of  ope ra t ion  than t h a t  of  th e  
v a r i a b l e s .  Changes in th e  paramaters  are o f  a h igher  o rde r  of  
opera t ion  than changes in th e  v a r i a b l e s .  As in th e  d i scuss ion  of
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orders  of  l e a rn in g ,  Bateson s t a t e s  t h a t  we a re  here dea l ing  with 
'm e t a - r e l a t i o n s h ip s  between messages '  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 293).
He con t inues :
'Any two o rde rs  o f  learn ing  a re  r e l a t e d  so t h a t  t h e  le a rn ing  of  
one o rde r  i s  a l ea rn ing  about th e  o th e r ,  and s i m i l a r l y  in the  
case  of  t h e  house the rm os ta t  th e  message which th e  householder 
puts  in to  t h e  system by changing the  s e t t i n g  i s  about how th e  
system s h a l l  respond to  messages of  lower o rder  emanating from 
th e  t h e rm o s ta t '  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 293,  a u t h o r ' s  emphases).
I t  i s  important  t o  note t h a t  t h e  example of  feedback which Bateson 
adduces here i s  an extremely mechanical one. We should a l so  ask 
what p lace  c a r i c a t u r e  and irony,  f o r  example, could have in such a 
model; c l e a r l y ,  a the rm os ta t  cannot comment upon i t s  own s e t t i n g .
Bateson now r e l a t e s  l ea rn ing  theory  and c y b e rn e t ic s  t o  R u s s e l l ' s  
theory  of  lo g i c a l  ty p e s ,  which we can see as th e  e s s e n t i a l  bedrock,  
as a typology of  t y p o lo g ie s ,  f o r  Ba teson 's  epistemology as i t  
developed in t h e  1940s and 1950s. Russel l  i n d i c a t e s  a h ie ra rchy  of  
names, c l a s s e s  and c l a s s e s  of c l a s s e s  which a re  each l o g i c a l l y  
d i s c r e t e .  This inc ludes  a h ie ra rchy  of  messages, meta-messages and 
meta-meta-messages; what Bateson had e a r l i e r  c a l l e d  " d e u te ro -  
l e a r n i n g 11 might in t h i s  con tex t  be r e f e r r e d  t o  as " m e t a - l e a r n i n g ". 
Bateson cla ims t h a t
' l o g i c a l  typ ing  i s  an i n e v i t a b l e  in g re d i e n t  in t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between any d e s c r ib e r  and any system to  be d e s c r ib e d '
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 294).
The problem i s  one of  l e v e l s  o f  complexity in ex p la n a t io n .  In 
hi s  f i r s t  Epi logue,  Bateson had claimed t h a t  ethos  and e idos  are  
only a l t e r n a t i v e  ways of  p resen t ing  th e  da t a .  He b e l i e v e s  now t h a t  
t h i s  i s  only another  way of saying t h a t  they  are  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  of 
th e  same o rd e r ,  o r  lo g ica l  type .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e se  two kinds of  
d e s c r ip t i o n  e x i s t  as formulated by Bateson,  however, does not  
imply t h a t  th e  system i t s e l f  possesses  such dual complexity.  But 
one d u a l i t y  c e r t a i n l y  does e x i s t  he re ,  namely t h a t  ob ta in ing  between 
any observa t ion  of  behaviour and any g e n e r a l i z a t io n  a b s t r a c t e d  from 
t h a t  o b se rva t ion .  This ,  according t o  Bateson, r e f l e c t s
' t h e  dual f a c t  of  le a rn ing  and lea rn ing  t o  l e a r n .  A s tep  in 
R usse l l i an  typology inheren t  in th e  system i s  r ep re sen ted  by
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a corresponding s tep  in the  d e s c r i p t i o n ’ (1936: 1958 2nd edn:
(296-297).
A f u r t h e r  important  r e f l e c t i o n  of  lo g i c a l  typ ing  i s  marked by 
th e  concept  of  schismogenesis .  This i s  seen as being of  a h igher  
orde r ,  o r  l o g i c a l  ty p e ,  than e thos  and e id o s ,  s ince  i t  r e f e r s  to  
change w i th in  th e  system. The use o f  t h e  concept  of  schismogenesis  
al lows us t o  see t h a t  Iatmul s o c ie ty  c on ta in s  an e x t r a  o rder  of 
complexity which i s  brought  about by th e  combination of  l ea rn ing  and 
t h e  i n t e r - a c t i o n  of  persons .
’The schismogenic u n i t  i s  a two-person subsystem. This subsystem 
con ta in s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  a c y b e rn e t i c  c i r c u i t  which 
might go in to  p rogress ive  change; i t  cannot ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be 
concep tua l ly  ignored and must be descr ibed  in a language of  
h igher  type  than  any language used t o  d e s c r ib e  ind iv idua l  
behaviour - th e  l a t t e r  category of  phenomena being only the  
even ts  in one or  another  arc o f  th e  schismogenic sys tem1 
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 297).
In o th e r  words, Bateson i s  claiming t h a t  th e  use of  th e  concept  
of  schismogenesis  enabled him t o  add a d iach ron ic  dimension t o  what 
had p rev ious ly  been a purely synchronic p i c t u r e  of  Iatmul s o c i e t y .  
S tatements about change,he says ,  w i l l  always be in a language one 
degree more a b s t r a c t  than th e  language which would be s u f f i c i e n t  
to  d e s c r ib e  t h e  system in a s teady s t a t e .
'As s ta tem en ts  about a c c e l e r a t io n  must always 'be  of  h igher  
lo g i c a l  type  than s ta tements  about  v e l o c i t y ,  so a l so  s ta tements  
about c u l t u r a l  change must be of  h igher  type  than  synchronic 
s ta tem en ts  about  c u l t u r e .  This r u l e  w i l l  apply th roughout  th e  
f i e l d  o f  l e a rn ing  and e v o lu t io n '  (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 298).
Here, in a few sen tences ,  i s  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s i s  f o r  Bateson 's  
models of  p lay ,  c r e a t i v i t y  and sch izophren ia  which he was o u t l i n in g  
a t  th e  same t ime as he was w r i t in g  t h i s  second Epilogue t o  h i s  
major work, f i r s t  published over twenty yea rs  b e fo re .
The problem here  i s  t h a t  Bateson i s  t r e a t i n g ' c h a n g e  as problem- 
a t i c ,  Wi t h  an unproblematic s t a s i s  ly ing underneath i t .  This reads  
l i k e  an apology f o r  much f u n c t i o n a l i s t  an thropology,  which regarded 
c o n t in u i t y  as welded t o  an e s s e n t i a l  c u l t u r a l  bedrock w i th in  which 
c u l t u r a l  and s o c ia l  change had l i t t l e  p la c e .  Ethos and e idos  are  
i l lu m in a t in g  and innovatory fo rm u la t ions ,  but  they  s t i l l  r e q u i r e
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human beings as inst ruments  of  c u l t u r e ,  r a t h e r  than as a c t i v e  
agents  i n t e r a c t i n g  in a meaningful r e f l e x i v e  s o c i a l  nexus.  Ethos 
and eidos a re  th e  "b lun t  instruments"  exe rc ised  by an immanent 
c u l t u r e  which determines human a c t io n .
A performance p e r s p e c t iv e ,  on t h e  o th e r  hand, can t r e a t  s t a s i s  
and change as two elements in a c o n t in u i t y  which n e g o t i a t e s  
between p a s t ,  p re sen t  and f u t u r e  p e r s p e c t iv e s .  Sure ly  a "steady 
s t a t e "  i s  as much in need of  exp lana t ion  as a s t a t e  o f  "change".
The ques t ion  i s ,  how is  i t  po s s ib le  f o r  human beings t o  o f ten  c r e a t e  
and r e - c r e a t e  c u l t u r e  and mainta in  th e  appearance of  s t a s i s ?
How is  c o n t i n u i t y  in performance main tained? Under what c i rc umstan­
ces does change t a k e  place? And, perhaps th e  most i n t e r e s t i n g  
ques t ion  of  a l l ,  how do p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e s  determine and de f ine  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between s t a s i s  and change? I would sugges t  t h a t  we 
can summarise th e s e  ques t ions  by ask ing ,  what a re  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
genera ted  in any one f i e l d  of  performance?
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NOTES to  Chapter Ten
(1) R u s s e l l ' s  In t roduc t ion  t o  W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  T ra c ta tu s  Logico- 
Ph i losoph icus i s  l i s t e d  by Bateson in h is  Bibl iography to  
h i s  1958 Epilogue (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 302-303),  but  t h e r e  
i s  no r e f e r e n c e  t o  W it tgens te in  h im se lf  in B a teson 's  t e x t .
(2 ) In t h i s  important  paper Gel lner  a t t a c k s  t h e  i n f l u e n t i a l  
W i t tg en s te in ia n  notion t h a t  meaning equals  use (1979: 45).
The r a m i f i c a t i o n s  of  G e l l n e r ' s  c r i t i q u e  o f ,  f o r  example,
Leach and Evans-Pr i t chard  from t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  i s  beyond 
th e  scope of  my p re sen t  argument.
(3)  There has been much re c e n t  d i s c u s s io n  in t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on
t h i s  impor tan t  i s sue ,  f o r  example by Rosaldo (1985) and Lutz 
(1985).  Rosaldo ques t ions  whether our c o n c e p tu a l i s a t i o n  of  
anger i s  r e l e v a n t  f o r  th e  I longo ts  of t h e  P h i l i p p in e s ,  while 
Lutz d e l i n e a t e s  indigenous c a t e g o r i e s  o f  emotion f o r  the  
I f a lu k  of  t h e  P a c i f i c  I s lands  and sugges ts  t h a t  Western 
c a t e g o r i e s  do not apply to  I f a lu k  no t ions  of  a f f e c t .
(4) I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note t h a t  in h i s  l a t e r  work, Bateson
of ten  i n s i s t s  on a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  "mind" as a realm inhab i ted  
e x c l u s i v e ly  by d i f f e r e n c e . See, e . g . ,  h i s  paper 'Form, 
Substance and D i f f e r e n c e ' : ' I  sugges t  t o  y o u . . . t h a t  th e  word
" idea" ,  in i t s  most elementary sense,  i s  synonymous with
" d i f f e r e n c e "  (1973 (e)  427).  De Saussure ,  of  course ,  def ined 
language in ex ac t ly  the  same te rms.  I have,  however, been 
unable t o  f in d  any r e fe ren c e  to  de Saussure  in Ba teson 's  
works. This t o p i c  a r i s e s  aga in ,  b r i e f l y ,  in Chapter  Twelve, 
pp. 287-288 below.
228
CHAPTER ELEVEN: DECONSTRUCTION VERSUS DRAMATISM
Needham, W ittgen stein , Lewis
IT CAN BE argued t h a t  the  h i s to r y  of  at tempts  t o  c r i t i c i s e  t r a d i t ­
ional  c a t e g o r ie s  in B r i t i s h  s o c ia l  anthropology began with Leach's  
famous c r i t i q u e  of  ' b u t t e r f l y  c o l l e c t i n g '  (1961).  In t h a t  paper 
Leach wanted to  draw a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  s t e r i l i t y  engendered by an 
obsession with th e  formulat ion of  a n a l y t i c a l  c a t e g o r ie s  in k inship  
s tu d i e s .  Leach's  i n s ig h t  here was taken  up by Needham in h is  
In t roduc t ion  to  Rethinking Kinship and Marriage (1971). One of  
the  achievements of  Needham in t h i s  essay was to  p re sen t  f o r  th e  
f i r s t  t ime a s ta tement by a B r i t i s h  an th ro p o lo g i s t  as t o  th e  import­
ance of  th e  e x p l i c a t i o n  of the  ph i losoph ica l  assumptions which are 
im p l i c i t  in th e  th eo ry  and p r a c t i c e  of  an thropology.  Needham 
w r i t e s :
'A s trenuous  inner  e f f o r t  is  c a l l e d  f o r ,  and an a u s te r e  s e l f -  
c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  not  a l l  can be expected t o  f ind  congen ia l '
(1971: x v i i ) .
A s l i g h t  change in viewpoint ,  warns Needham, i s  not enough, f o r
' i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  dev ia te  from an old l i n e  of  thought 
j u s t  a l i t t l e ' (W it tgens te in ,  1967, quoted by Needham, 1973: 
x v i i , a u t h o r ' s  emphasis).
Needham's use o f  W ittgens te in  here p o in t s  towards the  fo rm er ' s  1972 
study in th e  phenomenology of  b e l i e f .  This i s  an a r t i c u l a t e :  
at tempt a t  a r a d i c a l  c r i t i q u e  of  what has always been one of  the  most 
bas ic  c a t e g o r ie s  in an thropolog ica l  a n a l y s i s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
analyses of  r i t u a l  (1972).
Needham's bas ic  ques t ion  i s  t h i s :  i s  b e l i e f  a un ive rsa l  category  
of  exper ience?  Can we t r u l y  say t h a t  people in a l l  s o c i e t i e s  have 
b e l i e f s ,  or  is  t h e  importance given to  t h i s  no tion a c o n s t ru c t  of  
Western thought? In one s e c t io n ,  Needham asks what c r i t e r i a  we 
can adduce f o r  t h e  s t a t e  of  " b e l i e f "  in another  person.  He argues 
t h a t  t h e r e  are no outward c r i t e r i a ,  and he quotes W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  
comments on how one would d isp lay  an inward s t a t e  of  f e a r :
'What i s  f e a r ?  What does "being a f r a i d "  mean? I f  I wanted to  
exp la in  i t  a t  a s in g le  showing - I should p la y -a c t  f e a r .  Could
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I a l so  r e p re s e n t  hope in t h i s  way? Hardly.  And what about 
b e l i e f ? '  {Wit tgens te in ,  1953, quoted by Needham, 1972: 102, 
a u t h o r ' s  emphases).
Needham r e p l i e s  in t h e  nega t ive .  We cannot ,  he says ,  p l a y -a c t  
b e l i e f .
' t h e r e  i s  no f a c i a l  express ion ,  e i t h e r  n a tu ra l  or  (so f a r  as I 
know) conven t iona l ,  which can be put  on f o r  t h i s  purpose,  and 
t h e r e  i s  no bodily  a c t  which can be taken as a sure and 
d i s t i n c t i v e  sign of  b e l i e v i n g 1 (1972: 102).
A f u r t h e r  quote from Wit tgens te in  under l ines  the  d i f f i c u l t y :
'Suppose someone were a b e l i e v e r  and sa id :  "I b e l iev e  in a 
Last Judgement", and I sa id :  "Well,  I 'm not  so s u r e .  P oss ib ly . "  
You would say t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an enormous g u l f  between us .  I f  
he sa id  "There i s  a German aeroplane overhead",  and I sa id  
"Poss ib ly .  I 'm not  so s u re" ,  you'd say we were f a i r l y  near .
I t  i s n ' t  a ques t ion  of  my being anywhere near  him, but  on an 
e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  p lane '  (W it tgens te in ,  1966, quoted by 
Needham, 1972: 73).
Needham argues t h a t  b e l i e f  has been such an important  s u b je c t  of  
an th ropo log ica l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  because of  our powerful p re ju d i c e  in 
favour  of  a c o g n i t iv e  account of  exper ience .  I t  can be argued t h a t  
t h i s  can be seen p a r t i c u l a r l y  in an th ropo log ica l  d i s c u s s io n s  about 
r i t u a l .  The most no tab le  recen t  ethnography t o  examine t h i s  p re ju d ­
ice i s  G i lb e r t  Lewis' account of  i n i t i a t i o n  r i t e s  among th e  Gnau, 
a people who a re  c lo se  neighbours of  th e  Iatmul,  l i v in g  in th e  West 
Sepik Province of  New Guinea.
For Lewis, a no tab le  f e a t u r e  of  r i t u a l  i s  t h a t  ' i t  i s  p r a c t i c a l .  
I t  guides a c t i o n 1 (1980: 11 ) .  But reasons and mot iva t ions  are
another  m a t te r .
'Guidance on what to  do is  e x p l i c i t ,  but  the  reason f o r  doing i t ,  
the  meaning, motive or  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  the  ac t io n  may not  
be.  The exp lana t ions  f o r  what is  done may be c l e a r ,  o r  complic­
ated or  u n c e r t a in ,  or  m u l t ip l e ,  o r  f o r g o t t e n ;  but  what t o  do 
i s  known' (Lewis, 1980: 11).  (1)
Motivat ion proved a prime r i d d l e  f o r  Lewis in h i s  at tempt to
come to  g r ip s  with th e  Gnau i n i t i a t i o n  r i t e s .  His in v e s t i g a t i o n s
cen t red  around a Gnau pen is -b leed ing  r i t e .  At c e r t a i n  t imes  Gnau 
males remove themselves from th e  company of women and cu t  t h e i r
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penises  t o  make them b le ed .  The f i r s t  t ime t h i s  i s  done i s  a t  
puber ty ;  on t h i s  occasion th e  bleed ing i s  c a r r i e d  out  by an o ld e r  
man. Other r e p o r t s  on s i m i l i a r  r i t e s  from t h e  same a rea ,  by Mead on 
th e  Mountain Arapesh and by Hogbin on th e  people of  th e  i s l a n d  of 
Wogeo, had s t a t e d  t h a t  indigenous exp lana t ions  had equated male 
pen i s -b leed ing  with female mens t rua t ion .  But when Lewis asked the  
Gnau f o r  t h e i r  exp lan a t io n ,  they t o l d  him t h a t  t h i s  was not  so.  His 
problem was
'what s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  a t t a c h  t o  t h e  f in d in g  t h a t  Gnau men did 
not  equate  t h e i r  s im i l a r  p r a c t i c e s  of  pen i s -b leed ing  with 
m ens t rua t ion ,  while some o th e r  peoples in the  a rea ,  or  a t  
l e a s t  t h e i r  e thnographers ,  did so equa te  i t 1 (1980: 2 ) .
Other ethnographic  r e p o r t s  from var ious  o th e r  Sepik s o c i e t i e s  
s t a t e d  reasons  f o r  customs shared by th e  Gnau which concen t ra ted  on 
t r a d i t i o n  and t h e  teach ing  of  the  f o r e f a t h e r s .  The Gnau a l so  
p r a c t i s e d  b leed ing  from th e  mouth in ano ther  male i n i t i a t i o n  r i t e .  
For the  Gnau, r e p o r t s  Lewis, t h i s  was aimed a t  making them f i e r c e ,  
' t e e th e d  men' .  This i s  a p r a c t i c e  they  share  with o th e r  Sepik 
s o c i e t i e s  such as th e  Kwoma, Wogeo and th e  Iatmul.  Hogbin had 
repo r ted  t h a t  h i s  informants had e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  tongue-  
b le ed ing ,  c a r r i e d  ou t  on t h e  young men a t  puber ty ,  i s  t o  be equated 
with a pubescent  g i r l ' s  f i r s t  m e ns t rua t ion .  Hogbin had w r i t t e n  t h a t  
t h i s  tongue-b leed ing  is
' i n  a sense  a y o u th ' s  f i r s t  a r t i f i c i a l  m ens t rua t ion ,  co rrespond­
ing with th e  i n i t i a l  menst ruat ion  of  a pubescent  g i r l .  The 
tongue i s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  t h e  b leeding  because h i t h e r t o  he w i l l
have absorbed th e  worst  of  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  o r a l l y  with mother ' s
m i l k . . . I n  a few y e a r s ,  when he i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  mature f o r  
sexual  in t e r c o u r s e ,  the  penis  w i l l  be t h e  agent  whereby 
con tamination  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d .  Accordingly in l a t e r  l i f e  t h i s  
i s  t h e  organ t h a t  r ece ives  menstrual  t r e a tm e n t '  (Hogbin,
1970, quoted by Lewis, 1980: 3 -4 ) .
Another puzz le  f o r  Lewis was th e  i n t e r d i c t i o n  th e  Gnau p lace  on
th e  use o f  lime by women and young men when chewing a reca  n u t .  I f
lime i s  mixed with areca nut  when chewed, t h e  b e t e l  j u i c e  tu rn s
b r ig h t  r e d .  J u s t  as t h e  Gnau sa id  t h a t  mouth b leed ing tu rned  young
men in t o  f i e r c e " t e e t h e d  men",so they t o l d  Lewis t h a t  t o  chew lime
with b e t e l  j u i c e  was th e  p r i v i l e g e  of  grown men.If  young men so 
indulged,  i t  would i n t e r f e r e  with t h e i r  prowess as h u n te r s .  As f o r
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the  women, they
'chewed areca nut  with ash as th e  young men d id ,  u n t i l  t h e i r  
r ep roduc t ive  l i f e  was over and they had g randch i ld ren ,  when 
the  women too were allowed t o  chew with lime and s p i t  b r ig h t  
r ed '  (1980: 3 ) .
Lewis w r i t e s  t h a t  he was t o l d  t h a t  t h i s  was so because of  custom 
and p r i v i l e g e .
' P r i v i l e g e ,  s ca rce  lime and s e l f i s h  p le a su re  seemed adequate 
to  exp la in  th e  ru l e s  which favoured s e n io r  men withou t  looking 
f o r  some rec o n d i t e  symbolic e x p lan a t io n '  (1980: 3 ) .
What did seem c e r t a i n  was t h a t  t h e  Gnau did use s im i le s  which 
implied a p a r a l l e l  between mouth and vulva,  and t h a t  Gnau s o c ie ty  
g e n e ra l ly  i s  permeated with taboos concerned with blood.
Lewis shows t h a t  i t  would be q u i t e  easy f o r  him to  put  a l l  t h i s  
data t o g e t h e r ,  ' t o  play with log ic  o f  a k i n d ' ,  f o r  th e  an th ro p o lo g is t  
can be tempted to
' s e l e c t  what w i l l  f i t ,  r a t h e r  t o  remark what would not  f i t  i f  
one were as ingenious as a s c e p t i c  f in d in g  evidence to  c o n t r a ­
d i c t  t h e  proposed sys tem ' .
But i f  we avoid t h i s  t em pta t ion ,  we then have t o  ask
'what use i t  i s  t o  sugges t ,  by comparison w i th in  an a rea ,  p o s s ib le  
or  perhaps te nden t ious  l inks  of  t h i s  s o r t ;  t o  f in d  them where 
t h e  people concerned ignore them, do not  know them' (1980: 4 ) .
One of  Lewis'  c e n t r a l  arguments i s  t h a t  ' exp re s s ion  is  not  the  
same as communication'  (1980: 1) .  When we th in k  of  communication, 
we immediately th in k  t h a t  some form of c l a r i t y  i s  implied .  The 
problem with t h in k in g  about r i t u a l  as a form of communication is  
t h a t  the  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  f e e l s  h im se lf  t o  be c r u c i a l l y  involved in 
th e  search  f o r  such s p e c i f i c  c l a r i t y  as he a t tempts  t o  " i n t e r p r e t "  
the  r i t u a l .  But
'people  may express  th in g s  unaware t h a t  they  do so; they may 
express through ac t ions  t h in g s  t h a t  they  f in d  hard to  put  in to  
words' (1980: 18).
Or th ings
‘are  sometimes expressed in complex ways because i t  i s  t h e  only 
way or  t h e  b e s t  way they can be expressed .  There i s  no way 
except  through music f o r  some t o  express  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s ;  we
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cannot put  a perfume in to  words'  (1980: 24) .
Or, and here th e  e a r l i e r  quote from W it tgens te in  on p la y -a c t in g  
seems ap t :
'The r i t u a l  ac t  i s  not n e c e s s a r i l y  a symptom of th e  p e r fo rm er ' s  
mental s t a t e '  (1980: 26).
I t  would have been i n t e r e s t i n g  i f  Lewis had explored  th e  implic­
a t ions  of  t h e  term "expression"  here ,  e . g .  how does something 
"express"?  The notion t h a t  r i t u a l  a c t i v i t y  expresses  an underlying 
r e a l i t y  ( a l b e i t  in a complex, s u b t l e  and m u l t iv a le n t  way) runs deep 
in th e  h i s t o r y  of  s o c ia l  anthropology,  and a c r i t i q u e  of  t h i s  
assumption i s  an important  theme of  my own a n a ly s i s  of  Bateson 's  
d e s c r ip t i o n  of  t h e  naven, and of  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  which I would 
group t o g e th e r  under th e  ru b r ic  of  what I c a l l  an anthropology of  
performance.
Throughout h i s  book Lewis argues a g a in s t  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  
express ive  and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  p r o p e r t i e s  in phenomena which an th­
r o p o lo g i s t s ,  and o th e r s ,  regard  as "symbolic".  Much of  what he 
says here echoes S p e rb e r ' s  a t t a c k  on semio tic  models of  symbolism, 
models whose defenders  maintain  t h a t  symbols "mean" something in 
the  same way t h a t  words "mean" something.  Symbols thus  viewed 
must not  only be t r a n s l a t e d ;  they must a l so  be o p t i o n a l l y  
mot ivated .  The a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s  t a s k  i s  not  f i n i s h e d  when he 
produces an " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  of  a symbol. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  does 
not c o n s t i t u t e  an exp lana t ion .  I t  i s  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i t s e l f  
which must be exp la ined ;  and t h i s  exp lana t ion  i s ,  i n v a r i a b ly ,  an 
op t iona l  one (Sperber,  1975).
A powerful p o in t  made by Lewis i s t t h a t  th e  notion  of  r i t u a l  as 
communication o f ten  c a r r i e s  th e  im p l ica t ion  t h a t
' t h e  "au thor"  i s  so c ie ty  or  c u l t u r e  and i s  "communicating" with 
i t s  p re s e n t  members' (1980: 34).
Such would be th e  view of ,  f o r  example, Geertz and Turner.  But,
Lewis comments, such a view sounds absurd and, a t  any r a t e ,  c e r t a i n l y
cannot account f o r  much of  what appears t o  happen in t h e  r i t u a l  
co n tex t ,  as
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' f o r  th o s e  who perform i t ,  th e  r i t u a l  i s  more c l e a r l y  something 
p r a c t i c a l  prov id ing guidance on how t o  cope with some p a r t i c ­
u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  of  d i f f i c u l t y  o r  importance, and i t  i s  c o r r e s ­
pondingly valued .  The r i t u a l  o f f e r s  a con t r ived  and complex 
e xper ience '  (1980: 34-35).
Lewis sugges ts  t h a t  a clue t o  the  na tu re  of  t h e  kind of  exper ience  
which r i t u a l  might o f ten  (but  no t ,  by any means, always) provide  is  
t o  be found in Bruner ' s  notion of  "ga ting"  and "ungating" as used 
by Gombrich (1965).  This not ion p re s en ts  a p i c t u r e  of  what might 
be c a l l e d  "symbolic exper ience" q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  kind of 
s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e  model c r i t i c i s e d  by Sperber .  A s p e c t a t o r  or 
p a r t i c i p a n t  in a performance f in d s  t h a t  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  i s  d e f l e c t e d  
from ord inary  lo g i c a l  thought through some echo of  meaning in the  
sequence,  o r  by some com plexo f  a s s o c i a t i o n s  thrown up as a r e s u l t  
of  th e  sequence.
'By th e  device  of  making c e r t a i n  t h in g s  in r i t u a l  t h e  o b je c t s  
of  p e c u l i a r  a t t e n t i o n ,  the  s p e c t a t o r  i s  prompted to  sp e c u la te ,  
he i s  i n v i t e d  t o  "ungate" th e  way he sees  some o b je c t  so t h a t  
he i s  f r e e  t o  look f o r  f u r t h e r  and f u r t h e r  echoes t o  i t s  
sense.  And t h i s  a l so  c o n t r i b u te s  to  t h a t  f e e l i n g  of  meanings 
r i c h e r  but  l e s s  p r e c i se  than those  to  be t a lk e d  of  c l e a r l y  
which some have sa id  i s  t h e  hal lmark of  t h e  " t ru e"  symbol1 
1980: 31) .
But Lewis adds t h a t  we are not  f r e e  t o  assume
‘t h a t  every th ing  occurr ing  in r i t u a l  aims a t  mystery and has 
many meanings.  The s t y l e  in r i t u a l  may tend towards c l a r i t y ,  
ove r t  meaning and lack of ambiguity;  or  f o r  c e r t a i n  purposes 
aim to  d isconnec t ,  confuse or  f a s c i n a t e '  (1980: 31) .
Lewis' r e f e r e n c e  t o  the  importance of  s t y l e  emphasises h is  
argument t h a t
' a  r e c o g n i t io n  of  th e  genre or  s t y l e  in r i t u a l  i s  i n t r i n s i c  t o  
i t s  p roper  unders tanding '  (1980: 24) .
This i s ,  aga in ,  l inked with the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  exp re s s ive  q u a l i t i e s  
of  r i t u a l  might be l o s t  in an a n a ly s i s  which s t r e s s e s  communication 
in a semiotic  sense .  So
'a  minute d e s c r i p t i o n  of  observed r i t u a l  l im i ted  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t ­
ies  i t  p resen ted  and excluding any element of  express ion  
recognised would be something p a r a l l a l  t o  th e  minute d e s c r ip t io n  
of  a canvas as th e  conca tenat ion  of  p a r t i c u l a r  o i l y  pigments in 
d i f f e r e n t - s i z e d  patches on a f l a t  s u r f a c e ,  when t h a t  canvas 
was a p a in t in g  in p e r sp ec t iv e  of  a landscape .  But i t  is  hard
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t o  see i t  so f l a t  and meaningless,  as i t  i s  almost  impossible 
t o  hear  t h e  words of  our language as pure sound. The " f a c t s "  
can not  be simply or  sharp ly  separa ted  from t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
nor d e s c r i p t i o n  kept  "pure" and unaccompanied by r e c o g n i t i o n 1 
(1980: 25) .
How, th e n ,  a re  we to  approach r i t u a l ?  For Lewis, th e  e s s e n t i a l  
problem is  t h a t  ’r i t u a l  i s  hard t o  de f ine  j u s t  as a r t  i s 1 (1980: 9 ) .  
This is  not  t o  say t h a t  we should equate r i t u a l  with a r t ,  al though 
Lewis would agree t h a t  many r i t u a l  products  can be so equa ted.  What 
he seems to  be saying here i s  t h a t  t h e  problems of  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  
a n a ly s i s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  are s i m i l a r  in both f i e l d s :
'We a re  sometimes unce r ta in  how t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  a r i t u a l  a c t  from 
a te chn ique  o r  a game; and we are  sometimes un ce r t a in  how t o  
s e p a ra t e  an a r t  from a c r a f t  o r  an amusement. So we may choose 
to  say t h e r e  i s  a r i t u a l  aspec t  t o  many a c t io n s ;  and we may 
choose t o  see a r t i s t r y  in many a r t e f a c t s 1 (1980: 9 ) .
But where does one end and the  o th e r  begin? What a re  our c r i t e r i a  
here?
The problem l i e s  in the  mind of  the  an th ro p o lo g i s t  q u i t e  as much, i f  
not  more, than in th e  minds of  th e  people he i s  s tudy ing f o r  
'meaning i s  p re s en t  not  in th in g s  but  in p e o p le ' s  minds'
(1980: 2 2 2 ) . ( 2 ) l f  t h e  a n th ropo log is t  i s  s e t  on f in d in g  meanings,  he 
w i l l  f in d  them. But Lewis argues t h a t
'we r e q u i r e  p o s i t i v e  grounds befo re  we assume t h a t  we need to  
look f o r  a symbolism or express ion  t h a t  is  not  apparent  or  
e x p l i c i t  in th e  minds of th e  a c t o r s  o r  in th e  reasons  t h a t  they 
give f o r  what they do. . .What seems s t r an g e  t o  an o u t s i d e r ,  
and appeals  t o  him for. f u r t h e r  examination ,  must be measured 
a g a in s t  h i s  h a b i t s  and exper ience .  I f  we depend on what 
preoccupies  him, or  on what i s  evoked in h is  mind, we depend 
on something t h a t  may d i f f e r  g r e a t l y  from th e  responses  of  
the  people he s e t  out to  s tudy '  (1980: 220).
What t h e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  should examine in r i t u a l  a re
' convent ions  of  performance,  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  of  t h e  demand to  
fo l low a s e t  p a t t e r n ,  th e  r u l e s  governing p a r t i c i p a t i o n . . .
The p e o p l e ' s  customs may be l inked to  t h e i r  values  as p r a c t i c e  
i s  t o  th e o ry '  (1980: 220).
Lewis w r i t e s  here about 'genres  o f  cus tom ',  which can be d i s t i n g ­
uished by paying a t t e n t i o n  t o  what th e  r i t u a l  add res ses ,  and the
235
mode o r  modes of  t h a t  address .
Lewis argues t h a t  meaning can never be divorced  from p e o p le ' s  
unders tanding ,  and t h i s  w i l l  o f ten  appear confused t o  th e  o u t s i d e r ,  
f o r
' i t  i s  a m a t t e r  of  empir ica l  observa t ion  t h a t  people may give 
var ied  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  the  meaning o f  t h e i r  a c t io n s ;  or  may 
be u n ce r t a in  about them, or  say they  cannot f ind  on e1 
(1980: 221).
But many an th ro p o lo g i s t s  have been i n t e n t  on at tempt ing  t o  show t h a t  
r i t u a l s  o r  symbols
‘have a meaning in themselves o b je c t i v e ly  p r e s e n t ,  sometimes 
even a s in g l e  c o r r e c t  meaning, wait ing  t h e r e  to  be d e t e c t e d 1 
(1980: 221).
So, we o f ten  f in d  ourse lves  presented  with i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  analyses 
which provide "meanings" suppl ied by th e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ,  r a t h e r  than 
by h is  s u b j e c t s .  The a n th ropo log is t  i s ,  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  always a 
s t r a n g e r  and, i f  he f in d s  something which appears t o  c o n t r a s t  markedly 
with h is  own world, he may, mis takenly ,  conclude
' t h a t  t h e  f e a t u r e  which a r r e s t s  him is  something t h a t  th e  o the r  
c u l t u r e  a l s o  pays spec ia l  a t t e n t i o n  t o '  (1980: 223).
Lewis argues t h a t  too  many an th ro p o lo g i s t s  a re  dr iven  by
'a  d e s i r e  t o  f in d  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  or  c o g n i t iv e  component in 
every th ing  t h a t  people do a t  t h e  expense or  n e g l e c t  of  the  
emot iona l ,  exp res s ive  and fu n c t io n a l  components'  (1980: 222).
Lewis uses th e  term " func t iona l"  here in a p a r t i c u l a r  sense .  I f  
we s t r e s s  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  a spec ts  of  r i t u a l  r a t h e r  than the  
exp re s s ive ,  so conf in ing  our in v e s t i g a t io n s  w ith in  a s p e c i f i c  f i e l d  
of p o s s ib le  "meanings", we w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  p r i v i l e g e  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  
as meaning over c r e a t i o n  as a c t io n .  Lewis takes  a lead from Gombrich 
(1960, 1963) in sugges t ing t h a t  in r i t u a l ,  as in a r t ,
'making comes before matching,  t h a t  c r e a t in g  or  doing comes 
before  i m i t a t i n g '  (1980: 116).
In the  West we have become used t o  the  idea of  r e p r e s e n t a t io n
as an ' i m i t a t i o n  o f  ex te rna l  fo rm s ' ,  whereas ano ther  important  sense 
in which we might use the  notion of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  connected
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with the  use of  s u b s t i t u t e s .
‘Objec ts ,  a c t io n s  and images may r e p re s e n t  in t h e  sense of  
se rv ing  as s u b s t i t u t e s  r a t h e r  than by im i ta t in g  t h e  ex te rna l
form of  something e l s e .  The p iece  of  wood may serve th e  gu ll
as a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  an egg; the  baby 's  thumb, as s u b s t i t u t e  
f o r  th e  m othe r ' s  b r e a s t ;  the  i d o l ,  as s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  a g o d . . . '  
(1980: 116),
and so on. Here, th e  common denominator between o b je c t  o r  ac t ion  
and th e  s u b s t i t u t e  i s  fu n c t io n ,  not form. The baby sucks i t s  thumb 
not  because t h e  thumb r ep re s en t s  th e  b r e a s t ,  but  because t h e  former 
is  an adequate s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r .  Gombrich' used th e  c h i l d ' s  
c re a t io n  of  a hobby horse from a s t i c k  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  th e  p o in t .
The s t i c k -a s -hobby-ho r se  does not  look l i k e  a horse nor ,  i n i t i a l l y
a t  any r a t e ,  does i t  have t o ;  what i s  important  f o r  th e  ch i ld  i s
t h a t  i t  can be used in the  same way as a ho rse.
' I t  may be j u s t  a s t i c k  to  r i d e  on. The common f a c t o r  i s  t h a t  i t  
i s  r i d a b l e .  To tu rn  t h e  s t i c k  in to  a hobby horse ,  the  s t i c k  
must have a form j u s t  p o s s ib le  to  r i d e ,  and th e  c h i ld  must 
want t o  r i d e 1 (1980: 117).
Once t h e  s t i c k  becomes a focus f o r  th e  c h i l d ' s  f a n t a s y ,  i t  can 
be used and, in f a c t ,
' t h e  g r e a t e r  h is  wish to  r i d e ,  th e  fewer may be the  f e a t u r e s  
t h a t  w i l l  do f o r  a horse '  (1980: 117).
Later ,  t h e  c h i ld  might want to  make th e  s t i c k  look more l i k e  a horse,  
but th e  c r e a t i o n  of  the  s t i c k - a s - h o r s e  n e c e s s a r i l y  precedes th e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  a more l i f e - l i k e  horse .  So
' s u b s t i t u t i o n  may precede p o r t r a y a l ,  c r e a t io n  may precede comm­
u n ic a t io n ,  making may precede matching'  (1980: 117).
What is  impor tant  f o r  Lewis about s u b s t i t u t e s  o r  symbols, is  
t h e i r  ' a b i l i t y  t o  r e l e a s e  a r e s p o n s e ' ,  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  what they 
"mean". E f f icacy  here l i e s  in
'a  combination of  t h e i r  i n t r i n s i c  a t t r i b u t e s ,  th e  con tex t  in 
which they  a re  s e t  and the  power of  expec ta t ion  ( the  mental 
s e t ,  a rousa l  and read iness  t o  respond) on the  p a r t  of  the  
animal o r  person who perce ives  them' (1980: 116).
I f  we keep t h i s  p i c t u r e  of  e f f i c a c y  in mind, Lewis asks ,  might
i t  not  lead us t o  ques t ion  whether at tempts  t o  ana lyse  r i t u a l  in 
terms of  'symbol,  metaphor and communication'  a re  headed in th e
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r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n ?
'To th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  we seek t o  f ind  im i ta t io n s  of  na tu re  of  
symbols of  o th e r  t h i n g s ,  th e  communication of  meanings, may 
we not  misconceive t h e  na tu re  of  r i t u a l ? 1 (1980: 116).
I would sugges t  t h a t  Lewis' use of  Gombrich's a e s t h e t i c s  of  "making" 
l i m i t s  h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  on the  exp res s ive  na tu re  of  r i t u a l  and, in 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  p revents  him from cons ider ing  the  " t ro p ic "  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
- i . e . ,  th o se  ind ica te d  by th e  power of  f i g u r e s  of  speech - of  
r i t u a l  a c t i v i t y ,  or  th e  sense in which r i t u a l  might c o n s t i t u t e  ways 
of  t a l k i n g  about t h i n g s ;  I have made p a r a l l e l  sugges t ions  concerning 
Bateson 's  a n a l y s i s  of  the  naven.
As a fo o tn o te  to  Lewis' commentary on h i s  Gnau ethnography,  I 
would add some observa t ions  made on a d i f f e r e n t  kind of  performance; 
they come from John Miller .  Chernoff  in h i s  r e c e n t  s tudy of  African 
drumming. Chernoff  w r i t e s :
'With our Western no tions  of "meaning" as being a spec ia l  kind 
of  knowledge, we must be caut ioned  a g a in s t  assuming t h a t  African 
music fu n c t io n s  p r im ar i ly  on such a leve l  and t h a t  we f a i l  t o  
unders tand th e  music because we lack knowledge of  th e  d e t a i l s  of 
th e  m us ic ' s  symbolic meaning' (1979: 124 ) .
A performance by a group of  African drummers provides  a ' c o n te x t  of 
m u l t ip le  rhythms'  which al low people t o
' d i s t i n g u i s h  themselves from each o th e r  while they  remain 
dynamically r e l a t e d . . .The music works more by encouraging 
s o c ia l  i n t e r - a c t i o n  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a t  each performance than 
by a f f i rm ing  a f ixed  s e t  of  sanctioned  conceptions  or  b e l i e f s '  
1979: 125 ) .
Here, p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  i t s  manner, i n t e n s i t y  and s t y l e ,  i s  more 
important  than any p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of  "meanings".
Dramatism: V ictor Turner
In h is  s tudy of  th e  Gnau, Lewis sugges ts  t h a t  al though th e  model 
of  r i t u a l  as communication might have some va lue ,  we would do 
b e t t e r  t o  regard  i t  as a performance,
' l i k e  a p lay ,  which i s  responded t o  in var ious  ways: communicat­
ion i s  only a p a r t  of  i t '  (1980: 8 ) .
A play is
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' a  con t r ivance  of  g rea t  complexity in which th e  most var ied  
s t im u l i  work on us t o  produce or  spark o f f  a complex response '  
(1980: 33) .
Following Mounin, Lewis suggests  t h a t  our response  t o  a play?and 
to  a r i t u a l  i s  more l i k e  a response t o  s t im u la t io n ,  r a t h e r  than 
communication. This app l ie s  t o  both performers and s p e c t a t o r s ,  but  
in d i f f e r e n t  ways. Lewis w r i t e s :
'We i n t e r p r e t  a r i t u a l  or  t h e  performance of  a play r a t h e r  in 
th e  way we i n t e r p r e t  an event  a t  which we a re  p re s e n t  or  in 
which we take  p a r t :  we do not  "read" th e  event  as we exper ience  
i t  o r  as we r e f l e c t  on i t ;  we do not  "decode" i t  t o  make 
sense of  i t  or  understand i t .  We a re  a f f e c t e d  by i t '  (1980: 34).
Lewis' sugges t ion  t h a t  we might compare r i t u a l  and t h e a t r e  
leads me in to  a c ons ide ra t ion  of  t h e  approach to  r i t u a l  a n a ly s i s  I 
r e f e r  t o  as "dramatism", with p a r t i c u l a r  r e fe ren c e  t o  th e  works of  
Vic tor  Turner and Richard Schechner.  I would, however, regard  
Lewis' approach as s c e p t i c a l ,  r a t h e r  than as d r a m a t i s t i c .  This is  
because Lewis i s  in h e re n t ly  c r i t i c a l  of  th e  notion  o f  r i t u a l ,  in 
a way which i s  not  t r u e  of  e i t h e r  Turner o r  Schechner. I would 
suggest  t h a t  much of  th e  work I have p rev ious ly  r e f e r r e d  to  by 
such w r i t e r s  as Leach, Needham and Lewis p o in t s  th e  way towards 
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a decons t ruc t ion  of  th e  an th ropo log ica l  
category of  " r i t u a l " .
Before cons ide r ing  dramatism, I would l i k e  t o  in t e rp o s e  some 
comments by Susan Sontag in an essay  which c r i t i c i s e s  the  
assumptions running through th e  h i s t o r y  o f  Western a e s t h e t i c s .
P la to  and A r i s t o t l e ,  she w r i t e s ,  int roduced  t h e  not ion t h a t  a r t  is  
e s s e n t i a l l y  mimetic,  or  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l .  For P l a t o ,  indeed,  a r t  was 
a l i e .  This extremely  powerful formula t ion  has r e s u l t e d  in the  
n e c e ss i t y  t o  regard  a r t  as problematic and in need of  defence,  and 
defence o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  kind.  Form has been separa ted  o f f  from 
con ten t ;  while t h e  form has been regarded as c o n t in g en t ,  con ten t  
has been regarded as necessary ,  i n h e re n t ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  but  always 
myste rious and in need of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  (1961).  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
w r i t e s  Sontag,  i s
'a  conscious  a c t  o f  th e  mind which i l l u s t r a t e s  a c e r t a i n  code, 
c e r t a i n  " ru le s "  of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . . .The t a s k  of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
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is  v i r t u a l l y  one of  t r a n s l a t i o n .  The i n t e r p r e t e r  says ,  Look, 
d o n ' t  you see t h a t  X is  r e a l l y  - o r ,  r e a l l y  means - A? That Y 
is  r e a l l y  B? That Z i s  r e a l l y  C?1 (1961: 5 ) .
Sontag then makes th e  claim"," which in another  school of  thought 
has been made more r e c e n t ly  by Jacques Derrida and o t h e r s ,  t h a t :
' I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  a r a d i c a l  s t r a t e g y  f o r  conserv ing  an old 
t e x t ,  which i s  thought too  p rec ious  t o  r e p u d ia te  i t ,  by 
revamping i t .  The i n t e r p r e t e r ,  without  a c t u a l l y  e r a s in g  or  
r e w r i t i n g  th e  t e x t ,  _i_s a l t e r i n g  i t .  But he c a n ' t  admit to  
doing t h i s .  He claims to  be only making i t  i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  by;  
d i s c l o s i n g  i t s  t r u e  meaning. However f a r  i n t e r p r e t e r s  a l t e r  
the  t e x t . . . t h e y  must claim t o  be reading  o f f  a sense t h a t  
i s  a l ready  t h e r e '  (1961: 6, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis ) .
Lewis'  sugges t ion  t h a t  r i t u a l  should be seen as an e x e rc i s e  in 
s t im u la t io n  r a t h e r  than communication comes t o  mind when Sontag 
w r i t e s :
'Real a r t  has th e  capac i ty  t o  make us nervous.  By reducing 
th e  work o f  a r t  t o  i t s  con ten t  and then i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h a t ,  
one tames t h e  work of  a r t .  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  makes a r t  
managable, conformable'  (1961: 8,  a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
Thus:
' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  th e  revenge of  th e  i n t e l l e c t  upon a r t .  Even 
more. I t  i s  th e  revenge of  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  upon t h e  world. To 
i n t e r p r e t  i s  t o  impoverish,  t o  d e p l e te  th e  world - in o rde r  t o  
s e t  up a shadow world of  "meanings" ' (1961: 7 ) .
Of th e  work of  Vic tor  Turner,  Sontag could have w r i t t e n  t h a t  
dramatism i s  t h e  revenge of  some a n t h ro p o lo g i s t s  upon r i t u a l  and 
upon t h e a t r e .  By "dramatism" I mean th e  corpus of  works produced 
in o rder  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  the  claim made by Turner and o th e r  
an th ro p o lo g i s t s  of  h i s  school ,  as well as by many contemporary t h e a t r e  
p r a c t i t i o n e r s  such as Richard Schechner - and, perhaps ,  P e te r  
Brook - t h a t  r i t u a l  and t h e a t r e  should be approached as subd iv is ions  
of  a g r e a t e r  whole and t h a t  each ca tegory  can be seen as i n t e N  
pe n e t r a t i n g  th e  o th e r .
There a re  two important  s t r ands  in t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  development 
of  T u rne r ' s  work. The f i r s t  i s  th e  e l a b o ra t io n  of  an e x p l i c i t  
psycho-dynamic model of  soc ia l  i n t e r a c t i o n  which p laces  " r i t u a l
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dramas" o r  " so c ia l  dramas" a t  i t s  c e n t r e .  The second i s  h is  
p a r t i c u l a r  s t y l e  of  symbolic a n a l y s i s .  The l a t t e r  has been thoroughly 
c r i t i c i s e d  by Sperber (1975).  I w i l l  con ce n t ra te  on t h e  former.
In h is  e a r l i e r  works, Turner developed a p a r t i c u l a r  brand of  
Radcl iffe-Brownian func t iona l i sm  by a s h i f t  of  concern in h i s  a n a ly s i s  
of Ndembu r i t u a l  from the  maintenance of  s o c i a l  o rde r  t o  the  
r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  s o c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which have become d is tu rbed  
through i n t e r - p e r s o n a l  t e n s io n s  (Turner:  1957, 1968).
The " c u l t s  o f  a f f l i c t i o n "  which occupy Turner in th e  e a r l i e r  
works a re  seen as a t tem pts ,  o f ten  s u c c e s s f u l ,  t o  overcome the  
perenn ia l  c o n f l i c t  which, according to  Turner,  e x i s t s  in Ndembu 
so c ie ty  between th e  p r in c i p l e s  of m a t r i l i n e a l  descen t  and v i r i l o c a l  
marr iage.  In T u rn e r ' s  reading of  th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e s e  two p r i n c i p l e s  
a re  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  and are  c o n s ta n t ly  g iv ing  r i s e  t o  both antagonisms 
between d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  of. kin and a f f i n e s ,  and t o  i n t e r n a l  problems 
w i t h i r r t h e  psyches of  in d i v id u a l s .  The l a t t e r  cases  of  in d iv idua l  
pathology a re  viewed by Turner as exp re s s ive  of  th e  former i n t e r ­
group and i n t e r - p e r s o n a l  c o n f l i c t s  which, in th e  absence of  any over ­
a l l  p o l i t i c o - j u r a l  a u t h o r i t y  in th e  v i l l a g e - b a s e d  Ndembu s o c ia l  
s t r u c t u r e ,  have t o  be handled a t  t h e  loca l  leve l  by th e  people 
themselves .  The " c u l t s  of  a f f l i c t i o n "  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  Ndembu s o lu t io n  
to  t h e  problems experienced with in  and between th e s e  small i n t e r ­
r e l a t e d  v i l l a g e  communities (1957, 1968).
Emotional d i s tu rba nces  are d e a l t  with by t h e  cur ing  r i t e s ,  dur ing  
which th e  p a t i e n t  i s  inducted in to  one of  t h e  many c u l t s .  He is  
presumed t o  be possessed by th e  shade of  an a n c e s to r ;  i t  i s  the  
d i v i n e r ' s  t a s k  t o  d i scover  th e  i d e n t i t y  of  t h e  shade,  and thereby  
loc a te  th e  cause  o f  t h e  problem. The curing  r i t e  i s  a t tended  by a l l  
t h e  in d iv id u a l s  who may be r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  s u f f e r e r  e i t h e r  by k in sh ip ,  
a f f i n i t y  or  re s id e n c e ,  or  by a combination of  t h e s e .  Turner claims 
t h a t  the  r i t e s  ach ieve t h e i r  e f f i c a c y  by r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g  s o c ia l  
harmony not  through an emphasis on p o l i t i c a l  symbols, but  by invoking 
cohesive p r i n c i p l e s  which are adhered to  by a l l  Ndembu, p r i n c i p l e s  
such as th e  f e r t i l i t y  of  crops and women and th e  idea l  of  m a t r i l i n y  
(1957, 1968).
The Ndembu r i t e s  a re  an example o f  what Turner c a l l s  " so c ia l
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dramas". This term is  in d i c a t i v e  of  t h e  theme he developed l a t e r ,  
in h i s  e l a b o r a t i o n  of  Gluckman's t h e s i s  of  r i t u a l  inve rs ion ,  namely 
th e  dual model of  c i v i t a s  and communitas (1969).  Here Turner 
uses the  " so c ia l  drama" model to  i n v e s t i g a t e  such " a n t i - s t r u c t u r a l "  
movements as C h r i s t i a n  f r e e - t h in k in g  groups and th e  utopian ide a l s  
of th e  h ip p i e s .  "S t ruc tu re"  and " a n t i - s t r u c t u r e "  a re  mediated by 
a " soc ia l  drama" which e f f e c t s  a t r a n s i t i o n  from one to  t h e  o th e r .
The development i s  seen as c y c l i c a l ;  t h e  wheel,  whether Turner i s  
w r i t ing  about  th e  Ndembu v i l l a g e r  or  th e  Western bohemian, always 
r e tu rn s  once again to  " s t r u c t u r e " .  "C iv i t a s "  always seems t o  win the  
game.
The u l t im a te  e l a b o ra t io n  of  the  s o c ia l  drama model i s  a compre­
hensive d r a m a t i s t i c  theory  about a l l  r i t u a l  and, indeed,  a l l  so c ia l  
i n t e r a c t i o n .  T u rn e r ' s  e x p l i c a t io n  of  t h i s  theory  i s  to  be found in 
h is  l a s t  book, From Ri tual  to  T h e a t r e : The Human Ser iousness  of  
Play (1982).  He o u t l i n e s  the  phases in th e  s o c ia l  drama; f i r s t ,  a 
breach in s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w ith in  a community, second a s t a t e  
of c r i s i s  r e s u l t i n g  f o r  the  members of  th e  community, and t h i r d  the  
r e d r e s s iv e  means taken  to  heal th e  breach and r e s o lv e  th e  c r i s i s .  
There are  two p o s s ib le  outcomes. There might be a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
of the  c o n f l i c t i n g  p a r t i e s  o r ,  i f  t h i s  i s  not  cons idered p o s s ib le ,  
a consensual  r e co g n i t io n  of  i r rem edia b le  b reac h , a f t e r  which th e  
p a r t i e s  s ep a ra t e  (1982: 68-71).  For Turner,  one of th e  important  
aspec ts  of  s o c ia l  dramas i s  t h a t  they 'suspend normal everyday ro l e  
p l a y in g 1 (1982: 92) so t h a t  they
' i n t e r r r u p t  th e  f low of s o c ia l  l i f e  and fo rc e  a group to  take  
cognizance of  i t s  own behaviour in r e l a t i o n  t o  i t s  own va lues ,  
even t o  ques t ion  a t  t imes th e  va lues  of  those  v a l u e s . . . (Thus) 
. . .d ram as  induce and conta in  r e f l e x i v e  processes  and genera te  
c u l t u r a l  frames in which r e f l e x i v i t y  can f ind  a l e g i t im a te  
p l a c e 1 (1982: 92, my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
Remarking t h a t  h is  adumbration of  th e  s o c ia l  drama corresponds 
c lo se ly  t o  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d e s c r ip t io n  of  t ragedy  -
' i n  t h a t  i t  i s  " the  im i ta t ion  of  an ac t ion  t h a t  i s  complete, and 
whole, and of  a c e r t a i n  m agn i tude . . .having a beginning,  a middle 
and an end" ' (1982: 72) - 
Turner w r i t e s  t h a t  t h i s  is  not  because he has t r i e d  to
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’ impose an e t i c  Western model of  s tage  ac t ion  upon the  conduct 
of  an Afr ican  v i l l a g e  s o c ie ty ,  but  because t h e r e  is  an i n t e r ­
dependent ,  perhaps d i a l e c t i c ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s o c ia l  dramas 
and genres  of  c u l t u r a l  performance in perhaps a l l  s o c i e t i e s '  
(1982: 72).
Turner goes on t o  w r i t e  t h a t  the  s o c ia l  drama is
' t h e  e x p e r i e n t i a l  matrix  from which th e  many genres of  c u l t u r a l  
performance,  beginning with r e d r e s s iv e  r i t u a l  and j u r i d i c a l  
p rocedures ,  and even tua l ly  inc luding  o ra l  and l i t e r a r y  n a r r a t i v e ,  
have been genera ted '  (1982: 78)
But the se  l a t e r  e l a b o ra t io n s  always and everywhere con ta in  th e  same 
e lements,  namely t h e  con ten t  of  breach ,  c r i s i s  and r e i n t e g r a t i v e  or  
d i v i s i v e  outcomes to g e th e r  with th e  form of r e d r e s s iv e  procedures .
In more complex s o c i e t i e s  we f ind  more complex examples of  the  
d iv i s io n  of  la bour .
'The s o c i a l  drama remains humankind's thorny  p rob lem . . .A t  the  
same t ime i t  i s  our na t iv e  way of  mani fes t ing  ourse lves  to  
o u r s e lv e s ,  and of  dec la r ing  where power and meaning l i e  and how 
they a re  d i s t r i b u t e d '  (1982: 78).
I would sugges t  t h a t  a comparison of  T u rn e r ' s  model of  so c ia l  
drama with G i r a r d ' s  notion of  mimetic r i v a l r y  and Bateson 's  form­
u la t io n  of  schismogenesis  would be he lp fu l  in e v a lu a t in g  the  p o ss ib ­
i l i t y ,  or  even th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y ,  o f  at tempt ing  to  d e l i n e a t e  a 
un ive rsa l  theo ry  of  any kind o f  s o c i a l  a c t i o n ,  be i t  in terms of  
" r i t u a l " ,  "drama", "performance" or  any o th e r  ca tegory .  For l e t  
us not  f o r g e t  t h a t  t h e se  a re  Western c a t e g o r i e s .  There are of  
course many p a r a l l e l s  between th e  t h r e e  fo rm ula t ions  l i s t e d ,  but 
a l l  I would say here i s  t h a t  each o f  them a r i s e s  from a p a r t i c u l a r  
area of  ethnographic  o r  - in G i r a r d ' s  case ,  l i t e r a r y  and philosoph­
i c a l -  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  For Turner,  i t  i s  the  Ndembu v i l l a g e r ,  f o r  
Bateson i t  i s  th e  locus of  gender r o l e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  among th e  
Iatmul,  and f o r  Girard i t  i s  a p a r t i c u l a r  reading of  l i t e r a r y ,  
mythical  and p sycho -ana ly t ic a l  t e x t s .  We can a l so  read G e e r tz ' s  
p i c t u r e  of  t h e  Bal inese " th e a t r e  s t a t e "  as th e  product  of  a p a r t i c ­
u l a r  ethnographic  an a ly s i s  informed by a p a r t i c u l a r  s t y l e  of  
hermeneutic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
For Turner,  th e  r e d re s s iv e  ac t ion  in th e  s o c ia l  drama involves 
r e f l e x i v i t y ,  whether th e  r ed re s s  i s  sought through r i t u a l  or  through
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j u r i d i c a l  means and, apparen t ly ,  whether o r  not  i t  i s  s u c c e s s fu l .
The term " r e f l e x i v i t y "  denotes
' t h e  ways in which a group t r i e s  t o  s c r u t i n i z e ,  p o r t r a y ,  
unders tand and then ac t  on i t s e l f 1 (1982: 75).
Refer r ing  t o  D i l they ,  Turner claims t h a t
' i t  i s  only th e  ca tegory  o f  meaning. . . t h a t  enables  us to  
conceive of  an i n t r i n s i c  a f f i n i t y  between th e  success ive  
events  of  l i f e ,  o r ,  one might add, of  a s o c i a l  drama. In the  
r e d r e s s iv e  phase the  meaning of  th e  s o c ia l  drama informs th e  
apprehension of  i t s e l f ,  while th e  o b je c t  t o  be apprehended 
e n t e r s  in to  and reshapes the  apprehending s u b j e c t '  (1982: 
75-76) .  (3)
I t  i s  T u rn e r ' s  c o n t e n t i o n ' t h a t  t h e  development of  th e  s o c ia l  
drama in advanced i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s  has been marked by a s h i f t  
from what he c a l l s  " l im ina l"  t o  "l iminoid"  a c t i v i t y .  This i s  because 
modern indus t ry  has produced a c l e a r  d iv i s i o n  between work and 
l e i s u r e .  The notion  of  th e  l iminal  s o c ia l  drama i s  taken from van 
Gennep's map o f  r i t e s  des passage , combined with H u iz inga ' s  p i c tu r e  
of "homo ludens" and th e  importance of  play in human c u l t u r e .  For 
Turner,  p r e - i n d u s t r i a l  communal r i t u a l  i s  a t  once l imina l  and ludic  
because i t  involves  th e  whole s e l f  and th e  whole community in the  
dramatic play  of  r i t u a l  performance.
'The whole community goes through th e  e n t i r e  r i t u a l  round,  whether 
in terms o f  t o t a l  o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Thus, some 
r i t e s ,  such as those  of  sowing, f i r s t  f r u i t s ,  or  h a rv e s t ,  may 
involve everyone,  man, woman, and c h i l d ,  o the rs  may be focused 
on s p e c i f i c  groups,  c a t e g o r i e s ,  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  e t c . ,  such as men 
or  women, o ld  or  young, one c lan  or  ano ther ,  one a s s o c i a t i o n  or  
s e c r e t  s o c i e t y  or  another .  Yet th e  whole r i t u a l  round adds up 
to  th e  t o t a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  t h e  whole community. Sooner or 
l a t e r ,  no one i s  exempt from r i t u a l  duty ,  j u s t  as no one is  
exempt from economic, l e g a l ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l  du ty '  (1982: 31, 
a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
But t h i s ,  claims Turner,  is  not "work" as we in th e  i n d u s t r i a l  
world regard  i t ;  r i t u a l  always con ta in s  a s trong  element of  "p lay" .
'L im in a l i t y ,  t h e  sec lus ion  pe r iod ,  i s  a phase p e c u l i a r l y  conduc­
ive to  such " lud ic"  inven t ion '  (1982: 31-32) .
The ludic  elements in r i t u a l  drama can inc lude
' jok ing  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  sacred  games, such as th e  b a l l  games of 
th e  anc ien t  Maya and modern Cherokee, r i d d l e s ,  mock-ordeals ,
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holy f o o l i n g ,  and clowning,  T r i c k s t e r  t a l e s  t o l d  in l imina l  
t imes  and p la c e s ,  in or  out  o f  r i t u a l  c o n te x t s ,  and hos ts  of 
o the r  t y p e s '  (1982: 32).
T u rn e r ' s  p o in t  i s  t h a t  even th e s e  "p lay” o r  " lud ic "  elements 
are always c r u c i a l l y  involved with th e  "work" a t  hand, t h a t  i s ,
' t h e  "work" of  t h e  c o l l e c t i v i t y  in performing symbolic ac t ions  
and manipulat ing symbolic o b je c t s  so as t o  promote and 
in c re a se  f e r t i l i t y  of  men, c rops ,  and animals,  domestic and wild ,  
t o  cure  i l l n e s s ,  to  av e r t  plague,  t o  ob ta in  success in r a id in g ,  
t o  tu rn  boys in to  men and g i r l s  in to  women.. . '  (1982: 32).
I would sugges t  t h a t  Turner here e s s e n t i a l i z e s  th e  no t ions  of  "work" 
and "play" -  t o g e th e r  with the  b inary  oppos i t ion  which immediately 
a r i s e s  between them - on the  b as i s  of  e t i c ,  Western c a t e g o r i e s .  The 
problem is  t h a t  he does not  ques t ion  h i s  own use of  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s ;  
i t  is  a s i m i l a r  problem to  t h a t  connected with Ba teson 's  model of  
"p lay" ,  which I cons ide r  b r i e f l y  in my Chapter  Twelve below.
Turner compares and c o n t r a s t s  l i m in a l - l u d i c  r i t u a l  with th e  
' l im ino id-e rg ic*  s o c ia l  dramas which have developed in t h e  wake of  
the  d iv i s i o n  of  labour  in i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s .  "Liminoid" r e f e r s  
to  a c t i v i t i e s  which are  s i m i l a r  t o ,  but  not i d e n t i c a l  w ith ,  l iminal  
a c t i v i t i e s ;  th e  e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  t h e  l iminoid  domain 
is  th e  product  of  the  d iv i s io n  between work and l e i s u r e  in in d u s t ­
r i a l  s o c i e t y .  Liminoid denotes th e  " p r iv i l e g e d  areas"  which are  
s e t  a p a r t  in our s o c ie ty  f o r  " l e i s u r e " ,  in a wide sense of  th e  
term. Thus, Turner inc ludes  u n i v e r s i t i e s  and co l l e g e s  w ith in  th e  
l iminoid domain, as well as a l l  work in exper imental  and p o l i t i c a l  
sc ience  (1982: 53-55) .  Turner w r i t e s :
'Liminoid phenomena develop a p a r t  from th e  c e n t r a l  economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  p rocesses ,  along th e  margins,  in th e  i n t e r f a c e s  
and i n t e r s t i c e s  of  c e n t r a l  and se rv ic in g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  - they 
are  p l u r a l ,  f ragmentary,  and exper imental  in c h a r a c t e r '
(1982: 54).
I would ques t ion  Turner ' s  p lac ing  of  t h e  " l iminoid"  a t  a remove 
from ' c e n t r a l  economic and p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s ' ,  s ince  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
arena of  Western i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s  con ta ins  much which would 
be def ined as " l iminoid"  in h i s  sense .  How does th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  
previous  P re s id en t  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  was an a c t o r  f i t  here?
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Is media coverage of th e  ' c e n t r a l  economic and p o l i t i c a l  p roces ses '  
p a r t  of  t h e  l iminoid  domain? Are t h e r e  not  s i t u a t i o n s  in which 
people speak o f  Par l iament  as ,  in some sense ,  a form of  t h e a t r e ?
One might add c r im ina l  t r i a l s  and so on. Sure ly ,  t o o ,  "show 
business"  i s  as much a p a r t  of  th e  ' c e n t r a l '  economic p rocesses  as 
any o th e r  kind o f  bus iness?  And where do a d v e r t i s in g  and public  
r e l a t i o n s ,  so c r u c i a l  to  our economics, f i t  in to  T u rn e r ' s  c a t e g o r ie s ?
The " e rg ic"  h a l f  of  T u rn e r ' s  neologism p e r t a i n s  t o  t h e  work/ 
l e i s u r e  d i v i s i o n  in contemporary i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  s o c ie ty  which makes 
l iminoid a c t i v i t y  p o s s i b l e .  With t h e  r i s e  of  th e  work e t h i c  comes 
th e  need to  t u r n  "play" i t s e l f  in to  a kind of  "work". Not only 
do we d iv ide  our t ime between work and l e i s u r e ,  we a l so  pay 
s p e c i a l i s t s  t o  work a t  p lay ing .  Here, T u rn e r ' s  c a t e g o r i e s  become 
ever  more confus ing .  According t o  Turner,  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  s i t u a t i o n  
gives  r i s e  to
' t h e  genres of  i n d u s t r i a l  l e i s u r e ,  th e  t h e a t r e ?  poe t ry ,  novel ,  
b a l l e t ,  f i lm ,  s p o r t ,  rock music,  c l a s s i c a l  music,  a r t ,  pop a r t  
. . . '  (1982: 40) .
In t h i s  co n te x t ,  Turner claims,
' t h e  former i n t e g r i t y  of  th e  o r c h e s t r a t e d  r e l i g i o u s  g e s t a l t  t h a t  
once c o n s t i t u t e d  r i t u a l 1
has been ' b u r s t  open1 by
' . i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  u r b a n i s a t io n ,  spread ing l i t e r a c y ,  labour 
m ig ra t ion ,  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s a t i o n ,  bureaucracy '
and
' t h e  d i v i s i o n  of  th e  l e i s u r e  sphere  from th e  work sphere by the  
f i r m ' s  c lock '  (1982: 85).
Turner quotes Geertz in support  of  h i s  d r a m a t i s t i c  approach,  in 
c o n t r a s t  t o  Kenneth Burke, in whose w r i t i n g s  drama i s  seen as 
pe rsuas ion .  In Burke 's  symbolic ac t io n  framework, t h e a t r e  i s  a l l i e d  
with r h e t o r i c .  Geertz has, however, c r i t i c i s e d  Turner f o r  c o n c e n t r a t ­
ing too  much on ' t h e  genera l  movement of  t h i n g s '  while n eg lec t ing  
th e  c u l t u r a l  uniqueness of  ind iv idua l  symbolic systems.  Geertz 
proposes t h a t  t h i s  can be remedied only by a s h i f t  from a d r a m a t i s t i c  
to  a t e x t u a l  analogy which in G e e r tz ' s  words a t t e n d s  t o
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'how th e  i n s c r i p t i o n  of  ac t ion  i s  brought  about ,  what i t s  
v eh ic le s  a re  and how they work, and on what th e  f i x a t i o n  
o f  meaning from the  flow of events  - h i s t o r y  from” what happened, 
thought  from th in k in g ,  c u l t u r e  from behaviour - implies  f o r  
s o c io lo g ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  To see s o c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  soc ia l  
customs,  s o c ia l  changes as in some sense " readable"  i s  t o  a l t e r  
our whole sense of what such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  towards modes 
of thought r a t h e r  more f a m i l i a r  t o  the  t r a n s l a t o r ,  t h e  exegete ,  
o r  t h e  iconographer than t o  th e  t e s t  g iv e r ,  t h e  f a c t o r  a n a ly s t ,  
or  t h e  p o l l s t e r '  (Geertz 1980(a) ,  quoted by Turner 1982: 107. 
a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
Turner answers Geertz by saying t h a t  he h im se lf  has o f ten  
t r e a t e d  r i t u a l  and j u r i d i c a l  systems of  t h e  Ndembu as t e x t u a l  mater­
i a l ,  but t h a t  he had ' t r i e d  t o  l o c a te  t h e se  t e x t s  in con tex t  of  
per formance1 (1982: 107, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
For Turner ,  th e  d iv i s i o n  and apparent  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  between the  
d r a m a t i s t i c  and th e  t e x t u a l  approaches can be reso lved  i f  we see th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  two modes of  a c t i n g ,  in " r e a l  l i f e "  and 
"on s tage"  as
'components of  a dynamic system of  in terdependence between 
s o c ia l  dramas and c u l t u r a l  performances '  (1982: 107).
In T u rn e r ' s  formula t ion  i t  would appear t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some kind of  
evo lu t iona ry  development from " so c ia l  drama" towards " c u l t u r a l  pe r ­
formance",  which i s  another  way of  saying t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an e v o l ­
u t iona ry  development from r i t u a l  t o  t h e a t r e .  The d i f f e r e n c e  in the  
kind of  r o l e  played in each case would seem t o  be t i e d  t o  th e  oppos­
i t i o n  between r i t u a l - h o l i s t i c  and c u l t u r a l  pe r fo rm ance- thea t re -  
d i v e r s i f i e d .  The advanced s o c i e t i e s  have d i v e r s i f i e d  t h e  so c ia l  
dramatic form ( i n t o  d i f f e r e n t  genres of  c u l t u r a l  performance) and, 
in th e  p rocess ,  th e  kind of r o l e -p l a y in g  involved has changed 
d r a s t i c a l l y .  This i s  because
' i n  t h e  s im pler  p r e i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s ,  ac t ing  a r o l e  and 
exemplifying a s t a t u s  was so much a p a r t  of  everyday l i f e  
t h a t  t h e  r i t u a l  playing of  a r o l e ,  even i f  i t  was a d i f f e r e n t  
r o l e  from t h a t  played in mundane l i f e ,  was of  t h e  same kind 
as one played as son,  daughter ,  headman, shaman, mother, c h i e f ,  
or  Q u e e n - s i s t e r .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between ord inary  and r i t u a l  
(or  e x t r a o rd in a ry )  l i f e ,  was mainly a m a t te r  of  framing and 
q u a n t i t y ,  not  of  q u a l i t y '  (1982: 115, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis ) .
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Turner c o n t r a s t s  t h i s  with what has happened in our own c u l t u r e .
'Against;  t h i s  symmetry between everyday l i f e  and i t s  l iminal  
double,  r i t u a l ,  we f in d  the  asymmetry of  " l i f e "  v i s - a - v i s  
"ac t ing"  in pos t-Renaissance ,  p r e - t o t a l i t a r i a n  Western 
s o c i e t i e s '  (1982: 115).
In our modern forms o f  en te r ta inm en t ,  t h e r e  has been a p a r a l l e l  
s p l i t  between th e  "persona" who works and t h e  " in d iv id u a l"  who is  
allowed t o  p lay .  Turner seems to  be cla iming t h a t  whereas th e  
persona of  t h e  modern Westernised s e l f  i s  concerned with t h e - " r e a l  
world" ep i tomised by "work", th e  ind iv idua l  i s  t h a t  p a r t  of th e  
s e l f  which can indulge in th e  l iminoid indulgences of  en te r ta inm en t  
and f a n t a s y .  Turner w r i t e s :
' t h e  former (persona) i s  governed by economic n e c e s s i t y ,  th e  
l a t t e r  ( in d i v id u a l )  i s  " e n t e r t a in e d " ;  th e  former i s  in the  
i n d i c a t i v e  mood of c u l t u r e ;  th e  l a t t e r  in th e  sub junc t ive  or  
o p t a t i v e  moods, th e  moods of  f e e l i n g  and d e s i r e ,  as opposed 
t o  th o s e  c o g n i t iv e  a t t i t u d e s  which s t r e s s  r a t i o n a l  cho ice ,  f u l l  
( i f  r e l u c t a n t )  acceptance of  c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t ,  r e p u d ia t io n  of 
mysti ca l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  or  magical a f f i n i t i e s ,  c a l c u l a t i o n  of 
probable  outcomes of  a c t i o n ,  and awareness o f  r e a l i s t i c  l i m i t ­
a t io n  on a c t i o n 1 (1982: 115, a u t h o r ' s  p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
I t  would perhaps be i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  cons ide r  whether,  bear ing  in mind 
th e  Durkheimian b i n a r i e s  p u l s a t in g  away in th e  above passage and a l so  
r e c a l l i n g  T u rn e r ' s  p la c ing  of  th e  u n i v e r s i t y  with in  th e  " l iminoid"  
domain, t h e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  i s  t o  be considered  as "persona" or  
as " in d iv i d u a l " ,  as " lud ic"  or  " e r g i c " ,  as " l im ina l "  or  " l iminoid"?
Turner main ta ins  t h a t  in th e  t h e a t r e  we can s t i l l  see a 'means 
of  communication with i n v i s i b l e  powers and u l t im a te  r e a l i t y '  
d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e a t r e  in t h e  West has abandoned i t s  former 
r i t u a l i s t i c  n a t u re .  Thea tre,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in t h e  wake of  depth 
psychology, can claim
' t h a t  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e a l i t y  behind th e  r o l e - p l a y in g  masks, 
t h a t  even i t s  masks, so to  speak,  a re  "negat ions  of  th e  
nega t ion" .  They p resen t  th e  f a l s e  f ace  in o rder  t o  po r t r ay  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a t r u e  f a c e 1 (1982: 115).
I s h a l l  at tempt t o  show in Chapter Twelve below t h a t  t h i s  view of 
t h e a t r e  might be an accu ra te  p o r t r a y a l  o f  th e  c l a s s i c  - S t a n i s l a v s -  
kian - contemporary Western model of  t h e a t r e ,  but  t h a t  t h i s  is
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only one among many po s s ib le  views. Writer s  as d iv e rs e  as Artaud 
and B a u d r i l l a rd ,  f o r  example, might o f f e r  very d i f f e r e n t  accounts 
of what " t h e a t r e "  i s ,  or  what i t  might p oss ib ly  be under c e r t a i n  
c i rcumstances .  For t h e  moment, however, I w i l l  r e f e r  t o  th e  c r i t i c  
Jan Kot t .  In t h i s  passage ,  he c a s t s  doubt on th e  kind of  o p t i m i s t i c  
view presen ted  by Turner,  namely t h a t  t h e  t h e a t r e  i s  capable  of 
po r t ray ing  ' t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a t r u e  f a c e ' .  What, a f t e r  a l l ,  i s  
one t o  make o f  th e  obsession with i l l u s i o n  t h a t  l i e s  a t  t h e  roo ts  
of  much of  t h e  g r e a t e s t  Western drama? Kott ,  in a s tudy of  
Shakespeare 's  love comedies, has compared th e  in te rm inab le  machin­
a t io n s  of  d i s g u i s e  and c o u n te r -d i s g u i s e  t o  be found,  f o r  example, 
in As You Like I t , with the  world descr ibed  in th e  p lays of  Jean 
Genet.
' I n  t h e  love scenes of t h e  F ores t  of  Arden, j u s t  as in those  of  
I l l y r i a ,  th e  t h e a t r i c a l  form and th e  theme completely correspond 
with and i n t e r - p e n e t r a t e  each o th e r ;  on co n d i t io n ,  t h a t  i s ,  
t h a t  female p a r t s  a re  played,  as they were on t h e  Elizabe than  
s t a g e ,  by boys.  An a c to r  d i sgu ised  as a g i r l  p lays  a g i r l  
d is gu ised  as a boy. Everything i s  r e a l  and u n re a l ,  f a l s e  and 
genuine,  a t  th e  same t ime.  And we cannot  t e l l  on which s ide  of  
t h e  looking g la s s  we have found o u r s e lv e s .  As i f  every th ing  
were mere r e f l e c t i o n . . . T h e  b o rd e r l i n e s  between i l l u s i o n  and 
r e a l i t y ,  between an ob je c t  and i t s  r e f l e c t i o n ,  a re  g radua l ly  
l o s t .  Once more one has t o  r e c a l l  t h e  t h e a t r i c a l  a e s t h e t i c s  of  
Genet. The t h e a t r e  r e p re s e n t s  in i t s e l f  a l l  human r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip s ,  but  not  because i t  i s  t h e i r  more o r  l e s s  succes s fu l  
im i t a t i o n .  The t h e a t r e  i s  t h e  image of  a l l  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
j u s t  because i t  i s  based on f a l s e n e s s ;  o r i g i n a l  f a l s e n e s s ,  
r a t h e r  l i k e  o r i g i n a l  s i n .  The a c to r  p lays a c h a r a c t e r  he i s  no t .  
He i s  who he i s  no t .  He is  not  who he i s .  To be o n e s e l f  means 
only t o  p lay one ' s  own r e f l e c t i o n  in th e  eyes of  s t r a n g e r s '  
(1965; 218-219).
While i t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  coun te r  T u rn e r ' s  p r i v i l e g i n g  of  the  
t h e a t r e  as a locus of  t r u t h  with K o t t ' s  comments, i t  i s  a l so  
obvious t h a t  th e  l a t t e r  is  w r i t in g  about one kind of  p e r s p ec t iv e  
on only one kind of  t h e a t r i c a l  genre.  Indeed, Shakespeare might not  
have agreed with Genet t h a t  a l l  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  p red ic a ted  
on f a l s i t y ;  Brecht  c e r t a i n l y  would no t ;  Becke tt  might regard  such a 
p ropos i t ion  as nonsens ica l .  A c r i t i c a l  e v a lu a t io n  of  th e  a e s t h e t i c s  
of Shakespeare,  Genet, Brecht and Beckett  would have t o  be very 
c a re fu l  p r e c i s e l y  not  t o  pre tend t o  be ab le  t o  prov ide a grand
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i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  theory  which would show how, f o r  example, King 
Lear , The Balcony, Waiting f o r  Godot and Mother Courage are  a l 1 
examples o f  th e  same kind of e x e rc i s e  in dramat ic form. Obviously,  
they are  n o t .  The s i t u a t i o n  becomes even more complex i f  we 
inc lude s cen a r io s  from genres o th e r  than those  c l a s s i c a l l y  cons id ­
ered " t h e a t r i c a l " ;  James Bond f i l m s ,  f o r  example, o r  S ta r  Wars, 
o r  c a b a re t  o r  s t r i p - t e a s e  shows. Why then do a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  
c o n t in u a l l y  a t tempt t o  provide j u s t  such a grand i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  
theory  o f  r i t u a l ?
Richard Schechner: Dramatism as Performance Theory
Twentieth century  movements in t h e  Western avan t -garde  t h e a t r e  
have o f ten  drawn in s p i r a t i o n  from dramatic  and performance forms 
from o th e r  c u l t u r e s .  Accounts of  such performances - inc luding  
an th ropo log ica l  works on r i t u a l  - have provided va luab le  source 
m a te r ia l  f o r  many o f  the  most no tab le  t h e o r i s t s  and d i r e c t o r s  in 
th e  contemporary Western t h e a t r e .  One th in k s  of  Artaud and Bal i ,  
of Brecht and th e  Chinese Thea tre ,  o f  Grotowski 's  use of Indian 
hatha yoga^and ka thaka l i  t e chn iques ,  and of  th e  work of  P e te r  
Brook. Brook has himse lf  conducted h i s  own form of an th ropo log ica l  
r esearch  by ta k in g  a t roupe  of  a c t o r s  on an exchange "show and 
learn" e xped i t ion  through remote v i l l a g e s  in c e n t r a l  A f r i c a .  Along 
with a l l  t h i s  has gone a genera l  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with contemporary 
c i v i l i z a t i o n .  This has a l l  been n e a t ly  summed up by Chr is topher  
Innes.
'But ,  in t h e  t h e a t r e  a t  l e a s t ,  t h i s  n ih i l i s m  has taken two 
p o s i t i v e  and h igh ly  productive  forms,  apparen t ly  c o n t r a d i c t o ry  
but  a c t u a l l y  complementary. On th e  one hand t h e r e  i s  t h e  t r a n s ­
formation of  th e  t h e a t r e  in to  a l a b o ra to ry  f o r  exp lo r ing  
fundamental ques t ions  about th e  na tu re  of  performance and the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a c t o r  and audience.  On t h e  o th e r ,  p r i m i t ­
ivism in var ious  shapes: the  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of  i r r a t i o n a l i t y ,  
t h e  e x p l o ra t i o n  of  dream s t a t e s ,  t h e  borrowing of  a rcha ic  
dramat ic models,  mythological  m a te r ia l  o r  t r i b a l  r i t u a l s '  
(1981: 9 ) .
Innes con t inues  by w r i t in g  t h a t  th e  ' s c i e n t i f i c '  and t h e  ' q u a s i -  
m yth ica l '  a spec t s  o f  avant -garde  t h e a t r e  re sea rch  a re  un i ted  by a 
d e s i r e  t o  r e tu r n
' t o  t h e  " roo ts "  of  t h e a t r e ,  whether in i t s  p r im i t i v e  o r ig i n s  
or  by d iv e s t i n g  i t  of  scenic  o r  i l l u s t i o n i s t i c  " a c c r e t i o n s " ,
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as much as t o  th e  psychologica l  o r  p r e h i s t o r i c  " roo ts"  of  man1
(1981: 9 ) .
This view among contemporary t h e a t r e  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  and t h e o r i s t s ,  
p a r a l l e l  in many ways with T u rn e r ' s ,  t h a t  t h e a t r e  can be seen as 
being rooted  in r i t u a l  forms, has a prev ious  in c a rn a t io n  in th e  
work of  G i lb e r t  Murray and Ellen Jane Harri son .  I t s  more r ecen t  
r e s u r r e c t i o n  r ece ives  one of  i t s  most a r t i c u l a t e  commentaries in 
a s e r i e s  o f  essays  by th e  t h e a t r e  d i r e c t o r  and P ro fe s so r  of  Drama 
a t  New York U n iv e r s i ty ,  Richard Schechner.  A summary of  h is  views 
i s  t o  be found in h i s  c o l l e c t e d  Essays on Performance Theory 1970- 
1976. I w i l l  r e f e r  t o  one essay in t h a t  book, 'From Ritua l  t o  
Thea tre  and Back: The S t ru c tu r e /P ro c e s s  of  th e  E f f i c a c y - E n t e r t a i n -  
ment Dyad' , which i l l u s t r a t e s  h is  p o s i t i o n  w e l l .
He s t a r t s  with an account o f  th e  kaiko pig f e s t i v a l  c e l e b ra te d  
by the  Tsembaga of  New Guinea, as descr ibed  by Rappaport .  This 
f e s t i v a l ,  he w r i t e s ,  is  made up of  a c t i v i t i e s  which a re  both 
' a c t u a l '  and ' symbol ic '  (1977: 65 ) .  The dancing which f e a t u r e s  in 
t h e  r i t u a l
' i s  a v e h ic le  f o r  deb tors  and c r e d i t o r s  t o  exchange p la c e s ;  i t  
i s  a l so  th e  occasion f o r  a market; and i t  i s  fun '  (1977: 65).
Schechner s t r e s s e s  t h a t
' t h e  dancing i s  not  an i s o l a t e d  phenomenon - as th e a t r e - g o i n g  
in America s t i l l  i s  u sua l ly  - but  a behaviour nes ted  in suppor t ­
ive a c t i o n s '  (1977: 64).
Here,
'what s t a r t s  in dancing ends in e a t i n g ;  o r ,  t o  pu t  i t  in a r t i s t i c -  
r e l i g i o u s  te rms ,  what s t a r t s  as t h e a t r e  ends in communion'
(1977: 66).
Schechner con t inues :
'Perhaps not  s ince  c l a s s i c a l  Athenian f e s t i v a l s  and medieval 
pageants  have we in th e  West used performances as th e  p ivo ts  
in systems involv ing economic, s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and r e l i g i o u s  
t r a n s a c t i o n s '  (1977: 66).
The kaiko dances
' ar f  HPl* ornaments o r  pastimes o r  even " p a r t  of  th e  means" of  
e f f e c t i n g  th e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  among t h e  Tsembaga. The dances both
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symbolize and p a r t i c i p a t e  in th e  process  of  exchange1 (1977: 
66).
Schechner claims t h a t  th e  h e a r t  of  t h e  kaiko c e l e b r a t i o n  
c o n s i s t s  of  a t r ans fo rm a t ion  of  combat behaviour in to  performance.
'The dances are  a p ivo t  in a system of  t r an s fo rm a t io n s  which 
change d e s t r u c t i v e  behaviour in to  c o n s t r u c t iv e  a l l i a n c e s .  I t  
i s  no acc iden t  t h a t  every move, chant  and costume of the  kaiko 
dances a re  adapted from combat; a new use i s  found f o r  t h i s  
b eh av io u r1 (1977: 66) .  (4)
He con t inues :
'This  t r ans fo rm a t ion  i s  i d e n t i c a l ' i n  s t r u c t u r e  t o  t h a t  a t  th e  
h e a r t  of Greek t h e a t r e  (and from th e  Greeks down throughout a l l  
of  Western t h e a t r e  h i s t o r y ) .  Namely, c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  and th e  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  of r e a l  or  p o s s ib le  events  - th e  s to r y ,  p l o t  or  
dramat ic ac t io n  worked out  among human f ig u r e s  (whether they 
be c a l l e d  men or  gods) - i s  a t r a n s fo rm a t io n  of  r e a l  behaviour 
in to  symbolic b e h a v i o u r ' (1977: 66, a u t h o r ' s  p a r e n th e s e s ) .
Transformation in t h i s  view i s  t h e  h e a r t  of  t h e  t h e a t r e .
Schechner claims t h a t  t h e r e  a re  only two fundamental kinds of  t h e a t ­
r i c a l  t r a n s fo rm a t io n .  F i r s t  t h e r e  is
' t h e  displacement of  a n t i - s o c i a l ,  i n j u r i o u s ,  d i s r u p t i v e  behav­
iou r  by r i t u a l i s e d  ges tu re  and d i s p l a y '
and second
‘t h e  inven tion  of  ch a ra c te r s  who a c t  out  f i c t i o n a l  event s  or  
r e a l  events  f i c t i o n a l i s e d  by v i r t u e  of  t h e i r  being acted out 
(as in documentary t h e a t r e  o r  Roman g l a d i t o r i a l  games)'
(1977: 66, a u t h o r ' s  p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
According t o  Schechner, t h e se  two kinds o f  t r an s fo rm a t io n  always occur 
t o g e t h e r ,  but  in any one event  one kind w i l l  u s u a l ly  be dominant 
over th e  o th e r .  In th e  Western t h e a t r e  we have emphasised c h a r a c t e r ­
i s a t i o n  ( r o l e - p l a y in g )  and th e  s tag ing  of  f i c t i o n s .  The o th e r  
t r a n s fo rm a t io n ,  t h e  displacement of  a n t i - s o c i a l  behaviour,  has 
been emphasised in Melanesian,  Afr ican and A u s t r a l i an  abor ig ine  
t h e a t r e .  Schechner claims t h a t  those  forms which balance t h e  two 
kinds o f  t r an s fo rm a t io n  - and here he l i s t s  Japanese Noh, Indian 
Kathakali  and th e  Bal inese Ketchak, and medieval drama as well as 
some examples of  contemporary avan t -garde  performances - o f f e r  
' t h e  b e s t  models f o r  the  f u t u r e  of  t h e  t h e a t r e '  (1977: 66).  I
would note here t h a t  Schechner p laces  g r e a t  importance on power-
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fu l  d icho tomies ;  witness  h i s  s t r a t e g y  a t  t h i s  po in t  in h is  argument. 
I t  i s  a l so  a f e a t u r e  of  Turne r ' s  th ough t .  Indeed,  th e  use of  
dichotomies appears t o  be a prime f e a t u r e  of  d r a m a t i s t i c  argument.
Schechner 's  purpose i s  to
' o u t l i n e  a process  through which t h e a t r e  develops from r i t u a l ;  
and a l s o  t o  suggest  t h a t  in some ci rcumstances  r i t u a l  develops 
from t h e a t r e 1 (1977: 68).
He claims t h a t  contemporary sources from o th e r  c u l t u r e s  (by which I 
t ake  him t o  mean ethnographic r e p o r t s )  and from our own ( the  work 
of  contemporary t h e a t r e  p r a c t i t i o n e r s ,  inc lud ing  himse lf )  can 
document t h i s .  I t  is  necessary t o  use t h i s  evidence
'because so o f ten  the  jump from r i t u a l  t o  t h e a t r e  i s  assumed, 
o r  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  anc ien t  even ts  t h e  evidence f o r  which is  
suspect* (1977: 68).  (5)
I would sugges t  here t h a t  i t  would be s a l u t a r y  f o r  an an th ro p o lo g i s t  
of performance to  cons ide r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a s h i f t  "from r i t u a l  
to  t h e a t r e "  - o r  a s h i f t  th e  o th e r  way round - i s  a s h i f t  not  so 
much in a c t u a l i t i e s ,  but  in a n a l y t i c a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  By t h i s  I mean 
a s h i f t  not  so much in " th in g s " ,  but  in " the  ways in which we t a l k  
about t h i n g s " ;  in t h i s  case ,  th e  ways in which we t a l k  about 
performance.  I would f u r t h e r  argue t h a t  a c o n s id e ra t io n  of  th e  ways 
in which we t a l k  about  performance and d i f f e r e n t  kinds of  perform­
ances n e c e s s i t a t e s  a co n s id e ra t io n  of  th e  h i s t o r y  of  what Foucault  
would c a l l  our "d iscourse"  about performance.  I w i l l  r e tu r n  to
t h i s  important  t o p i c  in Chapter  Th i r teen  below.
Schechner cla ims t h a t  r i t u a l  performances l i k e  th e  Tsembaga 
kaiko are concerned with e f f i c a c y ;  something happens during the  
performance.  His paradigm f o r  t h i s  i s  a r i t e  of  passage.  In th e  
kaiko f e s t i v a l ,
'g iv ing  and ta k in g  th e  meat not  only symbolizes th e  changed 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Group A and B, i t  i s  t h e  change i t s e l f 1 
(1977: 73).
In Western t h e a t r e ,  what Schechner c a l l s  ' a e s t h e t i c '  t h e a t r e ,  t h i s
convergence o f  symbolic and ac tua l  even t  i s  miss ing .  The oppos i te
of e f f i c a c y  i s  e n te r ta in m en t .  Schechner w r i t e s :
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'E f f ic acy  and en te r ta inm en t  a re  opposed t o  each o th e r ,  but  they 
form a b inary  system, a continuum1 (1977: 75).
Schechner summarises the  f a c t o r s  in t h i s  oppos i t ion  thus :
'E fficacy  (r itu a l)  Entertainment
(th ea tre)
r e s u l t s  fun
l ink  t o  an absent  o the r  only f o r  those  here
abo l i shes  t ime,  symbolic time emphasises now
br ings  o the r  here audience i s  th e  Other
performer possessed ,  in t r a n c e  performer knows what h e ' s
doing
audience p a r t i c i p a t e s  audience watches
audience b e l iev es  audience ap p rec ia te s
c r i t i c i s m  i s  forbidden c r i t i c i s m  i s  encouraged
c o l l e c t i v e  c r e a t i v i t y  in d iv idua l  c r e a t i v i t y 1
(1977: 75).
I would note in pass ing  t h a t  t h i s  p i c t u r e  (1) again r e l i e s  on a 
powerful s e t  o f  dichotomies,  and (2) i t  i m p l i c i t l y  l inks  " th e a t r e "  
with the  co g n i t iv e  ( 'pe r fo rm er  knows what h e ' s  doing,  ' c r i t i c i s m  
is  encouraged1, 'audience  a p p r e c i a t e s ' )  and with the  in d iv idua l  
( ' i n d i v i d u a l  c r e a t i v i t y ' ) ,  while " r i t u a l "  i s  l inked  with ac t ion  
seemingly non-cogni t ive  ( 'p e r fo rm er  possessed ,  in t r a n c e ' , ' c r i t i c ­
ism is  f o r b id d e n 1, 'audience  b e l i e v e s ' )  and c o l l e c t i v e ( j c o l l e c t i v e  
c r e a t i v i t y ' ) .  Theatre here i s  t i e d  to  th ink ing  and to  epistemology,  
as opposed to  r i t u a l  which is  t i e d  to  a c t i o n .
All performances,  Schechner s t r e s s e s ,  are mixtures  of  t h e  two 
ideal  ty p e s .  'No performance is  pure e f f i c a c y  o r  pure e n t e r t a i n ­
ment'  (1977: 75) .  There a re  many r i t u a l  a spec ts  to  a Broadway 
show, both in backs tage l i f e  and in th e  way r e h e a r s a l s  and perform­
ances a re  o rgan ised .  Recent experimental  produc tions  have tended to  
emphasise th e  machinations of  t h e a t r e  work, those  a spec ts  which a 
previous genera t ion  at tempted to  concea l .  Schechner sees in t h i s  
development
' a t t em p ts  a t  r i t u a l i s i n g  performance,  of  f ind ing  in th e  t h e a t r e  
i t s e l f  a u t h e n t i c a t i n g  a c t s '  (1977: 76).
A b ra id  made up of  th e  in te r tw in ing  poles of  en te r ta inm en t  and 
e f f i c a c y  can be drawn up to  show t h a t  the  two te ndenc ie s  have always 
been p re sen t  th roughout th e  h i s to r y  of  Western t h e a t r e .  When both 
e f f i c a c y  and en te r ta inm en t  a re  p re sen t  in nea r ly  equal p ro p o r t io n s ,
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Schechner w r i t e s ,  t h e a t r e  f l o u r i s h e s ;  he sugges ts  t h a t  t h i s  balance 
was p re s en t  in th e  t h e a t r e s  of  5th cen tury  Athens and Elizabethan  
England.
Schechner 's  conclusion i s  t h a t  r a t h e r  than  see ing  performance 
as o r i g i n a t i n g  in r i t u a l  o r ,  f o r  t h a t  m a t te r ,  in en te r ta in m en t ,  we 
should see i t  as o r ig i n a t i n g  in th e  binary  system " e f f i c a c y /  
e n te r ta in m en t" ,  which includes a su b se t ,  " r i t u a l / t h e a t r e "  (1977:
89) .  Both terms of  the  b inary  are  always and everywhere p re s e n t .
But
' a t  any h i s t o r i c a l  moment t h e r e  i s  movement from one pole 
toward th e  o th e r .  This o s c i l l a t i o n  i s  continuous -  perform­
ance i s  in an a c t i v e  steady s t a t e 1 (1977: 90).
Schechner sums up h is  p o s i t i o n  with a passage quoted with approval 
by Turner in h i s  own From Ritual  to  T h e a t r e .
'The whole b inary  system e f f i c a c y / r i t u a l  - e n t e r t a i n m e n t / t h e a t r e  
is  what I c a l l  "performance".  Performance o r i g i n a t e s  in 
impulses to  make th ings  happen and to  e n t e r t a i n ;  t o  c o l l e c t  
meanings and to  pass th e  t ime;  t o  be transformed in to  another  
and t o  be o n e s e l f ;  t o  d isappear  and t o  show o f f ;  t o  bring 
in to  a c e l e b ra to ry  space a t r ansce nden t  Other who e x i s t s  
here-and-now and late r-and-now and to  c e l e b r a t e  here-and-now 
only us who are  p r e s e n t ;  t o  ge t  t h in g s  done and to  play 
around; t o  focus inward on a s e l e c t  i n i t i a t e d  group shar ing  
a hermetic language and to  broadcas t  out  to  th e  l a r g e s t  
c o l l e c t i o n  of  s t r a n g e r s .  These oppos i t ions  - and a l l  the  
o th e rs  genera ted  by them - comprise performance:  i t  i s  an 
a c t i v e  s i t u a t i o n ,  a s teady process  of  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' (1977: 
90).
I would suggest  t h a t  th e  problem with Schechner 's  "Performance 
Theory", in common with Turne r ' s  own brand of  dramatism, i s  t h a t  
i t  embraces too  much and exp la ins  too  l i t t l e .  On t h e  s t r e n g th  of 
the  passage quoted immediately above, t h e  reade r  might assume t h a t  
"performance" i s  coterminous with th e  e n t i r e  spectrum of s o c ia l  
l i f e .  I t  becomes an amorphous e s s e n t i a l  ism, amorphous because i t  
permeates,  o r  can permeate,  every area of  human i n t e r a c t i o n ;  i t  is  
an e s s e n t i a l  ism because both Schechner and Turner cla im to  know 
p r e c i s e ly  what performance i s ,  and where and how i t  ta kes  p lace .
To say t h a t  performance manifes ts  i t s e l f  as "a steady process 
of t r ans fo rm a t ion"  i s  c e r t a i n l y  a t ru i sm  and i s  probably  a 
t a u to logy  - i t  i s  a s ta tement which can be app l ied  to  any event
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anywhere, Schechner o f f e r s  us two po les  in a c l a s s i c  binary  
oppos i t ion ,  between " e f f i c a c y / r i t u a l "  and " e n t e r t a i n m e n t / t h e a t r e " .  
But t h e  no tions  of  what c o n s t i t u t e s  "e f f i c a c y "  and what c o n s t i t u t e s  
"en te r t a inm en t" ,  as well as the  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f fe red  of  " r i t u a l "  
as opposed to  " th e a t r e "  here ,  are drawn from Western c a t e g o r i e s .
The po in t  i s  t h a t  any event  or  a c t i v i t y  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as a 
performance,  as e n t e r t a i n i n g  or  as e f f i c a c i o u s ;  i t  depends on who is  
doing th e  i n t e r p r e t i n g .
For t h i s  reason ,  I would argue t h a t  i t  i s  necessary  f o r  an 
an th ro p o lo g i s t  o f  performance t o  eschew any p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n  
of what performance a c t u a l l y  i s ,  f o r  - as I s h a l l  suggest  in 
Chapters Twelve and Thi rteen  below - we cannot  know what form pe r ­
formance might t a k e  except  within a p a r t i c u l a r  given ethnograph ic  
con tex t .  To argue as Schechner does,  t h a t  performance is  a process 
which c o n t in u a l l y  o s c i l l a t e s  between " r i t u a l "  and " th e a t r e " ,  
compounds our d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  because of  h is  use of  th e s e  two power­
fu l  e s s e n t i a l i s t ,  e t i c  c a t e g o r ie s  as th e  b a s i s  f o r  h is  un ive rsa l  
theory  of  performance.  I f  one were i n t e r e s t e d  in in v e s t i g a t i n g  
the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  t h e o r i e s  of  performance,  one would want to  
keep th e  notion  of  performance d e l i b e r a t e l y  open-ended in o rder  t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e  p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r a l  use.  Such a p r o j e c t  i s  doomed from 
th e  s t a r t  i f  i t  i s  determined by the  use of  c a t e g o r ie s  such as
" r i t u a l "  and " th e a t r e "  which may c o n s t i t u t e  indigenous formula t ions
f o r  contemporary European i n t e l l e c t u a l s  such as Schechner, Turner 
and Geertz,  but  which might not do so f o r  the  Iatmul,  the  Bal inese  
and o th e r  s o c i e t i e s  around the  globe.
Dramatism: Performance as Role Play
I have t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  t h e  main problems with t h e  d r a m a t i s t i c  
model of  r i t u a l  and performance embraced by Turner and Schechner are 
t h a t ,  f i r s t ,  i t  i s  p red ica ted  on Western no tions  of  r i t u a l ,  t h e a t r e
and performance and second,  t h a t  i t  soon s l i d e s  in to  a un ive rsa l
theory  of  human s o c ia l  a c t io n .  I would now l i k e  t o  b r i e f l y  cons ider  
a body of  work which can be considered as an o f f shoo t  of  dramatism, 
namely r o l e  theory  as used by Goffman ( c f . ,  e . g . ,  Goffman 1959).
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Goffman's p i c t u r e  of  s o c ia l  i n t e r a c t i o n  presupposes a r a d i c a l  
d iv i s io n  w ith in  t h e  ac t ing  s u b je c t ,  between on th e  one hand a 
" ro le"  or  "mask" which i s  presen ted  t o  th e  ex t e rn a l  world in various  
s t r a t e g i c  ways f o r  th e  gain ing of  var ious  ends,  and on th e  o the r  
hand a " r e a l  s e l f "  which remains hidden from th e  e x te rn a l  world.
Role th eo ry  in Goffman's terms has become a powerful paradigm in 
r ecen t  psychotherap ies  inc luding th e  encounter  group movement and, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  in dramatherapy.
In a re c e n t  paper,  H o l l i s  has summarised Goffman's p i c t u r e  of
' a c t o r s  as i n d iv id u a l s ,  l i v in g  on th e  seamy unders ide of  so c ie ty  
and working th e  system f o r  t h e i r  own ends.  The i r  a t t i t u d e  to  
r u l e s ,  norms and r o l e s  i s  ( l a r g e ly )  ins trumenta l  and t h e i r  
r e a l  motives (usua l ly )  a re  th e  p u r s u i t  of  perce ived  p r iv a t e  
advantage '  (1985: 226, a u t h o r ' s  p a r e n th e s e s ) .
But H o l l i s  notes  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a fundamental d i f f i c u l t y  here ,  f o r  
su re ly  we need t o  have some idea of  what p r e c i s e ly  l i e s  behind the  
mask which " l i e s " .  As Hol l i s  w r i t e s :
'The key t o  unders tanding what an a c to r  i s  up t o  in Goffman's 
scene i s  t h e r e f o r e  t o  spot  t h e  man behind the  mask; and the  
t h e o r e t i c a l  crux is  whether t h e r e  can be such a man. Goffman 
is  oddly s i l e n t  about the  s e l f 1 (1985: 226-227).
H o l l i s  quotes t h e  'occas iona l  remarks '  s c a t t e r e d  th roughout 
Goffman's works which r e f e r  t o  t h e  s e l f  a t  one po in t  as
' a  r e p e r t o i r e  of  behaviour a p p ro p r ia te  t o  a d i f f e r e n t  s e t  of 
c o n t in g e n c i e s 1 (Goffman 1959, quoted by H ol l i s  1985: 227)
and a t  ano ther  as
' t h e  code t h a t  makes sense out  of  almost  a l l  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
a c t i v i t i e s  and provides  a b a s i s  f o r  o rgan is ing  them' (Goffman 
1971, quoted by H ol l i s  1985: 227).
But, H o l l i s  con t inues ,  Goffman
'never  exp la ins  what organ ises  th e  r e p e r t o i r e ,  s u pp l ie s  th e  
c o n t in u i t y  of  motive or  e s t a b l i s h e s  th e  code'  (1985: 227).
In H o l l i s '  view, our contemporary no tions  of  s e l f  can be roughly 
s p l i t  between a p i c t u r e  de r iv ing  from Hume which sees a s e l f  as
'a bundle o f  p re fe ren c es ,  which a re  then  t r a c e d  t o  s o c i a l i s a t i o n
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and thence  t o  t h e  ( s o c i a l )  system i t s e l f  (1985: 227,  my
p a r e n t h e s i s )
and the  Hobbesian “core" in d iv idua l  engaging in l i f e  s t r a t e g i e s  
f o r  th e  ga in ing  o f  maximum advantage .  But th e  s e l f  which 
supposedly l i e s  behind Goffman's “r o l e s 11 evades a n a l y s i s  from both 
of  th e s e  p e r s p e c t i v e s .  I f  t h i s  s e l f  i s  viewed as Hume's s o c i a l i s e d  
bundle o f  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i t  i s  immediately i t s e l f  p a r t  of  th e  very 
s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  of  r o l e  p l a y  which i t  was meant t o  e x p l a in .  I f ,  
on th e  o th e r  hand, we regard  i t  as t h e  Hobbesian in d iv id u a l  fo r e v e r  
hidden behind an end less  d i s t a n c in g  s e r i e s  of  r o l e s ,  then
' t h e  r e a l  man i s  impenetrab le ,  i t  vanishes  from s c i e n t i f i c  
enqu i ry '  (1985: 227).
How, asks H o l l i s ,  can we escape t h i s  dilemma?
H o l l i s  then makes t h e  p e n e t r a t i n g  comment t h a t  in Greek t ragedy
a s e l f  i s  exposed when a c h a r a c t e r  becomes t rapped  in r o l e s  which
c o n f l i c t .  (6 ) Antigone 's  problem, f o r  example, i s  t h a t  she i s  
both s i s t e r  and s u b je c t ;  her  choice  i s  between ac t in g  as s i s t e r  and 
burying her  b r o th e r ,  the re by  disobeying th e  e d i c t  of  her  uncle,
King Kreon and head of  s t a t e ;  or  a c t in g  as loyal  s u b je c t  by obeying 
th e  e d i c t  a g a i n s t  burying her  beloved b ro th e r  Po lyn ices .  But t h i s  
i s  no t  u l t i m a t e l y  a cho ice between two courses  of  a c t io n ,  f o r  
Antigone
'must r e s o lv e  not  merely what t o  do bu t  who t o  be'  (1985: 227).
I t  i s  v ia  t h i s  fu s ion  of  i d e n t i t y  and r o l e ,  H o l l i s  c l a im s ,  t h a t  we
might come c l o s e r  t o  unders tand ing more about t h e  ca tegory  o f  s e l f :
' I t  i s  tempting to  suppose t h a t  t h e  e t h i c a l  f i x  occurs only 
because Greek t ragedy  lacks  an ego.  The t y p i c a l  modern 
presumption i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a s e l f  d i s t i n c t  from both r o l e s ,  
who must choose between them' (1985: 227-228).
Next, H o l l i s  c r i t i c i s e s  a more contemporary p i c t u r e  o f  s e l f ,  
t h a t  p resen ted  by S a r t r e ' s  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m .  Bad Fa i th  i s  a sc r ibed  
by S a r t r e  t o
'anyone who performs t h e  d u t i e s  of  an o f f i c e  j u s t  because he 
holds t h e  o f f i c e  (1985: 228).
But th e  ques t ion  f o r  H o l l i s  i s  t h e  n a tu re  o f  th e  “a u th e n t i c
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s e l f "  which, presumably,  l i e s  behind th e  choice and, f o r  good 
or  i l l ,  a c t u a l l y  makes t h a t  cho ice .  I n ~ S a r t r e ' s  ph ilosophy,  however, 
we a re  t h e  choices  we make. H o l l i s '  quote"from S a r t r e  h im se lf  
i s  t e l l i n g  here:
' I n  l i f e  a man commits h im se l f ,  draws h i s  own p o r t r a i t ,  and 
t h e r e  i s  nothing but  t h a t  p o r t r a i t 1 ( S a r t r e  1973, quoted by 
H o l l i s  1985: 228).
But, H o l l i s  conc ludes ,  i f  t h i s  i s  so,  then  someone, 'an inner  
b e i n g ' ,  must be a v a i l a b l e  to  s i t  f o r  t h a t  p o r t r a i t .  In H o l l i s '  
words:
'This  u l t im a te  s e l f  would not  be applying  a measure bu t  c r e a t ­
ing one and t h a t  would leave us s t i l l  s tuck  with my complaint  
about S a r t r e .  Cons idera t ions  of  u t i l i t y  th us  f a i l  t o  be 
n e u t ra l  and th e  a d d i t ion  of  a pure s e l f  does noth ing t o  he lp .
I f  Antigone i s  t o  have any s o r t  o f  a s s e s s a b le  cho ice ,  we must 
work with what Sophocles p rov ides .  There i s  no missing 
p i e c e 1 (1985: 229).
The crux o f  H o l l i s '  argument i s  t h a t  ' pu re  s e l f '  i s  in f a c t
'an i l l u s i o n :  but  a p l a u s i b l e  i l l u s i o n  when con jured up ag a in s t  
l i m i t i n g  cases  a t  th e  o th e r  extreme'  (1985: 229).
H ol l i s  r e f u s e s  t o  accep t  t h a t  we must choose between a s e l f  t o t a l l y  
c o n s t i t u t e d  by s o c i a l  f a c t o r s ,  in t h e  t r a d i t i o n  of  Durkheim, and 
a s e l f
'so pure t h a t  i t  vanishes in to  d a rk e s t  p r ivacy '  (1985: 229).
The way out  of  t h i s  dichotomy, claims H o l l i s ,  i s  t o  fo l low Kant 
r a t h e r  than e i t h e r  Hume or Hobbes; we should see t h a t
' t h e  s o c ia l  analogue f o r  r e f l e c t i v e  consciousness  i s  i n t e l l i g ­
en t  agency.  We i d e n t i f y  th e  p o s i t i o n s  and r o l e s  o f  the  
s o c i a l  world by ac t ing  i n t e l l i g e n t l y  w ith in  them. I n t e l l i g ­
ence depends on c o n t in u i t y  of  t h e  s e l f ,  by analogy with th e  
u n i ty  of  t h e  s e l f  r equ i red  t o  weave phenomena in to  phys ica l  
o b j e c t s .  For meaningful s o c ia l  phenomena, th e  apperception  
i s  t h a t  of  a s o c i a l  a g e n t 1 (1985: 229).
Thus, we can see t h a t  A ntigone 's  a c t io n s  are  her  a c t io n s  not  
because o f  some pure s e l f  which l i e s  behind th e  d i f f e r e n t ,  and 
c o n f l i c t i n g ,  " ro le s "  with which she i s  confron ted ,  but  because 
ac t ion  and r o l e  cannot  be separa ted  in th e  way which r o l e  theory  
r e q u i r e s .  I f  we ask who i t  was t h a t  bur ied  Po lyn ices ,  Sophocles
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t e l l s  us t h a t  Kreon's  n iece  did i t  -  and t h a t  she i s  th e  same
person as th e  Antigone who i s  P o lyn ices '  s i s t e r .
' I t  adds nothing t o  t h i s  answer t o  invoke a pure s e l f  as a 
g loss  on what i s  meant by "same person" .  That Antigone is  
t h e  same s o c ia l  a c to r  i s  both necessary  and s u f f i c i e n t 1 
(1985: 229-230).
For H o l l i s ,  what i s  p e c u l i a r l y  modern about  our ca tegory  of 
" s e l f "  i s  t h a t  'we c o n s t ru c t  our own s o c i a l  i d e n t i t y '  (1985: 230). 
This i s  p o s s ib le  owing to  our h e r i t a g e  of  Roman law and mediaeval 
C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  which l e f t  us with
' n o t io n s  of  in d iv idua l  persona and p r i v a t e  s p i r i t u a l  subs tance .  
With them behind us,  we can p i c t u r e  a s o c i a l  a c t o r  as an in d iv ­
idual  who p a i n t s  h is  own s o c ia l  p o r t r a i t ,  f o r  whom t h e r e  is
noth ing s o c ia l  but  th e  p o r t r a i t '  (1985: 230).
But, H o l l i s  c o n t inues ,  t h i s  cannot be e n t i r e l y  t r u e .  The idea t h a t  
i d e n t i t y  i s  something which we c o n s t r u c t  f o r  ou rse lves  comes e a s i l y  
to  us
'on ly  because we do not  suppose t h a t  people c o n s t r u c t  a l l  of
t h e i r  own personal  i d e n t i t y '  (1985: 230).
There i s  s t i l l  an anchoring s e l f  which, f o r  example, engages in the  
s t r a t e g i e s  of  "se lf -development"  so popular  now in th e  West, 
and which a l so  a c t s  s o c i a l l y  in our choice  of  r o l e s  and in our 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  th e  ro l e s  which we choose:
'Th is  g ives  more scope f o r  th e  c o n s t ru c t io n  of  s e l f  than th e r e  
i s  in Greek t ragedy  but  a g r e a t  deal l e s s  than  ind iv idua l i sm  
would have us b e l i e v e 1 (1985: 230).
H o l l i s  argues t h a t  we cannot p o s tu l a t e  a dichotomy which ' a s s ig n s
in d iv id u a l s  t o  n a tu re  and persons t o  s o c i e t y 1 (1985: 231),  as 
a n t h ro p o lo g i s t s  in t h e  F o r te s ian  t r a d i t i o n  such as La Fonta ine 
( c f .  1985: 123-140) at tempt to  do. This i s  simply because th e  
d iv i s io n  between
' t h e  powers of  an o f f i c e  and t h e i r  e x e r c i s e  by in d i v i d u a l s '  
(1985: 231)
is  p r ed ic a ted  on a not ion of  ind iv idua l  which i s  s o c ia l  as much 
as n a t u r a l .  What H o l l i s  seems to  be saying here ,  i f  I read him 
c o r r e c t l y ,  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no " n a tu r a l "  i n d i v i d u a l s .  On th e  
o th e r  hand, and t h i s  i s  an important  s ta tem ent  by H o l l i s  which
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is  in tune with my reading of  Bateson 's  Naven:
'S oc ia l  forms can never shape human beings complete ly ,  because 
s o c ia l  forms owe . t h e i r  shape t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  human beings 
a re  s o c i a l  agents  with ideas about s o c ia l  forms'  (1985: 232).
We can,  I sugges t ,  apply H o l l i s '  c r i t i q u e  of  r o l e  theory  to  
Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  th e  naven. Throughout Ba teson 's  t e x t ,  t h e r e  
i s  an assumption t h a t  th e  naven i s  an express ion  of  Iatmul e thos .
I have argued t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  view th e  s i t u a t i o n  as t h e  
r eve rse  of  t h i s ;  t h a t  by engaging in naven and o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
Iatmul males and females become what they  a re  -  t h a t  i s ,  Iatmul 
males and females .  There would, from t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  be no 
" n a tu ra l "  Iatmul in d iv id u a l s  e x i s t i n g  behind th e  naven performances.  
There would be no n a t u r a l ,  p re s o c ia l  in d iv id u a l s  e x i s t i n g  f i r s t ,  
l a t e r  t o  be transformed in to  waus, lauas  and so on.
As a fo o tn o te  t o  t h i s  aspec t  of  t h e  m a t te r ,  I r e f e r  t o  a 
t h i n k e r  quoted by H o l l i s ,  in a passage used approvingly by Goffman 
himse lf  in The P re s en ta t io n  of  S e l f  in Everyday L i f e . (1959:
81-82) .  This i s  S a r t r e ' s  famous i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  Bad Fa i th  which 
uses a p o r t r a i t  o f  a ca fe  w a i t e r .
'Le t  us cons ide r  t h i s  w a i t e r  in th e  c a f e .  His movement i s  
quick and forward,  a l i t t l e  too  p r e c i s e ,  a l i t t l e  too  r a p id .
He comes toward t h e  pa t rons  with a s tep  too  p r e c i s e ,  a l i t t l e  
too  quick .  He bends forward a l i t t l e  too  e ag e r ly ;  h i s  vo ice ,  
h is  eyes express  an i n t e r e s t  a l i t t l e  too  s o l i c i t o u s  f o r  th e  
o rde r  of  t h e  customer.  F in a l ly  t h e r e  he r e t u r n s ,  t r y i n g  to  
im i t a t e  in h i s  walk the  i n f l e x i b l e  s t i f f n e s s  of  some kind of  
automaton while ca r ry ing  h i s  t r a y  with th e  r e c k l e s sn e s s  of
a t i g h t - r o p e  walker by p u t t in g  i t  in a p e r p e t u a l l y  u n s tab le ,
p e r p e t u a l l y  broken equ i l ib r ium  which he p e r p e t u a l l y  r e - e s t a b ­
l i s h e s  by a l i g h t  movement of  th e  arm and hand. All h is  
behaviour  seems t o  us a game. He a p p l i e s  h im se l f  t o  cha in ing  
h i s  movements as i f  they  were mechanisms, th e  one r e g u la t in g  
th e  o th e r ;  h i s  g e s tu re s  and even h i s  voice seem to  be mechanisms 
he g ives  h imse lf  the  quickness and p i t i l e s s  r a p i d i t y  of  
t h i n g s .  He i s  p lay ing ,  he i s  amusing h im se l f .  But what i s  he 
play ing?  We need not  watch long befo re  we can exp la in  i t :  he 
i s  p lay ing  a t  being a w a i t e r  in a c a fe .  There is  nothing th e r e  
to  s u r p r i s e  us .  The game i s  a kind of  marking out  and i n v e s t ­
i g a t i o n .  The c h i ld  plays with h is  body in o rde r  t o  exp lo re  i t ,
t o  t a k e  invento ry  of  i t ;  the  w a i t e r  in th e  cafiT plays with h is
cond i t ion  in o rde r  t o  r e a l i s e  i t .  This o b l i g a t i o n  i s  not  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  which i s  imposed on a l l  t radesmen.  Their  
cond i t ion  i s  wholly one o f  ceremony; t h e r e  i s  th e  dance of  the
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gro ce r ,  of  th e  t a i l o r ,  of  th e  a u c t io n e e r ,  by which they  endeav­
our t o  persuade t h e i r  c l i e n t e l e  t h a t  they  are  nothing but  a 
grocer , , . an  au c t io n e e r ,  a t a i l o r 1 (1969: 59, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
The important  p o in t  about t h i s  passage f o r  an an th ro p o lo g i s t  
of  performance i s  t h a t ,  r e g a rd l e s s  of  th e  r e a d e r ' s  s tance  on 
S a r t r e ' s  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m ,  i t  i s  a p e n e t r a t i n g ,  and evoca t ive ,  
commentary on a c t i o n . With H o l l i s '  c r i t i q u e  o f  Goffman, and S a r t r e ,  
in mind, I would ask i f  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  view th e  w a i t e r  as a man 
who is  "merely" p laying  a p a r t ,  "merely" r e a l i z i n g  a r o l e  - which 
is  Goffman's view. I would sugges t  t h a t  in viewing t h e  w a i t e r ' s  
"ac t"  as " a c t i v i t y " ,  r a t h e r  than as t h e  play ing  out  of  a c o n s t r a i n ­
ing r o l e ,  we can avoid th e  dualisms of  i n d i v i d u a l - v e r s u s - r o l e ,  
o f  a u t h e n t i c - v e r s u s - a r t i f i c i a l  and o f  a c t o r - v e r s u s - c h a r a c t e r  which 
r o l e  th e o ry ,  p red ic a ted  as i t  i s  on a p a r t i c u l a r  no tion  of  t h e a t r i c a l  
performance,  r e q u i r e s .  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  S a r t r e ' s  ca fe  
w a i t e r  i s  no t  busy making choices  between " in s t rum en ta l "  as opposed 
to  "express ive"  a c t i v i t y .  Viewing h i s  a c t i v i t y  "as" performance,  
we can say t h a t  i t  i s  r e d u c ib le  t o  n e i t h e r  po le .  I f  we view h is  
a c t i v i t y  "as" r i t u a l ,  we can say t h a t  t h e r e  i s  something r e a l  going 
on; co f fee  j^s being d e l iv e red  to  t h e  t a b l e ,  t i p s  a re  being picked 
up, and so on. I f  we view th e  scene "as" t h e a t r e ,  we can pay 
a t t e n t i o n  not  so much t o  t h e  "ac tua l"  in d iv idua l  who i s  pre tending  
to  be a w a i t e r  - in the  c r i t i c a l  mode of  Western drama -  but  in s t e a d ,  
perhaps,  we can address  ourse lves  t o  h i s  s t y l e ,  h i s  te chn ique  and 
h i s  p resence ,  a l l  of  which a re  b r i l l i a n t l y  conveyed by S a r t r e .
As f o r  "who" th e  w a i t e r  might be,  t h a t  i s  ano ther  m a t t e r .
Charles Taylor: Public Space
Whether o r  not  we cons ider  th e  t h e a t r e  t o  be a locus of  t r u t h
or i l l u s i o n ,  o r  sometimes one and sometimes th e  o th e r ,  whether or
not we use no t ions  of  " th e a t r e "  and " r i t u a l "  as a b a s i s  f o r  a theory
of performance,  somewhere along th e  l i n e  we have t o  co n s id e r  th e
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s e l f ,  s o c ie ty  and language.  Martin H o l l i s  and
Charles Taylor ,  in rece n t  essays  contained  in a c o l l e c t i o n  dea l ing  
with th e  theme o f  personhood,  have made important  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to
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t h i s  t o p i c .  In th e  previous s ec t i o n  of  t h i s  chap te r  I cons idered 
H o l l i s '  es say  and i t s  re levance  t o  r o l e  th e o ry .  I would now l i k e  t o  
d is cuss  T a y l o r ' s  paper.
Taylor  w r i t e s  t h a t  language i s  t h e  ' l o c u s  of  d i s c l o s u r e '  which 
is  t h e  p r e - c o n d i t io n  f o r  a l l  human in t e r c o u r s e  (1985: 276).  Our 
f e e l i n g s ,  thoughts  and sensa t ions  about ou rse lves  a re  'bound up 
with language,  d i sc lo se d  in language 1 (1985: 276). F u r t h e r , t h i s
'makes c l e a r  why our human f e e l i n g s  and emotions a re  c o n s t i t ­
uted by our unders tanding  of  them. They a re  shaped by th e  
language in which they a re  d i s c l o s e d .  This i s  r e f l e c t e d  both 
in t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s  have both d i f f e r e n t  
emotive languages and a d i f f e r e n t  gamut of  emotions;  and a l so  
in t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we a re  always s t r u g g l i n g  t o  f in d  t h e  r i g h t  
way of  t h i n k i n g / t a l k i n g  about o u r s e lv e s '  (1985: 276).
According t o  Taylor,  language has a t  l e a s t  two important  
aspec ts  he re .  F i r s t ,  language enab les  us t o  focus on, and to  
desc r ib e  and ana lyse ,  th e  world,  ou rse lves  and o th e r s ,  or  a t  l e a s t  
to  make some at tempt t o  do so.  Language ' a r t i c u l a t e s '  t h e  world.
'Language, in s h o r t ,  enab les  us t o  be aware of  what we d iscourse  
about in a way which has no analogue f o r  n o n - l i n g u i s t i c  
an imals .  Being able  to  say i t  i s  being ab le  t o  make i t  the  
focus in a way which i s  p e c u l i a r  t o  la nguage . . .A  n o n - l i n g u i s t i c  
c r e a t u r e  can a c t  in such a way t h a t  we can unders tand i t  as 
guided by a s tandard ;  i t s  behaviour i s  shaped by a s tanda rd .
But only a l i n g u i s t i c  being can r ecogn ise  a s tan d a rd .  The 
s tandard  needs t o  be focussed in language'  (1985: 272).
This i s  one sense in which Taylor uses th e  notion of  " fo rm ula t ion" .  
But t h e r e  i s  another sense ,  which i s  t o  do with t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
language i s  concerned with a fo rmula t ion  which i s  shared ,  in o the r  
words with communication. Two s t r a n g e r s  t r a v e l l i n g  on a t r a i n  in 
very hot  count ry  might remark t o  each o th e r  how hot  they  f e e l .  As 
Taylor says ,
' t h i s  d o e s n ' t  t e l l  you anything you d i d n ' t  know; n e i t h e r  t h a t  
i t  i s  ho t ,  nor t h a t  I f in d  i t  so.  Both t h e s e  f a c t s  were p la in  
t o  you b e f o r e . . .What th e  express ion  has done here i s  t o  c r e a t e  
a r ap p o r t  between us,  the  kind of  th in g  which comes about when 
we do what we c a l l  s t r i k i n g  up a co n v e r s a t io n .  P rev ious ly  I 
knew t h a t  you were hot ,  and you knew t h a t  I was ho t ,  and I 
knew t h a t  you must know t h a t  I knew t h a t . . . u p  t o  about any 
leve l  you ca re  t o  chase i t .  But now i t  i s  out  t h e r e  as a f a c t  
between us t h a t  i t ' s  s t i f l i n g  in he re .  Language c r e a t e s  what
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one might c a l l  a public  space,  o r  a common vantage p o in t  from
which we survey the  world t o g e t h e r '  (1985: 273, a u t h o r ' s
em phas i s ) .
We might here put  T a y lo r ' s  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  t h e  two ways in 
which language fo rmula tes  the  world - d e s c r ip t i o n  and communication 
-  to g e th e r  with th e  po in t  made about Shakespeare ' s  comedies 
and G enet ' s  plays by Kot t .  Language, indeed,  makes a shared r e a l i t y  
p o s s i b l e .  But i t  a l so  immediately puts  t h a t  r e a l i t y  in to  ques t ion ,  
a po in t  which Taylor ignores .  Language in t roduces  " f a c t s "  in to  
th e  world,  i f  you l i k e ;  but a t  t h e  same t ime i t  in t roduces  
" f i c t i o n s "  in to  th e  same world.  I t  in t roduces  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
f a c t  and f i c t i o n  a t  once . (7)
For Taylor ,  a c r u c i a l  im p l ica t ion  of  language i s  th e  c r e a t i o n  of  
what he c a l l s  ' p u b l i c  s p a c e ' .  Language makes
' t h e  m a t te r  t a lk e d  about no longer j u s t  f o r  me o r  f o r  you, but  
f o r  u s . . .Y ou  c a n ' t  unders tand how human s o c ie ty  works a t  a l l  
. . . u n T e s s  you have some notion of  pub l ic  space '  (1985: 273, 
a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
In our c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  we have disconnected th e  ' a r t i c u l a t e  formu­
l a t i o n '  a spec t  of  language from i t s  ' p u b l i c  space '  o r  ' s h a r e d '  
a spec t ;  we have,  claims Taylor,  'b rought  s o l i t a r y  fo rm ula t ion  to  
a high a r t '  (1985: 274-275).  But th e  l in k  remains,  f o r
'ou r  s o l i t a r y  formula t ions  depend on th e  language which we 
could only le arn  in c o n v e r s a t i o n . . . I become a person and 
remain one only as an i n t e r l o c u t e r '  (1985: 275-276).  ( 8 )
In h is  essay Taylor c r i t i c i s e s  those  views of  th e  person which 
s t r e s s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and consc iousness ,  views which a re  extremely 
powerful in our c u l t u r e .  These views, he c la im s ,  c o n s t i t u t e  an 
at tempt  to
' i n t e r i o r i z e  personhood,  t o  read th e s e  powers as possess ions  of 
th e  i n d i v id u a l '  (1985: 277).
The locus of  language has always been pub l ic  space,  but  t h i s  has 
not  always been seen as t h e  realm of  human language.  I t  has v a r io u s ly  
been i d e n t i f i e d  with ,  f o r  example, some reg ion of  th e  cosmos, 
some mythical  r eg ion ,  some sacred  space or
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' t h e  space of  s o c ia l  i n t e r c o u r s e  but  seen as independent of  
th e  ac tu a l  conversa t ion  of  m e n . . .F o r  P l a t o ,  t h i s  space was 
t h a t  of  t h e  ideas '  (1985: 277).
Taylor  cla ims t h a t  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n  of  t h e  modern s u b j e c t /  
person has involved th e  u n i f i c a t i o n  of  a l l  t h e s e  p o s s ib le  spaces ,  
and then  t h e  i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n  of  t h i s  u n i f i c a t i o n .  For us ,  t h e  space 
of  d i s c l o s u r e  i s  1 i n s i d e , in th e  "mind" ' (1985: 277, a u t h o r ' s  
emphasis ) .  Any sense we might have of  t h e  world i t s e l f  being the  
source o f  a p le n i tu d e  of  p o s s ib le  d i s c l o s u r e s  has been undermined 
by t h i s  movement of  i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n ,  which
'suppressed  a l t o g e t h e r  th e  sense t h a t  we are  persons only as 
i n t e r l o c u t e r s ;  and gave us a view o f  th e  s u b je c t  as capable 
of  pu re ly  inne r ,  monological th ough t ;  of  t h i s  monological 
thought  as preceding any co n v e r s a t io n '  (1985: 278).
I would suggest  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  draw a p a r a l l e l  between 
T a y lo r ' s  no tion of  “publ ic  space" as th e  locus of  d i s c l o s u r e ,  and 
T u rn e r ' s  l im in a l - l im in o id  domains. The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t ,  in 
p lac ing  r e f l e x i v i t y  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w ith in  th e  l a t t e r ,  Turner has 
claimed f o r  one p a r t i c u l a r  a rea  of  human exper ience  ( s o c ia l  drama/ 
genre o f  performance) what Taylor claims - and I th in k  c o r r e c t l y  - 
t o  be a fundamental  q u a l i t y ,  in one way o r  ano the r ,  o f  a l l  human 
exper ience .  All language -  o r ,  more p r e c i s e l y ,  a l l  d i s c o u r s e  -  
has th e  in h e re n t  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  r e f l e x i v i t y ,  as Taylor p o in t s  out  
when he w r i t e s  t h a t
‘our human f e e l i n g s  and e m o t io n s . . . a r e  shaped by th e  language 
in which they  are  d i s c l o s e d '  (1985: 276).
I f  we q u a l i f y  t h i s  s ta tement by s u b s t i t u t i n g  "d iscourse"  f o r  
" language",  as in d i c a t i n g  t h a t  we inc lude  a l l  p o t e n t i a l  media in 
th e  ca tegory  r e f e r r e d  t o  by Taylor as "language",  then T a y lo r ' s  
claim here i s  o f  c r u c i a l  importance f o r  an unders tanding  of  the  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  th e  naven, and f o r  those  
f i e l d s  of  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  which would be opened out  by an an th rop­
ology of  performance.  I f  T u rne r ;could have taken  T a y l o r ' s  words t o  
h e a r t ,  he would have had t o  admit t h a t  an im p l ica t ion  of  h i s  claim 
t h a t  r e f l e x i v i t y  l i e s  a t  the  h e a r t  of  pe r fo rmat ive  a c t i v i t y  would 
be t h a t  a l l  human i n t e r a c t i o n  i s , i n  some sense o r  o t h e r ,  perform­
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a t i v e  in n a tu re .  But t h i s  makes a nonsense out  of  any at tempt to  
d e l im i t  an a n a l y t i c a l  category  of  performance.  Can t h i s  be done? 
Are we any nea re r  to  unders tanding r i t u a l  i f  we make such an 
at tempt? What i s  the  domain of  performance? Or, t o  put  i t  
d i f f e r e n t l y :  when i s  a r i t u a l  not a r i t u a l ?  When is  t h e a t r e  not  
t h e a t r e ?  When is  a performance not  a performance? And who decides?
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NOTES to  Chapter Eleven
( 1) H o l l i s  has made a s im i l a r  p o in t ,  noting t h a t  a man might
make th e  sign of  a f i s h  in t h e  dus t  in o rder  t o  make
c o n tac t  with a fe l low C h r i s t i a n ,  or  on th e  o the r  hand he 
might be ac t ing  as an agent  provoca teur  employed by th e  a n t i -  
C h r i s t i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  (Personal  communication, Mark Hobar t) .
(2) Compare Bateson 's  s ta tement :  'Al l  exper ience  i s  s u b j e c t i v e 1
(1972(a):  47).
(3) For a c r i t i c a l  overview of  th e  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  the  notion of
“meaning" in Western thought in g e n e ra l ,  and in anthropology 
in p a r t i c u l a r ,  c f .  Hobart 1982. Lewis a l so  a r t i c u l a t e s  
s e r io u s  doubts as t o  th e  usefu lness  of  t h i s  ub iqui tous  
n o t io n ,  warning us t h a t ,  ' s i n c e  "meaning" i s  a word of  such
easy v i r t u e . . . w e  would do well t o  be^wary of  i t s  te m p ta t io n s '
(1980: 221).
(4)  In bas ing  the  kaiko dances in combat a c t i v i t y ,  Schechner 's  
a n a l y s i s  i s  s im i l a r  t o  the  p i c t u r e  of  play p resen ted  by 
Bateson; f o r  the  l a t t e r ,  play i s  developed out  of  animal 
combat. I cons ider  t h i s  t o p i c  b r i e f l y  in my Chapter  Twelve.
(5)  Here Schechner is  r e f e r r i n g  t o  the  Cambridge school a t  the  
t u rn  o f  th e  cen tury .  I r e f e r  t o  t h i s  School b r i e f l y  on p.
250.
(6) I would suggest  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t r u e  of  a l l .  t r a g i c  drama; the  
c o n f l i c t  of r o l e s ,  s u r e ly ,  l i e s  a t  t h e  h e a r t  of  the  p r e d i c ­
ament of  Hamlet and of  Lear.
(7) The Ba l inese ,  f o r  example, would r e a d i ly  agree t h a t  language
l i e s  as e a s i l y  as i t  t e l l s  the  t r u t h  (Personal  communication, 
Mark Hobart ) .
(8) Compare Bateson on conversa t ion :  'Sometimes i f  both people
a re  w i l l i n g  to  l i s t e n  c a r e f u l l y ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  do more
than exchange g ree t in g s  and good wishes .  Even to  do more than
exchange informat ion .  The two people may even f in d  out  
something which n e i th e r  of  them knew b e fo re '  (1972( b ) * 12).
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CHAPTER TWELVE: AN ECOLOGY OF MIND: BATESON'S WORK AFTER NAVEN
IN THE MAIN body of  t h e  t h e s i s  I have t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  
Ba teson 's  importance as a t h i n k e r  i s  demonstrated by t h e  f a c t ,  not  
t h a t  he produced t h e  r i g h t  answers,  but  t h a t  he asked important  
q u e s t i o n s .  I t  can be argued t h a t  a primary ques t ion  which an throp­
o l o g i s t s  should cons ide r  i s ,  "What i s  u s e f u l l y  askable?" This 
ques t ion  runs a l l  the  way through Naven, and informs t h e  two 
major t r a n s i t i o n s  in the  book, i . e .  from a concern with 
" soc ia l  s t r u c t u r e "  to  t h e  form ula t ion  of  "e idos"  and "e thos" ,  and 
then from a c o l l a p s e  of eidos  and e thos  in to  t h e  model of  ac t ion  
which Bateson c a l l s  "schismogenesis" .  These t r a n s i t i o n s  can be 
g lossed  as a p rogress ion  from, f i r s t ,  a s o c io l o g i c a l  epistemology 
grounded in s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l  ism ("How does th e  s o c ie ty  
work?") t o  a more s u b t l e  epistemology which dichotomises the  
phenomenology of  e idos  ("How do th e  Iatmul know what they know?") 
and th e  ontology of  ethos ("How does an Iatmul become an Iatmul?")  
and second,  from epistemology per  se t o  t h e  schismogenic model 
of  a c t i o n .  As I argued in Chapter  Four above,  Bateson thus  
co l l a p s e s  two of the  bas ic  b inary  o p p os i t ions  widely used in 
anthropology,  namely between i n t e l l e c t  and a f f e c t ,  and between 
i n t e l l e c t / a f f e c t  and a c t i o n .
These t r a n s i t i o n s  can a l so  be read as a p rogress ion  from a 
concern with system - in the  form of  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of  s o c ia l  
s t r u c t u r e  in th e  c l a s s i c a l  sense -  t o  a concern with c o n t e x t , or  
the  d e l i n e a t i o n  and d e s c r ip t io n  of  th e  corpus of  ideas and values 
which shape Iatmul c u l t u r e  and, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  naven i t s e l f .  
The fo rmula t ion  of  schismogenesis  r e p re s e n t s  th e  cu lminat ion of  
Bateson 's  at tempt t o  c o n te x tu a l i s e  th e  naven; i t  i s  a s u b t l e  and 
f l e x i b l e  model of  ac t ion  which al lows us t o  view Iatmul s o c i a l  
l i f e  from many p e r s p ec t iv es  - e p i s t e m o l o g ic a l , phenomenological ,  
o n to lo g ica l  - without  g iv ing a n a l y t i c a l  p r i o r i t y  t o  any one view­
po in t .
In t h e  f i n a l  s ec t io n  of  th e  book, c o n s i s t i n g  of  th e  chap te r  on 
eidos  and th e  two Epilogues,  Bateson r e t u r n s  t o  a concern with 
system which - as I have at tempted t o  show th roughout  my reading  ,
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of h is  t e x t  - never e n t i r e l y  eluded him. The chap te r  on e idos ,  
which he h im se lf  cons idered h is  l e a s t  s u c c e s s f u l ,  remains an u n s a t ­
i s f a c t o r y  at tempt t o  rescue the  phenomenological aspec t  (e idos)  
from th e  marginal  p o s i t i o n  i t  occupies  with r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  onto ­
log ica l  a s p e c t ,  or  e idos .  The F i r s t  Epilogue evoca t ive ly  
summarises th e  a u t h o r ' s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and con ta in s  the  
important  a t t a c k  on th e  f a l l a c y  of  "misplaced consc iousness" ,  or  
' t h e  h a b i t  o f  thought which a t t r i b u t e s  concre teness  t o  a spec ts  of  
phenomena' (1936: 263). (1) In th e  Second Epilogue,  however,
Bateson b e t ra y s  t h i s  and th e  o th e r  impor tant  i n s ig h t s  which 
genera ted th e  progress ion  from system t o  co n te x t ,  by using R u s s e l l ' s  
theory  of  lo g i c a l  types  and cybe rne t ic  theo ry  in o rde r  t o  p lace  
th e  naven again w ith in  a p a r t i c u l a r  systemic model. Using th e se  
ep is tem olog ica l  r e f e r e n t s  acquired s ince  th e  w r i t i n g  of  the  
o r ig i n a l  book, Bateson can now cla im t h a t
' t h e  concept  "schismogenesis" i s  an i m p l i c i t  r e c o g n i t io n  t h a t  
th e  system con ta ins  an e x t r a  o rde r  of  complexity due t o  th e  
combination o f  le a rn ing  with th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  of  persons .  The 
schismogenic u n i t  i s  a two person subsystem. This subsystem 
con ta in s  th e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  of  a cy b e rn e t i c  c i r c u i t  which 
might go in to  p rog res s ive  change; i t  cannot ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be 
concep tua l ly  ignored and must be descr ibed  in a language of  
h igher  type  than  any language used t o  d e s c r ib e  ind iv idua l  
behaviour -  th e  l a t t e r  ca tegory  of phenomena being only the  
events  in one o r  another  arc of  th e  schismogenic subsystem'  
(1936: 1958 2nd edn: 297).
Thus, in th e  terms of  Ba teson 's  l a t e r  work on c r e a t i v i t y  and 
p lay ,  naven as an in s tance  of  schismogenic a c t i v i t y  must be regarded 
as a " m e t a " - a c t i v i ty .
I t  i s  not  w ith in  t h e  scope of  t h i s  t h e s i s  t o  give a d e t a i l e d  
account o f  Ba teson 's  l a t e r  work in d e t a i l ,  but  any a n a l y s i s  of  
Naven as a c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  an anthropology of  performance would be 
incomplete without  some re fe ren c e  to  t h i s  work. I w i l l  here 
comment on t h r e e  no tab le  t o p i c s ;  t h e  r e sea rch  c a r r i e d  out  with 
Margaret Mead in B a l i ,  th e  theory  o f  play  and c r e a t i v i t y  and the  
double bind the o ry  of  sch izophren ia .  The r e s u l t s  of  t h e  work
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in Bali a re  t o  be found in th e  book Bateson wrote with Mead (1942), 
and in two papers  in the  volume of  c o l l e c t e d  essays  (1973); 
papers on p lay ,  c r e a t i v i t y  and th e  double bind are  a l so  inc luded 
in t h a t  volume.
As a r e s u l t  of  h i s  f ie ld -w ork  in B a l i ,  which began in 1936, 
Bateson r e p o r te d  t h a t  'Schismogenic sequences were no t  found in 
B a l i 1 (1973 ( a ) : 8 4 ) .  There i s ,  however, an impor tant  exception  to  
t h i s ,  namely in p a t t e r n s  of  i n t e r a c t i o n  observed by Bateson and 
Mead between mothers and young c h i l d r e n .  These p a t t e r n s  t a k e  th e  
form of  a mother t e a s i n g  an i n f a n t  and then tu rn i n g  away and 
ignor ing t h e  c h i ld  as the  l a t t e r  becomes e x c i t e d .  Bateson w r i t e s :
'The mother w i l l  e i t h e r  play a s p e c t a t o r ' s  r o l e ,  en joying th e  
c h i l d ' s  tan trum,  o r ,  i f  th e  c h i ld  a c t u a l l y  a t t a c k s  he r ,  w i l l  
brush o f f  h i s  a t t a c k  with no show of  anger on her  p a r t .  These 
sequences can be seen e i t h e r  as an express ion  of  th e  mother ' s  
d i s t a s t e  f o r  t h i s  type  of  personal  involvement or  as a con tex t  
in which th e  c h i ld  acqu i res  a deep d i s t r u s t  o f  such invo lve­
ment. The perhaps b a s i c a l l y  human tendency towards cumulat ive 
i n t e r a c t i o n  i s  thus  muted1 (1973 ( a ) :  85) .
An example of  t h i s  sequence between mother and c h i ld  i s  i l l u s t ­
r a t e d  in one of  th e  s e t s  of  photographs in Bateson and Mead's 
Bal inese  C h a r a c t e r : A Photographic Analys is  (1942, p l a t e s  47-53 
and 69-72: pages 32-36) .  Bateson i n t e r p r e t s  t h e  m o the r ' s  behaviour 
here as 'd im in ish ing  th e  c h i l d ' s  t e ndenc ie s  towards com pet i t ive  
and r i v a l r o u s  behaviour '  (1973 (a)  : 85 ) .  Ba teson 's  obse rva t ion  
t h a t  schismogenic i n t e r a c t i o n  i s  a c r u c i a l  element in th e  upbr ing­
ing of  B a l inese  c h i ld r e n ,  d e s p i t e  th e  f a c t  t h a t  'Schismogenic 
sequences were not  found in B a l i ' ,  i s  an obvious c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  a 
c o n t r a d i c t io n  in h i s  th in k in g  which he d id  not  fo l low up in any 
depth .  However, i t  can be argued t h a t  h is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
Bal inese  m othe r -ch i ld  i n t e r a c t i o n  marked an e a r l y  s tep  in th e  
development of  t h e  idea of  schismogenesis  as t a k in g  p lace  not  only 
between in d i v i d u a l s ,  but  a l s o  in s id e  th e  in d iv id u a l  psyche.  ( 2 )
In terms of  t h e  l a t e r  "double bind" th eory  of  s ch izoph ren ia ,  the  
Ba l inese  mother in Ba teson 's  p i c t u r e  i s  seen as inducing a s t a t e  
o f  con t in u a l  exci tement  and f r u s t r a t i o n  in t h e  c h i l d .
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Bateson had gone t o  Bali be l iev in g  t h a t  t h e  schismogenic 
p a t t e r n s  he had descr ibed  amongst t h e  Iatmul a re  u n i v e r s a l .  The 
behaviour Bateson observed between Bal inese  a d u l t s  appeared t o  deny 
t h i s .  He r epo r te d  t h a t  th e  Bal inese conduct t h e i r  s o c ia l  l i v e s  in 
a s p i r i t  o f  determined t r a n q u i l i t y  and calm, a s p i r i t  which 
allowed f o r  no emotional cl imaxes and which p sycho log i s t s  would 
d esc r ibe  as one of  " f l a t  a f f e c t " .  Moderation p r e v a i l e d .  Bal inese 
s o c ie ty  was, according to  Bateson, organised  by a s t r u c t u r e  of  
r i g i d  s o c i a l  h i e r a r c h i e s  permeated with s t r i c t  r u l e s  of  i n t e r p e r ­
sonal e t i q u e t t e .  The rampant emotional  cl imaxes and c u l t u r a l l y  
p resc r ibe d  f i t s  of  aggress ive  boas t ing  considered s o c i a l l y  d e s i r ­
able  amongst th e  Iatmul could not  have been f u r t h e r  from th e  ethos  
which Bateson descr ibed  as s tanda rd i se d  in B a l i .  This lack of  
climax was t o  be found in Bal inese music,  drama and p i c t o r i a l  a r t s  
(1973 (a)  : 85-88) .  Bateson concludes t h a t  th e  dec id ing  f a c t o r  
which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  Iatmul from Bal inese e thos  i s  t o  be found 
in c h i l d - r e a r i n g ;  but  t h i s  conclusion i s  merely s t a t e d ,  and 
not  explored f u l l y .
'We s t a r t e d  with th e  hypothesis  t h a t  human beings have a 
tendency to  involve themselves in sequences of  cumulat ive 
i n t e r a c t i o n ,  and t h i s  hypothesis  i s  s t i l l  l e f t  v i r t u a l l y  
i n t a c t .  Among the  Bal inese th e  bab ies ,  a t  l e a s t ,  e v id en t ly  
have such t e n d en c ie s .  But f o r  s o c io l o g i c a l  v a l i d i t y  t h i s  
hypothesi s  must now be guarded with a p a r e n t h e t i c a l  c l ause  
s t i p u l a t i n g  t h a t  t h e se  tendenc ie s  a re  o p e ra t iv e  in th e  dynamics 
of  s o c i e t y  only i f  t h e  childhood t r a i n i n g  i s  not  such as t o  
p reven t  t h e i r  express ion  in a du l t  l i f e*  (1973 (a)  : 87-88) .
Bateson analyses  Balinese e thos  in terms of  th e  th eo ry  of  
games devised by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).  For th e  
p layer  in t h e  Von Neumannian game, th e  aim i s  t o  maximise a s imple 
v a r i a b l e ,  which might f o r  example be f i n a n c i a l  ga in ,  p r e s t i g e  or  
power, in a l l i a n c e  with and in competi t ion a g a in s t  o th e r  p la y e r s .
For Bateson,  game th eory  i s  obvious ly a p p l i c a b le  t o  ' co m p e t i t iv e '  
s o c i e t i e s  such as t h e  Iatmul o r  our own, f o r :
' i t  i s  important  to  note t h a t  com pet i t ive  con tex ts  - provided 
th e  in d iv id u a l s  can be made t o  recognize  t h e  con tex t  as 
co m pet i t ive  - in e v i t a b ly  reduce th e  complex gamut of  va lues  
t o  very simple and even l i n e a r  and monotone te rm s .  Consider­
a t io n s  of  t h i s  s o r t ,  plus d e s c r i p t i o n s  of  th e  r e g u l a r i t i e s
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in th e  process of  c h a ra c te r  format ion ,  probably s u f f i c e  to  
desc r ib e  how simple value sc a le s  are imposed upon mammalian 
in d iv id u a l s  in competi t ive  s o c i e t i e s . s u c h  as t h a t  o f  th e  Iatmul 
or  tw e n t i e th - c e n tu ry  America' (1973 ( a ) ;  96, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
But, accord ing  to  Bateson, t h i s  cannot  be t r u e  of  Bal inese  
s o c i e t y .  The Bal inese ind iv idua l  i s  no t  engaging in s t r a t e g i e s  to  
maximise any one v a r i a b l e ,  but  r a t h e r  something more s u b t l e :
'N e i th e r  t h e  in d iv idua l  nor t h e  v i l l a g e  i s  concerned to  maxim­
i s e  any simple v a r i a b l e .  Rather,  they  would seem t o  be 
concerned t o  maximise something which we may c a l l  s t a b i l i t y ,  
using t h i s  term perhaps in a h igh ly  metaphor ical  way'
(1973 (a)  : 96).
Bateson d i s c e rn s  t h i s  concern with s t a b i l i t y ,  o r  ba lance ,  in a l l  
areas  of  Bal inese  l i f e ,  from r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between v i l l a g e s  t o  the  
movements o f  Bal inese  dancers .  The model f o r  th e  ub iqu i ty  of  t h i s  
concern i s  t o  be found in th e  techn ique  of  a t i g h t r o p e  walker with 
a ba lanc ing po le ,  who
'w i l l  no t  be ab le t o  maintain h i s  balance  except  by vary ing 
th e  f o r c e s  which he e x e r t s  upon t h e  po le '  (1973 ( a ) : 97, 
a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
Thus, f o r  Bateson:
' i t  seems t h a t  th e  Bal inese extend to  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
a t t i t u d e s  based upon bodily  ba lance ,  and t h a t  they  g e n e ra l i z e  
th e  idea t h a t  motion i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  ba lance .  This l a s t  po in t  
g ives  us,  I b e l i e v e ,  a p a r t i a l  answer t o  t h e  ques t ion  of  why 
th e  s o c i e t y  not  only cont inues  t o  func t ion  but  f unc t ions  
r a p id l y  and b u s i ly ,  c o n t in u a l ly  under tak ing  ceremonial  and 
a r t i s t i c  t a s k s  which a re  not  economica ll ly  or  com pe t i t ive ly  
determined.  This s teady s t a t e  i s  mainta ined  by con t inua l  non­
p ro g re s s iv e  change'  (1973 (a)  : 98).
I t  i s ,  in f a c t ,  a case  of  t h e  "Steady S ta te"  of  t h e  Bal inese
being c o n t ra s t e d  with the  "Schismogenic System" of  th e  Ia tmul.  I
would argue t h a t  Bateson 's  use of  von Neumannian game theory
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  same p o s i t i v i s t i c  b ia s  in h i s  t h in k in g  found
throughout t h e  pages of Naven and, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  in th e  f i n a l
sec t io n  on cy b e rn e t i c s  and lo g i c a l  ty p in g .  An a r t i c u l a t e  c r i t i q u e
of game theory  has been mounted by Ions,  who p o in t s  out  t h a t  von
Neumann and Morgenstern 's  model r e l i e s  on a r e i f i e d  sense  of
th e  notion  of  " r a t i o n a l i t y "  which i s  equated with a s i m p l i s t i c  means-
end s t r a t e g y  t o  maximise u t i l i t y  by an i s o l a t e d ,  com peti t ive
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in d iv idua l  (1977: 36-41).  I t  i s  open t o  ques t ion  whether Bateson 's  
p i c tu r e  of  th e  Balinese as maximising game p l a y e r s ,  a l b e i t  of a 
value more s u b t l e  than those  u sua l ly  a s s o c ia t ed  with game the o ry ,  
provides an adequate account  of  Balinese so c ie ty  and c u l t u r e .  I 
would sugges t  t h a t  th e  important  f e a t u r e  of t h e  paper summarised 
above i s  t h a t  f o r  t h e  Bal inese  case Bateson smuggles schismogenesis  
in through th e  back door in another  form, t h a t  of game theo ry .
The maximisation i s  no longer o f  s imple v a r i a b l e s  such as p r e s t i g e ,  
as i t  i s  f o r  t h e  Iatmul,  but of  "ba lance” and " s t a b i l i t y " .  One 
might argue t h a t  Bateson 's  ana ly s i s  of  Bal inese  e thos  here resembles 
th e  c l a s s i c  equ i l ib r ium  model favoured by fu n c t io n a l i sm .  Behind 
t h i s  p i c t u r e  of  th e  Bal inese  maximising ba lance ,  schismogenesis  
lu rks  in t h e  shadows. I t  would, indeed,  be easy t o  analyse  
Iatmul e thos  in von Neumannian terms but t h i s ,  i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,
Bateson does not  do.
I t u rn  now t o  a b r i e f  cons ide ra t ion  of  Ba teson 's  work on play ,  
c r e a t i v i t y  and t h e  double bind .  One under ly ing theme runs through 
the  papers  published on th e se  t o p i c s ,  namely t h e  development of  the  
use of  R u s s e l l ' s  theory  of  log ica l  types  which underpins t h e  argu­
ments of  t h e  1956 Epilogue t o  Naven. Two papers publ ished in 
Steps To An Ecology of  Mind are of  c r u c i a l  importance t o  th e se  
t o p i c s ,  namely 'A Theory of  Play and F an ta sy 1 (1973 (c) ) and
'Towards A Theory of  Sch izophrenia '  (1973 (q) ) .
In terms of  log ica l  typ ing ,  Bateson claims t h a t  a c e n t r a l  f a c e t  
of human communication i s  'metacommunication ' ,  in which ' t h e  
sub jec t  of  d i scou rse  i s  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  speakers '
(1973 (c) : 151).  This i s  in c o n t r a s t  t o  a 'seemingly deno ta t ive
level  ( " th e  c a t  i s  on t h e  m a t " ) ' ,  and t o  a more a b s t r a c t  leve l
'where t h e  s u b jec t  of  d iscourse  i s  th e  language.  We w i l l  c a l l  
t h e s e  m e ta l i n g u i s t i c  ( f o r  example, "The verbal  sound ' c a t '  
s tands  f o r  any member of  such and such c l a s s  of  o b j e c t s " ) !
(1973 (c ) : 150, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
A metacommunicative communication, one which would r e f e r  to  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  speakers ,  would f o r  example be 'My t e l l i n g  
you where t o  f in d  th e  c a t  was f r i e n d l y ' ,  o r  'This  i s  p lay '
(973 (c)  ; 151). (3)
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Bateson r e c a l l s  an episode in which he v i s i t e d  a zoo, and was 
as ton ished  by th e  s ig h t  of
'two young monkeys p l a y in g , i . e . ,  engaged in an i n t e r a c t i v e  
sequence of  which the  u n i t  a c t io n s  or  s ig n a l s  were s im i l a r  t o  
but  not  the  same as combat. I t  was ev id e n t ,  even t o  th e  human 
obse rve r ,  t h a t  th e  sequence as a whole was not  combat, and 
ev iden t  t o  the  human observer  t h a t  t o  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t  monkeys 
t h i s  was "not combat" ' (1973 (c ) : 152, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
For Bateson,  play i s  only po s s ib le  through metacommunication, or  in 
h is  words i t
'could  only occur i f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t  organisms were capable of 
some degree of  metacommunication, i . e .  o f  exchanging s ig n a l s  
which would ca r ry  the  message " t h i s  i s  play" ' (1973 (c)  : 152).
The message " t h i s  i s  p lay" ,  Bateson w r i t e s ,  i s  a s ta tement of  
the  paradoxes which a r i s e  as a r e s u l t  of  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  
R u s s e l l ' s  theo ry  of  lo g i c a l  ty p e s .  The paradox in ques t ion  con ta ins
'a  nega t ive  s ta tement con ta in ing  an i m p l i c i t  nega t ive  s ta tement 
con ta in ing  an im p l i c i t  nega t ive  metas ta tement .  Expanded, 
th e  s ta tement "This i s  play" looks something l i k e  t h i s :
"These ac t io n s  in which we now engage do not  denote what those  
ac t io n s  f o r  which they stand would denote" ' (1973 (c) : 152, 
a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
This f i n a l  sen tence can be expanded to  read:
' "These a c t i o n s ,  in which we now engage,  do not  denote what 
would be denoted by those  ac t ions  which th e s e  ac t io n s  denote" ' 
(1973 (c)  : 153).
In the  domain of  animal play ,  t h i s  can be t r a n s l a t e d  as r e f e r r i n g  
t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t
'The p la y fu l  nip  denotes t h e  b i t e ,  but  i t  does not  denote what 
would be denoted by th e  b i t e '  (1973 (c) : 153).
This s ta tement con ta ins  th e  essence of  Ba teson 's  th eo ry  o f  play and 
c r e a t i v i t y .  Both a re  only p o s s ib le  when humans and o th e r  animals 
send ' s i g n a l s  s tanding  f o r  o the r  e v e n t s '  o r ,  in o th e r  words, when 
t h e r e  i s  a communication such t h a t  deno ta t ion  i s  used a t  ' two 
leve ls  of  a b s t r a c t i o n '  (1973 (c )  : 153). I t  would thus  appear 
t h a t  f o r  Bateson "play" i s  a q u a s i - c o g n i t iv e  a c t i v i t y  in which 
organisms "read o f f "  various  l e v e l s  of  communication between each 
o th e r .  Bateson does not  explore th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  "play" might
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be connected with sheer phys ica l  enjoyment,  t h a t  i t  might be "fun";
I would sugges t  t h a t  i t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t h a t  Ba teson 's  templa te  
f o r  "play" i s  a b i t e ,  r a t h e r  than a cuddle o r  a hug. (4)
For Bateson,  t h e  phenomena of t h r e a t  and h i s t r i o n i c  behaviour 
are s i m i l a r l y  grounded in metacommunication; he does not  mention 
the  naven in t h i s  con tex t ,  but  th e  im p l ica t ion  would be t h a t  naven, 
l i k e  o th e r  r i t u a l s ,  i s  t o  be equated with metacommunicative 
a c t i v i t y .  P lay ,  t h r e a t  and h i s t r i o n i c  behaviour mark an important  
s tep  in t h e  evo lu t ion  of  communication in t h a t  they  manipulate the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between what Korzybski c a l l s  " t e r r i t o r y "  and "map", 
t h a t  is
' t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a message, of  whatever k ind ,  does not  c o n s i s t  of 
those  o b je c t s  which i t  denotes ("The word "ca t"  cannot s c ra tch  
u s " ) .  Rather,  language bears  t o  th e  o b je c t s  which i t  denotes 
a r e l a t i o n s h i p  comparable t o  t h a t  which a map bears t o  a 
t e r r i t o r y '  (1973 ( c ): 153).
There a r e ,  perhaps ,  obvious p a r a l l e l s  here with W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  
" p ic tu r e  theory"  of  language descr ibed  in h i s  T rac ta tu s  Logico- 
P h i lo soph icus . LangpjjJe i s  seen t o  be t r a n s p a r e n t  and one­
dimensional  ly r e f e r e n t i a l  t o  th e  " t e r r i t o r y "  o r  th e  " r e a l i t y " .  I 
would ask how a m e t a l i n g u i s t i c  or  a metacommunicative leve l  of  
language f i t s  such a s i m p l i s t i c  m a p / t e r r i t o r y  model? For, i f  
language can r e f e r  to  i t s e l f ,  as well as t o  " r e a l i t y "  (whatever 
we mean by t h a t ) ,  then su re ly  t h e r e  can be no simple one- to-one 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between language and t h e  world,  or  as Korzybski would 
have i t ,  between "map" and " t e r r i t o r y " .  There a re  deep and t r o u b l in g  
waters  here  which Bateson does not  e n t e r .
Bateson then draws on th e  Freudian d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  
unconscious,  or  "primary process"  and th e  consc ious ,  o r  "secondary 
p rocess" .  He claims t h a t
' i n  primary p rocess ,  map and t e r r i t o r y ,  a re  equated;  in second­
ary p rocess ,  they can be d i s c r im in a te d .  In p lay ,  they  are  
both equated and d i s c r i m i n a t e d 1 ( 1 9 7 3 ( c ) :  158).
Play,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  not a communication but  a "metacommunicat- 
10n ; not  an a c t i v i t y ,  but  a " m e t a - a c t iv i t y " .  This "m e ta -a c t iv i t y "  
a r i s e s  from th e  paradoxes which a re  connected with th e  a p p l i c a t i o n
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of th e  the o ry  of  log ica l  type s ;  Bateson 's  reading of  t h i s  th eo ry  
here i s  a c r i t i q u e  of  R usse l l ,  f o r :
' t h e  paradoxes of  a b s t r a c t io n  must make t h e i r  appearance in a l l  
communication more complex than t h a t  of mood-signals ,  a n d . . .  
w ithou t  th e s e  paradoxes th e  evo lu t ion  of  communication would 
be a t  an end. Li fe would then  be an end less  in terchange  of 
s t y l i z e d  messages, a game with r i g i d  r u l e s ,  unre l ieved  by 
change o r  humour1 (1973 (c)  : 166).
One might ask i f  any "communication" i s  p o s s i b l e  a t  a l l  withou t  a 
degree of  "metacommunication" in t h e  f i r s t  p la ce .
In a paper concerned with Bal inese p a i n t i n g ,  Bateson en la rges  
on th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between primary and secondary process  mentioned 
above. A r t ,  t o o ,  manipula tes  l e v e l s  of  a b s t r a c t i o n  in t h a t  i t  
a c t s  as a b r idge  between conscious and unconscious,  s ince :
'mere purpos ive  r a t i o n a l i t y  unaided by such phenomena as a r t ,  
r e l i g i o n ,  dream and th e  l i k e ,  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  pathogenic and 
d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  l i f e ;  a n d . . . i t s  v i ru l e n c e  sp r ings  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
from th e  ci rcumstances t h a t  l i f e  depends upon in t e r lo c k in g  
c i r c u i t s  of  contingency,  while consciousness  can see only 
such s h o r t  a rcs  of  such c i r c u i t s  as human purpose may d i r e c t '  
(1973 (b) : 119, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
I t  i s  a ' s e n se  or  recogn i t ion  of  th e  f a c t  of  c i r c u i t r y '  which 
Bateson equates  with 'wisdom' (1973 (b) : 119). This i s  an 
important  theme of much of  Ba teson 's  l a t e r  work, namely t h a t  
n e i t h e r  conscious purpose nor unconscious i r r a t i o n a l i t y  alone lead 
to  "wisdom", which can only be achieved by an a p p rec ia t io n  of  the  
pathways which l ink  conscious and unconscious.  These pathways,  
Bateson m a in ta in s ,  include  p lay ,  a r t ,  f a n t a s y ,  dreams and r e l i g i o n .  
He does n o t ,  however, ques t ion  th e  use t o  which he puts  t h e  a l l -  
important  ana log ies  of  c y b e rn e t i c s ,  lo g i c a l  typ ing  and game th e o ry .  
These an a lo g ie s ,  f o r  him, express  e s s e n t i a l  t r u t h s  about t h e  human 
co nd i t ion ;  t h e  important  ques t ion ,  however, i s  t o  cons ide r  th e  
po in t  a t  which th e s e  analogies  lose  t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  - f o r  
analogies  always run o u t .  U l t im ate ly ,  t h e r e  i s  no analogy which is  
t r u e ;  what i s  t r u e  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  are an a lo g ie s .
F i n a l ly ,  I r e f e r  t o  th e  double bind th eory  of  s ch izophren ia ,  
formulated  by Bateson in work c a r r i e d  out  wi th Jackson,  Haley and
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Weakland (1973 (d) ) .  In t h e  sch izophrenogenic family u n i t ,  th e  
paradoxes of  communication r e s u l t ,  no t  in p lay and c r e a t i v i t y ,  but  
in a p a th o lo g ic a l  impoverishment of  communication such t h a t  th e  
" p a t i e n t "  or  "v ict im" i s  forbidden to  metacommunicate, o r  t o  comment 
on th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with in  th e  fami ly  group.  The double b ind ,  
which i s  seen as th e  r e s u l t  of  r e c u r r e n t  even ts  in th e  l i f e  of  the  
vic t im r a t h e r  than a s in g le  trauma, i s  composed of  t h r e e  
i n j u n c t i o n s .  The f i r s t ,  descr ibed  as ‘a primary nega t ive  in ju n c ­
t i o n 1, may t a k e  e i t h e r  the  form of a command t o  do something or  
not t o  do something, on t h e  t h r e a t  o f  some kind o f  punishment such 
as the  withdrawal of  love.  The second in j u n c t io n  is  one which 
c o n f l i c t s
‘with t h e  f i r s t  a t  a more a b s t r a c t  l e v e l ,  and l i k e  th e  f i r s t  
( i s )  enforced by punishments o r  s i g n a l s  which t h r e a t e n  
s u r v i v a l ‘ ( 1973 (d) :
178, my p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
This in ju n c t io n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be communicated by non-verbal  
means, f o r  example by po s tu re ,  tone  o f  voice  and so on. However,
'V e rb a l i z a t i o n  of  t h e  secondary in ju n c t io n  may. . . i n c lu d e  a 
wide v a r i e t y  of  forms; f o r  example, "Do not  see t h i s  as 
punishment"; "Do not  see me as t h e  punish ing agen t" ;  "Do not  
submit t o  my p r o h i b i t i o n s " ;  "Do not  t h i n k  of  what you must 
not  do"; "Do not  ques t ion  my love of  which t h e  primary p roh ib ­
i t i o n  i s  (o r  i s  not)  an example"; and so on. Other examples 
become p o s s ib le  when t h e  double bind i s  i n f l i c t e d  not  by one 
in d iv id u a l  but  by two. For example, one pa ren t  may negate a t  
a more a b s t r a c t  leve l  t h e  in ju n c t io n s  of  th e  o th e r '
( 1973 (d) : 178-179, au th o r s '  p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
The t h i r d  in ju n c t io n  i s  one which f o r b id s  th e  v ic t im  from 
escaping from th e  s i t u a t i o n  - but  t h i s  might not  be necessary  s in ce ,  
i f  t h e  double bind p a t t e r n  cont inues  during in fancy ,  then escape 
w i l l  become im poss ib le.
The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  c o n d i t io n in g ,  c a r r i e d  out  over a long period 
of  t ime,  r e s u l t s  in th e  v ic t im le a rn ing
' t o  pe rce ive  h is  un ive rse  in double bind p a t t e r n s .  Almost any 
p a r t  of  a double bind sequence may then be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p r e c i p ­
i t a t e  panic o r  rage .  The p a t t e r n  of  c o n f l i c t i n g  in ju n c t io n s  
may even be taken over by h a l lu c i n a t o r y  v o ic e s '  (Bateson,  e t  
(1973 (d ) :  179). ~
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The i n a b i l i t y  of  the  v ic t im ,  or  " sch izophren ic" ,  to  d i s c r im in ­
a te  between messages of  d i f f e r e n t  log ica l  types  i s  the  c ru c i a l  
outcome of  double bind cond i t ion ing .  For Bateson and h is  c o l l ­
eagues,  t h i s  i n a b i l i t y  may exp la in  why th e  sch izophren ic  is  unable 
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between the  l i t e r a l  and th e  metaphoric in h is  
thought and speech;  why he develops th e  p e c u l i a r  "word-salad" 
language o f  sch izophren ia ,  and why h is  behav iour ,  t h a t  of  a s e l f  
r id d led  with confus ion,  doubt and c o n t r a d i c t io n  i s  -  q u i t e  system­
a t i c a l l y  - s t r u c t u r e d  in such a way t h a t  nobody can "make sense" 
of  i t ,  s ince  he cannot "make sense" of  i t  e i t h e r .  The schizophrenic  
has, l i t e r a l l y ,  been driven mad by those  around him. (5) In 
terms of  th e  development o f  Ba teson 's  t h i n k in g ,  we can see the  
double bind theory  as a p i c t u r e  of  th e  i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n  of  
schismogenetic  p a t t e r n s  with in  th e  in d iv idua l  psyche.
I t  can be argued t h a t  double binds of  t h e  type  descr ibed  by 
Bateson and h is  co l leagues  occur f r e q u e n t ly  in a l l  s i t u a t i o n s  of  
human i n t e r a c t i o n ,  and not  only with in  fami ly groups.  Even gran ted 
t h a t  double bind con tex ts  d r ive  some people mad, t h e  ques t ion  can 
be asked,  why do they  d r ive  some people mad and not  o th e rs ?  I t  
might be more i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  regard  th e  double bind theory  as 
a model f o r  poor human communication, r a t h e r  than  as an exp lanato ry  
model of  sch izophren ia .  c o
In my prev ious  sec t ion  I b r i e f l y  o u t l in e d  some of  th e  more 
s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  of  Bateson 's  l a t e r  work, work which developed the  
themes of t h e  f i n a l  pages of  Naven. There a re  a t  l e a s t  two 
problems he re .  The f i r s t  i s ,  what, in any s p e c i f i c  co n te x t ,  a re  th e  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h in g  between an "ac t ion"  and a "m eta -ac t ion" ,  
or  between a "communication" and a "meta-communication"? The 
second problem, which a r i s e s  from th e  f i r s t ,  i s  how many kinds of  
o r i g i n a l ,  f i r s t - b a s e  "ac t ions"  and "communications" a re  th e re ?  In 
o th e r  words,  how does Bateson 's  m e ta - leve l  model of  play and
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c r e a t i v i t y  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  complex it ie s  o f  c u l t u r a l  s p e c i f i c i t y ?
These q u es t io n s  a re  c r u c i a l  f o r  an anthropology of  performance.
The problems a re  s im i l a r  t o  those  posed by Goffman's r o l e  
the o ry .  We can ask, f o r  example, i f  S a r t r e ' s  w a i t e r  i s  engaging 
in an " a c t i v i t y "  or  a "m e ta -a c t iv i t y "  in h i s  ca fe  a c t i v i t y .
(See Chapter  Eleven pp. 260-261.)  Is th e  w a i t e r  "p lay ing"  in the  
Batesonian c r e a t i v e  mode, or  i s  he t h e  v ic t im  of th e  p a tho log ica l  
double bind con tex t?  I would sugges t  t h a t  i t  i s  always p o s s ib le  to  
bu i ld  a th e o ry  of  human ac t io n  by in t roduc ing  a d d i t i o n a l  l e v e l s  of  
a b s t r a c t i o n ,  but  t h a t  any theory  b u i l t  in t h i s  way w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  
be r e d u c t iv e .  Human r e a l i t y  i s  more s u b t l e  and complex than any 
such theory  can al low.
The dichotomy between "ac t ion"  and "m eta -ac t ion" ,  grounded in 
the  paradoxes a r i s i n g  from lo g i c a l  typ ing ,  al lows Bateson t o  escape 
from t h e  problems posed by schismogenesis ,  play and f a n ta sy  seen 
as models of  a c t i v i t i e s  which i s sue  from p a s t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and by 
ins tances  o f ,  f o r  example, th e  naven as p a r t i c u l a r  event s  which, 
al though t o  an important  e x t e n t  improvised,  a re  r e - c r e a t i o n s  of  
previous c r e a t i o n s ;  t h a t  i s  to  say, t h i s  dichotomy al lows Bateson 
to  escape from th e  problems posed by h i s t o r y  and c u l t u r a l  s p e c i f ­
i c i t y .  In t h e  theory  of  lo g ica l  types  Bateson d i scovers  a 
un ive rsa l  system which can be app l ied  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y  t o  th e  Iatmul,  
and th e  B a l inese ,  and to  Europeans and Americans ( " th e  double 
bind")  and, f u r t h e r ,  t o  spec ie s  o th e r  than t h e  human, t o  chimpan­
zees and t o  o t t e r s  too  ( in  t h e  work on p l a y ) .
I would argue t h a t  th e  use of  lo g i c a l  ty p in g ,  and th e  a t t e n d a n t  
p i c tu r e  of  s o c ie ty  as a s e r i e s  o f  cybe rne t ic  feed-back loops ,  is  - 
in B a teson 's  terminology - a "h igher  l e v e l "  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  model 
than th e  model with which he began, i . e .  t h e  c l a s s i c  s t r u c t u r a l -  
f u n c t i o n a l i s t  paradigm of s o c ie ty  as an organism opera t ing  by means 
of a number o f  i n t e r lo c k in g  p a r t s .  The use of  t h e  analogy of  a 
th e rm o s ta t ,  in Naven (1936: 1958 2nd edn: 292) and th roughout  h is  
l a t e r  work ( e . g .  1980: 212-214) in o rde r  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  th e  work­
ings of  a c y b e rn e t ic  system, be t rays  Ba teson 's  cont inu ing  
f u n c t i o n a l i s t  s c ien t i sm ;  f o r  t h e  th e rm o s ta t  i s  a l so  a c l a s s i c  
i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  t e l e o lo g y .  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,
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we can say t h a t  both th e  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  and the  
cy b e rn e t ic  views c o n s t i t u t e  a correspondence  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  an 
a l i e n  c u l t u r e ,  and th e  answers thus  adduced a re  couched in terms of  
r e f e r e n t s  -  e i t h e r  e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  - loca ted  w i th in  th e  
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s  own conceptual  framework. The cor respondence 
t h e o r i s t  a sks ,  "How do t h e  phenomena observab le  in ano ther  c u l t u r e  
correspond t o  th e  phenomena observable  in our  c u l tu r e ? "  I t  i s  
apparent  t h a t  such a ques t ion  presupposes t h a t  such cor respondences 
must e x i s t ;  once t h i s  assumption has been made, i t  only remains 
fo r  th e  a n t h ro p o l o g i s t  t o  dec ide where t h e  correspondences l i e ,  
and to  d e s c r ib e  them. This s t r a t e g y  i s  in n a te ly  e s s e n t i a l i s t ,  and 
i t s  proponents adhere t o  a b e l i e f  in u n iv e r s a l s  which must be 
sought,  d iscovered  and descr ibed  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y ;  t h e s e  u n iv e r s ­
a l s  a re  le g io n ,  but  some o f  th e  more no ta b le  inc lude  c e r t a i n  no t ions  
of  s t r u c t u r e  - whether i t  be th e  e m p i r i c a l ly  e x i s t i n g  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  Radcliffe-Brown and F o r te s ,  o r  th e  c o g n i t iv e  s t r u c t u r e s  
genera t ing  b ina ry  oppos i t ions  in t h e  work of  L e v i -S t r au s s ;  as well 
as a p r iv i l e g e d  r a t i o n a l i t y  which i s  seen as under ly ing human 
ac t ion  everywhere,  along with a s o c i a l  ph ilosophy  which sees  the  
ide o lo g ica l  debates  o f  contemporary Europe r e f l e c t e d  in a l l  o th e r  
c u l t u r e s  and,  aga in ,  a n a l y t i c a l  c a t e g o r i e s  such as k in sh ip  and 
marr iage ,  b e l i e f  and, of  course ,  r i t u a l .
This correspondence view of  an th ropo log ica l  endeavour can be
compared and c o n t ra s t e d  with the  approach taken  by Bateson in th e
se c t io n s  o f  Naven which lead t o  th e  fo rm ula t ion  o f  th e  notion  of
schismogenesis .  In t h i s  p a r t  o f  h is  t e x t ,  Bateson grounds th e
naven a c t i v i t i e s  in Iatmul e idos  and e thos  be fo re  provid ing  a
dynamic model of  ac t ion  which subsumes both e idos  and e t h o s .  Action,
in t h e  form o f  schismogenesis ,  then occupies  t h e  space th us
c l e a r e d .  In t h i s  way Bateson both c o n t e x t u a l i s e s  t h e  naven w ith in
Iatmul phenomenology and onto logy ,  and in d i c a t e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y
of viewing th e  Iatmul as humans a c t in g  in terms of  a c u l t u r a l l y
s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n ,  while a t  t h e  same t ime c r e a t in g  and r e - c r e a t i n g
th e  e lements ,  behav iours,  g e s tu r e s  and s t y l e s  which c o n s t i t u t e
t h a t  s i t u a t i o n .  Here Bateson shows h im se lf  t o  be an adept  c o n t e x t ­
ual i s e r ,  seek ing t o  frame human ac t io n  in t h e  terms of  th e  a c t o r s ,
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r a t h e r  than seeking correspondences between Iatmul c u l t u r e  and 
our own. However, in the  chap te r  on schismogenesis  t h i s  s t r e s s  on 
con tex t  i s  be trayed when th e  au thor a t tempts  t o  j u s t i f y  th e  form­
u la t i o n  by endowing i t  with u n iv e r s a l ,  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  
and a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  This i s  a l so  a no tab le  f e a t u r e  of  t h e  chap te r  
on e th o s .  F i n a l ly ,  a t  th e  end of  t h e  book, t h e  correspondence 
view of  schismogenesis  i s  p r iv i l e g e d  a t  th e  expense of  th e  c o n t e x t ­
ual view in t h e  use of  lo g i c a l  typ ing  and c y b e rn e t ic  the o ry ,  
int roduced as un iv e rs a l s  which l i e  behind a l l  human ac t io n  in a l l  
c u l t u r e s .  They a re  seen as un ive rsa l  t r u t h s  which can be appl ied  
to  c u l t u r a l l y  s p e c i f i c  problems.
Thus, a f t e r  proving himse lf  as p o t e n t i a l l y  a p e rce p t iv e  con­
te x t u a l  i s e r ,  Bateson tu rn s  back to  correspondence and r a t i o n a l i s m .  
What encouraged him t o  do t h i s ?  I sugges t  t h a t  th e  answer t o  t h i s  
ques t ion  l i e s  in Bateson‘s s c i e n t i f i c  p r e ju d i c e s  which led him to  
seek t r u t h s  of  un ive rsa l  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  study of  human 
c u l tu r e  and s o c i e t y .  From th e  p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  my t h e s i s ,  t h e  
formula t ion  o f  schismogenesis  approaches t h e  arena o f  performance 
theory  but  u l t im a te ly  eludes i t .  This i s  because of  th e  important  
f a c t  t h a t  Bateson does not  fol low through t h e  im pl ica t ions  of  a 
performance p e r s p ec t iv e  which would view t h e  naven as a s e r i e s  of  
events  which c r e a t e  and r e - c r e a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  
workings of  Iatmul s o c ie ty .  Bateson main ta ins  t h a t  i t  i s  th e  o the r  
way round,  i . e .  t h a t  Iatmul ethos  produces schismogenic i n t e r ­
ac t ion  and th e  naven. Someone i n t e r e s t e d  in performance might 
suggest  t h a t  i t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  cons ide r  t h e  r ev e r s e  p o s s i b i l i t y ;  
t h a t  human ac t io n  can be viewed in  i t s  own r i g h t  as c o n s t i t u t i n g  
d is cou rses  which exemplify ways of  doing t h i n g s ,  and t h a t  such 
p r a c t i c e  then  c o n s t i t u t e s  f u r t h e r  ac t io n  in t h e  c o n t in u a t io n  of  
d i scourse  and t h e  e l a b o ra t i o n  of  mores,  a t t i t u d e s  t o  k in ,  gender 
s t e r e o t y p in g ,  th e  marking of  s tages  in the  l i f e  cyc les  of  the  
p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  and so on - roughly speaking,  t h a t  i s  t o  say,  the  
e l a b o ra t io n  of  what Bourdieu has c a l l e d  "hab i tus"  (1977).  Seen 
in t h i s  l i g h t ,  ac t ion  i s  both c o n s t i t u t i v e  and c o n s t i t u t i n g ,  
r a t h e r  than  a mere r e f l e c t i o n  - or  "express ion"  - of  an under ly ing ,  
immanent es sence ,  whether t h a t  essence  i s  assumed to  be epistemo-
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l o g i c a l ,  phenomenological o r  o n to l o g ic a l .
B a teson 's  problem throughout  i s  t h a t  he i s  caught  in one of 
th e  c l a s s i c  dilemmas -  perhaps t h e  dilemma - which face s  a l l  so c ia l  
a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s ,  between a f a i t h  in c u l t u r a l  con tex t  (and,  by 
im p l ic a t io n ,  r e l a t i v i s m )  on th e  one hand ( a f t e r  a l l ,  i f  c u l t u r e s  
a re  a l l  t h e  same why bother  t o  s tudy them?),  and on th e  o th e r  
hand th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  something e s s e n t i a l l y  common t o  a l l  
c u l t u r e s  (o therw ise ,  s u r e ly ,  i t  would be imposs ib le  t o  study o the r  
c u l tu r e s  in th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ) .  This dilemma has been well a r t i c u ­
la ted  by V ic to r i a  Hamilton in a review o f  a book concerned with 
the  t h e o r e t i c a l  background t o  fami ly o r i e n t e d  psychotherapy -  
a f i e l d  in which Bateson was ext remely i n f l u e n t i a l :
' . . . t h e s e  concepts  a re  p a r t  o f  two s e p a r a t e ,  and c o n f l i c t i n g ,  
b e l i e f  systems.  One holds t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an abso lu te  t r u e  
r e a l i t y  which may be a c c u ra te ly  rep re sen ted  by th e  c o r r e c t  
method, th e  o the r  t h a t  t h e o r e t i c a l  schemas a re  r e l a t i v e  to  
a s p e c i f i c  c u l t u r e  and t ime '  (1981: 23) .
In Naven Bateson f a l l s  prey to  a common symptom which an throp­
o l o g i s t s  d i s p l a y  as a r e s u l t  of  being caught  in t h i s  dilemma, a 
symptom which Leach (1961) addressed ,  and which became known as 
"secondary e thnocen t r i sm " .  Ethnographic re sea rch  in a p a r t i c u l a r  
s o c ie ty  i s  framed with in  a p a r t i c u l a r  methodological  p e r s p e c t iv e .
The l a t t e r  then becomes "theory" which i s  o f ten  app l ied  t o  s o c i e t i e s  
o th e r  than t h a t  s tud ied  by th e  a n th ro p o lo g i s t  in q u es t io n ,  i . e .  in 
the  process  of  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  comparison.  Thus, approaches to  
da ta  very qu ick ly  change from phases in a methodology t o  being 
s o l i d i f i e d  in to  grand t h e o r y . This kind of  r e i f i c a t i o n  can be 
seen in many of  th e  examples of  th e  a n a l y s i s  of  r i t u a l  which I have 
examined in my previous  c h a p te r s ,  f o r  example in t h e  works of  
L^v i -S t rauss  and Turner.  I would sugges t  t h a t  Bateson can be 
added t o  t h i s  l i s t .  Schismogenesis ,  lo g i c a l  typ ing  and cy b e rn e t ic  
theory  remained th e  corne rs tones  of  a l l  B a teson 's  l a t e r  work. 
Although t h e  Bal inese did not  f i t  t h e  Iatmul p i c t u r e  o f  schismogenic 
maximisers ,  f o r  Bateson th e  Bal inese  played a vers ion  of  th e  game 
in th e  "maximisat ion of  ba lance" .  But i f  schismogenesis  per  se 
could not  be appl ied  to  t h e  Bal iense a la  t h e  Iatmul,  i t  could be
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appl ied  t o  American mental p a t i e n t s  diagnosed as s ch izophren ic .
The i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n  of  schismogenesis  w i th in  t h e  s e l f  i s  one of  
th e  c r u c i a l  f a c e t s  of  th e  double bind th e o ry .  Logical  typ ing  and 
c y b e rn e t ic s  f e a t u r e  heav i ly  in t h e  papers on play  and c r e a t i v i t y .  
They form essences  which a re  seen as working f o r  a l l  humans in a l l  
s o c i e t i e s ,  e . g .  c r e a t i v e  play and a r t  a re  made p o s s ib le  by th e  
manipulat ion of  lo g i c a l  ty p e s ,  while t h e  p l i g h t  of  th e  schizophrenic  
i s  t h e  r e s u l t  of  h is  lo g ica l  typ ing  being manipulated f o r  him by 
o th e r s .  I would not  deny t h a t  much of  t h i s  work i s  i l l u m in a t in g ,  
but  th e  problem posed by i t  from a performance p e r s p e c t iv e  i s  
t h a t  any comprehensive,  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  theory  o f  human ac t ion  
r e q u i r e s  f o r  i t s  bas is  a comprehensive,  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  theo ry  of 
s o c i e t y ,  which in t u rn  w i l l  involve a f a i r l y  r i g i d  s e t  of  metaphys­
ic a l  assumptions.  I would argue t h a t  schismogenesis  and lo g ica l  
typing  a re  “ways of  t a l k i n g  about t h i n g s " ,  r a t h e r  than essences  a t  
work out  in t h e  world.  But Bateson a t tempts  t o  make th e  model of  
log ica l  typ ing  ap p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  s o c i e t i e s  and c u l t u r e s .  Again, i t  
i s  a m a t te r  o f  s p e c i f i c i t y ;  t h e  Iatmul might th in k  l i k e  t h a t ,  or 
they might no t ;  th e  Bal inese might th in k  l i k e  t h a t ,  or  they  might 
not  -  and so on. There i s  no l o g i c a l ,  o r  o n t o - l o g i c a l , essence  
e x i s t i n g  in t h e  world as an o b j e c t i v e  f a c t .
Whereas t h e  correspondence view o f  s o c i e t y  s t r e s s e s  th e  necess ­
ary and u n iv e r s a l  opera t ion  of  s c i e n t i f i c ,  r a t i o n a l  enqui ry ,  
con tex tua l  ism s t r e s s e s  the  c u l t u r a l  con tex t  w i th in  which human 
ac t ion  t a k e s  p la c e .  A s t r a t e g y  it inked to  a con tex tua l  and r e l a t i v ­
i s t  approach,  in c o n t r a s t  t o  an approach which s t r e s s e s  
correspondence and r a t i o n a l i s m ,  can be summed up by th e  term 
coherence . An an th ro p o lo g i s t  i n t e r e s t e d  in coherence asks how 
d i f f e r e n t  phenomena in th e  same c u l t u r e  r e l a t e  t o  each o th e r .  
Questions asked about coherence are  a t tempts  t o  make sense of  
c o n tex t .
The cho ice  here  i s  not  composed of  a r i g i d  dichotomy between
r a t i o n a l i t y  on th e  one hand and r e l a t i v i s m  on th e  o th e r ;  the
coherence view leaves open th e  ques t ion  whether or  not  da ta  from 
o the r  c u l t u r e s  can be compared with da ta  from our own. I f  we
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fo l low t h i s  r o u te ,  we might agree with E v a n s -P r i t c h a rd ' s  i l l u m in ­
a t ing  sugges t ion  t h a t  i t  i s  more important  t o  be ' f i r s t . . . a n  
e thnographer and s e c o n d l y . . . a  so c ia l  a n t h r o p o l o g i s t 1 ( ^ 9 5 5  : 34).
I t  i s  e n l ig h ten in g  to  cons ide r  b r i e f l y  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
approach i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  work of  Bateson and E vans-Pr i tchard .
As I have argued th roughout th e  t h e s i s ,  Ba teson 's  approach to  
c u l t u r e  remained avowedly s c i e n t i f i c .  Despi te  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  much 
of  h is  work can be read as a r e f r e s h in g  r i p o s t e  t o  th e  s i m p l i s t i c  
c r u d i t i e s  of  soc iob io logy ,  he never escaped t h e  p o s i t i v i s t  p re ju d ­
ices  acqui red  during h is  upbringing and in h i s  educa tion  as a 
n a tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t .  To th e  end of  h is  l i f e ,  Bateson saw t h e  study 
of c u l t u r e  as a necessary ad junc t  t o  t h e  study  of  th e  n a tu ra l  
world.  Owing t o  h is  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  and s u b t l e t y ,  h i s  v i s io n  of  
a "necessary un ity"  between Mind and Nature led him t o  some of the  
remarkable i n s i g h t s  t o  be found in h i s  c o l l e c t e d  papers (1973) 
and summarised in h is  l a s t  book (1980).  I am in some sympathy, 
f o r  example, with the  fo l lowing s ta t em en t ,  made a t  th e  onse t  of  a 
period during which, as Bateson mournfully announced, th e  very 
su rv iva l  o f  humankind i s  a t  r i s k  from a whole range of  se lf - imposed  
eco log ica l  c r i s e s :
'This  i d e n t i t y  between t h e  u n i t  of  mind and th e  u n i t  of  e v o l u t ­
ionary  s u rv iv a l  is  o f  very g r e a t  importance,  not  only t h e o r e t ­
i c a l ,  but  a l so  e t h i c a l '  (1973(e)  : 435).
This i s  an e x t r a c t  from a paper w r i t t e n  long a f t e r  Ba teson 's  move out  
of  anthropology proper ,  but  th e  fo l lowing page con ta in s  a pronounce­
ment which I would argue e l a b o ra te s  t h e  theme of th e  b io logy /  
anthropology loop while a l so  exemplifying t h a t  c r u c i a l  element in 
Bateson 's  th in k in g  which marks h is  l i m i t a t i o n s  as an an th ro p o lo g i s t :
'The in d iv id u a l  mind i s  immanent but  not  only in th e  body. I t  
is  immanent a l so  in pathways and messages o u t s id e  t h e  body; 
and t h e r e  i s  a l a rg e r  Mind of  which th e  ind iv idua l  Mind is  
only a sub-system. This l a r g e r  Mind i s  comparable t o  God and 
i s  perhaps what some people mean by "God", but  i t  i s  s t i l l  
immanent in th e  t o t a l  in te rconnec ted  s o c i a l  system and 
p la n e ta ry  ecology '  (1973(e)  ; 436).
The problem with t h i s  f o r  an a n t h ro p o l o g i s t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  an 
a n th ro p o lo g i s t  adopting a coherence p e r s p e c t iv e ,  i s  t h a t  "mind"
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is  a produc t  of  "cu l tu re"  and t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  minds a re  products  of 
p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e s .  Sah lins  has c r i t i c i s e d  t h i s  p i c t u r e  of  "Mind" 
as a s u b - s e t  of  a h ighe r -o rde r  b iosphere ,  no ting  t h a t  a
' s a c r i f i c e  o f  th e  autonomy of  c u l t u r e  (and c u l t u r a l  sc ience)  
would be th e  consequence of  i t s  subo rd ina t ion  with in  a l a rg e r  
system of n a tu ra l  c o n s t r a i n t .  I n s o fa r  as th e  l a t t e r  is  
conceived as a cyb e rn e t ic  o rd e r ,  as i s  common in eco lo g ica l  
s t u d i e s ,  inc luding  c u l t u r e  in a " u n i f i e d  sc ience"  would a l so  
e n t a i l  d i s p la c in g  the  p roper ty  of  "mind" from humanity t o  the  
ecosystem'  (1976: 90, a u t h o r ' s  p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
Human c u l t u r e ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  e n t i r e  domain of  c u l t u r a l  s p e c i f i c s  
which forms th e  f i e l d  of  re sea rch  of  s o c i a l  an thropology ,  i s  sub­
sumed w i th in  th e  fu n c t io n a l  workings o f  t h e  b iosphere  and thus  
d isappears  as an au th en t ic  and innova tive  realm in i t s  own r i g h t .
'Within t h e  ecosystem, th e  i n t e r a c t i o n a l  node o r  subsystem 
encompassing man and h i s  immediate envi rons  would be c h a r a c t ­
e r i z e d  by feedback r e l a t i o n s  as r e c i p r o c a l  and equal as those  
between any o th e r  elements of  th e  c i r c u i t ,  no tw i ths tand ing  
t h a t  t h e  man-nature t r a n s a c t i o n  i s  mediated by c u l t u r e .
Cu l tu re  here i s  merely t h e  s e l f -m e d ia t io n  of  n a tu re .  I t  i s  
merely t h e  human mode of response,  and hence s y s t e m a t i c a l ly  
governed,  inasmuch as man i s  but  a fu n c t io n a l  v a r i a b l e  of  
t h e  whole - a r e a c t i v e  component in mutual de te rm ina t ion  
with environmental  v a r i a b l e s ,  themselves as much s u b je c t  to  
h i s  o b je c t  as v ice v e r s a 1 (1976: 90).
E vans-P r i t cha rd ,  from a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  c r i t i c ­
i ses  many kinds of  use by an th ro p o lo g i s t s  o f  th e  "comparative 
method" which aim a t  the  c o n s t ru c t io n  of  genera l  laws be l ieved  to  
apply c r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y .  We should ask o u r s e lv e s ,
' i f  we should not  ques t ion  whether t h e  ba s ic  assumption which 
has so long been taken f o r  g ran ted ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  any so c io ­
lo g i c a l  laws of  th e  kind sought;  whether s o c i a l  f a c t s ,  bes ides  
being remarkably complex, are not  so t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from 
those  s tud ie d  by th e  inorgan ic and organ ic  sc iences  t h a t  
n e i t h e r  t h e  comparat ive method nor any o th e r  i s  l i k e l y  t o  lead 
t o  t h e  fo rmula t ion  of  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  comparable t o  t h e  laws 
of  th o se  s c ie n c e s .  We have t o  deal  with va lues ,  s en t im en ts ,  
purposes ,  w i l l  reason ,  choice ,  as well as with h i s t o r i c a l  
c i rcum stances '  (<1955 : 33).
In t h i s  passage  Evans-P ri tchard  s t r e s s e s  h i s  concern with c u l t u r a l  
s p e c i f i c s  and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  with what t h e  ph ilosopher  
Collingwood c a l l e d  " p re suppos i t ions" .
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For Collingwood, a p resuppos i t ion  i s  something which i s  
involved in every ques t ion ;  we cannot ask ques t ions  without  presupp­
o s i t i o n s .  There a re  two kinds of  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ,  r e l a t i v e  and 
ab s o lu t e .  A r e l a t i v e  p re suppos i t ion  i s  one which we be l ie v e  to  
be v e r i f i a b l e ,  e . g .  we might presuppose t h e  accuracy of  a measur­
ing t a p e  and we be l ieve  t h a t  we can demonstrate  t h i s  accuracy in 
the  ac t  of  measuring (1972: 29-30) .  But when we say t h a t  th e  tape  
is  capable  of  measuring a c c u ra te ly  because ,  say,  accura te  
measurement per  se i s  p o s s i b l e ,  then  we a re  adher ing  to  an 
abso lu te  p re s u p p o s i t i o n .  Thus, f o r  Collingwood,  we can t r a c e  t h r e e  
important  a b s o lu t e  p resuppos i t ions  in th e  development of  Western 
phys ics :
' ( i ) Some even ts  have causes .
( i i )  All events  have causes .
( i i i )  No events  have causes '  (1972: 51).
These a b s o lu t e  p ro p o s i t i o n s ,  according t o  Collingwood, l i e  behind 
Newtonian, Kantian and E in s te in ian  physics  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Absolute 
p re su p p o s i t io n s  change with h i s t o r y  and f o r  Collingwood th e  
proper  s tudy of  metaphysics i s  t h e  study of  changes in a bso lu te  
p r e s uppos i t ions  through h i s t o r y .  This o f ten  leads  t o  r e s i s t a n c e  
from s ch o la r s  in o th e r  f i e l d s :
' I n  my own experience  I have found t h a t  when n a tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t s  
express  ha t red  of  "metaphysics" they  a re  u su a l ly  express ing  
t h i s  d i s l i k e  of  having t h e i r  ab so lu te  p re s u p p o s i t io n s  
to u c h e d 1 (1972: 44).
For Coll ingwood,  t h e r e f o r e ,  "metaphysics" c o n s i s t s  of a 
h i s t o r i c a l  account  because, fo l lowing Hegel,  Collingwood mainta ins 
t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no ideas o u ts id e  h i s t o r y  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  circum­
s tances  which a r i s e  w ith in  d i f f e r e n t  h i s t o r i c a l  epochs.  All presupp­
o s i t i o n s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  a l l  ideas ,  must be framed in terms of  t h e i r  
h i s t o r i c a l  s i t u a t i o n .  In th e  essay quoted above, Evans-Pr i t chard  
r e f e r s  approvingly  t o  Collingwood, and i t  can be argued t h a t  t h e r e  
are  important  p a r a l l e l s  between the  work of  t h e  two t h i n k e r s .  
E v a n s -P r i t c h a rd ' s  most no tab le  book achieves i t s  r e s u l t s  by a c lo se  
d e s c r ip t i o n  which al lows th e  reade r  to  view w i t c h c r a f t  as a phenom­
enon which can only be understood in th e  l i g h t  of  da ta  s p e c i f i c  to  
Azande s o c i e t y  and c u l t u r e  (1936). I t  i s  a m as te r ly  e x e r c i s e  in
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c u l t u r a l  t r a n s l a t i o n .  (7) Azande w i t c h c r a f t  i s  c u l t u r a l l y  framed 
in a sense in which Bateson 's  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  naven, u l t im a te ly ,  
i s  no t .  There i s  no e l ab o ra t i o n  of  a "general  theo ry  of  w i t c h c r a f t " ,  
no need f o r  th e  use of  an exp lana to ry  model comparable with Bateson 's  
use of  lo g i c a l  typ ing  and c y b e rn e t i c s .  Again I quote Evans- 
P r i t c h a r d ,  from th e  same essay ,  on h is  Azande book:
'Other  people can,  and some have,  made s tu d i e s  o f  w i t c h c r a f t  
in o th e r  s o c i e t i e s  in t h e  l i g h t  of  which i t  w i l l  be p o s s ib le  
to  say whether some of my conclusions  a re  l i k e l y  t o  hold as 
genera l  ones while o th e r s  a re  v a l i d ,  assuming t h e  obse rva t ions  
and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t o  have been c o r r e c t ,  only f o r  Zande 
s o c i e t y  or  f o r  some s o c i e t i e s  and not  o t h e r s .  I f  a s u f f i c i e n t  
number o f  s tu d ie s  of  t h a t  t o p i c  a re  made we end up with 
c e r t a i n  genera l  conc lusions  about i t ,  though I would not  claim 
f o r  them the  s t a t u s  o f  u n ive rsa l  laws.  I do not  see what 
o th e r  procedure can be a d o p t e d . . . I  would sugges t  t h a t  i t  is  
in t r y i n g  to  s o l v e . . .small  problems and not by a t tempt ing  
sweeping g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  t h a t  we s h a l l  make p rogress :  p i e c e ­
meal and l i t t l e  by l i t t l e ,  i t  i s  t r u e ,  but  f i rm ly  grounded 
in e thnographic  f a c t '  ( 1965 : 31).
E v a n s -P r i t c h a rd ' s  concerns here can be seen as a r i s i n g  out  of 
a humanist approach t o  sc ience  in th e  t r a d i t i o n  of  Collingwood, an 
approach which can be compared with th e  more r e c e n t  Continen ta l  
school of  t h e  " h i s to r y  of  th e  p resen t"  a s s o c ia t e d  with Foucault  
(al though t h e  l a t t e r  might have ques t ioned  whether h i s  work should 
be viewed as a decons t ruc t ion  of  humanism r a t h e r  than as a 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  humanist ic  s t u d i e s  as such .)
In c o n t r a s t  t o  Evans-Pr i tchard ,  Ba teson 's  approach from Naven 
onwards can be viewed as a combination o f  empir ici sm and r a t i o n a l ­
ism; u l t i m a t e l y ,  Bateson 's  concern i s  not  with c u l t u r a l  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  
but  how t o  b u i ld  a br idge  between Mind (or  C u l tu r e /S o c ie ty  w r i t  
la rge )  and Substance (or  Nature,  th e  Biosphere o r  Eco-System).  
Bateson,  I have sugges ted,  came to  view th e  s o lu t i o n  t o  th e  
r e p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  r e a l i t y  in th e  form of a t o t a l  mega-system 
c ons t ruc ted  out  of  a h i e r a r c h i c  s e r i e s  of  s t r a t a  or  l e v e l s ,  with 
Mind as a sub-system of th e  g r e a t e r  whole,  o r  ' o r g a n i s m - i n - i t s -  
environment '  (1973 (e ) : 426).
There i s  an i l lu m in a t in g  p a r a l l e l  here with Lev i -S t rauss  who, 
l i k e  Bateson, p r i v i l e g e s  t h e  notion  of  "communication" as a key or
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roo t  metaphor th rouout  h is  w r i t i n g s .  There a re  however important  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between th e  two approaches,  a d e t a i l e d  co n s id e ra t io n  
of  which l i e s  ou ts id e  the  scope of  t h i s  t h e s i s .  B r i e f l y ,  f o r  Levi- 
S t rauss  t h e  communication metaphor i s  grounded in th e  necessary 
log ics  produced by th e  ope ra t ions  of  th e  human b r a in .  These l o g i c s ,  
which can be reduced to  one and one only,  namely th e  logic  of  
binary  o p p o s i t i o n ,  genera te  th e  s t r u c t u r e s  observable  as k in sh ip  
systems,  r u l e s  of  marr iage,  myth and so on. This c o n s t i t u t e s  an 
e s s e n t i a l l y  r a t i o n a l i s t  p i c t u r e  of  human a c t i v i t y ,  and i t  i s  t h i s  
p i c t u r e  which marks Lev i -S trauss  as an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  who p laces  
the  c o g n i t i v e  domain as t h e  fundamental arena of  s o c ia l  and 
c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t y .  Bateson 's  own brand of  r a t i o n a l i s m ,  on the  
o the r  hand, leads  him to  a p r o j e c t  which aims to  ground c u l t u r e  
and s o c ie ty  w ith in  an em pir ica l  whole, a " n a tu ra l  o rder  of  t h i n g s " ,  
with t h e  theo ry  of  log ica l  types  provid ing t h e  ladder  on which 
can be b u i l t  t h e  "Steps" to  an Ecology of  Mind.
In c o n t r a s t  t o  both Bateson and L ev i -S t r au s s ,  w r i t e r s  such as 
Collingwood, Evans-Pr i tchard and Foucault  would argue t h a t  the  
notion o f  c u l t u r e  as a communication system must be viewed as a 
product  of  t h e  a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s  own epistemology r a t h e r  than as a 
u n iv e r s a l ,  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  essence  which is  held t o  account  f o r  a l l  
a l i e n  ep i s t em o log ies .  In Coll ingwood's  terms Bateson 's  s ta tement 
t h a t  'Al l  behaviour i s  communication* (quoted in Wilden, 1980: 1) 
would c o n s t i t u t e  an abso lu te  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n .  In t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  
ways, both Lev i -S trauss  and Bateson have been major c o n t r i b u to r s  to  
th e  powerful contemporary metaphor which views th e  world as a 
sytem of communication. For an an th ro p o lo g i s t  i n t e r e s t e d  in perform­
ance,  perhaps ,  th e  power o f  t h i s  metaphor might l i e  l a rg e ly  in 
the  f a c t  of  i t s  cons tan t  production and reproduc t ion  over th e  
pas t  twenty or  t h i r t y  y e a r s .
There i s  a f i n a l  and remarkable s i m i l a r i t y  between Bateson and 
a major in f lu en ce  on L ev i -S t raus s .  I am r e f e r r i n g  to  de S aussu re ' s  
model of  language which i s  based on th e  oppos i t ion  between i d e n t i t y  
and d i f f e r e n c e .  This i s  s i m i l a r  t o  Ba teson 's  own d e f i n i t i o n  of  the  
fundamental u n i t  of  cyberne t ic /menta l  p rocess ,  th e  " b i t "  of
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in formation ,  in h i s  s tat ement t h a t :
'what we mean by information - the  elementary u n i t  of  inform­
a t io n  - i s  a d i f f e r e n c e  which makes a d i f f e r e n c e 1 (1973(e ) : 
428, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis).
I have found no evidence t o  the  e f f e c t  t h a t  Bateson ever read 
de Saussure ,  bu t  t h e r e  can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  th e  notion of  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  which makes a d i f f e r e n c e  as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a " b i t "  of 
information acted as a c r u c i a l  inpu t  t o  th e  e a r l y  work on cyber ­
n e t i c s  by r e s e a r c h e r s  such as Wiener (1964) and t h e  r e l a t e d  work 
on game theo ry  by Morgenstern and von Neumann (1944), in which 
Bateson h im se lf  was involved and which in tu rn  in fluenced  h is  own 
l a t e r  t h in k in g  ( c f .  Lipse t  1982, pp. 178-183).
In Chapter  Ten above, I noted t h a t  Ricoeur made a d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  between sem io t ic s ,  t h e  theo ry  of  s igns  developed out  of  de 
Saussure,  and semantics .  According t o  Ricoeur,  while th e  l a t t e r  
is  capable  of  analys ing sentences  which can only be understood 
as e x e rc i s e s  in p r e d ic a t io n ,  th e  realm o f  semio t ic s  i s  l im i ted  
t o  a co n s id e ra t io n  of  the  one-way passage from s i g n i f i e r  to  
s i g n i f i e d .  Both Lev i -S t rauss  and Bateson, in t h e i r  own ways, are 
c ons t ra ined  by a semiotic  approach; f o r  th e  former,  d i f f e r e n c e  
becomes simply "oppos i t ion" ,  while f o r  Bateson i t  forms th e  u n i t ,  
or  " b i t " ,  which c a r r i e s  information .  For Bateson every human ac t ion  
(and indeed every ac t ion  of  every organism everywhere) i s  viewed
as an e x e r c i s e  in th e  ca r ry ing  of  in formation .
'When I s t r i k e  the  head of  a n a i l  with a hammer, an impulse 
i s  t r a n s m i t t e d  to  i t s  p o in t .  But i t  i s  a semantic e r r o r ,  a 
misleading  metaphor,  t o  say t h a t  what t r a v e l s  in an axon i s  
an " impulse".  I t  could d i r e c t l y  be c a l l e d  "news of  a 
d i f f e r e n c e "  (1973 (e) : 428).
I would argue t h a t  one way of  reading  Bateson 's  works as a
whole i s  as a p r o t o - s t r u c t u r a l i s t  e x e r c i s e .  In Chapter  Six above
I t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  Bateson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  Iatmul s o c ie ty  implied 
many of th e  f e a t u r e s  l a t e r  made e x p l i c i t  by Lev i -S t rauss  in the  
l a t t e r ' s  fo rmula t ion  of  a l l i a n c e  the o ry .  I would now sugges t  t h a t  
the  s t r e s s  throughout  Bateson 's  oeuvre on information and commun­
ic a t io n  i n v i t e s  a comparison with L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  model of  c u l t u r e  
as a system of s ig n s .  Both s t y l e s  of  s t r u c t u r a l i s m  r e l y  on a
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semio tic  r a t h e r  than a semantic model of  communication and 
language,  and may u s e fu l ly  be viewed in th e  l i g h t  of  th e  work of  
l a t e r ,  p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l i s t  t h e o r i s t s  such as Ricoeur who s t r e s s  
the  p r e d i c a t i v e ,  semantic na tu re  of  l i n g u i s t i c  communication.
F i n a l ly ,  I would r e f e r  t o  th e  decons t ruc t ion  of  th e  de 
Saussurian b inary  oppos it ion  between s i g n i f i e r  and s i g n i f i e d  c a r r i e d  
out  by Derrida (1973).  Derrida r ep la ces  de S au ssu re ' s  no tion  of  
" d i f f e r e n c e ” with the  term " d i f f e r a n c e " , a term which plays with 
t h e  space between s i g n i f i e r  and s i g n i f i e d  in i t s  double sense 
which in d i c a t e s  both "d i f fe rence "  and " d e f e r r a l " .  The use of 
d i f f e r a n c e  both r e t a i n s  de S au s su re ' s  o r i g i n a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
between s i g n i f i e r  and s i g n i f i e d ,  while a t  th e  same t ime in d i c a t in g  
th e  pe rpe tua l  d i s t a n c e  between language and i t s  r e f e r e n t ,  between 
i n t e n t io n  and meaning and between u t t e r a n c e  and o r i g i n .  As Norris  
summarises i t :
'This  invo lves  th e  idea t h a t  meaning i s  always d e fe r r e d ,  
perhaps t o  th e  po in t  of an endless  supp lem en ta r i ty ,  by the  
play of  s i g n i f i c a t i o n .  D ifferance  not  only des igna tes  t h i s  
theme but  o f f e r s  in i t s  own uns tab le  meaning a graphic  example 
of  th e  process  a t  work' (1982: 32, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
We can perhaps u t i l i z e  D e r r id a ' s  no tion here  and combine i t  
with Goodman's use of the  idea of  "exem pl i f ica t ion"  ( c f .  Chapter  
Three,  pp. 6 6 - 6 8  above),  to  sugges t  t h a t  we might s t a r t ,  not  by 
assuming t h a t  r e a l i t y  j_s a communication or  in format ion system, but 
by asking "What a re  t h e  im pl ica t ions  of  viewing r e a l i t y  _as, o r  
unders tanding  i t  as_, or  exper iencing  i t  as_, a communication or  
information system?" We should not  assume, with Bateson,  t h a t  we 
can d e l i n e a t e  an a n a l y t i c a l  ca tegory  such as "play" which i s  
r ed u c ib le  t o  one mode of d e s c r i p t i o n ,  i . e .  one based on t h e  manip­
u la t io n  of  lo g i c a l  type s .  In th e  l i g h t  of  t h e  work of Foucaul t ,  
we can ask how i t  i s  t h a t  th e  notion of  "play" has assumed such 
graphic importance in the  w r i t in g s  of  a prominent b i o l o g i s t /  
a n th ro p o lo g is t  with in  th e  con tex t  of  th e  modern episteme
( c f .  Chapter  Th i r teen ,  p. 293 below).  I would ask i f  
Bateson 's  d i s co u r s e  on "play" i s  open t o  t h e  same kind of  h i s t o r i c a l  
a n a ly s i s  t o  which Foucault  has sub jec ted  th e  d i scou r se  on s e x u a l i t y
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(1981). In t h e  wake of Derrida,  we can ask i f  Ba teson 's  an a ly s i s  
of  the  naven as the  product  o f  a cy b e rn e t ic  communications system - 
"schismogenesis" - r e s t r i c t s  th e  "play of  s i g n i f i c a t i o n "  of 
in s tances  of  th e  naven to  a s e r i e s  of  de l im i ted  s i g n i f i e r - s i g n i f i e d  
loops working with in  th e  conf ines  of  an assumed essence  ( the  
naven, as opposed t o  a l l  p o t e n t i a l  navens) .
I f  Der rida i s  c o r r e c t ,  i f  a l l  s i g n i f i c a t i o n  r e l i e s  on an 
endless  supp lem en ta r i ty ,  then we must ask not  whether Bateson i s  
r i g h t  - f o r ,  as I hope I have shown throughout th e  t h e s i s ,  Naven 
is  a c r u c i a l  t e x t  f o r  contemporary anthropology - but  we should 
ask,  how many o th e r  ways are  t h e r e  in which he could have been 
r i g h t ?  We must enqui re  not  only in to  th e  Iatmul play of  s i g n i f i c ­
a t i o n ,  but  B a teson 's  own. I t  i s  a remarkable achievement on 
Bateson 's  p a r t  t h a t ,  in an important  sense,  he managed t o  do 
p r e c i s e ly  t h a t  in h i s  own t e x t .  I would argue t h a t  in th e  pages 
of  Naven he was as c lose  t o  a d e c o n s t ru c t iv e  reading  of  h i s  own 
work as any w r i t e r  could be in t h e  1930s. But i t  was not  p o s s ib le  
f o r  him t o  extend h i s  own p lay  of s i g n i f i c a t i o n  beyond th e  cyber ­
n e t i c  a n a l y s i s .
The fo rmula t ion  of  ethos and of  schismogenesis  b r ings  human
ac t ion  in to  prominence,  while a t  th e  same t ime conceal ing i t  as
the  end product  of  an a l l -embrac ing  system. This f a i l u r e ,  which
is  a l so  c r u c i a l l y  a p a r t i a l  success ,  i s  I sugges t  t r a c e a b l e  to  th e
underly ing assumption t h a t  th e  naven i s  open t o  a f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,
e f f e c t i n g  a c lo su re  wi thin t h e  domain of  th e  ca tegory  c a l l e d
" r i t u a l " .  There i s  here no ques t ion  of  o th e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  These
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  would be s ignposted by D e r r id a ' s  no tions  o f  f r e e p l a y ,
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supplem enta r i ty  and d i f f e r a n c e . To cons ide r  such p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
would not  remove th e  naven from th e  category of  " r i t u a l "  a l t o g e t h e r ,  
but  would al low us t o  open up domains of  d e s c r i p t i v e  and t h e o r e t ­
ic a l  approaches which would r e se rve  judgement on whether the  naven 
is  a r i t u a l ,  o r  whether c e r t a i n  in s tances  of  naven can be cons idered 
to  be r i t u a l s ,  or  no t .  The naven could then  be recons ide red  in 
terms of  a c t i o n ,  of  which r i t u a l  would be one p o s s i b l e  c l a s s i f i c ­
a t i o n .  Such an approach t o  ac t ion  would leave prev ious  c a t e g o r i e s  
such as r i t u a l ,  b e l i e f  and symbolism open t o  c r i t i c i s m  without  
denying t h e i r  p o s s ib le  v a l i d i t y .
291
I am aware t h a t  “performance" i s  an emic ca tegory ,  as a re  
r i t u a l ,  b e l i e f  and symbolism. Recall ing my own observa tion  a t  th e  
beginning of t h i s  chap te r  t h a t  an important  ques t ion  f o r  an throp­
o l o g i s t s  i s ,  "What can we u s e fu l l y  ask?" ,  I would sugges t  t h a t  
a focus  on performance should not  s t a r t  by ask ing ,  "What is  
performance?" Needham and Sperber have argued t h a t  t h e  r e s p e c t iv e  
qu e s t i o n s ,  "What i s  b e l i e f ? "  and "What i s  symbolism?" are  unanswer­
able ;  I would argue,  s i m i l a r l y ,  t h a t  th e  ques t ion ,  "What is  
performance?" i s  a l so  unanswerable.  There i s  no essence ,  "perform­
ance", a t  work out  t h e r e  in th e  world - a f a c t  which b r ings  us 
back again t o  our own c a t e g o r i e s .  An anthropology of  performance 
would not  be t e n a b le ,  or  v a l i d ,  o r  even p o s s i b l e ,  un less  i t  began 
from th e  s tan d p o in t  of  a co n s id e ra t io n  o f  t h e  h i s t o r y  of  the  
notion of  "performance" in our own c u l t u r e .  Only then can we 
ask about performances in o th e r  c u l t u r e s ,  f o r  we can never be sure  
of the  t r u t h  of  any d e s c r ip t io n  p red ic a ted  on an emic category the  
v a l i d i t y  of  which has been taken f o r  g ran te d .  U l t im a te ly ,  t h e r e  
can be no t r u e  d e s c r ip t i o n s ;  what i s  t r u e  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  
d e s c r i p t i o n s .
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NOTES to  Chapter Twelve
d )  This was t o  become an important  theme of Bateson 's  l a t e r  
work; c f .  p a r t i c u l a r l y  1973 (e) : 423-424.
(2) Bateson f i r s t  noted th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  schismogenesis  
occur r ing  within an in d iv idua l  p e r s o n a l i t y  in th e  chap te r  on 
schismogenesis  in t h e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  o f  Naven (1936: pp. 
179-182).
(3) B a teson 's  notion of  "metacommunication" would appear t o  be
s i m i l a r  t o  J akobson 's "poe t ic"  or  " a e s t h e t i c "  f unc t ion  of  
language - c f .  Hawkes (1977: 83-87).
(4) I t  can be argued t h a t  Ba teson 's  concern with play as an
i n t e l l e c t u a l  puzzle i s  t r a c e a b l e  to  h i s  ch i ldhood .  Ba teson 's  
biographer  Lipse t  claims t h a t  youngs te rs  of  th e  'academic 
middle c l a s s . . . a t  the  t u rn  of  th e  c e n t u r y . . . (were) t r e a t e d  
more as s tuden ts  than as c h i l d r e n '  (1982: 43, my paren­
t h e s i s ) .  Lipse t  records  t h a t  Bateson had r e c a l l e d
having had ' a  d i d a c t i c  ch i ldhood'  in which 'walks were f i e l d  
t r i p s  and conversa t ions  were exp lan a to ry '  (1982: 44) .
(5) The " a n t i - p s y c h i a t r y "  of  Laing and o th e r  r a d i c a l  p s y c h ia t ­
r i s t s  i s  based on s i m i l a r  premises ;  Laing h imse lf  has always 
recognised  Bateson 's  double bind th eory  as a major in f luence  
on h i s  work. For a c r i t i c a l  account  of  La ing 's  ideas and 
c a r e e r ,  c f .  Sedgwick, 1982 (Chapters  3 & 4 ) .
(6 ) I am g r a t e f u l  to  Liam Hudson and t o  Alf red  Gell (personal
communications) f o r  th e  c r i t i c a l  o bse rva t ions  on Bateson 's  
double bind theory  in t h i s  paragraph .
(7) E vans -Pr i tchard ,  of  course ,  has not  been withou t  h i s  c r i t i c s
( e . g .  Gellner  1970 and Winch 1970). To explore  t h e i r  
impor tan t  comments would, however, be o u t s id e  th e  scope of 
t h i s  t h e s i s .
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN: TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF PERFORMANCE
IN THE ORDER OF THINGS Foucault  t r a c e s  th e  development of  th e  
human s c ie n c e s ,  inc luding psycho -ana ly s i s ,  l i n g u i s t i c s  and an throp­
ology, as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  f i e l d  of  s tudy ,  t h a t  of  Man 
(1974). This f i e l d  of s tudy a r i s e s  a t  th e  end of  t h e  n ine teen th  
cen tu ry .  Before then:
'man did  not  e x i s t . . . a n d  th e  human sc iences  did not  appear 
when, as a r e s u l t  of some p ress ing  r a t i o n a l i s m ,  some unresolved 
s c i e n t i f i c  problem, some p r a c t i c a l  concern,  i t  was decided to  
inc lude man ( w i l l y - n i l l y ,  and with a g r e a t e r  or  l e s s e r  degree 
of  success )  among th e  o b je c t s  of  sc ience  - among which i t  
has perhaps not  been proved even y e t  t h a t  i t  is  a b s o lu t e ly  
p o s s i b l e  t o  c l a s s  him; they  appeared when man c o n s t i t u t e d  
h im se l f  in Western c u l t u r e  as both t h a t  which must be 
conceived of and t h a t  which i s  t o  be known' (1974: 344-345, 
a u t h o r ' s  p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
The human sc iences  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  underly ing p re s u p p o s i t i o n s ,  
or in F o u c a u l t ' s  term the  "ep is teme ' ' ,  of  contemporary Western 
consc iousness ,  in t roducing  t h a t  s t y l e  of  thought we c a l l  "modern" 
and which Foucaul t  desc r ibes  as " i r o n i c " .  This modern consciousness 
both c o n s t i t u t e s  a c e r t a i n  view of th e  human, and i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  
by i t .  We can summarise F o u c a u l t ' s  p i c t u r e  of  th e  i r o n ic  episteme 
by saying t h a t  i t  dichotomises Man in to  a s e r i e s  o f  appearances ,  
or s u r f a c e s ,  on th e  one hand, and a s e r i e s  of  hidden depths,  on 
the  o t h e r .  The t a s k  of  l i n g u i s t s ,  psycho-ana lys t s  and a n th ropo l ­
o g i s t s  i s  t o  exp la in  the  su r face  appearances in terms of  t h e  hidden 
depths .  The no tab le  works produced in th e  e ra  o f  th e  " i ro n ic  
ep is teme" ,  those  of  Freud, Chomsky and L e v i -S t r a u s s ,  f o r  example, 
a l l  conce ive of  human r e a l i t y  as a s t r u c t u r e  co n s t ru c ted  from a 
s e r i e s  of  laye rs  which have t o  be uncovered with th e  aim of 
d iscover ing  and desc r ib ing  t h e  " t r u th s "  concealed benea th ,  be they 
th e  t r u t h s  o f  t h e  workings of  th e  unconscious mind, o r  th e  
dynamics of  t r a n s fo rm a t io n a l  grammar o r ,  in L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s  s t r u c ­
t u r a l  an thropology ,  th e  t r u t h s  of  human reason and b inary  l o g i c s .
I t  i s  with F o u c a u l t ' s  notion of  th e  i r o n i c ,  or  " s u r f a c e - d e p th " , 
episteme in mind t h a t  I would at tempt an e x p lo ra t io n  of our 
contemporary no tions  of  performance.
In th e  concluding se c t io n  of  th e  t h e s i s  I can do no more than
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i n d i c a te  p o s s i b l e  s t a r t i n g  p o in t s  t o  t h e  study  of  performance,  but  
I would begin by cons idering  t h e  work of  a number of  w r i t e r s  whose 
work has had a c r u c i a l  impact on th eory  and p r a c t i c e  in the  
Western drama of  th e  tw en t ie th  cen tu ry ,  and the reby  on our notions  
of performance.  These w r i t e r s  would inc lude S t a n i s l a v s k i ,  Brecht  
and Artaud as well as Brook and Grotowski. I would then d i scuss  
the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  c r i t i c i s i n g  th e s e  no t ions  in t h e  l i g h t  of  
a pos t -m ode rn is t  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say a p e r s p e c t iv e  which 
would t a k e  in to  account both D e r r id a ' s  a t t a c k  on a u t h e n t i c i t y  
and presence ,and  F o u cau l t ' s  " h i s to r y  of  t h e  p r e s e n t " .  I would a l so  
r e f e r  t o  t h e  re c e n t  c r i t i q u e  of  th e  ideology of  " r e p re s e n ta t io n "  
by B a u d r i l l a r d .
A c l a s s i c  p i c t u r e  of  t h e a t r e - a s - i l l u s i o n ,  but  an i l l u s i o n  which 
promises a p o r t r a y a l  of  th e  " r e a l " ,  i s  t o  be found in th e  works of  
Cons tant in  S t a n i s l a v s k i .  These works, inc lud ing  An Actor Prepares  
(1980) and Building A Charac te r  (1979),  remain a b l u e - p r i n t  f o r  
th e  work of  a c to r s  and d i r e c t o r s  in r e a l i s t  Western t h e a t r e  and 
o the r  media.  For S t a n i s l a v s k i ,  t h e  a c t o r ' s  t a s k  i s  t o  uncover th e  
t r u t h  of  h i s  t e x t  by d iscover ing  th e  hidden " su b - t e x t "  which l i e s  
underneath t h e  p r in t e d  d ia logue .  Thus, t h e  t e x t  of  th e  play i s  a 
s u r face  appearance which conceals  a t r u t h ,  th e  t r u t h  of  th e  sub­
t e x t .  I t  i s  perhaps i n s t r u c t i v e  to  compare t h i s  with Freud 's  
model of  t h e  psyche as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a "conscious" which at tempts  
to  d i s g u i s e  t h e  t r u t h  of  th e  p a t i e n t ' s  d e s i r e s ,  d e s i r e s  which are 
s i t u a t e d  in th e  hidden domain of  th e  "unconscious" .  (1) 
"Motiva t ion" ,  in both psycho-ana lys i s  and in th e  r e a l i s t  t h e a t r e  
of S t a n i s l a v s k i ,  i s  something which begins as i m p l i c i t  but  which 
must u l t im a te ly  be made e x p l i c i t . In an important  sense ,  t h e  aim 
is  th e  oppos i te  in each case ;  whereas t h e  a n a l y t i c  p a t i e n t  is  
encouraged t o  shed th e  already-formed f a n ta s y  " s e l f " ,  adopted 
through s t r a t e g i e s  of  r e p r e s s iv e  defences ,  in o rde r  t o  recognise  
an a u t h e n t i c  " s e l f "  concealed s ince  ch ildhood,  f o r  t h e  S t a n i s l a v -  
skian a c t o r  t h e  r o l e  must be given v e r i s i m i l i t u d e  by th e  c r e a t io n  
of the  i l l u s o r y  "presence" of  a " r e a l "  c h a r a c t e r  on t h e  s t a g e .
As S t a n i s l a v s k i  w r i t e s :
' i n  o rd in a ry  l i f e ,  t r u t h  i s  what r e a l l y  e x i s t s ,  what a person 
r e a l l y  knows. Whereas on th e  s t a g e  i t  c o n s i s t s  of  something
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t h a t  i s  not  a c t u a l l y  in e x i s t e n c e  but  which could happen'
(1980: 128).
In th e  S ta n i s l a v s k ia n  t h e a t r e  and in p s y cho -ana ly s i s ,  th e  
"work" i s  mediated by a co -o rd in a t in g  a u t h o r i t y ,  a r e p o s i t o ry  
of mastery ;  t h e  r e h e a r s a l s  in th e  t h e a t r e  o f  rea l i sm  a re  managed 
by th e  d i r e c t o r ,  whereas in th e  l a t t e r  case ,  of  course ,  th e  
p a t i e n t ' s  e x p lo ra t io n  of  h is  psyche i s  made p o s s i b l e  through the  
manifold s t r a t e g i e s  of  th e  a n a ly s t  v ia  t r a n s f e r e n c e ,  c o u n t e r - t r a n s  
f e rence  and so on.
The s i m i l a r i t i e s  between t h e  p rocesses  involved in th e  p re p a r ­
a t ion  of  a p iece  of  r e a l i s t  t h e a t r e  and th o se  in psycho-ana lys i s  - 
between t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between a c t o r  and d i r e c t o r  in t h e  f i r s t  
case ,  and between p a t i e n t  and a n a ly s t  in th e  second - have not  
gone unnoticed by o th e r  w r i t e r s .  The a n a l y s t  Stephen A. Kurtz has 
s t a t e d  in a r e c e n t  a r t i c l e :
'The psychoana ly t ic  s i t u a t i o n  i s . . . a  t h e a t r e  whose "play" can 
develop according to  i n t e r n a l  or  e x t e rn a l  n e c e s s i t y .  Allowing 
i t  t o  evolve by i t s  own r u l e s ,  however, r e q u i r e s  t h e  h ighes t  
l eve l  o f  e x p e r t i s e '  (1986: 103).
I t  can be argued t h a t  th e  metaphor of  the rapy-as -p e r fo rm ance  has 
become a major f a c e t  of  much psycho therapeu t ic  theory  and p r a c t i c e  
in th e  West dur ing  the  p a s t  twenty y e a r s .  I would c i t e  th e  develop 
ment of  psychodrama, th e  encounter  group movement and EST, as 
examples of  t h i s .  (2)
We should view S t a n i s l a v s k i ' s  work, which has had a commanding 
in f luence  on t h e  t h e a t r e  and o th e r  performance media in th e  con­
temporary West, in a broader p e r s p e c t iv e  and see i t  as de r iv ing  
from th e  no tion  of  a r t  as th e  im i ta t io n  of  r e a l i t y  found in th e  
w r i t ings  o f  P la to  and A r i s t o t l e ,  and a l so  as an express ion  of  th e  
i ro n ic  episteme which s t r e s s e s  th e  s u r f a c e /d e p th  dichotomy. (3)
I t  i s  te mpt ing ,  too ,  t o  apply a Derridean deco n s t ru c t io n  t o  An 
Actor Prepares  and the  o th e r  t i t l e s  in th e  S ta n i s l a v s k ia n  canon, 
which would view them as i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of  th e 'm e taphys ic s  of 
presence exempli f ied  in th e  notion  t h a t  t h e  r e a l i s t  mise-em-scene 
of  any production  can uncover th e  " t r u th "  of  any given p iece  of  
s c r ip t e d  d ia logue .  Such e x e rc i s e s  a re  beyond t h e  scope of  t h i s
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t h e s i s .
My i n t e n t i o n  here is  t o  ques t ion  t h e  im p l ic a t ions  of  our not ions  
of  t h e a t r e  and performance,  of  which S t a n i s l a v s k ia n  rea l i sm is  a 
c r u c i a l  example, f o r  an an th ropo log ica l  approach to  performance.  
Perhaps we should recons ide r  t h e  "dramaturg ica l"  p i c t u r e  of 
r i t u a l  and s o c i e t y ,  as rep resen ted  by th e  works of  Turner and 
Geertz,  from t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e .  I would sugges t ,  f o r  example, t h a t  
a comparison can be made between th e  S ta n i s l a v s k ia n  p r o j e c t  of  
r e c o n s t ru c t in g  t h e  l ived  r e a l i t y  of  a t h e a t r e  t e x t  with Tu rne r ' s  
p i c tu r e  o f  s o c i e t y  as a s e r i e s  of " so c ia l  dramas" and with G ee r tz ' s  
d e s c r ip t i o n  of  Bal inese r i t u a l  as t h e  symbolic express ion  of  a 
" t h e a t r e  s t a t e " ,  with Der r ida,  we can argue t h a t ,  f o r  Turner 
and Geertz as f o r  S tan i s l avsky ,  " the re  i s  nothing o u t s id e  th e  
t e x t " ,  whether t h e  t e x t  i s  t h a t  of  a w r i t t e n  d ia logue ,  or  t h a t  of  
a " r i t u a l  process"  t h e  t r u t h  of  which can be uncovered by hermen­
e u t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
I would now l i k e  to  b r i e f l y  cons ide r  th e  work of  Brecht  as 
c o n s t i t u t i n g  an important  development of  th e  S ta n i s l a v s k ia n  
t r a d i t i o n .  While Brecht was in some sympathy with S t a n i s l a v s k i ' s  
d e s i r e  to  b r ing  t r u t h  to  th e  s tag e ,  Brecht wanted to  move beyond a 
mere " rea l i sm "  or  "na tu ra l ism" towards an "epic"  t h e a t r e  which 
would p r e s e n t  " t r u th s "  not  as given and necessa ry ,  but  as c r e a t i o n s  
of p a r t i c u l a r  s o c ia l  and economic c i rcumstances .  In B re c h t ' s  
view t h i s  could be achieved by h ig h l ig h t in g  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  fo rces  
a t  work in any given s i t u a t i o n ,  while p laying down c e r t a i n  of  th e  
imperat ives  demanded by S t a n i s l a v s k i .  Both d i r e c t o r s  aimed a t  
c l a r i t y  in t h e  t h e a t r e ,  but f o r  Brecht  th e  important  p o in t  was to  
show, not  how in d iv idua l s  ac t  " r e a l l y  and t r u l y "  in th e  r e a l  and 
t r u e  world,  but  how our b e l i e f s  as to  what c o n s t i t u t e  th e  " re a l "  
and the  " t ru e"  a re  the  r e s u l t s  of  s u p ra - in d iv id u a l  n e c e s s i t i e s  
manifes ted  in r e l a t i o n s  of  power, c l a s s  and dominance. This is  
achieved by means of  th e  famous verfremdung, o r  a l i e n a t i o n  e f f e c t ,  
which al lows a c to r s  - in d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  t o  th o s e  working in th e  
S ta n i s l a v s k ia n  mode - to  s tep  o u t s id e  t h e i r  " ro le s "  and t o  comment 
about th e  e v en t s ,  ch a ra c te r s  and s i t u a t i o n s  por t rayed  in th e  
p lay .
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B re c h t ' s  in t e n t i o n  i s  always t o  f o s t e r  a s o c i a l  awareness in 
the  minds of  h i s  audience,  r a t h e r  than a concern f o r  th e  p l i g h t  of  
i n d i v id u a l s .  Thus, th e  aim of  a product ion of  Mother Courage should 
not be t o  evoke sympathy f o r  th e  Mother and her  c h i ld r e n ,  but  t o  
show:
'That  in wartime th e  big p r o f i t s  a re  not  made by l i t t l e  people.  
That war,  which is  a co n t in u a t io n  of  bus iness  by o th e r  means, 
makes t h e  human v i r t u e s  f a t a l  even to  t h e i r  pos se s s o r s .  That 
no s a c r i f i c e  is  too  g r e a t  f o r  t h e  s t r u g g le  a g a in s t  war'
(1980: 101).
To achieve t h i s ,  a s a c r i f i c e  of  " i l l u s i o n "  must be made.
'The i l l u s i o n  c rea ted  by t h e  t h e a t r e  must be a p a r t i a l  one, so 
t h a t  i t  can always be recognised as i l l u s i o n .  R ea l i t y ,  
however completely r e p re s en ted ,  must be changed by a r t ,  in 
o rde r  t h a t  i t  may be seen t o  be s u b je c t  t o  change and t r e a t e d  
as such (1980: 100).
Hawkes has summarised th e  views of  Brecht  here in comparing the  
aims of  th e  school of  Russian Formalism with th e  t h e a t r e  of  
a l i e n a t i o n .  For both the  Formal is ts  and th e  Brech t ians ,
' t h e  o b j e c t  of  a r t  i s  seen t o  be t h e  r e v o lu t io n a ry  goal of 
making th e  audience aware t h a t  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and s o c ia l  
formulae which they i n h e r i t  a re  not  e t e r n a l  and " n a tu ra l "  but
h i s t o r i c a l  and man-made, and so capable  of  change through
human a c t i o n '  (1977: 63).
I t  i s  t h i s  i n s ig h t  in to  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  p a r t i c u l a r i s m  of the  
human c o nd i t ion  t h a t ,  I would argue,  makes Brecht  an impor tant  
t h i n k e r  f o r  any an thropolog ica l  approach t o  performance.  The 
manipulat ion of  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a c t o r s  and audience t o  be 
found in any Brech tian  production  which r e t a i n s  Brecht ian  i n t e g r i t y  
ques t ions  our  preconcep tions  as t o  the  n a tu re  of  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
and, t h e r e f o r e ,  our preconcep tions  as to  t h e  n a tu re  of  performance
i t s e l f . I t  i s  t h i s  cha l lenge  which arguably i s  lacking in the
dramaturg ica l  p i c t u r e  of  r i t u a l  and s o c i e t y .  I would sugges t  t h a t  
a comparison of  a c t i v i t i e s  such as r i t u a l  and t h e a t r e  as d i f f e r e n t  
kinds of  performances w i l l  not  be f r u i t f u l  as long as i t  is  
l im i ted  t o  a co n s id e ra t io n  of  p a r t i c u l a r  dramatic  s t r u c t u r e s ,  forms 
and c o n te n t ;  as long as ,  t h a t  i s ,  i t  i s  co n s t r a in ed  by Western 
notions  o f  drama, play ,  t h e a t r e  and performance.  We should widen
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our range of  enqui ry as ethnogrpahers  of  performance and ask what 
is  held t o  be "performance" in any one given s o c i e t y  and f o r  whom. 
We should i n v e s t i g a t e  the  p a r t i c u l a r  modes of  exper ience  and 
a c t i v i t y  which, when engaged in c e r t a i n  kinds of i n t e r a c t i v e  nexus,  
produce t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  which might be descr ibed  as "performance",  
whatever t h e  outward m an i fe s ta t io n  of  such ev e n t s .  I t  is  because 
of  t h e s e  impera t ives  t h a t  th e  ques t ion ,  "What i s  performance?",  i s  
not askab le .
What i s  askab le ,  and what may c o n s t i t u t e  a usefu l  s t a r t i n g  
po in t  f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  approach t o  performance,  i s ,  "What a re  
th e  im p l ic a t io n s  of  viewing c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t i e s  as performance in 
any given so c ie ty ?"  This ques t ion  should be asked,  because i t  does 
not  p o s t u l a t e  an essence of  performance - or  drama, or  t h e a t r e ,  
or  r i t u a l  - e i t h e r  in the  p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t y ,  nor in the  world a t  
l a rg e .  We cannot  presuppose an antinomy between "performance" 
and "normal behaviour" ,  simply because t h a t  antinomy is  such a 
c ru c i a l  one f o r  us.  As an th ro p o lo g i s t s  we should not  be tempted 
by P e te r  Brook's  v is ion  of  a "un iversa l  t h e a t r e " .  One should always 
r e tu rn  t o  s p e c i f i c  ethnography,  and remember t h a t  th e  notion of  
" th e a t r e "  i s  i t s e l f  c u l t u r a l l y  s p e c i f i c .  What u n d e r l i e s  a v i s io n  
l i k e  Brook 's ,  and many of h is  contemporaries  in Western drama, i s  
a p e c u l i a r l y  modern Western yearn ing f o r  a u n i f i e d ,  p a n - c u l tu r a l  
consciousness  which can be found in ,  and which can express  i t s e l f  
through,  such a un ive rsa l  t h e a t r e .  But what Brook i s  doing is  
i t s e l f  t h e  workings of  human consc iousness ,  a consciousness  formed 
within a p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r a l  m i l ieu  en t ranced  by th e  a t t r a c t i o n s  
of  th e  a l i e n ,  th e  o th e r ,  t h e  e x o t i c  - a t t r a c t i o n s  which a re  o f ten  
shared by both a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  and avan t -garde  t h e a t r e  people.  
Nei ther  should we ignore,  as w r i t e r s  such as Geertz ,  Turner and 
Schechner have done, the  c r u c i a l  ques t ion  of  what form indigenous 
no tions of  t h e a t r e  and performance might t a k e ;  we should not  assume 
t h a t  t h e  members of  o th e r  c u l t u r e s  share  contemporary or  re c e n t  
Western n o t io n s .  The ques t ion  might r a t h e r  be,  "Which no tions  are 
cent red  by which s o c i e t i e s ? "  This i s  a ques t ion  which can only be 
answered by means of  s p e c i f i c  ethnograph ic  r e s e a r c h .
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Here I sugges t  we can f r u i t f u l l y  r e f e r  t o  W i t tg e n s t e in ' s  s t r e s s  
on "use" in h i s  l a t e r  phi losophy.  I do not  imply t h a t  we should 
fol low him when he a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e  meaning of  any u t t e r a n c e  can 
be demonstrated by i t s  use,  bu t  t h a t  e n q u i r i e s  in to  performance as 
"ac t ion"  and performance as "use" would decen t re  re c e n t  anthropo­
lo g ica l  concerns with " b e l i e f " ,  "symbolism" and " r i t u a l "  and focus 
on c u l t u r a l l y  s p e c i f i c  usage.  We might ,  f o r  example, t a k e  up th e  
im pl ica t ions  of  the  work of  t h e  Poli sh  t h e a t r e  d i r e c t o r  Jerzy  
Grotowski whose rece n t  " th e a t r e  labora to ry"  experiments have 
focused on t h e  notion of  " p a r a th e a t r e " ,  a term which r e f e r s  t o  a 
jumble of  elements which, in var ious  combinations ,  can be viewed 
as forming what we might want t o  de s c r ib e ,  in our c u l t u r e ,  as 
" t h e a t r e " .  Such elements would inc lude games, p lay ,  clowning,  
con ju r ing ,  magic, r i t u a l ,  a c r o b a t i c s ,  dance,  s to ry  t e l l i n g  and 
c a r i c a t u r e .  (4) For t h e  performance t h e o r i s t ,  any of  t h e se  - 
or  any combination of  them - might c o n s t i t u t e  performance,  or  they  
might no t .  What i s  important  i s  how such elements a re  conceived -  
i f  a t  a l l  - and how they are  used,  or  not  used as th e  case might 
be, in p a r t i c u l a r  c u l t u r e s .
The antinomy between normal behaviour and performance al luded  
to  above forms th e  bas i s  of  A r taud 's  c r i t i q u e  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
as th e  foundation  of  a l l  Western t h e a t r e  (Artaud,  1958. c f .  a l so  
E s s l in ,  1976).  As Derrida has shown in an evoca t ive  a r t i c l e ,  
Ar taud 's  t r agedy  was to  endure t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  h is  " t h e a t r e  
of  c r u e l ty "  which would e f f e c t  th e  c lo su re  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
remains a necessary  im p o s s ib i l i t y  (Derr ida ,  1978: 232-250).  I t  is  
necessary f o r  Artaud because he wanted t o  t ranscend  and t ransform 
h is  own c u l t u r a l l y  moulded consciousness by ta k ing  t h e a t r e  
ou ts id e  t h e  s tage  of  r e p r e s e n t a t io n ;  o u t s id e ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  modern 
s tage  which i n t e r p r e t s  ac t ion  in terms of  hidden dep ths .  I t  is  
impossible because the  t h e a t r e  of  c r u e l t y  would escape th e  meta­
physics o f  p resence .  This meant, in D e r r id a ' s  words, t h a t  Artaud
'wanted t o  save the  p u r i t y  of  a presence without  i n t e r i o r  
d i f f e r e n c e  and withou t  r e p e t i t i o n  (o r ,  pa ra d o x ic a l ly  amounting 
t o  t h e  same th i n g ,  th e  p u r i t y  of  a pure d i f f e r e n c e ) '  (Derr ida ,  
1978: 249, a u t h o r ' s  p a r e n t h e s i s ) .
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Represen ta t ion ,  f o r  both Artaud and Derr ida ,  implies r e p e t i t i o n  
- and we should remember t h a t  in F r e n c h , ' r e p e t i t i o n 1 means 
' r e h e a r s a l ' .  Artaud is  himse lf  caught with in  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  and 
wi th in  r e p e t i t i o n .  'Because i t  has a l ready  begun, r e p re s e n t a t io n  
th e r e f o r e  has no end'  {Derrida,  1978: 250).  In th e  l i g h t  of  th e  
post-modernism of th e  1980s, however, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  gl impse th e  
c lo su re  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  But t h i s  c lo su re  does not  i n v i t e ,  as 
would have been the  case f o r  Artaud, a jo y fu l  f e s t i v a l  of  pure 
performance in which
'The d i r e c t o r  and the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  (who would no longer fre 
a c to r s  or  s p e c ta to r s )  would cease t o  be th e  instruments and 
organs of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n '  (Derr ida ,  1978: 237, a u t h o r ' s  
p a r e n t h e s i s  and emphases).
Rather,  according to  one view th e  c lo su re  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  has been 
e f f e c t e d  by means of  a technology of  mass media which d i s so lv es  
s i g n i f i e r  and s i g n i f i e d ,  not  in a play of  s i g n i f i c a t i o n ,  but  in 
‘t h e  r a d i c a l  negation of  th e  sign as v a l u e 1 ( B a u d r i l l a rd ,  1983:
11). For B a u d r i l l a rd ,  our contemporary consciousness  i s  a t  the  
mercy of  an e s c a l a t i o n  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  conceived o r i g i n a l l y  as 
' t h e  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  a bas ic  r e a l i t y '  but  which i s  then ab le t o  
'mask and p e r v e r t  a bas ic  r e a l i t y '  inc luding  t h e  masking of ' t h e  
absence of  a bas ic  r e a l i t y 1 and which, f i n a l l y :
' b ea rs  no r e l a t i o n  t o  any r e a l i t y  whatever; i t  i s  i t s  own 
pure simulacrum' (B au d r i l l a rd ,  1983: 11, a u t h o r ' s  emphasis) .
We a re  then  l e f t ,  not  with a c lo su re  of  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  as th e  
end of  a dichotomy between r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and i t s  o b je c t  nor t h a t  
between r e a l i t y  and i l l u s i o n ,  nor do we f in d  ourse lves  l i v in g  in the  
"global  v i l l a g e "  of  i n s t a n t ,  world-wide communication envisioned by 
McLuhan; we f in d  ourse lves  in s tead  in a world where ' t h e  r e a l  i s  no 
longer what i t  used t o  b e ' ,  and where ' n o s t a l g i a  assumes i t s  f u l l  
meaning' (1983: 11).  In t h i s  world,  t h a t  of  th e  ' e c s t a s y  of 
communication ' ,  th e  c losu re  of  r e p re s e n t a t i o n  has been e f f e c t e d  
by th e  o b l i t e r a t i o n  of  any " r e a l i t y "  which can be " rep re sen ted" .  
Ins tead  we have
'a  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of myths of  o r ig in  and s igns  of  r e a l i t y :  of 
second-hand t r u t h ,  o b j e c t i v i t y  and a u t h e n t i c i t y .  There i s  an
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e s c a l a t i o n  of  the  t r u e ,  of  th e  l i ved  exper ience ;  a 
r e s u r r e c t i o n  of  th e  f i g u r a t i v e  where th e  o b je c t  and sub­
s tance  have d i sappea red1 (1983: 12).
In th e  e c s t a s y  of  communication, a l l  f u nc t ions  ' a r e  abol ished  in 
a s in g le  dimension, t h a t  of  communication'  ( 1 9 8 5  : 131). For 
B a u d r i l l a r d ;  t h i s  ecs ta sy  marks an obscen i ty  which
'beg ins  p r e c i s e ly  when t h e r e  i s  no more s p e c t a c l e ,  no more
scene ,  when a l l  becomes t r a n s p a re n ce  and immediate v i s i b i l i t y ,  
when every th ing  i s  exposed to  th e  harsh and inexorable  l i g h t  
of  in format ion and communication'  ( i 985 • 130).
For B a u d r i l l a rd ,  th e  modern West faces  t h e  o b l i t e r a t i o n  of 
both pub l i c  and p r iv a t e  space.  The former i s  being des troyed  in 
a p l e th o r a  of  a d v e r t i s in g  and news media in which
' t h e  t h e a t r e  of  the  s o c ia l  and th e  t h e a t r e  of  p o l i t i c s  a re  
both reduced more and more to  a l a rge  s o f t  body with many 
h e a d s ' ;
th e  l a t t e r  by means of  th e  same media which bombards us with s l i c e s  
of  " r e a l "  l i f e  in th e  forms of  exposes,  documentary programmes and 
the  l i k e .  Publ ic  space and p r i v a t e  space d i s a p p e a r ,  f o r  ' t h e  one is
no longer a s p e c t a c l e ,  th e  o th e r  no longer  a s e c r e t '  ( 1 9 8 5  : 130).
An a n t h ro p o lo g i s t  i n t e r e s t e d  in "performance" should t a k e  note 
of  B a u d r i l l a r d ' s  a n a ly s i s  of  our p re sen t  predicament.  For i t  would 
seem as i f  Andy Warhol 's no to r ious  aphorism t h a t  "In th e  f u t u r e  
everyone w i l l  be famous f o r  f i f t e e n  minutes" no longer appears 
q u i t e  so fa tuous  nor ,  perhaps ,  q u i t e  so e n t i c i n g .  The f a c t  t h a t  
c e l e b r i t y ,  performance,  fame and stardom a re  such powerful not ions  
f o r  our own contemporary consc iousness ,  no tions  which pervade our 
th in k in g ,  our language,  our communications media and our d e s c r i p ­
t i o n s  of  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s  over an e n t i r e  spectrum from salesman­
sh ip  to  academic debate and psychotherapy,  makes an anthropology 
of performance an in t r ig u in g  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  bu t  a dangerous one. 
B au d r i l l a rd  warns us t h a t  we might no longer have access t o  t h e  
Western t h e a t r e .  In a sense in which Artuad could not  have 
p r e d ic te d ,  and which he c e r t a i n l y  would not  have welcomed, th e  
t h e a t r e  i s  c lo sed .
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NOTES to  Chapter Thirteen
( 1) Freud and S tan i s l av s k i  produced t h e i r  most innova tive  work 
a t  th e  same t ime.  I t  was during th e  1890s t h a t  S ta n i s l a v s k i  
began to  d i r e c t  h is  product ions  of  p lays  by Chekhov and 
o th e r s  which made the  Moscow Art Theat re famous. Freud 's  
The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of Dreams was f i r s t  pub li shed  in 1900.
(2 ) A r e c e n t  s tudy of "stage  f r i g h t "  amongst a c t o r s ,  w r i t t e n  
by a p sycho the ra p is t  who a l so  works as a t h e a t r e  d i r e c t o r  
and ac t ing  t e a c h e r ,  focuses on an impor tant  t o p i c  which 
deserves  f u r t h e r  re sea rch  by a n t h ro p o l o g i s t s ,  namely the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between performance and anx ie ty  (Aaron, 1986). 
Many psychoanalysts  have taken th e  t h e a t r e  metaphor in to  
t h e  in d iv idua l  psyche i t s e l f  w ith ,  f o r  example, dreams f 
being seen as in some sense comparable with t h e a t r i c a l  
performances.  (See, e . g . ,  Resnik,  1987). The c l a s s i c  work 
on psychodrama is  by Moreno (1-946). But, psychoanalys is  
and psychotherapy a p a r t ,  t h e  t h e a t r e  metaphor has been 
u b iqu i tous  in Western c u l t u r e  f o r  a long t ime.  Shakespeare,  
of  course ,  knew t h i s  very well and used i t  throughout  h is  
work. In t h e  process he a l so  ensured i t s  continu ing  
longe v i ty .  (See, e . g . ,  R igh ter ,  1967).
(3) For a p o l i t i c a l l y  based c r i t i q u e  of  A r i s t o t l e ' s  theory  of 
t r a g e d y ,  c f .  Boal (1979).  For a wide-ranging review of the  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l ,  a e s t h e t i c  and h i s t o r i c a l  t e n s io n s  between 
th e  w r i t i n g s  of  P la to  and A r i s t o t l e  and th e  plays of  
Aeschylus, Sophocles and Eur ip ides ,  c f .  Kaufman (1969).
(4)  For an in t roduc t ion  t o  Grotowski 's  no tion  of  p a r a t h e a t r e ,
I am indebted to  Nick Sales o f  Exeter  U n i v e r s i t y ' s  Drama 
Department (personal  communication).
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONCLUSION
IN MY THESIS I have at tempted a read ing of  Ba teson 's  Naven as 
a t e x t  on performance,  and I have t r i e d  t o  l i n k  t h i s  reading with 
sugges t ions  as t o  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f ,  and t h e  dangers which a r i s e  
from, an an th ropo log ica l  approach to  performance.  The opening 
chap te rs  in t roduced  Bateson as an important  t h i n k e r  whose c e n t r a l  
ethnograph ic  t e x t  employed s t r a t e g i e s  which a re  ap p l i c a b l e  to  
contemporary concerns with th e  c r i t i c i s m  and d e cons t ruc t ion  of  
e s t a b l i s h e d  an th ro po log ica l  techn iques  and c a t e g o r i e s .  In Chapter  
One I a l so  commented on var ious  contemporary views o f  r i t u a l  which 
bear on my own concerns in th e  t h e s i s .  I suggested  in Chapter  
Six t h a t  B a teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  Iatmul k insh ip  and marriage p a t t e r n s  
foreshadowed Lev i -S t raus s ian  a l l i a n c e  th e o ry .  In Chapters  Seven 
and Eight  I t r i e d  t o  show how. an emphasis on performance might open 
out  Ba teson 's  a n a ly s i s  of  th e  naven, with p a r t i c u l a r  r e fe re n c e  to  
a system of  asymmetrical s i s t e r  exchange and t h e  l i f e  cyc le  of  
Iatmul males .  In Chapter  Nine, I suggested t h a t  a f e m i n i s t  
c r i t i q u e  o f  Iatmul gender e thos  might a s s i s t  in ques t ion ing  Iatmul 
emic gender s t e reo ty p in g  with regard  t o  t h e  performances o f  th e  
men and with regard  to  the  wider s o c ia l  i n t e r a c t i o n s  in the  
s o c ie ty ,  e . g .  th o se  concerned with economics,  housekeeping and so 
on. Chapter  Nine d e a l t  with Ba teson 's  impor tan t  fo rmula t ion  of  
schismogenesis ,  which, I at tempted t o  show, formed t h e  high po in t  
of  Bateson’s a n a ly s i s  of  th e  naven. At t h e  end of  my reading  of 
Ba teson 's  a n a l y s i s ,  I t r i e d  t o  demonstra te t h a t  Ba teson 's  s t r u g g le  
t o  f r e e  h im se l f  from e s t a b l i s h e d  an th ropo log ica l  th ink ing  ( t h a t  i s ,  
in the  terms o f  th e  1930s, from s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m )  was 
u l t im a te ly  checked by h is  p r e d i l i c t i o n  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  determinism 
and un iv e rs a l  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  model b u i ld in g .
In Chapter  Eleven I reviewed some of th e  r e c e n t  t e x t s  which I 
take t o  be symptomatic of  important  t r en d s  in t h e  study of  
performance from an an thropolog ica l  p e r s p e c t iv e .  I r a i s e d  doubts 
as t o  th e  v a l i d i t y  of  the  "dramaturg ica l"  p i c t u r e  of  r i t u a l  and 
so c ie ty  espoused by such w r i t e r s  as Turner and Schechner,  f o r  in 
th e  hands of  such w r i t e r s  every th ing  in t h e  s o c i a l  p i c t u r e  qu ick ly
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becomes a performance;  t h i s  makes any d e s c r i p t i o n  of  "performance" 
per  se d i f f i c u l t  i f  not  im poss ib le.  I then drew on r e ce n t  work 
by H o l l i s  and Taylor which p o in t s  out  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of  views of 
s o c ia l  a c t i o n ,  and of  performance,  which r e l y  on no tions  o f  r o l e  
and persona,  and on ind iv idua l  consc iousness ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Chapter  Twelve continued my c r i t i q u e  of  B a teson 's  search  f o r  c ro s s -  
c u l t u r a l  u n i v e r s a l s ,  in a b r i e f  co n s id e ra t io n  of  h is  l a t e r  work. 
F in a l ly ,  in Chapter  Thi r teen  I suggested t h a t  a n th ro p o lo g i s t s  
need to  re-examine Western c a t e g o r i e s  such as "performance",
"drama" and " th e a t r e "  before they  at tempt t o  d e s c r ib e  and analyse  
what they t a k e  t o  be "performances" in o th e r  c u l t u r e s .  I ended 
the  t h e s i s  with B a u d r i l l a r d 1s warning as t o  t h e  vacuous emptiness 
of our p r e s e n t  day obsession with media and "communications",  and 
with what might seem to  some a d ep res s ing ly  p e s s i m i s t i c  view of 
how t h i s  obsess ion  might v i t i a t e  any f u t u r e  a t tempt a t  d e l im i t in g  
an an th ropo log ica l  approach t o  performance.
Throughout th e  t h e s i s  I have d e l i b e r a t e l y  r e f r a i n e d  from any 
over t  a t tempt a t  a d e f i n i t i o n  of  "performance".  I wanted to  al low 
a broad arena of  p o t e n t i a l  im p l ica t ions  of  t h e  term t o  a r i s e  in 
th e  course of  my e x p o s i t io n ,  r a t h e r  than t o  a t tempt t o  lay down a 
s t r i c t  "meaning" which would then r e q u i r e  t h e  m i n i s t r a t i o n s  of 
adherence and coherence f o r  i t s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  There i s ,  however, 
the  s u b s t a n t i v e  problem t h a t ,  as I suggested in Chapter Eleven, 
any a c t i v i t y  can be viewed as a performance,  o r  a t  l e a s t  can be 
seen as having performative  a s p e c t s .  I t  does seem t o  me, however, 
t h a t  t h e r e  a re  some s ta tements  we can make about  performance with 
r e l a t i v e  s a f e t y .  I would agree with Turner t h a t  'P e r fo rm ance . . .  
is  always doubled'  (1982: 105); i t  i s  l inked  t o  many words which 
are p re f ix e d  with " r e - " ;  r e f l e x i v i t y ,  r e f l e c t i o n ,  r e s t a t e m e n t ,  
r e l i v i n g ,  r e t e l l i n g ,  r e c r e a t io n  ( in  i t s  "double" sense of  both 
r e l a x a t i o n  and c r e a t in g  something anew) and so on.
I have suggested  a t  var ious  p o in t s  in t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  a perform­
ance p e r s p e c t iv e  might be of  use in d i s s o lv in g  t h e  powerful 
dichotomies which s t i l l  inform much an th ropo log ica l  th in k in g  and 
w r i t i n g ;  th e  dichotomy, f o r  example, between mind and body, or  
between i n t e l l e c t  and a f f e c t ,  o r  between i n t e l l e c t / a f f e c t  and
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ac t io n ,  o r  between ins trumenta l  and e x p re s s iv e .  In Chapter  
Thi r teen  I suggested t h a t  an th ro p o lo g i s t s  cannot  presuppose an 
antinomy between "performance" and "normal behaviour" .  A m i s t r u s t  
of t h i s  antinomy has been a c e n t r a l  theme of th e  t h e s i s .  I t  might 
appear i r o n i c  t o  suggest  t h a t  dichotomies might be d is so lved  by 
means of  a no tion as embedded in doubling as performance appears 
t o  be; but  i f  an th ro p o lo g is t s  of  th e  1990s a re  t o  t a k e  up th e  
se r ious  cha l lenges  posed by the  " r e f l e x iv e "  t r e n d s  of  th e  an throp­
ology of  the  l a t e  1980s, t h e r e  a re ,  perhaps ,  even more cur ious  
i r o n i e s  around t h e  next  ep i s temolog ica l  co rne r .  The p resen t  
d i s q u i e t  which many a n th ro p o lo g is t s  have voiced a t  th e  c e n t r a l i t y  
of  th e  no t ions  of  "meaning", " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  and " t r u t h " ,  r e f l e c t s  
( " r e - "  ag a in ! )  a tu rn ing  away from t h e  modern ep is temic  concern 
with su r fa c e s  and depths,  and a movement towards an i n t e r e s t  in 
su r faces  f o r  t h e i r  own sake.  Thus, the  doubling of  r e f l e x i v e  
anthropology in i t s  tu rn ing  back,  ques t ion ing  and ( r e - )  examinat­
ion of  Western ca t e g o r ie s  goes hand in hand with an a p p e t i t e  f o r  
the  d i s s o l u t i o n  of  the  void between su r face  appearance and the  
concealed Truth which, to  fo l low Foucault ,  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  
f o r  t h e  "modern" consciousness but  which, in D e r r id a ' s  te rms,  
has haunted Western thought f o r  over two thousand years  in i t s  
"o n to th e o lo g ic a l"  f a i t h  in a Presence e x i s t i n g  s e l f - p r e s e n t  to  
i t s e l f ,  beyond d e f e r r a l  and withou t  need of  a language to  
desc r ib e  i t .
I t  was Ba teson 's  Iatmul ethnography which o r i g i n a l l y  in sp i r e d  
th e  w r i t i n g  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  t o g e th e r  with my own i n t e r e s t  and 
involvement in performance.  The anthropology o f  t h e  fu tu r e  
c e r t a i n l y  r e q u i r e s  ethnography as r a d i c a l  and as s e l f - q u e s t i o n in g  
as was B a teson 's  in h i s  day; any anthropology of  performance 
r eq u i re s  i t s  own Navens even more so.  A book such as Naven i s  not 
w r i t t e n  withou t  the  tak ing  of  enormous r i s k s .  Any performer w i l l  
acknowledge t h a t  no worthwhile performance i s  p o s s ib le  wi thout  
r i s k ;  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  on one view, to  see performance as an 
ex e rc i s e  in r i s k .  What i s  so f o r  performance,  must a l so  be so 
f o r  any anthropology of  performance.
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